



VICE ADMIRAL BELLOW,

**LIVES**  
OF THE  
**BRITISH ADMIRALS :**  
CONTAINING AN ACCURATE  
**NAVAL HISTORY**  
FROM THE  
EARLIEST PERIODS.

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BY DR. JOHN CAMPBELL.

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THE NAVAL HISTORY CONTINUED TO THE YEAR 1779,

BY

DR. BERKENHOUT.

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A NEW EDITION,

REVISED, CORRECTED,

*And the Historical Part further continued to the Year 1780,*

BY THE LATE

HENRY REDHEAD YORKE, Esq.

And further continued to

THE LAST EXPEDITION AGAINST ALGIERS IN 1816,

WITH

THE LIVES OF THE MOST EMINENT NAVAL COMMANDERS

*From the Time of Dr. Campbell to the above Period,*

BY

WILLIAM STEVENSON, Esq.

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IN EIGHT VOLUMES.

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# C O N T E N T S

OF

## VOLUME THIRD.

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FLOURISHED IN THE REIGN OF CHARLES THE SECOND.

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**LIVES**  
**OF**  
**THE ADMIRALS:**  
**INCLUDING**  
**A NEW AND ACCURATE**  
**NAVAL HISTORY.**

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**MEMOIRS OF SIR EDWARD SPRAGGE, ADMIRAL  
OF THE BLUE.**

**T**HERE are some men great in a particular way, to a degree of eminence, that exempts them from any blame, though possibly defective in many others. Education and habit alter men frequently; and nature herself sometimes infuses qualities into the breasts of men, which particularly dispose them to a certain kind of life, and as apparently disable them from following other pursuits: but it very rarely happens, that a man is alike equal to various, and even to opposite employments. Alcibiades is celebrated, by antiquity, for his peculiar felicity in this respect, in the camp, in the court, in the closet, he was equally able, and esteemed. He was a soldier, a seaman, a statesman, a courtier, a man of business, or a man of pleasure, as cir-

cumstances required, and, in every character he assumed, he so far excelled, as to seem born and designed for that alone.\* The same thing his contemporaries, his companions, those who knew him, and the world too, perfectly well, affirm of Sir Edward Spragge; who, with a fine person, and a gentle temper, had as solid an understanding, and as bold a spirit, as any counsellor or captain of that age.†

With all these advantages; with the favour of the duke of York; with the merit of so great services, as he certainly rendered his country; and with the still superior merit of dying gloriously in his country's service, which indeed procured his remains an interment in Westminster-Abbey;‡ he was not honoured with a tomb, or any memorial, as far as I can yet discover, where he was born, of what family, or how he attained to his first preferment; which are circumstances that ought to have been recorded, of so great and gallant a man; and which, in or nearer his own times, might have been easily known. But since these are not, at present, to be retrieved, we must be satisfied with those notices which have connected his actions with our public history; and these, we shall find, will abundantly make good what we have already observed, and induce us to regret the want of more particular memoirs; because it is a kind of political justice, to preserve the private history of those who have deserved well of the public.

We find him a captain, in the first engagement with the Dutch, after the Restoration, on the 3d of June, 1665, wherein he behaved with great reputation; and so far recommended himself to the favour of the duke of York, that, upon his majesty's visiting the navy, and going on

\* Justin. *Hist. lib. v.* His Life by Plutarch, and also by Cornelius Nepos.

† Bishop Parker's *History of his own Time*, p. 126. Dryden's *Annus Mirabilis*, stanza clxxiv. Evelyn of *Medals*, p. 160.

‡ *Antiquities of the Abbey-church of Westminster*, vol. i. p. 214.

board the Royal Charles, he received the honour of knight-hood; \* which encouraged him to expose himself still more freely. He was likewise in the four days battle in June, 1666, where he was particularly taken notice of by the duke of Albemarle; and in the succeeding battle, which was fought on the 24th of July, he carried a flag under Sir Jeremiah Smith, admiral of the blue squadron; who engaged Van Tromp, shattered his vice-admiral, so that she was absolutely disabled; and, having ruined the rigging of his rear-admiral, and killed its commander, contributed greatly to the glory of that day. †

He distinguished himself, likewise, very remarkably in the close of that war, in the unlucky business at Chatham, where he was employed, by the duke of Albemarle, to maintain the fort of Sheerness, attacked by the enemy on the 10th of June, 1667: and though it was unfinished, his garrison very small, and the place in no state of resistance; yet he continued to defend himself, till it would have been an act of rashness to expose his garrison any longer. When he found how impracticable it was to do any effectual service by land, he set himself to collect as great a force as he could by sea. This amounted to no more than five frigates, seventeen fire-ships, and some tenders; and yet when the Dutch admiral, Van Ness, came up the river again, after their attempt upon Harwich, Sir Edward Spragge engaged him about the Hope. The fight was very unequal; but there being at first, little or no wind, Sir Edward laid hold of that advantage; and, by dexterously towing his fire-ships, burnt eleven or twelve of their ships, with only six of his own; but the wind stiffening, he was at last obliged to shelter himself, from the enemy's unequal force, under the cannon of Tilbury-fort.

The next day, the weather being favourable, he attacked the Dutch again, in his turn; and, by the happy manage-

\* See p. 344, vol. ii.

† See p. 359, vol. ii.

ment of his fire-ships, put them into such confusion, that, after a short dispute, they were forced to retire, and to burn their last fire-ship themselves, to prevent her being taken. On the 25th, they prosecuted their retreat, but with Sir Edward Spragge's squadron of fire-ships in their rear. He followed them to the river's mouth, where they met another squadron of fire-ships from Harwich, which put them in such danger, that above a hundred men in the Vice-admiral of Zealand, and another large man-of-war, leaped overboard, and were drowned. This was the last action, on our side, in that war. \*

In 1668, the constable of Castile being appointed governor of the Spanish Netherlands, Sir Edward Spragge was sent over to compliment him upon that occasion; and to enter into some further negotiations for the success of the new measures, in which Sir Edward is said to have been deeply engaged.\* The truth is, he was raised and supported by the favour of the duke of York; so that he devoted himself wholly to his service, and was thought to have a large share in his confidence. Some have from thence reported, that he was a Papist; of which there is little probability, since we find him sent to sea with Prince Rupert, in 1673, when the Test had driven the duke of

\* See p. 375—379, vol. ii.

† Philips's Continuation of Heath's Chronicle, p. 569. Lord Arlington, in his letter to Sir William Temple, dated London, December 11, 1668, says, "The bearer, Sir Edward Spragge, is sent, by his majesty, to the constable of Castile, to compliment his excellency upon his arrival in Flanders, where, because it is possible you may either meet him, the said Sir Edward, according to your late credential, or send to him, in order to something in his majesty's service; I thought I could not do less than, in a few lines, let you know, that he is a brave man, and hath long served his majesty faithfully, particularly with much gallantry in the last Dutch war; that you may, on all occasions, put that value upon him which is due, and which shall be always acknowledged by," &c. Sir Edward returned to Whitehall, from his embassy, on the 29th of January following. *Annals of the Universe*, p. 209.

York, and others of his religion, from their posts. This advancement of Spragge I mention here, only to obviate the objection to him on the score of religion ; for before I speak of his behaviour in the last Dutch war, I must take notice of his employment in the Mediterranean, after his return from his negociation in Flanders.

There had been several squadrons sent to chastise the Algerines, both by the English and Dutch ; but very few of them had been able to effect any great matter : they, generally speaking, contented themselves with some slight action, to the prejudice of these corsairs, and then concluded a peace ; which was usually broken by the time they, with their squadrons, were returned home.† The consideration of this, together with the loud complaints of the merchants, induced the court to fix upon Sir Edward Spragge to command a squadron in those seas, in hopes of his meeting with greater, or making more use of his success than his predecessors, from his known courage and resolution : for, it is confessed by the writers of those times, that Sir Edward greatly resembled the earl of Sandwich ; and concealed, like him, a high and daring spirit, under the most captivating address, and most polished behaviour.

He sailed from England, on this expedition, in the spring of the year 1671, with five frigates, and three fire-ships, and there might be as many more ships in those seas ; so that, in all, his fleet consisted of about twelve sail. In the latter end of the month of April, he had intelligence that there were several Algerine men of war in Bugia bay ; on which, he called a council of war, when it was resolved, that he ought immediately to attack them. In pursuance of this resolution, he sailed thither ;

\* Echard's History of England, p. 893. Annals of the Universe, p. 300. History of the Dutch War, p. 45. An exact Relation of the Actions of His Majesty's Fleet under Prince Rupert, p. 5.

† See p. 382, vol. ii.

but, in his passage, had the misfortune to have the *Eagle* fire-ship disabled by a storm; and soon after, one of his ships springing her main-mast, was obliged to bear away for the Spanish shore. Sir Edward, however, persisted in his design; refitted the *Eagle*; and bore into the bay of Bugia with a brisk gale, not doubting that he should be able to fire the ships: but by the time they got within half-shot of the castle and forts, it fell a dead calm; and when the wind rose again, it proved contrary.

On the 2d of May, they were able to do nothing, for the same reason, the wind changing every half hour; upon which, Sir Edward resolved to make an attempt upon them in the night with his boats, and the smallest of his fire-ships, which rowed as well as a long-boat. About twelve o'clock that night, he executed his project, sending in all his boats, and the *Eagle* fire-ship, under the command of his eldest lieutenant Mr. Nugent; but the night proving very dark, and the high land obscuring the ships as they drew near them, they passed by; and Lieutenant Nugent leaving one of the boats with the fire-ships, besides her own, rowed in, to discover the enemy, leaving orders, with the captain of the fire-ship, to come to an anchor, in case he found shoal water. The lieutenant had not left them a minute before he perceived himself within pistol-shot of the ships; and, concluding the business now as good as done, steered off again to find the fire-ship, and, to his amazement, saw her all in flames. \*

The enemy taking the alarm at this, the lieutenant was forced to row off with his boats; and so this promising advantage vanished, which had given hopes of burning all Algerine men-of-war, without the loss of a man. The next day, the enemy unrigged all their ships, and made a strong boom with their yards, top-masts, and cables, buoyed

\* In those days, our fire-ships and bomb-vessels were by no means so perfect in their construction, or so secure against accidents, as they are now.



up with casks, for which they had all the leisure and conveniency they could wish, the wind hindering the English from doing any thing; and, to try the admiral's patience to the very utmost, it so fell out, that by a drunken gunner's firing a pistol, his other small fire-ship was destroyed; so that he had now none left but the *Little Victory*, which drew too much water to enter that part of the bay where the Algerines lay.

On Monday the 8th of May, 1671, there appeared a considerable body of horse and foot in the neighbourhood of the bay, which were soon after discovered to be an escort to a very large convoy of ammunition sent from Algiers to the ships; on the safe arrival of which, they fired all their cannon, to testify their joy. Sir Edward Spragge considering this, and not knowing what future reinforcements they might receive, resolved to take the earliest opportunity of making his last and utmost effort; and, in order thereto, directed the *Victory* to be lightened, so that she might not draw above eight feet. About noon, there sprung up a fine breeze to the east; upon which, the admiral gave the signal for the men-of-war to draw into a line, and bear up into the bay; immediately after, the wind sunk at once, so that they despaired of doing any thing. †

But about two the gale sprang up again, and the ships bore in, as they were directed. The admiral came to an anchor in four fathom water, close under their castle walls, which fired upon him continually for two hours. In this interim, he sent in his own pinnace, and those of the *Mary* and the *Dragon*; these cut the boom, though not without

\* This bay the Romans called the Numidian Gulf. The town of Bugia was built by them, and the walls still remain. Don Alonzo de Peralta, the Spanish governor, surrendered it, in the 18th century, to the Algerines: for which he lost his head.

† Shaw's Travels, p. 44. Strabo calls this place *Sarda*, the Romans *Saldis*; and the true orthography of the modern name is *Boojeiah*; the sound of which is preserved in *Bugia*.

considerable loss. Lieutenant Pin, who commanded the Mary's boat's crew, had eight wounded with himself; Lieutenant Pierce of the Dragon was also wounded, with ten of his men, and one killed. In the admiral's own pin-  
 nace there were seven killed, and all the rest wounded, except Mr. Harman, who commanded it. \*

The boom being cut, the fire-ship went in, and getting up athwart their boltsprits, their ships being a-ground, and fast to the castles, she burnt very well, and destroyed them all. Captain Harris, who commanded her, his master's-mate, gunner, and one of his seamen, were desperately, wounded with small shot, and this at their entrance; so that probably the whole design had proved abortive, if the admiral had not with great prudence commissioned Henry Williams, then one of his master's-mates, but who had formerly commanded the Rose fire-ship, to take the charge of the vessel, in case the other was disabled; which he did accordingly, and performed all that could be expected from him. †

This loss was irreparable to the Algerines, who had picked out those seven men-of-war, that were here burnt, on purpose to fight Sir Edward Spragge; had furnished them with their best brass ordnance from on board all the rest of their vessels, with between eighteen and nineteen hundred chosen men double-officered, under the command of old Terkey their admiral; of whom between three and four hundred were killed; the castles and town miserably torn; and a vast number of people in them slain and wounded; and, which much increased the misfortune, all their surgeons' chests were burnt on board their ships, so that numbers died for want of having their wounds dressed. Besides the men-of-war, of which we shall give

\* Sir Edward declared he had never seen a bolder attempt, or one better executed by officers and seamen.

† *Annals of the Universe*, p. 263. *Atlas Geograph.* vol. iv. p. 191. *Burchet's Naval History*, p. 402.

a list, there were burnt a Genoese ship, a small English prize, and a settee.\*

AN EXACT LIST OF THE ALGIER SHIPS BURNT IN  
BOUJELIAH, OR BUGIA BAY, WITH THEIR NUMBER  
OF GUNS, AND AGE OF THE VESSELS, MAY 8, 1671.

SHIPS NAMES.	COMMANDERS.	GUNS.	YEARS OLD.
White Horse .....	Tabark Rays .....	34 .....	4
Orange Tree.....	Couhaly.....	34 .....	4
Three Cypress Trees ..	Caram Hammet.....	34 .....	$\frac{1}{2}$
Three Half Moons ....	Brayham Tagrin ....	28 .....	2
Pearl .....	Brayham Turco .....	26 .....	8
Golden Crown .....	Halua Tagrin.....	24 .....	1-6
Half Moon .....	Hammett .....	24 .....	$\frac{1}{2}$

In this engagement Sir Edward Spragge had only seventeen men killed, and forty-one wounded, which makes the victory still more extraordinary; and is a very full proof how necessary a steady and constant temper of mind, as well as a brisk and active courage, is in an officer who bears supreme command at sea. What the consequences were of this memorable action, and how well Sir Edward by his prudence improved the advantage that had been thus gained by his arms, we have already shewn,† and shall not therefore repeat it here; but proceed to his conduct in the last Dutch war, in which he was remarkably distinguished.‡

\* This account of Sir Edward Spragge's expedition is taken, first, from his instructions, published in the *Memoirs of English Affairs*, chiefly Naval, p. 200; which instructions are dated at Richmond, the 14th of June, 1670, and several other papers in the same book; 2dly, From Sir Edward's own Letter, dated May 11, 1671, and published by authority under the title of "A True and Perfect Relation of the Happy Success and Victory obtained against the Turks of Algier, at Bugia, by his Majesty's Fleet in the Mediterranean, under the Command of Sir Edward Spragge, &c. Printed in the Savoy by Thomas Newcomb, 1671."

† See p. 384, vol. ii.

‡ It may not be amiss to remark here, that, in all our wars with the pirates of Algiers, the Spaniards allowed us the free use of the har-

After having performed, with equal honour and success, the business for which he was sent into the Mediterranean, he returned, in the beginning of the year 1672, with the squadron under his command. The Dutch war was then meditated by our court, but had not as yet broken out. Sir Robert Holmes, who had been the principal instrument in bringing on the first Dutch war, was employed also to begin this, by attacking the Smyrna fleet, which was then expected home. On the 12th of January, Sir Edward Spragge met with Sir Robert Holmes's squadron near the Isle of Wight; and, upon Sir Robert's inquiring news, Sir Edward very frankly told him, that he had sailed several days with the Dutch Smyrna fleet, and that in a day or two they might be certainly expected. \*

Sir Robert Holmes was very well pleased with this news, but took great care to say nothing that might give him the least intimation of his having any orders to attack them; though, if he had so done, and required Sir Edward's assistance, he could not possibly have failed of taking or destroying that whole fleet; which was reckoned to be worth a million and half sterling, and on the taking of which, the king depended for a supply toward carrying on the war. But Sir Robert, averse from sharing any part of the reputation that might be acquired by this action, used his utmost diligence that no body should have any hand in the execution of it but himself, in which, however, he had no success: and, as this blasted his reputation with the world, so it produced a quarrel between him

bour of Port Mahon, as to the champions of the Christian cause, and protectors of the commerce of the Mediterranean; and thither Sir Edward repaired to refit, before he returned home.

\* See the Growth of Popery, by Andrew Marvell, where we are told, Sir Edward Spragge's squadron was still in sight, when Sir Robert Holmes attacked the Dutch Smyrna fleet; and that Captain Legge made sail after him to bring him back to their assistance, till called away by a gun from his own admiral.

and Sir Edward Spragge, which could never afterwards be composed. \*

When his royal highness the duke of York had resolved to take upon himself the command once again of the English navy, Sir Edward Spragge was chiefly depended upon for assembling the fleet, and preparing all things for the reception of his royal highness, as I find by an order directed to him as commander-in-chief of his majesty's fleet, dated June 15, 1672; † and he performed his part so well, that by the end of the month all things were completely ready, and his highness was invited on board, who joined him soon after, together with the earl of Sandwich, and other persons of distinction. He was present in Solbay fight the 28th of May, and distinguished himself therein by sinking a Dutch ship of sixty guns; during the rest of that campaign he behaved with his accustomed diligence, and returned with great reputation after it was over, which very probably determined the court to employ him, as they did, the next year in so high a station. ‡

When the duke of York, by the passing of the TEST Act, was obliged to part with his command, and the court, to gratify the desires of the nation, lay \*under an absolute necessity of making use of Prince Rupert; they took care to secure the fleet notwithstanding, by employing on board it such officers only as they could best, and his highness could least trust. Sir Edward Spragge was to carry the BLUE flag, instead of Sir Robert Holmes whom his high-

\* Memoirs of John, duke of Buckinghamshire, vol. ii. p. 11. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 307. Coke's Detection of the Four Last Reigns, b. iv. p. 61.

† Memoirs of the Royal Navy, p. 246.

‡ The secret histories of those times say, that the miscarriage of the design on the Smyrna fleet upset the schemes of the CABAL, who hoped thereby to make the two nations irreconcilable; to have embarked the merchants and the people in the quarrel; and to have obtained, by the sale of the cargo, a fund for the campaign, which otherwise they scarcely knew how to get.

ness proposed; and, because there had been a difference between these two admirals, the court thought fit to lay Holmes intirely aside, though he was a very active man, and had been much in their confidence.\* Before the fleet put to sea, Sir Edward was sent with the character of envoy extraordinary to France, where he was received with all possible respect; exceedingly caressed during his stay; and, at his taking leave, had a present made him of great value. His business was to renew the treaty with that court; to settle the rules that were to be observed on the junction of the French and English fleets; and to restore the old friendship between the courts, which seemed to be somewhat injured by the late proceedings in England.† As no circumstances of Sir Edward Spragge's negociation or instructions were ever communicated to Prince Rupert, it gave him fresh grounds of dislike; so that, when Sir Edward came to hoist his flag, there was a great coldness between them.‡

This did not hinder our admiral's doing his duty very gallantly in the engagement which happened on the 28th of May, 1675; wherein he fought Van Tromp seven hours, forced him to go from the *Golden Lion* into the *Prince on Horseback*, and thence into the *Amsterdam*, from that into the *Comet*, where he had certainly either been killed or taken, if he had not been relieved by *De Ruyter*.§ Sir Edward also twice changed his ship. The circumstances are not mentioned at all in the account which was published after Sir Edward's death; but, in Prince Rupert's letter, to the earl of Arlington, the matter, notwithstanding the quarrel betwixt them, is very fairly stated. "Sir

\* True Account of the Actions of the Fleet under Prince Rupert, &c. p. 5.

† *Annals of the Universe*, p. 307. *Columna Rostata*, p. 233.

‡ True Account of the Actions of the Fleet under Prince Rupert. p. 9.

§ *Basnage Annales des Provinces Unies*, vol. ii. p. 411. See also p. 406, of vol. ii.

“ Edward Spragge,” says his highness, “ did on his side  
 “ maintain the fight with so much courage and resolution,  
 “ that their whole body gave way to such a degree, that,  
 “ had it not been for fear of the shoals, we had driven  
 “ them into their harbours, and the king would have had  
 “ a better account of them.” \*

In the battle of the 4th of June, Sir Edward is generally blamed for coming, just before the engagement began, six miles in his boat to receive his highness's orders; † however, after he returned, he behaved with great resolution, forced Van Tromp, with whom he was again to contend, twice to change his ship; and would inevitably have either taken or destroyed him, if he had not been relieved by the admiral. The hazard that he ran, provoked him so against vice-admiral Sweers, that he accused him to the states-general. Prince Rupert in his letter takes no notice of Sir Edward Spragge's behaviour at all; and, though it be very certain that he had the advantage of Van Tromp in this action; yet, even that is concealed by an author who pretends to more than ordinary knowledge of all that passed. The Dutch writers confess his bravery, and own he pushed them hard; and Tromp in his letter to the States says, that he was forced to retreat a little before it was dark. ‡

In the third battle, which happened on the 11th of August, Sir Edward Spragge with the BLUE squadron was in the rear; where it is said, that notwithstanding he had promised Prince Rupert not to part from his side, yet, being provoked by Van Tromp, he laid his fore-top sail to

\* See that Letter printed by authority, and dated from on board the Royal Charles, off the Oyster-bank, May 29, 1673.

† True Account of the Actions of the Fleet under Prince Rupert, p. 10, 11.

‡ The writer above-mentioned is the author of the relation so often cited, who had himself a command in the fleet. Basnage *Annales des Provinces Unies*, vol. II. p. 415. Le Clerc. tom. II. p. 341. See Chap. 157.

the mast to stay for him ; and, having engaged his squadron, continued fighting for many hours at a distance from the body of the fleet. Sir Edward was at first on board the Royal Prince, and Van Tromp in the Golden Lion ; but, after a dispute of about three hours, in which the Dutch admiral always avoided, as much as possible, coming to a close fight, Sir Edward's ship was so disabled, that he was forced to go on board the St. George, as Van Tromp, for the same reason, did on board the Comet. Then the fight between them began again with greater fury than before : at last the St. George was so battered, that Sir Edward thought fit to leave her, and to endeavour to go on board the Royal Charles ; but, before his boat had rowed ten times its own length from the St. George, it was pierced by a cannon-shot ; upon which the crew endeavoured as strenuously as men could do to get back again ; but, before that could be effected, Sir Edward was drowned, his hands taking so strong hold on the side of the boat, that, when it came to float, he was found with his head and shoulders above water. \*

This glorious, though untimely end, had the brave Sir Edward Spragge, who thereby made good what he promised the king when he took leave of him ; that he would either bring him Van Tromp alive or dead, or lose his own life in the attempt. † These admirals, indeed, seem to have had a particular passion each to overcome the other ; for they had constantly fought in every battle from the time that Sir Edward Spragge succeeded the earl of Sandwich, and Van Tromp came again to command the Dutch fleet in the room of Van Ghent. The Dutch writers speak of his death with visible regret, and own,

\* An Exact Relation of the Actions of the Fleet under Prince Rupert, &c. p. 14, 21. Philips's Continuation of Heath's Chronicle, p. 593. Annals of the Universe, p. 302. Memoirs of Sir John Reresby, p. 22 See also p. 153.

† Richard's History of England, p. 894.



that he was one of the bravest men and best commanders that ever fought at sea : \* our own writers are profuse in the praises they bestow on his valour, and therefore I shall content myself with citing only one testimony in his favour, which shall be that of Bishop Parker, who describes the last scene of his life thus :

“ There was a remarkable fight between Spragge and Tromp : for these having mutually agreed to attack each other, not out of hatred but a thirst of glory, they engaged with all the rage, or, as it were, with all the sport of war. They came so close to one another, that, like an army of foot, they fought at once with their guns and swords. Almost at every turn, both their ships, though not sunk, were yet bored through, their cannon being discharged within common gun-shot : neither did our ball fall in vain into the sea, but each ship pierced the other, as if they had fought with spears. But at length, three or four ships being shattered, as Spragge was passing in a long boat from one ship to another, the boat was overturned by a chance shot, and that great man, not being skilled in swimming, was drowned, to the great grief of his generous enemy, who, after the death of Spragge, could hardly hope to find an enemy equal to himself. But thus it happened, that when that brave man had overcome so many dangers, his country being now victorious and safe, no honour remained for him to receive, but the reward of a glorious death.”†

\* Brandt Leeven Van De Ruyter, p. 860, 861. *Le Cleire Histoire des Provinces Unies*, tom. iii. p. 345. *Vie de l'Amiral De Ruyter*, ii. partie, p. 155. The Dutch in this action had two very brave officers, viz. Captain David Zwerets and Jan Paulz van Gelder, killed, in whose honour they struck magnificent medals.

† Bishop Parker's History of his own Time, p. 157. The same prelate in another part of his history tells us, that Sir Edward Spragge was a person the love and delight of all men, as well for his noble courage, as the gentle sweetness of his temper, p. 126.

We will take this opportunity of mentioning what became of the vessel which Sir Edward Spragge first quitted, and on board which he chose to hoist the blue flag. This was the *ROYAL PRINCE*, a first rate, of the burden of fourteen hundred tons, carrying one hundred pieces of brass cannon, and seven hundred and eighty men.\* She was exceedingly well built, in perfect good order, and allowed to be as fine a ship as any in either of the fleets. Before Sir Edward left her, all her masts were gone, most of her upper tier of guns were disabled, four hundred men killed, and in other respects very little better than a wreck. In this situation, a large Dutch man of war bore down upon her with two fire-ships, resolved to burn, sink, or take her. The first lieutenant, giving all for lost, ordered the colours to be struck, and the men to shift for themselves; but the gunner, Mr. Richard Leake, a bold determined man, who had before given the strongest proofs of conduct and courage;† ordered the lieutenant to quit the deck, took the command himself, sunk the two fire-ships, forced the man of war to sheer off, and brought the *ROYAL PRINCE*, wreck as she was, safe into port.‡ This gentleman, who was father to the famous Sir John Leake, was, for these and other services, made keeper of the ordnance stores, and master-gunner of England;§ a man, whose name lived long in the memories of seamen, and should live for ever, could my pen confer immortality.||

These were among the great men who carried the glory of the English arms so high, and who effectually supported the honour of the flag. If the reader miss the

\* Thus this vessel stands in the list of the royal navy, A. D. 1672.

† Philips's Continuation of Heath's Chronicle, p. 560.

‡ The Old and True Way of Manning the Fleet. London, 1707, 4to.

§ Chamberlayne's Present State of England, 18th edition, p. 616.

|| Actions like these do honour to our seamen, to the British nation, and add lustre to naval history.

memoirs of some whose actions are mentioned in our history, it is because they belong to another place, in consequence of their having survived this reign, and that unfortunate one which succeeded it; but, these are, at least, the principal heroes to whom were owing our distinguished victories; which raised our reputation so much; extended our commerce so far; and might have brought us much greater advantages, if our domestic divisions had not in some measure frustrated their labours; and defeated our expectations from those naval successes, which all of them hazarded, and many laid down, their lives to purchase. \* A memorable misfortune this! and which we ought never to forget, if we desire to avoid feeling the effects of so wretched a conduct, with a short explication of which, as a necessary comment on what has been already said, we shall conclude this chapter. †

The two Dutch wars were very disagreeable to a great part of the nation, through an apprehension of their consequences; and therefore the gallant exploits performed by our seamen, and the advantages gained by the last peace, which has secured us from any subsequent quarrels with that nation, were not, at least generally, looked upon in the light they deserved; but such as did their duty, and acted vigorously in their stations, were disliked, and

\* The administration, in the beginning of the king's reign, had so little confidence in the parliament, that they parted with Dunkirk, rather than ask for money to keep it. The parliament, toward the close of his reign, had so little confidence in the administration, that they forced him to blow up Tangier. The first Dutch war was made, by advice of parliament, against the sense of ministers; the second at the persuasion of ministers, against the sense of parliament: from that time factions prevailed, the public debt began, and public confusion ensued.

† Compare Sir William Temple's Memoirs, Coke's Detection, Kennet's Complete History, North's Examen, and Dr. Welwood's Memoirs.

treated as the servile creatures of a court, ready to attempt any thing for which they received orders.

This was certainly very injurious usage, and such as must have contributed to sink the spirits of many. The true merit of a soldier, or seaman, certainly consists in executing vigorously the orders he receives; and things are carried too far, when we pretend to make them accountable for those orders; because, if this maxim should be once established, such consequences must inevitably flow from it, as would be far more detrimental to society, than the affording a certain measure of applause to such gallant actions as might be performed upon wrong principles. †

Of this I might give a flagrant instance, by referring to a certain history, where Sir Robert Holmes is severely censured for doing what a council of war directed; and some persons, who had been attainted by parliament, are justified, and commended for assisting the Dutch to invade this nation, and to destroy our ships at Chatham; which is a doctrine of a very dangerous nature, and directly contrary to that true public spirit which ought to influence all men, and all parties; to bear whatever may be required of them for their country's good, and to forbear avenging themselves upon her, whatever provocations, from their rulers, they may receive. ‡

After having pointed out this error on one side, I shall, with equal freedom, lay open one, no less criminal, on the

\* Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. i. p. 307. North's Examen, p. 51. Coke's Detection of the four Last Reigns, p. ii. p. 39.

† This was the sentiment of Montague, Blake, and Ayscye; for which they were never censured.

‡ Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. i. p. 531, 565. Basnage Annales des Provinces Unies, vol. i. p. 784. Le Clerc Histoire des Provinces Unies, tom. iii. p. 151, 152, 194—196. By comparing these passages, the reader will see, that the Dutch authors are far from writing with spleen, or resentment of these transactions; so different is party rage, from national attachment!

other: I mean the court's too great regard for France, which was highly detrimental to the trade of these nations, and had well nigh been the destruction of our navy. It is a monstrous thing to assert, and yet there are too strong proofs of this truth for us to avoid saying, that the administration in the latter part of King Charles's reign, from the time his notions had a wrong turn given them by the CABAL,\* favoured too much the French schemes, for the advancement of their commerce, to the prejudice of ours; in doing which, they issued such orders to the officers of the navy, as made them justly obnoxious to parliament, though very able men in their stations; and thereby created such an alteration in the management of things, as added the ruin of our shipping, to the hurt done to our trade: whereas, if the court had acted honestly, and the nation been of one mind, we might certainly have given law to Europe, and become, even then, the greatest maritime power the world ever saw. †

We lost, by these errors, those advantages at that time; and the sense of this omission ought to be of service to us now. The fleet, at the death of King Charles II. was recovering, indeed, but very slowly. ‡ It is time to see how a prince, who took care of nothing else, prosecuted that work with diligence, and raised our navy to a better state than ever it was before.

\* This appellation, which will everlastingly remain, was first fixed on that ministry by a pamphlet intitled, *England's Appeal from the private Cabal at Whitehall to the great Council of the Nation*. London, 1673, 4to. by Sir W. Coventry. (Wood's *Athen. Oxon.* vol. ii. col. 793.) Coke, however, ascribes it to Secretary Trevor.

† See Andrew Marvell's *Growth of Popery*, with the Lists of Ships taken by French Privateers, the Reports from the Committee of Council, and the King's Orders. See likewise the character of Sir Ellis Leighton, who was entrusted to solicit the restitution of those ships in France, as given by Bishop Burnet, of his own knowledge, vol. i. p. 300, 356, 360. See also Sir Richard Bulstrode's *Memoirs*.

‡ Secretary Pepys's *Memoirs of the Royal Navy*, p. 13—22. Sir Peter Pett's future *Happy State of England*, p. 186. Sir D. North's *Life*.

## CHAP. I.

The Naval History of Great Britain, during the Reign of King James II. containing an Account of the Methods made use of for restoring and improving the Fleet; their Success, and the King's Disappointment in his Endeavours to prevent an Invasion from Holland.

A.D. 1685. FEW princes have struggled with greater difficulties, before they ascended their thrones, than King James II. and few ever sustained a greater load of trouble afterwards. He succeeded his brother the 6th of February, 1685, with the general acclamations of his subjects, who expected great things from a king who came to the throne with such advantages. \* He was then turned of fifty-one, had good natural parts, improved and strengthened both by education and experience; inclined to, and very diligent in business; an able economist; in fine, a prince who, if he had conducted public affairs with the same ease and dexterity which he shewed in the management of his private concerns, his reign must have been as happy and glorious, as it proved troublesome and unfortunate. †

It was his great foible, that he was constantly influenced by foreign councils, which is a thing the English nation cannot endure; and, indeed, it is impossible they should; for as our constitution differs from the constitution of all the states upon the continent, it is simply impracticable to govern us well, by any other system of politics than our

\* Echard's History of England, p. 1049. Sir John Reresby's Memoirs, p. 188, 189. London Gazette, of February 6, No. 2006.

† Coke's Detection of the Four Last Reigns, b. v. p. 7. Sir John Reresby's Memoirs, p. 189, 200. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 292, 293.

own. \* King James knew this well enough ; and yet his fondness for the Popish religion, threw him into the arms of France, and engaged him, while a subject, to act as a tool ; when a king, to rule as a viceroy to Lewis XIV. ; and this at a juncture, when, if he had been of the religion of his fathers, and had complied with the desires of his people, he might have given law to that haughty monarch, and been esteemed the deliverer of Europe. † His bigotry blinded him ; some of his ministers abused his confidence ; till, by a series of bad management, he made his affairs desperate, and lost the affections of his people, which soon lost him all.

Yet, as wrong as his conduct was, in almost every other particular, the care he took of naval affairs, deserves to be transmitted to posterity with just applause. He had long exercised the office of lord high-admiral, in the reign of his brother, and understood it thoroughly ; he knew too, the disorders which had crept into the whole economy of the fleet, in the six years immediately preceding his accession ; and he was well acquainted, besides, with the difficulties the late king had found, in discovering and applying remedies to these mischiefs.

As soon, therefore, as he was seated on the throne, he began to consider how a total reformation might be wrought, and the affairs of the navy be not only set right for the present, but also put into such a settled course, as that they might not suddenly go wrong again. ‡ With this view, he consulted Mr. Pepys, and some other con-

A. D.  
1685.

\* Montesquieu de l'Esprit des Loix, liv. xi. chap. vi. liv. xix. chap. xxvii.

† S. Puffendorf Rerum Brandenburgicarum Hist. lib. xviii. Echard's History of England, p. 1049. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. i. p. 623.

‡ Chamberlayne's Present State of England, 16th edition, p. ii. p. 176—181, where the reader may find a clear, as well as copious account, of the state of the navy, at the king's accession.

siderable persons, on whose abilities and integrity he could depend; and having learned from them what was necessary to be done, to bring about the ends at which he aimed, he first assigned a stated fund of four hundred thousand pounds a year, payable quarterly out of the treasury, for the service of the navy; and then issued a special commission for settling all things relating to it, and for putting the management thereof into such a method, as might need few or no alterations in succeeding times. \*

A.D.  
686.

This commission was the wisest act of his whole reign, and answered very effectually all that was, or indeed could be, expected from it. It was grounded, as to form, on a commission which had issued, for the same purpose, in the reign of his grandfather, of which we have taken notice more than once. † As the then commissioners of the navy were men of fair character, though they had been so unlucky in the management of their office; the king would not remove them, but caused their names to be inserted in this commission, which superseded their own, with the addition of a few old servants, though new commissioners, on whose skill and vigilance he depended. The old commissioners were, the Lord Viscount Falkland, Sir John Tippetts, Sir Richard Haddock, Sir Phineas Pett, Sir John Narborough, Mr. Southerne, Sir Richard Beach, Sir John Godwin; the new ones, Sir Anthony Dean, Sir John Berry, Mr. Hewer, and Mr. St. Michael. ‡ This commission was dated the 17th of April, 1686, and by it the commissioners were directed to inquire into, and remedy all the disorders that were then in the navy; to restore it,

\* Pepys's *Memoirs of the Royal Navy*, p. 31—41, containing his own succinct, candid, and perspicuous proposition to his majesty, on which this whole reformation was grounded.

† See before, in this work, vol. ii. p. 112.

‡ This was an unacceptable service to the new commissioners; but when they once were in, they acted vigorously.



in every respect, to good order; and from time to time to report the proceedings to his majesty and the privy council, as they were particularly enjoined in that commission. \*

The commissioners vested with these powers lost no time, but fell immediately on a diligent inspection into the state of the navy, inquired strictly into the causes of past miscarriages, with respect rather to things than men, and taking such measures for the immediate remedy of the mischiefs they discovered, that the old ships were perfectly repaired; the new ones, where they wanted it, altered and amended; the yards properly supplied with the ablest workmen; all the store-houses filled with whatever was requisite, bought at the best hand, and in all respects, the best in their kind; the estimates brought into proper order, and the whole economy of the navy reduced into so clear a method, that it was impossible any officer could be ignorant of, or mistaken in, his duty, the public service suffer in any of its various branches, or the king run any

\* The whole of this account is taken from Mr. Pepys's Memoirs relating to the state of our Royal Navy of England; wherein he tells us, that the following qualifications were chiefly considered in the choice of the new commissioners, pursuant to a memorial addressed by him to the king, and which was drawn by his master's express directions, *viz.*

“ I. A practised knowledge in every part of the works and methods  
“ of your navy, both at the board, and in your yards. The not discerning of which, and the others that follow, appears to have cost  
“ your royal brother and you, within the forementioned five years,  
“ above half a million. II. A general mastery in the business and  
“ accounts, though more particularly those incident to the affairs of  
“ your navy. III. Vigour of mind, joined with approved industry,  
“ zeal, and personal aptness for labour. IV. An entire resignation  
“ of themselves, and their whole time to this your service, without  
“ liableness to avocation from other business or pleasure. V. Lastly,  
“ Such credit with your majesty for integrity and loyalty, as may,  
“ with the former conditions, lead both yourself, and my lord treasurer, to an entire confidence of having all done, that can be  
“ morally expected from them, in the advancement of your service,  
“ and the circumspect and orderly dispensing and improving of your  
“ treasure.”

hazard of being cheated, without an immediate discovery of the offender. \*

That all this might more fully and indisputably appear, besides the reports directed by the commission being duly made, the commissioners engaged his majesty to visit, in person, the yards, docks, store-houses, &c. which, considering his perfect acquaintance with naval affairs, made it impossible he should be deceived; and then, having demonstrated the justice of their conduct, by leaving the navy much increased, in perfect order, and with sea stores valued at four hundred thousand pounds; they laid down their posts, their commission being superseded with a just approbation of their conduct, by letters patent under the great seal, October 12, 1688. Thus, in little more than two years time, this great reform was made; all the officers of the navy in general paid, to a farthing; and a saving made to the public, of three hundred seven thousand five hundred and seventy pounds, nine shillings and four pence; and this for the inconsiderable expense of six thousand pounds paid to the new commissioners. †

A.D.  
1686.

While this commission subsisted, the king issued new instructions to the officers commanding his ships of war; these are dated the 15th of July, 1686, and are extremely well calculated for promoting the public service, securing discipline, and preserving proper memorials of every man's particular merit; by obliging all captains, and superiour officers, to deposit a perfect copy of their journals with the secretary of the admiralty. As many things in these regulations might seem to bear hard upon commanders, and to deprive them of those emoluments which

\* The regulations, in respect to naval affairs, when the king himself acted as admiral, assisted only by Mr. Pepys, as secretary, at five hundred pounds *per annum* salary, are allowed, by all seamen, to be as judicious and effectual, and at the same time as gentle, and as practicable, as can be desired.

† Memoirs of the Royal Navy, p. 155; a small treatise little known, but nevertheless, of inestimable value.

their predecessors had long enjoyed, his majesty was pleased to grant them very considerable favours; such as a settled allowance for their tables, \* several advantages in respect of prizes, &c. and, in the close, graciously condescended to promise to take special notice of, and amply to reward, every instance of courage, care, or diligence, in any of his officers, upon proper attestations deposited with the secretary of the admiralty. †

We need not wonder, that, in consequence of so unwearied an attention, the British fleet was in very good order when King James had the first notice of the prince of Orange's design; but we may be justly surprised at the strange management of maritime affairs from that time. A squadron of ships was indeed immediately ordered to sea, under the command of Sir Roger Strickland, then rear-admiral of England; who was, perhaps, the most improper man in the world to command them, on account of his being obnoxious to the seamen, by the readiness he had shewn in bringing priests on board the fleet. His squadron was ordered to the Downs, very indifferently manned; and when he complained of it, and desired to have soldiers at least sent on board, even this was very

A.D.  
1688.

\* The reader may form a proper conception of the importance of this regulation, by considering the following table; which shews the proportion maintained in this new allowance, so as to make it a just equivalent for the perquisites taken away by this instruction.

Rate. Present Wages. Present Victualling. Additional Grant  
for his Table.

	£.	s.	£.	s.	d.	£.	s.
1	273	15	12	3	4	250	0
2	219	0	12	3	4	200	0
3	182	0	12	3	4	166	5
4	136	10	12	3	4	124	5
5	109	10	12	3	4	100	0
6	91	0	12	3	4	83	0

† Memoirs of the Royal Navy, p. 124, 125. It were to be wished something of this nature could again take place.

slowly complied with, considering the importance of the service.\*

By his instructions he was to have remained in the Downs; but conceiving that to be a very improper station for the service he was expected to perform, after consulting with the captains in whom he could best confide, he certified as much to the court; and offered it as his and their opinion, that it would be better for the fleet to remain at the buoy of the gun fleet, near Harwich. The king, as soon as he received this advice, sent for Lord Dartmouth, Sir John Berry, Captain John Clements, the three elder brothers of the Trinity-house at Deptford, and Mr. Pepys, to whom he communicated Sir Roger Strickland's letter, and, in consequence of their joint advice, sent the admiral orders to sail out of the Downs with the first easterly wind, and place himself between the north Sand-head and the Kentish Knock; there to continue under sail in the day-time, and at anchor in the night, in order to observe the Dutch fleet, and to gain the best intelligence of them he could, in pursuance of the instructions which were then sent him.†

When the danger appeared more clearly, this fleet was directed to retire to the buoy in the Nore; and Lord Dartmouth was ordered to sea with such a reinforcement as made the whole fleet under his command consist of forty men-of-war, of which thirty-eight were of the line-of-battle, and eighteen fire-ships. This fleet being at the gun-fleet, and ready in all respects to sail, a council of war was called, wherein Sir William Jennings, who commanded a

\* Hornby's Caveat against the Whigs, p. ii. p. 50. where he tells us, that, on the first celebrating mass on board one of his majesty's ships, it occasioned such an uproar and mutiny in the fleet, that it was as much as the officers could do, to prevent the sailors from sacrificing the priests to Neptune.

† Burchet's Naval History, p. 411. Kennet's Complete History of England, vol. iii. p. 527. Echard's History of England, p. 1112, 1120. Sir John Reresby's Memoirs, p. 280.

third-rate, proposed to put to sea, and stand over to the Dutch coasts, as the shortest and surest way to prevent an invasion. This proposition, however, was rejected by a great majority, and so it was resolved to continue there. The true ground of this, as Mr. Secretary Burchet \* fairly tells us, was the secret resolution of the greatest part of the captains to hinder the admiral, in case he had come up with the Dutch fleet, from doing them much damage: and thus it appears how ineffectual fleets and armies are, when princes have lost the confidence of those who serve in, or command them.

It may not now be amiss to cast our eyes over to Holland, in order to consider the force preparing there for this invasion. His highness the prince of Orange had about his person abundance of English noblemen and gentlemen, particularly the earls of Shrewsbury and Macclesfield, the Lords Mordaunt, Wiltshire, Pawlet, Elan, and Dumblain, Admiral Herbert, Mr. Herbert, Colonel Sidney, Mr. Russel, Sir Rowland Gwyn, Major Wildman, Dr. Burnet, Mr. Harbord, Mr. Ferguson, and, besides the general officers of the States, the Marshal Schomberg, Count Charles, his son Mr. Caillemotte, younger son to the marquis of Rouvigni, and two or three hundred French refugees. † The fleet that was to carry these consisted of about fifty sail, most of them third or fourth rates, and the transports were about five hundred. These, with twenty-five fire-ships, made up the whole navy: the land forces embarked, were four thousand horse and dragoons, and ten thousand foot. It was very remarkable, that though all the captains of these vessels were Dutch, yet the chief command was given to Admiral Herbert, ‡ who very lately

\* Naval History, p. 414.

† Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. i. p. 762. Echard's History of England, p. 118. Father Orleans's History of the Revolutions in England under the Family of the Stuarts, p. 310.

‡ Le Clere Histoire des Provinces Unies, tom. iii. p. 409. Mer-

commanded the English fleet; and this with a view either to engage ships to come over, or, at least, to encourage the seamen to desert.

In order to do this more effectually, Herbert first addressed a letter to his countrymen in the sea service, and then stood with the Dutch fleet over to the Downs, in order to look at the English squadron, and try what effects his exhortations had produced. \* At that time his success did not promise much; and, after a fortnight's cruising, he returned to the Dutch coasts, with a better opinion of the king's fleet, and a worse of his own, than when he sailed. But, for all this, his epistle did almost as much service as the force he commanded; for, though the desertion was inconsiderable, yet by degrees the sailors lost their spirits; and their officers began to cabal, and to consult, not how they should execute the orders they had received, but how they might best take their measures to secure the fleet.

A.D.  
1688.

On the 19th of October, 1688, the prince went on board, and the whole fleet sailed that night; but the next day, the wind turning north, and then settling in the north-west, it was found impossible to struggle with it, and therefore on the 21st the fleet returned, after having been rudely handled by a storm. † On the 1st of November, the fleet sailed again. The prince intended to have gone northwards, and to have landed his forces in the mouth of the Humber; but a strong east wind rendered this im-

eme Historique et Politique, tom. v. p. 1236. See our Memoirs of Admiral Herbert, afterwards earl of Torrington, in vol. iii.

\* An impartial account of some remarkable passages in the Life of Arthur earl of Torrington, London, 1691, 4to. p. 12, 13, where the admiral's letter is printed at large.

† Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 526. Life of King William, p. 130. Memoirs of Sir John Reeshey, p. 277, 280. The History of the Desertion, or an Account of all the Public Affairs in England from the beginning of September, 1688, to the 12th of February following. By Edmund Bohun, Esq.

practicable, and seemed to direct them to a better course. His highness then sailed westward; the same wind which brought him to the English coast keeping in the king's ships, though they were come down so low as the gun-fleet. There, in a foggy day, they passed the English navy undiscerned, except a few transports which sailed in sight; while the English fleet rode with their yards and top-masts down, and could not, by reason of the extraordinary violence of the wind, purchase their anchors.

On the 4th of November, at noon, it was resolved on board the Dutch fleet, that part of the ships should go into Dartmouth, and the rest into Torbay; but in the night, the pilots overshot both, and then it was determined to go into Plymouth, which, if they had done, might have proved fatal; but the wind, suddenly turning from east to south, corrected the error of their pilots, and brought them safe into Torbay, where the army was immediately landed, and the prince made the necessary dispositions for drawing the country gentlemen in the neighbourhood to join him.\*

A.D.  
1688.

As soon as the wind would permit, the earl of Dartmouth, a gallant, loyal, and active officer, weighed with the English fleet, and stood to sea with a resolution to follow and fight the Dutch. Secretary Burchet and Bishop Burnet seem to contradict each other in what they say on this subject. The secretary informs us, that Lord Dartmouth came before Torbay with his fleet, and gave the Dutch an opportunity of seeing what his strength might have enabled him to do, if he had inclined to treat them as enemies.† The prelate on the contrary says, that Lord

\* Echard's History of England, p. 1121. An Impartial Account of some Remarkable Passages, &c. p. 15. Memoirs of Sir John Reresby, p. 281. The History of the Desertion, p. 59.

† Memoirs of Transactions at Sea during the War with France, beginning in 1688, and ending in 1697, by Josiah Burchet, Esq. London. 1703, 8vo. p. 19.

Dartmouth assured him some time after, that, whatever stories the Dutch might have heard either of officers or scamen, he was confident they would have fought very heartily. \*

This seeming contradiction may, however, be easily reconciled; for this disposition for fighting is to be referred to the time when the English first got to sea; and then, if they had come up with the Dutch fleet, it is very probable they had come to blows, and the business had been decided by a battle: but when the wind, turning to the south, carried the prince's fleet into Torbay, it forced the English fleet back; and, afterwards rising into a storm, ruffled them so much, that it was two or three days before Lord Dartmouth came again before Torbay; and then it was that, as Mr. Burchet says, he shewed the Dutch a fleet, capable indeed, but little inclined to hurt them. The seamen had time in this space to consider what they were doing, and such of the officers, as were well affected to the prince's design, had an opportunity of working upon them, and disposing things for his service; and thus that naval force, which the king had cultivated with so great care, and on which he depended so much, proved of little or no use, as well as his army: so difficult a thing it is to bring Englishmen to enslave England!

As to the conduct of the king after the arrival of the Dutch fleet, it was so unaccountable in itself, and so much has been said of it by other writers, that it is absolutely unnecessary for me to insist upon it: † I shall only observe, that it was very strange he paid so little attention to the fleet, since, if we except the care he took in sending away his family, it does not appear, that he issued any orders relating thereto; which will seem still the more

\* History of his own Time, vol. i. p. 789.

† Kennet, vol. iii. Echard. Sir John Reresby's Memoirs. See likewise the Memoirs of his Grace John, duke of Buckinghamshire, vol. ii. p. 91.



extraordinary, if we consider, that his admiral was not only a man of quality, and one on whose fidelity he could absolutely depend, but also an experienced officer, and a man extremely beloved by the sailors. In all probability, he was deterred from taking any measures of this sort, by what happened at the docks, where the workmen employed in the service of the royal navy rose on a sudden; and, without any other arms than the tools belonging to their trades, drove out a regiment of regular troops quartered at Rochester and Chatham; and declared for the Protestant religion, and the prince of Orange.

It is also not improbable, that the king was discouraged from making any applications to the seamen, in whom he had formerly shewn much confidence, by the revolt of Guernsey and Jersey; where the people, and especially the sailors belonging to the vessels in their harbours, seized several Popish officers, who had been sent thither to discipline their militia, and on other pretences; and this upon the first news of the invasion here. \* To say the truth, the sea-faring people all over the nation, but particularly in Bristol and London, declared unanimously and vehemently against his measures; † and did all in their power to prevent the most obnoxious of his ministers, such as Chancellor Jefferies, ‡ and Father Petre, from making their escape; which can be attributed to nothing but the just sense they had of the iniquitous measures these people had pursued; for, as to themselves, they had no particular grievances.

But, what is still more strange, the king made no use of the French power at sea, though he was in the strictest alliance with that court. A French fleet, if fitted out at

\* Falle's History of the Island of Jersey, p. 125, 126.

† History of the Desertion, p. 84, 88. Memoirs of Sir John Reresby, p. 295. Echard, p. 1130.

‡ Memoirs of John, duke of Buckinghamshire, vol. ii. p. 99. A Complete History of the Life of George Lord Jefferies, London, 1689, 4to. p. 79.

that juncture, might have made the Dutch more cautious, even while this invasion was under their deliberation; or, if a French squadron had joined his own navy, as in his brother's time, when we were engaged in the last Dutch war, this must have had a great weight: for though, in the former case, the French squadrons, as we have shewn, never did any good; yet now the circumstances of things being altered, and the French king so nearly concerned in breaking a confederacy, which he knew to be forming against him, and of which this was the first apparent act; as well as in succouring so firm and so useful an ally, there is reason to believe his officers and seamen would have acted heartily and harmoniously.\*

Besides, the French naval power, without our king's assistance, was now become quite another thing than it was in the Dutch war; since very lately they had fought the Dutch upon equal terms in the Mediterranean with honour; and, consequently, were capable of fighting them elsewhere, as the States very well knew, and would have been unwilling to run any such hazard. But, above all, in so delicate a conjuncture, the appearance of a large French fleet would have compelled his own to fight; and, in all probability, would have raised again the spirits of the timid; and put suspected captains on exerting themselves to wipe away the imputations of their enemies. The engaging the Dutch on any terms, was that at which he ought chiefly to have aimed; for an action must have done him service, by rousing the spirits of his sailors, who

\* Quincy, *Histoire Militaire de Louis XIV.* tom. ii. p. 141. There are two causes assigned for this conduct of the French: the first, that Baillon, the French ambassador here, assured his master it would cost a long and bloody civil war to dethrone King James; so that he might take his own time to relieve him: the second, that his minister M. de Louvois, led by his own interests, turned the arms of France against the House of Austria, which left the republic of Holland at full liberty to employ their fleet and forces in the service of the prince of Orange.

would then have banished all diffidence, and considered nothing but the support of the English reputation. These obvious advantages he missed, either from a strong persuasion that his own force was more than sufficient to repel the invaders; or, as it is commonly reported, by the advice of the earl of Sunderland, who discouraged the having recourse to foreign assistance, from arguments drawn from the king and nation's safety; and so the king, when he wanted them most, had not either a fleet of his own or of his allies at his devotion; which if he had, it is not improbable he might have turned the tables again, and forced the Dutch off the coast. \*

The mistakes committed on this side were heightened in their appearance by the great caution and wise management on the other; as well as by the foreseen and unforeseen consequences of the whole transaction. The embarkation was made with ease; the passage better regulated by the winds, than it could have been by their prudence; the descent in the fittest place in England for landing of horse; so that it was performed without difficulty as well as without danger. Bishop Burnet, † therefore, says truly, that these lines from Claudian were very happily applied to the prince of Orange's expedition :

*O nimum dilecte Deo ! cui militat æther,  
Et conjurati veniunt ad classica venti.*

“ Oh heav'n-protected chief! whom skies defend,  
“ And on whose call submissive winds attend.”

In Holland, they triumphed on the exact execution of the plan laid down by the States; and the most eminent news-writer they then had, made this observation on the success of the prince's enterprize, in his reflections on the history of Europe for November, 1688: “ The expense

\* Memoirs of Sir John Reresby, p. 276, 280, 317. Echard's History of England, p. 1115. See the earl of Sunderland's Letter to a Friend in London, dated March 23, 1689.

† History of his own Time, vol. i. p. 790.

“ bestowed on the fleet and army, set out from Holland, “ is a sign they are morally assured of the success of the “ expedition, which I am apt to think has been a long “ time in agitation, though it was carried with that prudence and secrecy, as not to be discovered till it could “ be no longer concealed.” \* When skill, industry, and zeal were visibly on the part of the prince, and weakness, irresolution, and diffidence apparent in all the king’s measures; it was impossible things should continue long in dispute, or that his highness, who knew so well how to use all the advantages that were in his hands, should not prevail.

When Lord Dartmouth saw the disposition of his officers, and how little it was in his power to serve his master, he wisely yielded to necessity; and, sailing once again into the Downs, and there holding a council of war, it was resolved first, to dismiss from their commands all such officers as were known to be Papists, or suspected so to be; and then to send up an address to his highness, setting forth their steady affection to the Protestant religion, and their sincere concern for the safety, freedom, and honour of their country. Not long after this the ships were dispersed, some to the dock-yards to be dismantled and laid up; others to be cleaned and repaired; and such as were in the best condition for the sea were appointed for necessary services. †

These were all the exploits performed by the English navy during the reign of a prince, who, while a subject, had served and acquired a reputation at sea; who understood maritime affairs perfectly well; and who attended to them with extraordinary diligence. But it ought to be remembered, that though this fleet was useless to him, yet it was of the highest advantage to the nation. If he had been less careful in this respect; if he had left the navy in

\* *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. v. p. 1246.

† Burchet’s *Memoirs*, p. 20.

a low condition; nay, if he had left it as he found it at his brother's decease; it would have been impossible for us to have withstood the naval power of France, which had been for several years growing, and about the time of the Revolution, or a little before it, had attained to its greatest height.\*

As it was, the king left behind him as numerous, and in every respect, as complete and well-furnished a navy, as England had ever seen; so that, when the French came out with such a strength as amazed all the world, it surprised indeed, but did not frighten us; we were quickly in a condition to look them in the face: and the subsequent part of this work will shew, that notwithstanding the mighty change that had happened in a short time abroad; and the pains almost every where taken to create a naval force; yet we were as able to assert our sovereignty in our own seas, and to maintain the honour of our flag every where else, as in any preceding period.

\* Reflexions Politiques sur les Finances et sur le Commerce, tom. ii. p. 375, from which ingenious and esteemed book I have borrowed, for the readers use,

AN ABSTRACT OF THE STATE OF THE FRENCH NAVY  
A. D. 1681.

Rates.	Number	Guns.	Mar. Officers.	Sailors.	Soldiers.
I.	12	1080	1252	4132	2486
II.	21	1518	1719	4470	2661
III.	36	1928	2350	6142	3008
IV.	26	1088	1167	2713	1570
V.	20	608	119	681	2790
Totals	115	6222	7149	18,884	10,407
Small frigates	24	400	446	937	497
Fire-ships	8	74	80	160	....
Barks	10	43	90	190	....
Pinks	22	341	190	447	....
Totals	179	7080	7955	20,618	10,904

# NAVAL HISTORY

I SHALL conclude this chapter by exhibiting to the reader's view an exact account of the fleet, and the condition in which it was left by King James, in order to prove what has been before asserted; and to prepare him for the history of those actions at sea, which followed in the next reign.

## AN ABSTRACT OF THE LIST OF THE ROYAL NAVY OF ENGLAND, UPON THE 18TH OF DECEMBER, 1688, WITH THE FORCE OF THE WHOLE.

Ships and Vessels.		Force.	
Rates.	Number.	Men.	Guns.
1	9	6705	878
2	11	7010	974
3	39	16,545	2640
4	41	9480	1908
5	2	260	60
6	6	420	90
Bombers	3	120	34
Fire-ships	26	905	218
Hoys	6	22	00
Hulks	8	50	00
Ketches	3	115	24
Smacks	5	18	00
Yachts	14	353	104
Total	173	42,003	6980

## CHAP. II.

The Naval History of Great Britain, under the Reign of King William III. from the Revolution to the Peace of Ryswick.

THE crown was no sooner placed on the head of the prince of Orange, than he began to feel the weight of it, and to experience all the cares that necessarily attend it; he had not so much leisure to taste in peace the first moments of royalty; \* but found himself obliged to embark in a war, as soon as he was seated on the throne. A war in which all Europe was engaged, and engaged in point of interest; for the ambitious designs of Lewis XIV. were now so evident, that even the powers least inclined to action, saw themselves obliged to provide for their own safety, by entering into a confederacy for effectually opposing the encroachments of that aspiring prince. A.D. 1689.

The French king, on the other hand, instead of discovering any dread of this formidable alliance; began first, by falling upon the empire, and declaring war against Spain, at the same time that he provided for his ally, King James, whom he sent over into Ireland, with a considerable force, escorted by a fleet of thirty sail of men-of-war, and seven frigates. † On the 12th of March, 1688-9, A.D. 1689.

\* Memoirs of Sir John Reresby, p. 345. Life of King William, p. 228. Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. Burnet, Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. Tindal's Continuation of Rapin, vol. iii. p. 88.

† M. de Quincy *Histoire Militaire du Regne de Louis le Grande*, tom. ii. p. 147, 148. Larrey, *Histoire de Louis XIV.* tom. ii. Le Clerc *Histoire des Provinces Unies*, tom. iii. p. 415. Sir John Reresby in his Memoirs, p. 332, says, the French king on this occasion furnished King James with a squadron of fourteen men-of-war, six lesser frigates, and three fire-ships, all well manned and fitted; eight experienced field-officers, one hundred of inferiour note, a guard

that monarch landed at Kingsale, from whence he went to Cork. On the 14th, M. de Lauzun landed with five thousand French auxiliaries; and King James sent over General M'Carthy, and as many Irish to France. The following is an exact list of the French fleet taken at the time, and which therefore seems very worthy of being here inserted:

LIST OF THE FRENCH FLEET IN KINGSALE BAY,  
MARCH 12, 1689.

Commanders.	Ships Names.	Guns.	Men.
Lieut.-Gen. le Marq. d'Antreville,	L' .....	62	420
Chefs d'Escadres			
Le Chevalier de Flaiour .....	Le Glorieux ....	50	380
Le Marq. de Relinguess .....	Le Serieux .....	60	370
Le Marq. de Nesmond .....	Le Constant ....	54	370
Captains.			
Les Sieurs			
D'Amblement .....	Le Henry .....	64	400
D'Hannault .....	Le Furieux ....	60	250
De Septeme .....	L'Ardent .....	62	370
De Machard .....	Le Bourbon ....	62	370
De Belleisle .....	Le Marquis ....	56	330
De Belfontaine .....	Le Prince .....	58	350
De Reald .....	Le Courageux ..	60	350
De Mabrane .....	L'Excellent ....	60	350
De la Hatteloire .....	Le Fort .....	58	350
De Septeville .....	L'Entreprenant..	60	350
De Bidaw .....	L'Aquillon.....	58	330
De Chasseur .....	Le Vermandois..	58	350
Du Palaise.....	Le Bon .....	54	300
De Gallisoniere .....	Le Maure .....	54	270

of one hundred Swiss, a corps of skilful pioneers, fifteen thousand of his own natural subjects, arms for forty thousand more, cannon and ammunition, in great abundance; two hundred thousand pound in money, fifty thousand pistoles as a present for that prince's private use, with plate, tents, and a most royal and splendid equipage, with an offer of fifteen thousand French troops, which King James declined accepting, saying, he would succeed by the help of his own subjects, or perish in the attempt.



Captains.	Ships Names,	Guns.	Men.
de Hebert .....	Le Sage .....	50	300
d'Allis .....	Le Francois .....	40	250
de France .....	Le Trident .....	52	375
de Champigny .....	Le Brave .....	56	350
de Renault Huet .....	Le Temeraire .....	54	330
de Serguinge .....	Le Diamant .....	54	300
de Florin .....	Le Neptune .....	48	330
de St. Maure .....	L'Aig en Ciel .....	54	250
* * * * *	L'Arrogant .....	58	250
de Genlis .....	L'Imperfait .....	44	250
de Chateau Morant .....	Le St. Michael ..	60	230
Baron des Ardess .....	Le Faucon .....	36	200
de Pontis .....	La Courtizane ..	64	370
des Auguere .....	Le Jolli .....	36	200
des Hainault .....	Le Moderne .....	50	300
de la Rougere .....	Le Sans Pareil ..	58	250
de la Guiche .....	Le Palmier .....	36	200
Baron .....	L'Aleion .....	36	200
Europin .....	L'Opiniat .....	36	200
		1958	11495
Besides 4 Fire-ships			
6 Flotes			
3 other ships of			
		265	1710
		St. Louis ..	
Total of men and guns ..		2243	13305

It was upon this occasion, that the impolitic and inconsiderate management in the two last reigns, in respect of the correspondence holden between our princes and the French king, manifestly appeared by the prodigious growth of his naval power. Under the administration of the great Cardinal Richlieu, France was so weak in this respect, that this high-spirited minister was forced, in very pressing terms, to solicit assistance from the Swedes; \* and even in this reign, the protector, Cromwell, had shewn the utmost contempt for the French power at sea. To speak the truth, it was our wars with the Dutch, in the

\* As to this fact, we find it in the Cardinal's Letters. vol. ii. p. 144.

## NAVAL HISTORY

reign of King Charles II. that, as the French themselves confess, gave them first an opportunity of learning, at the expense of the maritime powers, what it was to make a figure upon an element with which before they were little acquainted. This knowledge they so far improved, by sometimes siding with the Dutch, and sometimes with us ; that in the course of less than twenty years, they found themselves able to deal with either nation ; and in 1676, actually beat the Dutch and the Spanish fleets in conjunction, in the Mediterranean, and killed the famous Admiral De Ruyter.\* At this time, they were grown so much stronger, that we shall see them, during a great part of

\* The inquisitive reader may find a succinct view of the rise and progress of the French Naval power, under the reign of Lewis XIV. in Father Daniel's *Histoire de la Milice Francoise*, liv. xiv. chap. vii. But, to place this matter in the clearest light, and to give the English reader a competent idea of the French force at sea, as well as to enable him to judge for himself, which none of our naval writers have done, of the comparative strength of English and French fleets and squadrons, I shall here give an exact abstract of the state of the French fleet, as it stood in 1681; and it was even in a better condition at the beginning of the war; and to this recourse may be had on all occasions.

### ABSTRACT OF THE FRENCH FLEET.

[illegible]

this reign, endeavouring to dispute the empire of the sea against the joint forces of both the maritime powers : which is sufficient to shew, with how great disadvantage King William entered into the war, in this respect ; since, while the enemy took all advantages of pouring supplies into Ireland ; his affairs in England were so perplexed, that it was some time before he could provide so much as a force sufficient to cruize on the coast of that island.

At last, Admiral Herbert, who commanded the English fleet, in the beginning of the month of April, 1689, sailed for Cork, with a squadron which consisted of no more than twelve ships of war, one fire-ship, two yachts, and two smacks. Here he received information, that King James had landed at Kingsale, about two months before. \* He then thought it proper to attempt cutting off the convoy that had attended him from France : with this view he sailed for Brest, and cruized off that port for some time ; but hearing nothing of the French men-of-war from the advice-boats he daily received ; and having increased his force to nineteen sail, of which, however, one was but a small frigate, he again steered for the Irish coast, and toward the latter end of April appeared off Kingsale. A.D. 1689.

On the 29th of that month, he discovered a fleet of forty-four sail, which he judged were going into Kingsale, and therefore did his utmost to prevent it. The next day, he heard that the enemy were gone into Baltimore ; but, upon coming thither, he found that information to be false. The wind being then easterly, he stood for Cape Clear, and in the evening, he saw them standing into Bantry Bay. He lay off that place till morning, and about break of day resolved to attack the enemy. † All our English writers of naval history agree, that the French

\* London Gazette, No. 2447.

† Burchet's Naval History, p. 416. Life of King William, p. 231. An Impartial Account of some Remarkable Passages in the Life of Arthur, Earl of Torrington, p. 17. Columna Rostrata, p. 254.

fleet had some empty transports under their care; but the French writers, who should certainly best know what their fleet was doing, say positively, that they had only four merchant-ships laden with arms, bridles, saddles, powder, and ball, for the use of King James's army, and a considerable sum of money, which was on board the men of war. This they shipped, as soon as they perceived the English fleet, on board six fire-ships, and sent these, with the merchantmen before-mentioned, to land their supplies at a place in the bay seven leagues distant, while they engaged the English squadron, that at all events they might be safe. \*

Authors vary not a little as to the strength of both fleets, which I take to be rather owing to partiality, than to any real difficulty there was of coming at the fact. Mr. Burchet says, the English were but nineteen ships in all.† Bishop Kennet more truly reckons them twenty-two, wherein he agrees with all the French relations.‡ The enemy's fleet consisted, according to our accounts, of twenty-eight, according to their own, of no more than twenty-four sail.§ The English had certainly the wind, and might therefore have avoided fighting, if they had so pleased; but this was by no means agreeable to Admiral Herbert's temper: he therefore endeavoured all he could to get into the bay, that he might come to a close engage-

\* *Histoire Militaire*, vol. ii. p. 149.

† See his *Naval History* as above cited. My reason for saying what I do in the text, is my observing, that both the accounts may be very well reconciled; Burchet speaking only of the large ships, and the other writers of all in general, that were under Admiral Herbert's command.

‡ See his *Complete History of England*, vol. iii. p. 564, where he tells us, that the English fleet consisted of eight third rates, ten fourth, and two fifth, with two tenders.

§ The marquis de Quincy informs us, that the French fleet consisted, exclusive of the vessels under their convoy, of fifteen third, and nine fourth rates; and in this all the French writers agree.

ment; but the French saved him the labour, by bearing down upon him in three divisions about ten in the morning on the 1st of May. The foremost division consisted of eight ships under the command of Mr. Gaberet; the second, of the like force, was commanded by Admiral Chateau-Renault, the third, which was also of eight ships, had for its commander Mr. Forant: the fight was pretty warm for about two hours, but then slackened, because a great part of the English fleet could not come up; but they continued firing on both sides till about five in the afternoon; Admiral Herbert keeping out all the time to sea, because he found the dispute very unequal, and that there was no other way by which he could possibly gain the wind, and thereby an opportunity of bringing his whole fleet to engage. But, about the hour before mentioned, the French fleet stood into the bay, which put an end to the fight. The English writers ascribe this either to want of courage, or to the admiral's being restrained by his orders; but the French inform us, that he retired in order to take care of the ships under his convoy; and that, after they had entirely disembarked the supply they had brought, he disposed every thing in order to put to sea the next morning, which he did. \*

This is the battle in Bantry Bay, which, though considerable enough in itself, since the English, who had certainly the worst of it, lost only one captain, one lieutenant, and ninety-four men, and had not more than three hundred wounded, is yet magnified by some writers into a

\* It must be acknowledged, that the French speak in too high terms of this trivial success: the fleet, says M. Quincy, was out but twelve days, in which short time they landed what they carried in Ireland, beat the English fleet, and made seven Dutch prizes. On the other hand, our authors are desirous of charging some mismanagement on the French admiral; whereas in truth he did his duty very exactly, and Quincy and the other French writers complain, that for want of the fire-ships he was unable to prosecute the advantages he had gained, which seems to be the fact.

mighty action. The French had one ship called the Diamond set on fire, and two others so much damaged, as to be obliged to draw out of the line. The affair was certainly very inconsiderable; and any advantage that was gained was rather to be ascribed to a favourable wind, and superiour force on one side, than to any want either of courage or conduct on the other. \*

After the action Admiral Herbert bore away for the Scilly islands, and, having cruized there for some time, returned to Spithead; upon which occasion, King William went down in person to Portsmouth; where, to shew he would distinguish and reward merit, though not pointed out to him by success, he declared Admiral Herbert earl of Torrington; and knighted Captain John Ashby of the Defiance, and Captain Cloudesley Shovel of the Edgar; giving at the same time a bounty of ten shillings to each seaman, and making a provision for Mrs. Ailmer, relict of Captain Ailmer, and for the rest of the widows of such as had been killed in the action. This was perfectly well judged by that prince, and was indeed an act of his own, flowing from the thorough knowledge he had of mankind, and the necessity there is of keeping up the spirits of seamen, if we expect they should perform great things. He said, when he read the account of the battle of Bantry Bay, that such actions were necessary at the beginning of a war, though they would be rash in the course of it; which shews his great penetration, and accounts for his creating Admiral Herbert a peer, after an affair in which he had certainly no advantage. †

A.D. 1689. The fleet being at length refitted, the admiral sailed with it for Torbay, in the middle of June, where he was

\* The reader may consult Kennet, Burnet, and Burchet, who have all given their opinions on this side the question.

† Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 564. Life of King William, p. 232. Pointer's Chronological Historian, vol. i. p. 364. An Impartial Account of some remarkable Passages in the Life of Arthur, earl of Torrington, p. 20, 21.

afterwards joined by a Dutch fleet, and by Vice-admiral Killegrew's squadron, which had been cruising before Dunkirk. This combined fleet stood over to the coast of France, and continued cruising there, and in the soundings, till toward the latter end of August; and being then in great want of beer; and there being not the least appearance of the French putting to sea; they returned to Torbay, where soon after the fleet separated; the larger ships which wanted repair being ordered into port; and the rest distributed into several squadrons for different services.\* Before we speak more particularly of these, it will be proper to take notice of what was performed by some other squadrons, which had been detached earlier in the year.

When King James landed in Ireland, his affairs had certainly a very promising aspect on that side.† He brought with him a very considerable supply, and he found there an army of forty thousand men complete. There were but two places in the north which held out against him, *viz.* Londonderry and Inniskilling. Of these he determined to make himself master, and might easily have done it, if he had been well advised; but, as Bishop Burnet justly observes, there was a kind of fatality that hung on his councils.‡ He resolved to begin with Londonderry, in respect of which two proposals were made to him; the first was, to attack the place vigorously, and to

A.D.  
1689.

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 417. Bishop Burnet complains, that this year there was nothing considerable done at sea, and according to his manner insinuates I know not what of treason, or treachery, or something very black in it. But the truth seems to be, the funds were late settled, and the government itself but half settled, which occasioned the fleets being ill manned, poorly victualled, and worse paid.

† Sir John Reresby's Memoirs. History of the Wars in Ireland, 1690, 12mo. ch. 2. Father Orleans' History of the Revolutions in England under the family of the Stuarts, p. 324. Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 575, 576. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 16.

‡ History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 19.

take it as soon as possible by storm ; the other, to block up the city, and to act with his great army in such a manner as might best suit his interest, till this place should, by dint of famine, be compelled to surrender. Either of these methods might have succeeded; but King James declined these, and made choice of a third, which was to take the place by a slow siege, in order to enure his Irish army to fatigues, and to render them, by this kind of discipline, more fit for service. This resolution gave sufficient time for an application to the government in England : and upon this, two regiments of foot, under the command of Colonel Cunningham and Colonel Richards, with some supplies, were sent thither : they arrived on the 15th of April in the Lough; but Colonel Lundy, who was governor of the town, being, as it was commonly believed, in King James's interest, persuaded those gentlemen, that it was impracticable to defend the place ; and that therefore the best thing they could do was to return and preserve his majesty's troops ; which they accordingly did. The townsmen, having turned out their governor, however, made a noble defence, which gained time for another application to England.\*

During this period, Commodore Rooke, who had been sent with a squadron in the month of May to the coast of Ireland, performed all that could be expected from him there, by keeping King James and his army from having any intercourse with the Scots ; and, on the 8th of June, he sailed in with the *Bonaventure*, *Swallow*, *Dartmouth*, and a fleet of transport-ships, under the command of Major-general Kirk, who was come with this force to relieve Londonderry. The commodore concurred with

\* Dr Walker who was governor of Londonderry, published an exact account of the siege under the title of "A True Account of the Siege of Londonderry, London, 4to. 1690, 59 pages." Afterwards he wrote a vindication of this account, and from these, Burnet's history, and the detail I have had from living witnesses, I report these facts.



aim, as it was his duty, very cheerfully in carrying on this service. When they came to examine the method taken by the enemy to prevent their relieving the place, they found they had laid a boom cross the river, composed of chains and cables, and floated with timber, there being strong redoubts at each end, well provided with cannon. Upon a view of this, General Kirk resolved to make himself master of the Inch, an island in Lough Swilly, in which the commodore assisted him so effectually, that on the 16th he was in full possession not only of that island, but of the pass to the main; and, having performed this service, he returned to his station.\*

He continued there till the 22d, on which day he received, by the Portland man of war, a letter from the general, wherein he informed him, that being satisfied the place was reduced to the last extremity, he was determined to attempt its relief at any rate. The commodore upon this left the Bonaventure and Portland on his station, and, with the Deptford and Dartmouth, sailed to the assistance of the major-general.\* He sent the Dartmouth, commanded by captain, afterwards Sir John Leake, up to Kilmore to receive his orders; and then returned to the Bonaventure and Portland, with intention to continue there till the arrival of the three ships he expected from the earl of Torrington. With this assistance Major-general Kirk, having properly disposed the men of war, on the 30th of July, sent the Mountjoy of Derry, Captain Browning, and the Phoenix of Colrain, Captain Douglas, both deeply laden with provisions, under the convoy of the Dartmouth frigate, to attempt breaking the boom. The Irish army made a prodigious fire upon these ships as they passed, which was very briskly returned, till the Mountjoy struck against the boom, and broke it, and was by the rebound run ashore; upon this the Irish gave a

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 418. Columna Rostrata, p. 255. Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 579.

loud huzza, made a terrible fire upon, and with their boats attempted to board her. But the sailors firing a broadside, the shock loosened her so, that they floated again, and passed the boom, as did the Phoenix also, under cover of the Dartmouth's fire. This seasonable supply saved the remains of that brave garrison; which, after a hundred and five days close siege; and, being reduced from seven thousand five hundred to four thousand three hundred, had subsistence for only two days left, the enemy raising the siege on the last of July. \*

Commodore Rooke, on the 13th of August, escorted the duke of Schomberg's forces, consisting of upwards of ten thousand men, horse and foot, embarked in ninety vessels of several sorts; and landed them safe in Groom's Bay, near Carrickfergus, whither he brought the remainder of the army and the artillery, and then continued with the general, till he had taken the town, and had not any farther occasion for his assistance. He stationed afterwards as many ships and yachts of his squadron as he thought requisite for maintaining the correspondence between England and Ireland, and preventing any attempt that might be made by French or Scots privateers. He sailed next with those few ships that were remaining to Dublin, where he insulted the city by manning his boats, and making a shew of landing; and, on the 18th of September, he actually endeavoured to burn all the vessels that were

\* Dr. Walker's Account, p. 33, which agrees exactly with the French Relation of the Siege by Quincy, *Histoire Militaire*, vol. ii. p. 232. Bishop Burnet accuses (though without reason) Major-general Kirke for not relieving them sooner. Indeed there is no escaping this prelate's resentment; for, if an officer miscarries, it is through his own ill conduct; and, if he succeeds, he might have done it sooner, had he been hearty. The truth is, the general thought the business impracticable, but was determined to make some attempt, when he understood the besieged fattened their dogs on the bodies of the slain Irish, and then killed and eat those animals themselves. *History of the Wars in Ireland*, chap. 3. *Father Orleans' History of the Revolutions in England under the Family of the Stuarts*, p. 325.

in the harbour, and had certainly performed it, if the wind had not veered about, and blew a fresh gale, as the yachts and ketches were going in, which obliged him to abandon his design, and put to sea. King James was at this time in the place, and, which is still more, was also an eye-witness of this bold attempt.

From the bay of Dublin Commodore Rooke sailed to Cork, where he attempted likewise going into the harbour, but was prevented by the brisk fire the enemy made from their batteries, on which were mounted seventeen or eighteen pieces of cannon. He took possession, however, of the great island, and might have done farther services, if his ships had not by this time grown foul, and his provisions low; which forced him to quit his station, and repair to the Downs, where he arrived on the 13th of October; after having given by his activity, vigilance, and indefatigable attention to his duty in this expedition, an earnest of the great things which he afterwards performed when Sir George Rooke, and admiral and commander in chief of the British fleet.\*

A.D.  
1689.

As to the remaining naval transactions of this year, they were not either many or great; and therefore I shall only mention the taking of two celebrated sea-officers in the French service, *viz.* the gallant chevalier Fourbin, and the famous John du Bart. They commanded two small frigates, and had under their convoy six rich merchantmen, homeward-bound. Near the Isle of Wight they were chased by two of our fifty-gun ships, which they engaged very bravely, though they saw that it was a thing impossible for them to avoid being taken. All they aimed at was to give their merchantmen time to escape, in which they succeeded; for, while they fought desperately, the vessels under their convoy got safe into Rochelle. As for the Chevalier Fourbin and Captain Bart, they were car-

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 419—421. Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 580. History of the Reduction of Ireland, p. 32

ried prisoners into Plymouth, from whence they not long after found means to escape, and got safely over to Calais." For this generous action the French king rewarded each of them with the command of a man of war: but our writers of naval history have been so careless, that I cannot find with any certainty who the captains were that took them. We have indeed a much more particular relation of this affair in Fourbin's memoirs, wherein it is said they had twenty merchantmen under their convoy; that they fought two long hours; and that one of the English captains was killed in the engagement; but I think the relation, as I have given it, is more to be depended upon, as it comes from an unbiassed, and at the same time a very accurate historian. †

A.D.  
1689.

In the sessions of parliament, in the winter of 1689, there were many and loud complaints made of the conduct of affairs at sea; which bore hard on the new commission of admiralty, composed of the earl of Torrington, the earl of Carbery, Sir Michael Wharton, Sir Thomas Lee, Sir John Chicheley, Sir John Lowther, and Mr. Sacheverel; who in defence of their own characters, laid open the mis-carriages in the victualling-office, which produced a parliamentary inquiry into that affair, and a resolution of the house of commons, "That Sir John Parsons, Sir Richard Haddock, Admiral Stuart, and Mr. Nicholas Fenn, victuallers of the fleet, should be sent for, in the custody of the serjeant at arms, to answer to the said complaint." But, notwithstanding that an exact scrutiny

\* *Histoire Militaire*, tom. ii. p. 232.

† The memoirs which pass under the name of Count Fourbin abound with such exaggerated relations, that I own I suspect their credit. As to the work of the Marquis De Quincy, it is one of the best in its kind, written with care and exactness from good authorities; and for this reason the authors of modern memoirs, such as those of Marshal Villars, the duke of Berwick, and M. de Gué Trouin, transcribe it continually. See the *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. vi. p. 592, 600, tom. vii. p. 728.

into that affair produced a full discovery of great mischiefs occasioned by the bad victualling of the fleet; yet the spirit raised against the administration grew so strong, that it was thought necessary for the earl of Torrington to resign his office of first commissioner, in order to allay it; and he was succeeded therein by Thomas earl of Pembroke, which, from that nobleman's popularity, answered the end effectually, and gave the nation great satisfaction.\*

I shall open the naval transactions of 1690, with an account of Admiral Russel's sailing into the Mediterranean, though this is generally speaking, accounted a transaction of the former year; but my reason for placing it here, is the fleet's not putting to sea till the spring, though orders were given for it in the preceding winter. His catholic majesty, Charles II. having espoused a princess of the house of Neubourg, sister to the reigning empress, and to the queen of Portugal, demanded an English fleet to conduct her safely to his dominions, which was readily granted; and indeed such a compliment never had been refused even to States at war with us, because it was always taken as a tacit confession of our dominion at sea; which might, methinks, have secured it from Bishop Burnet's censure.† On the twenty-fourth of November, Admiral Russel sailed with seven large men of war, and two yachts, to Flushing, in order to receive her catholic majesty, and her attendants; and had orders, as soon as the queen came on board, to hoist the union flag at the main-top-mast head, and to wear it there as long as her

A.D.  
1690.

\* Kennet's Complete History of England, vol. iii. p. 582, 584. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 5. Life of King William, p. 258.

† History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 49. The propriety of this piece of complaisance will more clearly appear, if we reflect, that it obliged the house of Austria; was a proper return for the assistance given King William by that queen's relations; and was besides, as things were then circumstanced, which ought ever to be considered, a necessary and important service rendered to the grand alliance.

majesty was on board. On the eighteenth of January, 1690, she arrived in the Downs; on the twenty-fourth, she came to St. Helen's, whither their majesties, King William and Queen Mary, sent the duke of Norfolk to compliment her, as did their royal highnesses the prince and princess of Denmark, the Lord Cornbury, and Colonel Berkley.\* The admiral had orders to put to sea with the first fair wind, and was instructed to block up the harbour of Toulon, in order to prevent the French squadron there from coming out; and he endeavoured it on the beginning of February, and again towards the end of the month; but was forced back to Torbay on the twenty-third. Thence he sailed again in a few days, but was driven back on the second of March. At last he sailed with a pretty fair wind, on the seventh of that month, with a stout squadron of thirty men of war; under his command, and a fleet of four hundred merchant-men, bound for the Straits; and, after a very tempestuous passage, landed her catholic majesty on the sixteenth, at the Groyne; from whence he sailed to execute his other commission, but was forced by contrary winds into the harbour of Ferrol; where the Duke, a second-rate man of war, in a brisk gale of wind, ran ashore, and was with great difficulty got off. The admiral having executed his commission, and having left Vice-admiral Killegrew, with the Mediterranean squadron, behind him; bore away with the first fair wind for England, and arrived at Portsmouth on the 28th of April, where he landed several persons of quality who attended her catholic majesty in her voyage.†

The reader will easily discern, from this account of the matter, that Admiral Russel performed as much as the roughness of the season, and other circumstances con-

Burchet's *Memoirs*, p. 35. *Life of King William*, p. 261. *Mer-cure Historique et Politique*, tom. viii. p. 209, 412.

† Burchet's *Naval History*, p. 421, 422. *Tindal's Continuation of Rapin*, vol. 1. p. 139

sidered, could be expected from him, Bishop Burnet, however, suggests, that if it had not been for the care he was obliged to take of the queen of Spain, he might have blocked up the Toulon squadron in port, and thereby prevented the misfortunes that afterwards happened to our grand fleet; \* but I doubt, if we examine this to the bottom, it will be found a mere conjecture, and that, too, not very well founded. We have before observed, with how great difficulty Admiral Russel got with his fleet out to sea, and how late it was in the year. We have likewise mentioned the great fleet of merchant-men under his convoy; and taking these circumstances together, we may easily discern the reason of the Toulon squadron coming out, which was in the beginning of the month of May; without placing any thing to the account of the compliment paid to the queen of Spain, which, as I before observed, was a thing equally for the honour and interest of Britain; and the consciousness of this was what induced me to enter thus far into the justification of Vice-admiral Russel's conduct.

Vice-admiral Killegrew arrived at Cadiz on the eighth of April; where having, according to his instructions, taken all possible care of the trade; and having been joined by two Dutch men-of-war, the Guelderland and Zurickzee; he was next to proceed from thence in order to attend the motions of the Toulon squadron. In this, however, he met with no small difficulty, by reason of the stormy weather, which injured several ships of his squadron extremely, and the two Dutch ships, one of seventy-two, and the other of sixty-two guns, after losing all their masts, except a mizen, foundered. In repairing these unlucky accidents, a great deal of time was wasted; and so much the more through the coldness and inactivity of the governor of Cadiz, who, for his negligence in this

\* Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. *ubi supra*.

respect, was justly suspected of being in the French interest. Before things, through these disadvantages, could be brought into perfect order, the vice-admiral, on the 9th of May, received three different accounts of the Toulon squadron being at sea. Upon this, he held a council of war, wherein it was resolved, that pursuant to his instructions, he should immediately put to sea, in order to go in search of it. On the 10th of May, about four in the morning, he sailed accordingly, with nine English, and two Dutch ships, and arrived the next day in the mouth of the Straits; where he was joined by Captain Shelton, and his detachment, from the bay of Gibraltar, and at the same time received intelligence, that the French fleet was in the bay of Tetuan: thither he sailed in quest of them; his fleet consisting now of one second rate, three third rates, six fourth rates, two fifth rates, in all, twelve men-of-war, and two fire-ships, besides five Dutch men-of-war. On his arrival in Tetuan bay, he found only two ships, one at anchor, and the other under sail; the latter put out Algerine colours, and escaped; but the former, being embayed, was taken by the Dutch Vice-admiral Allemande, and proved to be a French ship bound for the West Indies. \*

The wind shifting, the admiral stood over again towards the Spanish coast, and being two leagues W. N. W. off Ceuta-point, the man at the mast-head saw ten ships to the north, with their heads lying eastwards. Upon this, advice was given to the Dutch admiral, and the Montague was sent a-head to discover the enemy's motions; the fleet still continuing to stretch over to Gibraltar. About one o'clock they were within two miles of the French squadron, which appeared to be on the run, and therefore our ships set their top-gallant-sails, and crowded after them; but to little purpose, for the French being all clean ships, just come out of port, whereas some of ours had been seventeen months off the ground, it is no wonder they got clear

\* Burchet's Memoirs, p. 37.



of them. The chase was continued till the next day, when the enemy were four leagues a-head, and the Dutch and one of ~~the~~ English ships as much a-stern; insomuch, that the admiral had with him no more than four ships, which induced him to give over the chase; yet, between nine and ten in the morning, the Richmond and the Tyger forced one of the merchant-ships on shore to the westward of Tariffa. About three in the afternoon, the whole fleet joined, and the admiral bore away for Cadiz.\*

The French writers have done their best to give this retreat the air of a victory: one of them tells us, that Mr. Chatteau-Renault, notwithstanding the great superiority of the enemy, ordered all the merchant-ships under his convoy, to sail before, while he remained with his squadron of eight men-of-war between them and the English; and that after this, perceiving one of the vessels, which was a very bad sailer, had fallen behind, he lay by till she passed him; and then, perceiving the English squadron did not incline to engage, he continued his course.† But Father Daniel, who piques himself so much upon his veracity, carries the thing still farther; he says, that, on the 20th of May, N. S. the French admiral, with seven ships under his command, discovered near the Straits of Gibraltar a squadron of twenty-three English and Dutch men-of-war. He immediately prepared for battle, and sailed towards them. This boldness surprised them so much, that they had not courage to attack him; and the count, after waiting for two of his ships that were heavy sailers, and for some merchantmen that were willing to secure themselves under his convoy; continued his route towards Brest, without the least opposition.‡ There is something so very improbable, not to say extravagant, in

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1690.

\* *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. ix. p. 55, 60, 61. Burchet's *Naval History*, p. 424.

† *Hist. Militaire*, tom. ii. p. 319.

‡ *Hist. de France*, tom. x. p. 125.

this story, that there wanted nothing but the historian's reflection to render it perfectly ridiculous. He concludes this tedious detail with observing, "that the very enemy themselves could not but admire the ability and intrepidity of the count de Chatteau-Renault." Such flourishes are so natural to these authors, that, after a very few instances, I shall content myself with a bare relation of them, and leave their credit to the candid consideration of every impartial reader.

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1690.

It was the 21st of May before Vice-admiral Killegrew could reach the port of Cadiz, where, having made the necessary detachments for the safe convoy of our homeward-bound merchantmen; he set sail in pursuance of his instructions, for England; and, in thirty-five days arrived at Plymouth with one second and four third-rates of ours, six Dutch men-of-war, the Half Moon, and Virgin prize. On his arrival at Plymouth, he received letters from the lords of the admiralty, informing him, that the French, after an engagement, had obliged our fleet to retire; and were with their own about Rye, Dover, and those parts, and therefore he was to take all imaginable care of his squadron. Upon this he called a council of war, at which were present the Dutch admirals Allemande and Evertzen, and Sir Cloudesley Shovel, rear-admiral of the red, then just returned from the Irish coast. Upon mature deliberation, they determined it was safest to proceed with the ships into Hamoze within Plymouth-sound; for, as they were large ships, they could not run in at low water, and as they were in want of water, provisions, and sea stores, it was impossible for them to put to sea; so that this was the only way left to be secure from any attempts of the French.\*

The French had been very industrious this year in sending a large fleet to sea, and that early in the season; for, on the 1st or 2d of March, they embarked a great supply for Ireland under the convoy of a squadron of thirty-six

\* Burchet's Memoirs, and Naval History, as before cited.

men-of-war, which sailed on the 7th of the same month, attended by four fire-ships and five flutes, and were afterwards joined by another squadron from Provence, with several transports; so that in all they convoyed over six thousand men, besides ammunition and money. Part of these they landed on the 11th at Kingsale, and the rest on the 13th in the bay of Cork. On the 8th of April, they left the coasts of that island, in order to return into the road of Brest, which they did safely on the 23d, and then prepared to join their grand fleet, which had orders to assemble under the command of the count de Tourville. \*

While the French were thus employed, our councils were chiefly bent on sending over a royal army, to be commanded by King William in person to Ireland. This great design was brought to bear about the beginning of the month of June, when his majesty left London to march toward the coast; where he embarked his forces on board

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\* Hist. Militaire, tom. ii. p. 315, 316 317. One may justly wonder how the French could be able to fit out not only a greater fleet than we, but with greater expedition too. In order to account for this, I shall offer to the reader's consideration some matters of fact, set down by Captain George St. Lo, who was at this time a prisoner in France, and saw this very armament made. "When I was first brought prisoner thither," says he, "I lay four months in an hospital at Brest for cure of my wounds, and was sent to Nantz, before half cured. While I was at Brest, I was astonished at the expedition used in manning and fitting out their ships, which till then I thought could be done no where sooner than in England, where we have ten times the shipping, and consequently ten times more seamen than they have in France; but there I saw twenty sail of ships of about sixty guns each, got ready in twenty days time: they were brought in, and the men discharged; and, upon an order from Paris, they were careened, keeled up, rigged, victualled, manned, and out again in the said time, with the greatest ease imaginable. I likewise saw a ship of one hundred guns had all her guns taken out there in four or five hours time, which I never saw done in England in twenty-four hours, and this with greater ease, and less hazard, than here, which I saw under the hospital window; and thus I am sure I could do as easily in England." England's Safety; or a Bridle to the French King. London, 4to, 1693, p. 18, 19.

two hundred and eighty-eight transports on the 11th; and, escorted by a squadron of six men-of-war under Sir Cloudesley Shovel, sailed for Carrickfergus, where he safely arrived on the 14th of the same month; and soon after, dismissed Rear-admiral Shovel, with the Plymouth squadron, with orders to join the grand fleet, which, as we have before shewn, he could not do, till it was too late. \*

There was nothing better understood in England than the absolute necessity of assembling early in the year a strong fleet in the channel. The honour of the kingdom depended upon it; for the French, after their small advantage in Bantry-bay, had given out, that they would the next summer insult the joint fleets of the English and Dutch. What was still more, the safety of the nation depended upon this measure no less, since the king and the greatest part of his forces were abroad: scarcely seven thousand regular troops left in England; and such as were in the interest of King James almost every where in motion, and waiting in all appearance for nothing, but the sight of a French fleet on the coast, to take up arms, and declare against the government.

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1690.

Yet, for all this, our maritime proceedings were very slow: for which various, and some scarcely credible causes are assigned. It was given out, that the greatest part of the fleet was disaffected; and, to wipe off this suggestion, it was thought necessary that an address should be sent up from the Downs, which was accordingly done. † On the other hand, it was late before the Dutch sent their fleet to sea; and the English, knowing that nothing of consequence could be done till after their junction, were the less solicitous about putting themselves in order, till they heard of their being at sea. ‡

\* Kennet's Complete History, vol. i. p. 598. Life of King William, p. 267. Burchet's Memoirs, p. 58. History of the Wars in Ireland, ch. xi. p. 109. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. ix. p. 74.

† See the address in Kennet's Complete History, vol. iii. p. 602.

‡ Bunnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 49. Burchet, and

The conduct of the French in the mean time was of quite another kind ; for, while the squadron before mentioned was gone to Ireland, orders were given for equipping a fleet of sixty sail at Brest, which was to put to sea by the end of May : this they actually did, and, though they were forced by contrary winds to put back again to that road ; yet, on the 12th of June, they put to sea in three squadrons, each squadron being divided into three divisions. Of these the white and blue squadrons, commanded by Count d'Estrees, on board the *Le Grand*, a ship of eighty-six guns, formed the vanguard, consisting of twenty-six men-of-war. The main body was composed of the white squadron, commanded by the Admiral Count Tourville, in the *Royal Sun*, a ship of one hundred guns ; this squadron consisted likewise of twenty-six sail ; the blue squadron made the rear-guard, commanded by Mr. d'Amsfreville in the *Magnificent*, a ship of eighty guns, and in this squadron there were but twenty-five sail. In all there were seventy-eight men-of-war, twenty-two fire-ships, and the whole fleet carried upwards of four thousand seven hundred pieces of cannon. On the 13th of June, they steered for the English coast ; and, on the 20th, found themselves off the Lizard. The next day, the admiral took some English fishing-boats ; and, after having paid the people who were on board for their fish, he set them at liberty again ; and these were the men, such was our supineness, that first brought advice of the arrival of the French fleet on our coast ; \* while our fleet was lying idle, and scarcely in a condition to put to sea, as Bishop Burnet very justly observes. †

other writers. An Impartial Account of some Remarkable Passages in the Life of Arthur, Earl of Torrington, p. 23.

\* M. de Quincy Hist. Militaire, tom. ii. p. 318, 319. Reincourt, tom. iii. p. 276. Mercure Historique et Politique, tom. ix. p. 80.

† History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 49.

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1690.

Our admiral, the earl of Torrington, was at St. Helen's when he received this news; which must have surprised him very much, since he was so far from expecting any advice of this kind, that he had no scouts to the westward.\* He put to sea, however, with such ships as he had; and stood to the south-east on Midsummer day, leaving his orders that all the English and Dutch ships which could have notice, should follow him. This shews how much he was confused, and how little notion he had of a speedy engagement; and indeed it was impossible he should have framed any proper scheme of action, when he had no certain account of the strength of the French. In the evening, he was joined by several ships, and the next morning, he found himself within sight of the enemy. The French landed, and made some prisoners on shore; and by them sent a letter from Sir William Jennings, an officer in the navy, who had followed the fortunes of King James, and served now as third captain on board the Admiral, promising pardon to all such captains, as would now adhere to that prince.† The next day, our admiral received another reinforcement of seven Dutch men-of-war, under the command of Admiral Evertzen; however, the fleets continued looking upon each other for several days.‡ It is certain that the earl of Torrington did not think himself strong enough to venture an engagement, and in all probability the rest of the admirals, *viz.* Ralph Delaval, Esq. vice-admiral of the red, Edward Russel, Esq. admiral of the blue, Sir John Ashby, vice-admiral of the same squadron, and George Rooke, Esq. rear-admiral

\* Kennet's Complete History of England, vol. iii. p. 602. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 49. Life of King William, p. 247.

† Burchet's Memoirs, p. 46. See likewise a pamphlet published about that time, entitled, "The late Plot on the Fleet detected, with the Jacobites Memorial, &c." London, 1690, 4to.

‡ An Impartial Account of some Remarkable Passages in the Life of Arthur, Earl of Torrington, p. 24. Life of King William, p. 274.

of the red, were of the like opinion. \* Besides, he waited for Sir Cloudesley Shovel, rear-admiral of the blue, who was to have joined him with the Plymouth squadron, and some other ships. †

His whole strength consisted of about thirty-four men-of-war of several sizes; and the three Dutch admirals had under their command twenty-two large ships. We need not wonder, therefore, that seeing himself out-numbered by above twenty sail, he was not willing to risk his own honour, and the safety of the nation, upon such unequal terms. But the queen, who was then regent, having been informed that her father's adherents intended a general insurrection; and that, if the French fleet continued longer on the coast, this would certainly take effect; by advice of the privy council, sent him orders to fight at all events, in order to force the French fleet to withdraw. ‡ In obedience to this order, as soon as it was light, on the 30th of June, the admiral threw out the signal for drawing into a line, and bore down upon the enemy, while they

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\* Naval History, p. 634.

† Burchet's Memoirs, p. 44.

‡ Bishop Kennet, in his Complete History of England, vol. iii, p. 606, entertains us with a succinct account of this Jacobite plot, which it is necessary to transcribe, that the reader may have some conception of those reasons that induced the queen and her council to send the admiral these positive orders to fight. "It was agreed," says he, "that while part of the French fleet should bear up the Thames, the Jacobites in London, who were grown very bold and numerous, by the flocking of that party from all parts of the country thither, should have made an insurrection, and have seized the queen and her chief ministers. Then certain persons were to have taken upon them the administration of affairs till the return of King James, who was to leave the command of his army to his generals, and hasten with all speed into England; the other part of the French fleet, having joined their gallies, was to have landed eight thousand men at Torbay, with aims for a greater number. After which the gallies and men-of-war were to sail into the Irish sea, to hinder the return of King William and his forces, and the discontented Scots were to have revolted at the same time, in several parts of that kingdom."

were under sail, by a wind with their heads to the northward. \*

The signal for battle was made about eight, when the French braced their head-sails to their masts, in order to lie by. The action began about nine, when the Dutch squadron, which made the van of the united fleets, fell in with the van of the French, and put them into some disorder. About half an hour after, our blue squadron engaged their rear very warmly; but the red, commanded by the earl of Torrington in person, which made the centre of our fleet, could not come up till about ten; and this occasioned a great opening between them and the Dutch. The French making use of this advantage, weathered, and of course surrounded the latter, who defended themselves very gallantly, though they suffered extremely from so unequal a dispute. The admiral, seeing their distress, endeavoured to relieve them; and while they dropt their anchors, the only method they had left to preserve themselves, he drove with his own ship and several others between them and the enemy, and in that situation anchored about five in the afternoon, when it grew calm; but discerning how much the Dutch had suffered, and how little probability there was of regaining any thing by renewing the fight, he weighed about nine at night, and retired eastward with the tide of flood. †

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The next day it was resolved in a council of war, holden in the afternoon, to preserve the fleet by retreating, and

\* Barchet's Memoirs, p. 36. Naval History, p. 426. Columna Rostrata, p. 256.

† These particulars are taken from a very authentic pamphlet, the title of which runs thus: "The Account given by Sir John Ashby, Vice-admiral, and Rear-admiral Rooke, to the Lords Commissioners, of the engagement at sea between the English, Dutch, and French Fleets, June the 30th, 1690; with a Journal of the Fleet, since their departure from St. Helen's, to their return to the Buoy in the Nore, and other material passages relating to the said engagement." London, printed for Randal Taylor, 1691, 4to. p. 32.



rather to destroy the disabled ships, if they should be pressed by the enemy, than to hazard another engagement by endeavouring to protect them. This resolution was executed with as much success as could be expected, which, however, was chiefly owing to want of experience in the French admirals; for, by not anchoring when the English did, they were driven to a great distance; and, by continuing to chace in a line of battle, instead of leaving every ship at liberty to do her utmost, they could never recover what they lost by their first mistake. \* But, notwithstanding all this, they pressed on their pursuit as far as Rye bay; and forcing one of our men-of-war of seventy guns, called the *Anne*, which had lost all her masts, on shore near Winchelsea, they sent in two ships to burn her, which the captain prevented by setting fire to her himself. The body of the French fleet stood in and out of the bays of Bourne and Pemsey, in Sussex, while about fourteen of their ships anchored near the shore. Some of these attempted to burn a Dutch ship of sixty-four guns, which at low water lay dry; but her commander defended her so stoutly every high water, that they were at length forced to desist, and the captain carried her safe into Holland. †

Our loss in this unlucky affair, if we except reputation, was not so great as might have been expected; not above two ships, two sea captains, two captains of marines, and three hundred and fifty private men. The Dutch were much more unfortunate, because they were more thoroughly engaged. Besides three ships sunk in the fight, they were obliged to set fire to three more that were stranded on the

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1690.

\* Burchet's *Memoirs*, p. 47. *Naval History*, p. 427. The fact is likewise acknowledged by M. de Quincy and other French writers.

† Burchet's *Naval History*, p. 427. I have been at some pains to discover the name of this ship and of its gallant captain. The former I find to have been *Demaes*, and the latter *Convient*. As I have my information from a Frenchman, I doubt whether the names are spelt right.

coast of Sussex, losing in all six ships of the line. They lost likewise abundance of gallant officers; particularly their Rear-admirals Dick and Brakel, and Captain Nordel, with a great number of inferiour officers and seamen.\* Yet even this misfortune contributed to raise their reputation at sea; since as soon as the states received the news, they ordered fourteen men-of-war to be built and put to sea in as many days; which, as my author says, may seem incredible to such as are unacquainted with the power of the Dutch, at that time, and what they were able to do upon extraordinary occasions.†

We need not wonder, that a victory gained by the French fleet over the joint forces of the maritime powers should extremely elevate the writers of that nation, who are so apt to run out into extravagant flights of panegyric on much slighter occasions. The Marquis de Quincy tells us, that the Dutch fought with all imaginable bravery, and tacitly acknowledges, that they owed their misfortune to their being surrounded by French ships. He likewise owns, that such of the English ships as engaged fought very well; and that the admiral endeavoured to succour the Dutch, though he did it with much caution. But then, to enhance the victory as much as possible, he asserts, that the united fleets were at least equal in force to the navy of France, though they had fewer ships.‡ In this, however, he is certainly mistaken, as I shall convince the reader by undeniable evidence. The Dutch squadron consisted of twenty-two large ships, and was by much the most formidable of the whole fleet, and yet that squadron carried but one thousand three hundred and sixty guns;

\* An Impartial Account of some Remarkable Passages in the Life of Arthur, Earl of Torrington, p. 24, 25. *Le Clerc Hist. des Provinces Unies*, tom. iii. p. 419. *Mercure Hist. et Politique*, tom. ix. p. 84, 85.

† *Memoires Hist.* p. 14. *Mercure Hist. et Politique*, tom. ix. p. 86, 87. *Le Clerc Hist. des Provinces Unies*, tom. iii. liv. xvi.

‡ *Hist. Militaire*, vol. ii. p. 330.

whereas the weakest of the French squadrons carried one thousand five hundred and twenty-six; and if we should suppose the united fleet to have consisted of ships of the like force with the Dutch, which it is certain they were not, it would then have carried three thousand four hundred and sixty-two guns; whereas the French fleet, according to this writer's own account, carried four thousand seven hundred and two. \* This is sufficient to shew how little dependance can be had even on the accounts of the fairest French authors. Father Daniel has given us two relations of this engagement, full of exaggerations. † He tells us, that seventeen English and Dutch ships, being disabled, ran a-shore, and were burnt by their own crews; whereas, in truth, instead of the seventeen, there were but seven. He likewise magnifies the conduct of the Count de Tourville, who would, as he informs us, have entirely destroyed the enemy, if they had not had the advantage of the wind and tide. In the battle, indeed, the English and Dutch had the advantage of the wind; but, in their retreat, the wind was equally favourable to the French; and, as to the advantage of the tide, it was owing to their superiour skill in the management of their vessels; and Bishop Burnet very rightly observes, that among the best judges, the Count de Tourville was almost as much blamed for not making use of

\* These computations, so far as they regard the French, I have taken from the Marquis de Quincy; but, as to the Dutch squadron, I did not think it fair to make use of the list he has given us, because I had a more authentic account, by which it appeared, that the Dutch squadron was larger by two ships, and carried more guns than the Marquis de Quincy has set down.

† We have this account first in his *Hist. de Milice Francoise*, tom. ii. p. 491, with the addition of a fact altogether groundless, *viz.* that the French fleet after their victory, took a vast number of merchant ships. He relates the same affair more at large in his *Hist. de France*, tom. x. in the *Historical Journal of the Reign of Lewis XIV.* p. 155, where he repeats the same tale of their taking an infinite number of ships.

his victory, as the earl of Torrington was on account of his defeat. \*

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After the engagement, our fleet retreated toward the river Thames; and the earl of Torrington, going on shore, left the command to Sir John Ashby, but first gave orders to Captain Monck of the *Phoenix*, together with four other fifth rates, and four fire-ships, to anchor above the narrow of the middle grounds; and to appoint two of the frigates to ride, one at the Buoy of the Spits, the other at the lower end of the middle, and to take away the buoys, and immediately retreat, if the enemy approached; or, if they pressed yet farther on him, he was ordered in like manner to take away the buoys near him, and to do what service he could against them with the fire-ships; but still to retire, and make the proper signals in such cases. On the 8th, the French fleet stood toward their own coast, but were seen, upon the 27th, off the Berry-head, a little to the eastward of Dartmouth, and then, the wind taking them short, they put into Torbay. There they lay not long; for they were discovered the 29th near Plymouth, at which place the necessary preparations were made by platforms and other works, to give them a warm reception. The 5th of August, they appeared again off the Ram-head, in number between sixty and seventy, when, standing westward, they were no more seen in the channel this year. †

The nation all this time was in the utmost confusion from the apprehension of a descent by the French in favour of an insurrection to be at the same time made by the friends of King James. The city of London shewed uncommon zeal for the support of the govern-

\* As this prelate conversed with all the great men of that time, what he reports in such cases as this deserves more credit than any of his own reflections. See also the *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom ix. p. 210.

† Burchet's *Naval History*, p. 427.

ment, by not only raising their militia, consisting of about nine thousand men, but offering to add to these, six auxiliary regiments, a regiment of horse, and two of dragoons, to be maintained at their own expense, so long as they should be necessary. \* The tinnerns in Cornwall also offered to rise; † and addresses of the same nature came from other parts, which were very graciously received by, and did great service to Queen Mary, though he did not think fit to make use of the proposed succours. She apprehended, or at least was advised by her council, that it would be more effectual to seize such persons of distinction, as were known to be in her father's interest. ‡ This, it is supposed, had the desired effect, and induced the French, when they saw themselves disappointed in their expectations of finding numbers ready to take arms on their first appearance, to attempt little or nothing to our prejudice, except it was the burning of Teignmouth, and three inconsiderable vessels there; which, however, some French historians have represented as a glorious enterprize; and, to make their tale hang the better together, have erected fortifications that were never seen, talked of an obstinate resistance that was never made, and have converted three fishing-smacks into four men of war, and eight merchant-ships richly laden. § The malcontents, however, gave quite a different turn to the inactivity of the French fleet: they said that the French

\* Kennet's Complete History, vol. iii. p. 603.

† Their address was presented to the queen by Shadrach Vincent, Esq. who represented the borough of Fowey at that time in parliament.

‡ A proclamation for that purpose, issued on the 14th of July, 1690.

§ This story of attacking Teignmouth, and the great things performed there, we find both in Quincy and Father Daniel; so that very probably the tale was forged on board the fleet; for that it was a forgery no man can doubt, who is acquainted with the town and creek of Teignmouth in Devonshire, and the inconsiderable trade carried on there.

king, as an ally to, and at the earnest request of James II. would not hurt his country, or plunder its inhabitants. Over and above these precautions the queen took another, which was sending over Mr. Harbord to the States-General, to inform them how much her majesty was concerned at the misfortune that had befallen their squadron in the late engagement, and at their not having been seconded as they ought to have been. He was likewise to inform them, that the queen had given orders for refitting the Dutch ships that were disabled, at the expenses of the nation; and that her majesty had farther directed, all possible care should be taken of the sick and wounded seamen; and that a bounty should be given to the widows of such as had fallen in the action. He was still farther instructed to acquaint the States, that twelve large ships were fitting out here to join the fleet, and to desire that their high mightinesses would direct a proportionable reinforcement; which they accordingly did.\*

\* That the reader may the better apprehend the reasons which induced her majesty to apply in this manner to the Dutch, it will be proper to lay before him an extract from Rear-admiral Evertzen's letter, in which he gives an account of the fight:

"The 4th of this month he joined the English and Dutch fleets, riding near the Isle of Wight, with three men of war; there he understood that the French fleet had been descried, riding in several places, to the number of eighty-two men of war, great and small: thereupon it was resolved that they should weigh anchor, with a resolution to find them out, and observe their motions. Before the arrival of Admiral Evertzen, it was agreed between the two nations, that the Hollanders should have the van-guard, which was in appearance to do them honour, but at the bottom to conceal Torrington's designs. After they had been under sail about two or three hours, they were obliged by fogs and bad weather to come to an anchor; but soon after they perceived the French fleet to bear up towards them, with the wind at east. Immediately they weighed anchor, and endeavoured to gain the weather-gage, which they did with such success, that Torrington gave the signal for the first squadron to engage; but the French thought fit to retire. The 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th, the two fleets were always in view of each other; but, in

As soon as the earl of Torrington came to town, he was examined before the council, where he justified himself with great presence of mind; he said, there were two things to be principally considered, the loss that had been sustained in the fight; and the motives which had induced him to retreat. The first, he alleged, was owing to the ill-grounded contempt the English and Dutch officers had of the behaviour of the French at sea; and, as to the

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“ regard the French fleet was much the stronger both for number and  
 “ bigness of ships, it was judged most proper not to fight in the open  
 “ sea; and Torrington did his part so well, that he avoided engaging  
 “ till he was come off Beachy-head, which was favourable for his  
 “ purpose; and there it was that he received the queen’s orders not to  
 “ delay engaging, if the wind and the weather would permit, which  
 “ was the reason that, upon the 10th, by day-break, we went to seek  
 “ the enemy, who expected us in order of battle; and so by nine o’clock  
 “ the engagement began between the blue squadron of the French  
 “ and the van-guard of the Dutch, and both sides fired desperately  
 “ for three hours together, till the French squadron not liking their  
 “ entertainment, bore away with all the tack they could make: but  
 “ about one there happened a calm, which not only prevented the  
 “ Hollanders pursuit, but put them in a little disorder; upon which  
 “ the French (whom the same calm hindered from getting away)  
 “ were constrained to begin the fight again, which lasted till five o’clock  
 “ in the evening, with an incredible fury. As for what concerns the  
 “ English, most certainly, unless it were some few vessels that fought  
 “ against Torrington’s order, the rest did nothing at all; so that the  
 “ main body of the French fell into the rear of the Dutch fleet, and  
 “ having fought from morning till evening, and defended themselves  
 “ so long against such a prodigious number of the enemy that assailed  
 “ them on every side, they were so battered, that hardly three were  
 “ capable of making any defence; which constrained them to make  
 “ their way through the French fleet, and bear away for the coast of  
 “ England between Beachy and Ferley. Admiral Brakel, Jean Dick,  
 “ and Captain Nordel were slain. The Friczland, having lost all her  
 “ masts, as she could not be towed off by reason of the calm, was  
 “ taken towards the end of the fight. Admiral Evertzon gave this  
 “ testimony of all the Dutch officers and soldiers, that there was not  
 “ one that did not exactly perform his duty. In short, it has not  
 “ ever been heard, that twenty-two ships fought so long against eighty-  
 “ two, of which seventeen carried no less than from eighty to an  
 “ hundred guns.”

latter, he affirmed, that he had acted according to the rules of prudence, by which he had saved the fleet; and with much steadiness and spirit declared, that he had rather his reputation should suffer for a time, than his country undergo a loss, which she might never be able to repair. The council, however, thought proper to commit his lordship to the Tower; and that they might lessen the clamours of the crowd, and give some satisfaction to the Dutch, they directed a committee to repair to Sheerness, where they were to make a thorough inquiry into the real causes of this disaster. \*

The fleet remained now under the command of Sir Richard Haddock, Vice-admiral Killegrew, and Sir John Ashby, who had orders to put it into the best condition possible; which they executed with great diligence, and by the latter end of August had forty-one ships of the line under their command, exclusive of the Dutch: yet, in spite of all their activity, it was very late in the year before they were able to undertake any effectual service; and by that time it was necessary to lay up the larger ships, the remainder being found sufficient for the embarkation of a body of troops under the command of the earl of Marlborough, whose winter expedition shall be taken notice of in its proper place. In the mean time, let us return to the proceedings of Sir Cloudesley Shovel, with the squadron under his command, which we left, with that of Vice-admiral Killegrew, in Plymouth-sound. †

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On the 21st of July, Rear-admiral Shovel received orders to proceed with the ships under his command for Kingsale, to intercept some French frigates that were said to be on that coast. Arriving at Waterford river,

\* Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 53. An Impartial Account of some remarkable Passages in the Life of Arthur, earl of Torrington, p. 25. Mercurio Historique et Politique, tom. ix. p. 202, 203.

† See Burchet's Naval Memoirs, p. 58.



with intention to execute this commission; he met with the agreeable news of Lieutenant-general Kirk's having made himself master of the town of Waterford; but was at the same time informed, that Duncannon-castle, which by its situation commanded the river, still held out, and that the lieutenant-general for want of cannon was not likely to take it. Upon this, considering the importance of the place, and that no use could be made of the port of Waterford, while it remained in the hands of the enemy; he sent advice to the lieutenant-general on the 27th of July, that he was ready to assist him by sending some frigates up the river, and landing all the men he could spare out of his squadron under the protection of their guns. Accordingly, the next day he sent in the *Experiment* and the *Greyhound*, two small ships, to batter their castle; and under their fire landed between six and seven hundred men, all the boats of the fleet being employed in this service. The castle all this time thundered upon them, though to little purpose; but, when once General Bourke, who commanded there, saw the men landed, he thought fit to capitulate, and marched out at the head of two hundred and fifty men, with their arms and baggage, leaving to the English the fortress, which was furnished with forty-two pieces of cannon. A noble reward for one day's hard duty! \*

\* Burchet's *Naval History*, p. 432. But there the author has committed a very extraordinary mistake; for, instead of Waterford, he mentions Kingsale as the city annoyed by Duncannon-castle: now, that this was really an effect of want of care, and not an error in transcribing, appears by comparing his *Naval History* with its index, and with his *Naval Memoirs*, p. 59, where the source of this error is seen; for there he says, that Sir Cloudesley Shovel, being ordered to proceed to Kingsale, received intelligence, when he was near the river of Waterford, that the town had surrendered two or three days; that is, the town of Waterford; but in his history he has put in, the town of Kingsale was surrendered, as if that town had stood on the river of Waterford.

After this happy success, the rear-admiral sailed for Limerick, where he was informed the French had a considerable number of ships; but finding soon after that the enemy had retired, and that his own squadron began to be in want of provisions and sea-stores; he came to a resolution of sailing to Plymouth, where he received a considerable reinforcement, with orders to proceed in quest of the enemy. But these orders, which came from the lords of the admiralty, were, on the 18th of September, countermanded by a fresh order from the king, directing him to detach ten ships into the Soundings for the protection of the trade, and to sail with the rest for the Downs; which he accordingly did.\*

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1690.

After raising the siege of Limerick, King William returned into England, where, in a council holden on the affairs of Ireland, which were still in a very precarious condition, many of the great cities, and most of the convenient ports being still held for King James, the earl of Marlborough proposed a plan for the immediate reduction of that island: he observed first, that our fleet was now at sea, and that of the French returned to Brest; in which situation, therefore, there was nothing to be feared in relation to descents. He farther remarked, that there were at least five thousand land-forces lying idle in England, which might be embarked on board the fleet even in this late season of the year, and land time enough to perform considerable service. The king readily accepted this offer; gave the command of the troops to the earl of Marlborough; and sent orders to the admirals to send the great ships about to Chatham; and to take on board the remainder of the fleet the forces ordered for this service.†

\* Burchet's Memoirs, p. 59, 60, 61, 62, 63. Kennet, Oldmixon, &c.

† Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 60. Life of John, duke of Marlborough. by Thomas Lediard, Esq.; vol. i. p. 63. Burchet's Naval History, p. 430.

The admirals hoisted their flag on board the Kent, a third rate; and, having embarked the troops with all imaginable expedition, arrived with them before the harbour of Cork on the 21st of September, in the afternoon. The next day, they attempted to enter; but were for some time prevented by the fire of a small battery of five guns, from which, however, the Irish were soon driven by two or three boats full of brave fellows; and then the whole fleet got into the harbour without any more interruption. On the 23d, the forces were landed; and joined a body of between three and four thousand men under the command of the duke of Wirtemberg, who, by an ill-timed dispute about the command, had nearly ruined the whole expedition.

The earl of Marlborough, as the elder lieutenant general, and commanding the troops that were principals, had, according to all the rules of service, a right to it; but the duke of Wirtemberg insisted on his being a prince, which at last, however, he was content to wave, and to consent they should command alternately. The city of Cork was very well fortified; and had in it a body of four thousand men: but the earl of Marlborough having observed that the place was commanded by an adjacent hill, he ordered a battery to be erected there on the 24th; which was performed with great expedition by five or six hundred seamen, carpenters, &c. and, after playing on the town for a few hours, made so considerable a breach, that, on the 25th, the generals resolved to attack it, in which they were assisted by ten pinnaces, manned by seamen well armed with hand-grenadoes from the fleet. The besieged were so terrified at this, that it was easily discerned the dispute would not continue long; and indeed the Irish instantly capitulated. \*

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\* We have a very fair account of this matter both in Burnet's History of his own Time, and in Bishop Kennet's Complete History: yet neither of those prelates were master enough of the subject to give

But, the very next day, the fleet received orders to retire, which they did, leaving a squadron under the command of the duke of Grafton to assist the general: but that brave nobleman, having received a wound in the shoulder in the attack before-mentioned, died within a few days; when the command devolved upon Captain Matthew Tenant, who was blown up in the *Breda* in Cork harbour; and then it fell to Captain Crofts, who attended the earl of Marlborough till after the reduction of Kingsale, as well as Cork, which surrendered on the 15th of October; and then brought over the victorious general, who was presented to his master at Kensington on the 28th of that month, after having atchieved, in a very few weeks, more than all the foreign generals had been able to do since the beginning of the war in Ireland.\*

A.D. 1690. The fleet arrived in the Downs on the 8th of October, bringing over with them, by the earl of Marlborough's desire, the governor of Cork, and several persons of quality, who were made prisoners when that city was taken. There the admirals received orders to divide their

their readers a proper idea of this extraordinary affair. The earl of Marlborough's expedition, all circumstances considered, was beyond comparison the most successful undertaking in the whole reign of King William; and even the reduction of Cork was such a mark of penetration as King William never forgot, since it depended entirely on his lordship's considering the situation of the place, and observing that all the pains taken in fortifying it were thrown away. If King James's French generals had undertaken as much, they would not have put four thousand men, and some of their best officers, into such a place; and, on the other hand, if King William's foreign officers had joined the light of genius to the knowledge they had acquired by experience, they would not have informed the king as they did, that the place could not be taken in less than six weeks even by a regular siege.

\* Burchet's *Memoirs*, p. 56, 57, 58. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. ix. p. 536—541, 551, wherein is an excellent account of this expedition, and very judicious remarks on its consequences. *Lediard's Life of the duke of Marlborough*, vol. i. book iii. ch. 2. *Life of King William*, p. 283.

fleet into small squadrons for several services ; and leave only a strong squadron in the Downs under the command of Sir Cloudesley Shovel, who cruized the remaining part of the year in the Soundings, without any success remarkable enough to deserve notice, except that the *Deptford* and the *Crown*, two small ships, took a small French man of war called the *Fripon*, commanded by Captain *St. Marca*, one of the briskest officers in the French service. She carried but eighteen guns and ten pattereroes ; and but a little before had engaged four Dutch privateers, whom she obliged to sheer off, though with the loss of thirty men killed and wounded : yet now, notwithstanding her force was so much weakened, she fought till her captain and lieutenants were desperately wounded, and her master killed ; nor did she yield at last, till her mainmast was shot away by the *Crown*, and she was boarded by the crew of that ship. When the rear-admiral had ended his cruize, he sent some of his ships to the coast of Ireland, others into the Soundings, and returned with the rest into the Downs : \* and thus ended the naval operations in Europe.

We ought next to proceed to the West Indies, where, within the compass of this year, there passed many things worthy of notice ; but as the critical observation of time in this case would necessarily occasion a great deal of perplexity in this narration ; and force us to consider it in such a manner as must render it very obscure as well as unconnected ; we shall therefore refer the history of the naval transactions there to that period in which they were completed ; and so take in the whole together, uniting the circumstances of the several expeditions in as clear and succinct a manner as the nature of the subject will allow. In the mean time, let us return to the inquiry made this winter into the conduct of the earl of Torrington, which

\* Burchet's Memoirs, p. 63.

was a point that exercised the thoughts of the ministry, and of both the houses of parliament, as well as it had done before the tongues of the people.

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The king, upon his return from Ireland, expressed great concern about this affair; the honour of the nation was in some measure affected; the common cry was very strong against the earl; and the queen had engaged her royal promise to the Dutch, that his conduct should undergo a strict examination. On the other hand, the earl had been very instrumental in the Revolution; had great alliances among the nobility; and had found the means of persuading many, that, instead of being called to an account for any real errors in his conduct, he was in danger of being sacrificed to the intrigues of his enemies, and the resentment of foreigners, merely for preserving the English fleet. The great difficulty lay in the manner of bringing him to a trial: the king was resolved it should be by a court martial; the friends of the earl maintained, that he ought to be tried by his peers. A doubt was likewise started as to the power of the lords of the admiralty; for though it was allowed, that the lord high admiral of England might have issued a commission for trying him; yet it was questioned, whether any such authority was lodged in the commissioners of the admiralty or not; and, though some great lawyers gave their opinions in the affirmative; yet it was judged expedient to settle so important a point by authority of parliament.\*

In order to obviate this difficulty, a new law was made declarative of the power of the commissioners of the admiralty;† and, immediately after the passing of this,

\* The reader may find much of this in Kennet, Burnet, Oldmixon, &c. Yet our account is chiefly taken from the journals of parliament, and some memoirs of those times, of which I shall give the reader a farther account in the memoirs of the earl of Torrington.

† Stat. 2 W. & M. sess. ii. cap. ii. it is declared, That all and singular authorities, jurisdictions, and powers, which by act of parliament or

these commissioners directed a court-martial to be holden for the trial of the earl, who was then sick in the Tower. On the 10th of December, this court-martial met on board the Kent frigate at Sheerness; Sir Ralph Delaval, who had acted as vice-admiral of the blue in the engagement, being president, and all the members of the court such as were believed to be absolutely independent of the person they were to try. The charge against the earl was, that, in the late engagement off Beachy-head, he had, through treachery or cowardice, misbehaved in his office, drawn dishonour on the English nation, and sacrificed our good allies the Dutch.

His lordship defended himself with great clearness of reason, and with extraordinary composure of mind. He observed, that, in the several councils of war holden before the fight, not only himself, but all the admirals in the fleet were against engaging. He took notice of the queen's express order, which obliged them to fight against their own opinion, and without any probability of success. He remarked the inequality of the confederate and French fleets; the former, consisting but of fifty-six, and the latter, having eighty-two actually engaged. He asserted, that the Dutch were destroyed by their own rashness; and that, if he had sustained them in the manner they expected, the whole confederate fleet must have been surrounded as they were; and as some reflections had

otherwise are invested in the lord high-admiral of England for the time being, have always appertained to, and shall be used and executed by the commissioners of the admiralty, as if they were so used and executed by the lord high-admiral. Every officer present upon trials of offenders by court-martial, to be held by virtue of any commission granted by the lord high-admiral, or commissioners of the admiralty, shall, before any proceeding to trial, take this oath, to be administered by the judge-advocate, or his deputy, *viz.*

“ You shall well and truly try the matter now before you, between  
“ our sovereign lord and lady the king and queen's majesty, and the  
“ prisoner to be tried. “ So HELP YOU GOD.”

been thrown out of his having a picque against the Dutch, to gratify which he had given them up, he not only justified himself very warmly on that point, but concluded his defence with saying, that his conduct had saved the English fleet, and that he hoped an English court-martial would not sacrifice him to Dutch resentment.\*

After a full hearing, and strict examination of all that had been advanced on both sides; his lordship was unanimously acquitted.† And though some writers of our own, as well as of another nation, have taken great liberties with this judgment of the court-martial;‡ yet,

\* See a farther account of this matter in the subsequent memoirs of the earl of Torrington.

† Burchet's *Memoirs*, p. 51. Kennet's *History of England*, vol. iii. p. 603. *Life of King William*, p. 275.

‡ Bishop Burnet in his *History of his own Time*, expresses himself with his wonted sharpness. "The commissioners of the admiralty," says he, "named a court to try him, who did it with so gross a partiality, that it reflected much on the justice of the nation; so that, if it had not been for the great interest the king had in the states, it might have occasioned a breach of the alliance between them and us. He came off safe as to his person and estate, but much loaded in his reputation, some charging him with want of courage, while others imputed his ill conduct to a haughty sullenness of temper, that made him, since orders were sent him contrary to the advices he had given, to resolve indeed to obey them and fight, but in such a manner as should cast the blame on those who had sent him the orders, and give them cause to repent of it."—The malignity of these reflections destroys their credit, and the weight of the charge overturns it. If the proceedings of the court-martial had been scandalously unjust, our prelate would not have been at a loss for the earl of Torrington's crime. His judges were upon oath, and regarded nothing therefore but proof. Indeed this was happy for him; for had they been governed like the bishop, by conjectures, and guessed at the thoughts of his heart, instead of examining his actions, he might have been punished, though he had not been guilty. The *Sieur De Monte*, in his *Political Mercury* for the month of January, 1691, censures the judgment of the court-martial severely, and says, the king was so displeased with it, that he resolved never to employ any of its members. What credit is due to this, we may easily guess, if we consider that Sir Ralph Delaval, the president of that court-martial, was immediately employed as vice-admiral of



on the whole, there seems to be no just ground either for censuring them, or fixing any imputation on the memory of that noble person.\* It is true, the day after his acquittal, the king took away his commission, and he was thence-forward laid aside; which might be a very right step in politics, as it tended to satisfy our allies, and gave his majesty an opportunity of employing a more fortunate officer. †

The care of the administration to repair all past errors in naval affairs, and to retrieve the honour of the maritime powers, appeared visibly in the measures taken for sending a great fleet early to sea in the spring of the year 1691. In order to this, the week after, the earl of Torrington was dismissed from his command; Edward Russel, Esq. was appointed admiral and commander in chief; and immediately received instructions to use the utmost expedition in drawing together the ships of which his fleet was to be composed; and a list of them, to the number of ninety-one, of which fifty-seven were of the line of battle, was annexed to his instructions. He executed these directions with the utmost skill and diligence; and, by the 7th of May, was ready to put to sea.

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The blue squadron was commanded by Henry Killgrew, Esq. as Admiral; Sir Ralph Delaval, vice-admiral; Sir Cloudesley Shovel, rear-admiral. Admiral Russel in the *Britannia* commanded the red squadron, having, for

the blue. Another foreign writer says, that the king dismissed some of the members of that court, and forty-two captains of the navy, who were supposed to be in the earl's interest. This alone is sufficient to shew his innocence. An English admiral, capable of cowardice or treachery, could have no such interest.

\* Bishop Kennet tells us, that in the year 1697, several French officers coming over after the peace, when they could not be suspected of partiality, openly justified and commended the earl's conduct, and said, "He deserved to be rewarded rather than censured, since he had preserved the best part of the fleet from being destroyed."

† Burchet's *Memoirs*, p. 51. *Columna Rostrata*, p. 258. *Tindal's Continuation of Rapin*, vol. iii. p. 145.

his vice-admiral and rear-admirals, Sir John Ashby, and George Rooke, Esq. : as to the particular strength of these squadrons, having seen a more perfect list than that exhibited by Mr. Burchet, I have given an abstract of it at the bottom of the page.\* His orders were to proceed in the Soundings as soon as he should be joined by the Dutch; and he was likewise directed to take care to block up the port of Dunkirk, in order to prevent the French privateers from disturbing our trade. These directions, however, were but indifferently executed; which our writers attribute to the slowness of the Dutch in sending their ships to join the confederate fleet, which they had stipulated to do by the beginning of May, according to the proportion of five to eight; though Bishop Burnet says of three to five, of equal rates and strength. Secretary Burchet, however, complains, that it was late in the month of May before there were so many as twenty-eight Dutch ships in the fleet; whereas, according to the list published by the states-general in the very same month, there ought to have been forty-six, and those too very large ships.† This, however, is certain, that, notwith-

## \* BLUE SQUADRON.

## RED SQUADRON.

	Guns.	Men.		Guns.	Men.
2 First rates	200	1,600	3 First rates	300	2,400
6 Second rates	570	3,960	5 Second rates	470	3,300
16 Third rates	1,090	7,040	16 Third rates	1,090	7,040
4 Fourth rates	200	1,000	5 Fourth rates	250	1,250
<hr/>			<hr/>		
28	2,060	13,600	29	2,110	13,990
3 Frigates.			3 Frigates.		
2 Hospital ships.			2 Hospital ships.		
1 Yacht.			1 Yacht.		
10 Fire-ships.			10 Fire ships.		

† According to this list the Rotterdam squadron consisted of eleven ships from 80 to 50 guns; the Amsterdam squadron of sixteen from 92 to 50 guns; the North Holland of five from 86 to 50 guns; the Friesland of six from 70 to 52 guns; the Zealand of eight from 92 to 50 guns; in all forty-six capital ships carrying 3,002 guns.

standing all his skill and care, Admiral Russel found his fleet but indifferently manned, and very scantily victualled; at the same time he was so perplexed by his orders, and with the difficulties started upon every occasion by the Dutch admiral, who very probably was as much cramped by his, that a great part of the months of May and June were spent to very little purpose; and, though the French fleet was not in such forwardness this year as it had been the last, yet it was at sea some time before our fleet had any intelligence of it.\*

If we may judge from appearances, one may safely say, that Lewis XIV. shewed a singular vanity in maintaining a prodigious naval force, to make all Europe see how soon, and how effectually, his councils had been able to create a maritime power. He had, at this time, to deal with the English, Spaniards, and Dutch; and as he was now in the zenith of his glory, he exhausted his treasures, in order, had it been possible, to render himself master at sea. He appointed the Count d'Estrees, vice-admiral of France, to command in the Mediterranean a fleet consisting of four large men of war, five frigates, twenty-six gallics, and three bomb vessels† and, on the other hand, Count Tourville was directed to assemble the grand fleet intended for the ocean: it consisted of three squadrons, the white and blue commanded by M. Chatteau Renault in the Royal Dauphin of one hundred guns; the white squadron commanded by Count Tourville in person in the Royal Sun, the finest ship in France, which carried one hundred and six guns; the blue squadron under the Marquis d'Amfreville in the Superbe of ninety-eight guns.‡ This fleet, though very considerable, and excel-

A.D.  
1691.

\* Burchet's Memoirs, p. 63, 64. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 73. Columna Rostrata.

† Hist. Militaire, tom. ii. p. 446. Pere Daniel Hist. de France.

‡ I take this from the Marquis de Quincy, who has given us an exact list of them, according to which the blue and white squadron

lently provided with every thing necessary, yet was inferiour in force to that of the confederates; and therefore Count Tourville was instructed to avoid an engagement as much as possible, and to amuse the enemy, by keeping, as long as might be, in the channel. This great officer did all that could be expected from him, in order to put early to sea; but, in spite of all his diligence and application, it was the middle of June before he left the port of Brest. But then it must be observed, that a squadron had been sent under the command of the Marquis de Nesmonde, to carry supplies of all sorts for the relief of King James's army in Ireland. \*

These were indeed great things, and what, all circumstances considered, one could scarcely conceive the French able to perform; yet they were far short of what it was believed in England at that time they were in a condition to undertake; and therefore so many accounts were sent to our admiral from court, of descents to be made here, forces to be convoyed there, and other strange projects, that he was hindered from pursuing either the orders that were first given him, or executing his own designs; and, though he discovered a good deal of uneasiness under this, yet he continued for many weeks to complain and obey. †

A.D.  
1691.

The Smyrna fleet was expected home this spring; and, as the English and Dutch had a joint concern therein to the amount of upwards of four millions sterling, both nations were extremely apprehensive of its being attacked by the French; and therefore, very precise orders were sent to Admiral Russel to use his utmost care for its preservation; and this he performed with equal industry

consisted of twenty-four ships, the white of twenty-five, and the blue of twenty-four; in all seventy-three capital ships, carrying 1,544 guns, and 29,450 men, together with twenty-one fire-ships.

\* Hist. Militaire, tom. ii. p. 455.

† Burchet's Memoirs, p. 71.

and success; for, having appointed single ships to cruize for them on every point of the compass, he crossed with the body of the fleet to Cape-Clear on the Irish coast; and, being off Kingsale, received advice, that the Smyrna fleet was arrived safely in that harbour. Upon this, he sent orders to Captain Aylmer to join him immediately with the squadron under his command, resolving to conduct the Smyrna fleet as far as Scilly; and then, if they had a fair wind, to leave them to proceed up the channel; having first taken the necessary precaution of sending a frigate before to Plymouth, that he might be satisfied none of the enemy's ships were upon the coast. \*

Upon parting with this fleet, the admiral determined to lie off Ushant, and, if the French were gone from thence, to follow them to Belle-Isle; but, being afterwards of opinion that they lay in the sea purposely to avoid him, he altered his resolutions, and resolved to go into a more proper station in search of them; so that, parting with the Smyrna fleet off Scilly the 13th of July, he first bent his course towards the French coast, from whence he sent a letter to the secretary of state, desiring that it might be considered, whether the fleet, before its return, could be serviceable toward the reduction of Ireland; for that the provisions on board would last no longer than the latter end of August; and, after that month was expired, he thought it not safe for the great ships to be out of harbour; but he desired that supplies of provision might be ready at Plymouth, that so the want of them might not incapacitate the fleet to perform any necessary service.

A. D.  
1691.

Arriving in this station, Sir Cloudesley Shovel was sent to look into Brest, where he saw about forty sail coming out of that port, which proved to be a fleet of merchant ships from Bretagne, escorted by three men of

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 441. Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 622. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. u. p. 65

war. Sir Cloudesley, to decoy these ships into his hands, made use of an excellent stratagem : he knew the French had intelligence that a small squadron of their fleet had made prizes of several English merchantmen ; laying hold, therefore, of this piece of false news, he ordered part of his squadron to put out French colours, and the rest to take in theirs. By this method he thought to deceive the French, who might naturally suppose it that squadron with their prizes. This succeeded in part ; but the enemy discovered the cheat before he was near enough to do much mischief.\*

A.D.  
1691.

Toward the latter end of the month of July, Admiral Russel fell in with a convoy going to the French fleet with fresh provisions ; some of these were taken, and from them he learnt that Count Tourville had orders to avoid fighting ; which he very punctually obeyed ; keeping scouts at a considerable distance on all points of the compass by which he could be approached ; and these being chased by ours, they immediately ran, making signals to others that lay within them ; so that it was impossible to come up with the body of their fleet, though that of the English and Dutch sailed in such a posture, that the scouts on each wing, as well as those a-head and a-stern, could in clear weather see twenty leagues round. †

The admiral, being sensible of the dangers that might attend this situation, wrote home for fresh orders ; which he received, but found them so perplexed, that having intelligence of the French fleet had gone into Brest ; he returned, in the beginning of August, pursuant to the resolution of a council of war, to Torbay, from whence he wrote up to court to have his last orders explained. In return he was directed to put to sea again, which he did ; and notwithstanding his frequent representations of the inconvenience of having such large ships exposed to the

\* Burchet's Memoirs, p. 87.

† Mercure Historique et Politique, tom. xi. p. 117, 239.

rough weather, which usually happens about the equinox; he was obliged to continue in the Soundings to the 2d of September, when he met with such a violent storm, that, after doing all that could be done for the preservation of the fleet, he was constrained to bear up for so dangerous a port as Plymouth; and doing this, through the violence of the wind, and the haziness of the weather, the ships were so scattered, that the greatest part of them were not seen when the admiral himself came to an anchor in the Sound; but, when it grew somewhat clearer, one of the second rates, which proved to be the Coronation, was discovered at anchor off Ram-head, without any thing standing but the ensign-staff; and soon after she foundered, her commander Captain Shelton, together with her company, except a very inconsiderable number, being lost. Many of the largest ships were not able to weather the easternmost point of land at the entrance into Plymouth-sound; and therefore were constrained to take sanctuary there, in that unavoidable confusion, which a lee-shore, thick weather, and a very hard gale of wind, will always occasion; insomuch that the Harwich, a third rate, ran on shore, and bulged near Mount Edgcombe-house; and the Royal Oak and Northumberland tailed on the ground, though afterwards they were luckily got off. A great Dutch ship was seen at anchor above five leagues in the offing, with all her masts gone; and several there were that very narrowly escaped the danger of the Edystone.\*

The admiral immediately gave orders for refitting such of the ships as had been damaged in the storm, and left Sir Cloudesley Shovel at Plymouth to see it performed; directing him, as soon as they were in a condition to sail, to send a squadron of ten sail into the Soundings for the security of the homeward-bound trade; himself, with the

A.D.  
1694

\* Burchet's Memoirs, p. 103. Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 622. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 65. Mercure Historique et Politique, tom. xi. p. 448.

rest of the fleet, steering for Spithead, where soon after he received orders to send the largest ships about to Chatham, as the Dutch admiral did to return home, with the first and second rates under his command. Admiral Russel was likewise directed to form a squadron of thirty sail of English and Dutch ships to be sent to the coast of Ireland; and he accordingly appointed Vice-admiral Delaval for this command, who four times attempted to execute his orders, and was as often forced back by contrary winds; which, however, proved of no detriment to the service, since the intelligence received of the French sending a fleet to Limerick, proved false.\* Thus ended the naval operations of the year 1691, very little to the profit, honour, or satisfaction of the nation. Yet certainly nothing could be charged on the admiral's conduct, who did all that could be expected from an able and vigilant officer; though his endeavours were frustrated by many clashing and contradictory orders from home; the artful conduct of a cautious enemy; and the unavoidable effects of high winds and boisterous weather.

We need not wonder, therefore, either at the attempts made in the house of commons, to fasten upon him the miscarriages, as they were called,† at sea; or the ill-natured censures glanced at his memory by some peevish writers,‡ with whom want of fortune will always imply want of skill and integrity: these are things not to be

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 449, 450.

† The house ordered the admiral's instructions, and the letters written to, and by him, to be laid before them, which sufficiently cleared him from all blame.

‡ Bishop Burnet says, the season went over without any action, and Russel, at the end of it, came into Plymouth in a storm; which was much censured; for that road is not safe; and two considerable ships were lost upon the occasion. Great factions were among the flag-officers, and no other service was done by this great equipment, but that our trade was maintained. This remark is worth nothing, unless Admiral Russel had it in commission to direct the winds; for in a storm folks do not make for the best but for the nearest port.



avoided, or indeed much to be heeded. The storm in the house of commons never gathered to a head; for those who misinterpreted the admiral's conduct found, on inspecting papers, that it was not for their interest to examine it; and as for our censorious authors, their reflections have recoiled upon themselves.

It was now become evident to the whole nation, that, with respect of our honour and interest in this war, the management of affairs at sea was chiefly to be regarded; and yet, by an unaccountable series of wrong councils, the management of these affairs was in reality less regarded than any thing else. The absolute reduction of Ireland, and the war in Flanders, seemed to occupy the king's thoughts entirely; and the care of the navy was left wholly to the board of admiralty, who, to speak in the softest terms, did not manage it very successfully, or much to the satisfaction of the nation. There were, besides, some other things which contributed to make our maritime councils move slowly. There was a faction grown up in the fleet against the admiral; and, at the same time, the government entertained a great jealousy of many of the officers, though to this hour it remains a secret, whether it were or were not well grounded.\*

The truth seems to be, that King James was better known to the officers of the fleet, than to any other set of men in England; most of them had served under him when lord high-admiral, and many had been preferred by him; which rendered it highly probable they might have an esteem for his person; but that any of these officers intended to act in his favour, in conjunction with a French force, against their country, is very unlikely; especially if we consider the unanimity with which they went into the revolution, which had been openly acknowledged, and they solemnly thanked for it by the convention. Yet the report

\* Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 92. Kennet, Oldmixon.

of the contrary was grown wonderfully loud, and seems to have been very artfully propagated by the enemies of particular persons, as well as by those who were no friends to the government; for it must be allowed, that King James's agents here boasted in all the advices they sent him, that they had brought back many of the officers of the navy to his interest; and they went so far as to name some of them, which they might do from many other motives than that of speaking truth. \* However it was, this is certain, that in parliament, at court, and in the navy, nothing was heard of but jealousies, ill conduct, and want of sufficient supplies for the service; a kind of discourse that lasted all the winter, and was productive of many bad consequences.

A. D.  
1692.

In the spring of the year 1692, a little before the king went to Holland, he began to communicate his intentions, as to the employment of the fleet, to Admiral Russel, who had been again appointed admiral and commander in chief by commission, dated December the 3d, 1691. At this time, however, he was very far from standing in high favour. † He had expostulated freely with his majesty on the disgrace of the earl of Marlborough, and lived on no extraordinary terms with the new secretary Lord Nottingham; but his character as an officer, and his known steadiness in revolution-principles, supported him; and the king resolved to confide the fleet to his care almost whether the admiral would or not.

\* The agent sent over by King James's adherents was one Captain Lloyd, to whom they gave a very exact list of the English fleet, and directed him particularly to inform the king, that, among other great sea officers, they had brought over Rear-admiral Carter to his service; when this was first talked of, a report prevailed, that he had ten thousand pounds given him; but of the falsehood of this story we shall have occasion to speak more largely hereafter. See Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 639. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 73.

† Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 92. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xii. p. 206.

The principal thing that seems to have been intended was, convincing not France alone, but also all Europe, that the maritime powers were still lords of the sea, by fitting out early such a fleet as should keep their enemies in awe, while a descent was made in Normandy. Something of this kind King William intimated in his speech to the parliament, and was certainly expected both by this nation and the Dutch. When, therefore, the king left England in the beginning of March, his instructions to Admiral Russel were, to use all imaginable diligence in getting the fleet out to sea; and, at the same time, he was promised, that his majesty would not fail to quicken the Dutch: but we shall soon see, that all these schemes were suddenly altered; and that, if the king's new ministry had been but furnished with tolerable intelligence, these schemes could never have entered into their heads.\* To be clear in this point, we must look over to the transactions in France.

As soon as Lewis XIV. perceived, either through unavoidable misfortunes, or the intrigues of his own ministers, that it was a thing impossible to support the war in Ireland any longer to advantage; he came to a resolution of employing the forces, that were still left King James, to serve his purpose another way. With this view he concerted, with the malcontents in England, an invasion on the coast of Sussex; and though for this design it was necessary to draw together a great number of transports, as well as a very considerable body of forces; yet he had

\* In order to prove the truth of this account, I shall refer the reader to the *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xii. p. 421, 422, wherein we are assured, that the scheme of making a descent on France was taken from King William's own mouth; that orders were given for having a prodigious number of pontoons and flat-bottomed boats ready by the latter end of June; and that the duke of Leinster, who was son to Marshal Schomberg, was to command the forces employed in this service. See also Burnet's *History of his own Time*, vol. ii. p. 92.

both in readiness, before it was so much <sup>\*</sup>as suspected here. The land-army consisted of fourteen battalions of English and Irish troops, and about nine thousand French, commanded by Marshal De Belfondes; - so that in all there could not be less than twenty thousand men. \* The fleet of transports consisted of three hundred sail, and was well provided with every thing necessary for the invasion. In short, nothing was wanting to the execution of this design, in the beginning of April, but the arrival of Count d'Estrees's squadron of twelve men of war, which was to escort the embarkation; while the Count De Tourville cruized in the channel with the grand fleet, which was also ready to put to sea, but was detained by contrary winds. Things being in this situation, King James sent over Colonel Parker, and some other agents of his, to give his friends intelligence of his motions; and some of these people, in hopes of reward, gave the first clear account of the whole design to our government at home; upon which, order after order was sent to Admiral Russel to hasten out to sea, in whatever condition the fleet might be at this time. †

A.D. 1692. There were at this very critical juncture two considerable squadrons at sea; one under the command of Sir Ralph Delaval, which was sent to bring home a fleet of

\* *Histoire Militaire*, tom. ii. p. 473, 577. Burnet's *History of his own Time*, vol. ii. p. 93. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xii. p. 525, 526.

† Queen Mary behaved on this occasion with great wisdom and firmness of mind; for, without discovering any apprehensions of danger, she took all the precautions that were necessary to prevent it, by publishing a proclamation requiring all Papists to quit the cities of London and Westminster; another for assembling both houses of parliament; and a third for apprehending the earls of Scarsdale, Litchfield, Newbourg, Middleton, and Dunmore, the lords Griffin and Forbes, Sir John Fenwicke, Sir Theophilus Oglethorp, Sir Andrew Forrester, and several other persons of distinction, supposed to be in her father's interest. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xii. p. 551, 553.

merchantmen from the Mediterranean; the other under Rear-admiral Carter, near the French coast. It was apprehended, that the French would have endeavoured to intercept the former; and therefore, on the last of February, orders were sent by the Groin packet-boat to Vice-admiral Delaval, to avoid coming near Cape St. Vincent, but rather to sail to Dingle Bay, the mouth of the Shannon, or some other port thereabouts.\* But, for fear these orders might not reach him soon enough at Cadiz, an advice-boat was ordered to cruize for him off Cape Clear, with instructions to put into Cork or Kingsale. However, both these orders missed him, and he was so fortunate as to arrive in the beginning of March safe in the Downs.

As for Rear-admiral Carter, he was ordered to continue cruizing with his squadron of eighteen sail, as near the French coast as it was possible, in order to be the better and more certainly informed of what they were doing.† His majesty King William, as soon as he arrived in Holland, took care to hasten the naval preparations with unusual diligence; so that the fleet was ready to put to sea much sooner than had been expected, or at least much sooner than it had done the year before, and was also in a much better condition. As for our admiral, he went on board in the beginning of May; and, observing how great advantage the French might reap by the division of such considerable squadrons from our fleet, his first care was to write to court on this subject; and to desire, that a certain place might be fixed for their conjunction; and that timely notice might be given to all persons concerned. In return to this, he had orders sent him to cruize between

\* Burchet's Memoirs, p. 129.

† See the London Gazette, No. 2749, whereby it appears, that Sir Ralph Delaval's squadron consisted of sixteen English and Dutch men of war, and had under convoy seventy merchantmen richly laden. Burchet's Naval History, p. 461. Kennet, and other writers.

Cape la Hogue and the Isle of Wight, till the squadrons should join with him, though he had proposed the junction should be made off Beachy-head. However, he obeyed his orders as soon as he received them; and plyed it down through the sands with a very scanty wind, contrary to the opinion of many of his officers, and all the pilots, who were against hazarding so great a fleet in so dangerous an attempt; and yet to this bold stroke of the admiral, which was his own, was owing all his following success.

On the 8th the fleet came safe off Rye, and that night the admiral sent to the Dutch admiral to weigh and make sail after him, that no time might be lost; and he also sent a squadron of small ships to look for Sir Ralph Delaval, being in great pain till the whole confederate fleet was in a body. On the 11th of May, he sailed from Rye-bay for St. Helen's; where in two days time, he was joined by Sir Ralph Delaval, and Rear-admiral Carter, with their squadrons. \* While they lay here, the admiral received a letter from the earl of Nottingham, as secretary of state, written by Queen Mary's direction, wherein he was informed, that a scandalous and malicious report was spread, as if some of the officers of their majesties fleet were disaffected, or not hearty in their service; and that her majesty had thereupon been pressed to the discharge of many of them from their employments: but her majesty charged the admiral to acquaint his officers, that she was satisfied this report was raised by the enemies of the government; and that she reposed so entire a confidence in their fidelity, that she had resolved not to displace so much as one of them. Upon this the flag-officers and captains drew up a very dutiful and loyal address, dated from on board the *Britannia* at St. Helen's, May the 15th, 1692, which was the same day transmitted to court; and on the next, presented by the lords of the admiralty to her majesty.

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 464.

who was pleased to make this wise and gracious answer, which was published that night in the Gazette: "I always had this opinion of the commanders; but I am glad this is come to satisfy others." \*

When all the ships, English and Dutch, were come together, the admiral proposed, that a small detachment of six or eight frigates might be sent to hover about the coast of Normandy; that, at the same time, the forces intended for a descent should embark, and be landed at St. Maloes; and the grand fleet lie westward of that place, in order to protect them from the enemy. This proposition being in part approved, he detached six light ships to gain intelligence; and, it being left to him to proceed as a council of war should advise; he sailed, on the 18th of May, for the coast of France. The next day, about three in the morning, the scouts, westward of the fleet, fired swivel guns, and, being in a short time in sight, made the signal of discovering the enemy. Immediately orders were given for drawing into a line of battle; and the signal was made for the rear of the fleet to tack, in order to engage the sooner, if the French had stood to the northward. A little after four, the sun dispersing the fog, the enemy were seen standing southward. The admiral upon this, caused the signal for the rear to tack to be taken in, and bore away with his ship so far leeward, as that each ship in the fleet might fetch his wake, and then be brought to, and lay by, with his fore-top-sail to the mast; that so others might have the better opportunity of placing themselves according to the manner formerly directed on such an occasion.†

\* I give in some respects a different account of this affair from what the reader will meet with in Burchet, and the rest of our historians. But then I do this from the Gazette itself, No. 2767, wherein the reasons I have assigned are expressly mentioned. See likewise the *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xii. p. 646.

† Burchet's *Memoirs*, p. 138, 139. It will be proper to give the reader here an abstract of the force of the respective fleets:

A.D.  
1692.

The confederate fleet was in good order by eight, having the Dutch squadron in the van, the red in the centre, and the blue in the rear. About ten the French fleet bore down upon them with great resolution. About half an hour after eleven, Count Tourville in the Royal Sun, brought to, and began the fight with Admiral Russel, being within three quarters musket-shot. He plyed his guns very warmly till one, but then began to tow off in great disorder; his rigging, sails, and top-sail yards being very much wounded. About two the wind shifted; so that five of the enemy's blue squadron posted themselves, three a-head, and two a-stern of their admiral, and fired very briskly till after three. The admiral and his two

#### THE RED SQUADRON.

Rates.	Men.	Guns.
5 First	3,835	500
3 Second	1,800	270
16 Thrd	6,000	1,100
7 Fourth	1,860	350
—	—	—
31	13,895	2,220

The Right Honourable Edward Russel, Esq. admiral, commander-in chief.

Sir Ralph Delaval, vice-admiral.

Sir Cloudesley Shovel, rear-admiral.

Sir John Ashby, admiral.

George Rooke, Esq. vice-admiral.

Richard Carter, Esq. rear-admiral.

#### THE DUTCH SQUADRON.

Rates.	Men.	Guns.
9 First	4,515	796
10 Second	3,766	772
9 Third	2,925	640
8 Fourth	1,845	406
—	—	—
36	13,051	2,614

Admiral Allemande.

Vice-admiral Callembergh.

Rear-admiral Vandergoes.

#### THE BLUE SQUADRON.

Rates.	Men.	Guns.
1 First	780	100
7 Second	4,655	636
18 Third	7,710	1,270
6 Fourth	1,500	304
—	—	—
32	14,675	2,310

So that Admiral Russel had 99 ships of the line under his command, and Count Tourville but 63, some of which were detached at the time of the action.

#### THE FRENCH FLEET.

##### THE VAN.

26 Ships from 90 to 60 guns.

##### THE CENTRE.

25 Ships from 104 to 54 guns.

##### THE REAR.

12 Ships from 94 to 54 guns.



seconds, Mr. Churchil and Mr. Aylmer, had all these ships to deal with. There was so thick a fog about four, that the enemy could not be seen; and, as soon as it was cleared up, the French admiral was discovered towing away northward; upon which the admiral followed him, and made the signal for chasing.

While this passed between the admirals, Sir Cloudesley Shovel had gotten to the windward of Count Tourville's squadron, and engaged them; but, the fog growing darker than before, they were forced to anchor: and about this time it was that captain, some lists call him colonel, Hastings, in the Sandwich, was killed, driving through those ships of the enemy, because his anchors were not clear. The weather clearing up a little, the French followed their flying admiral, and the English chaced the best they could. About eight in the evening it grew foggy again; and part of the English blue squadron, having fallen in with the enemy, engaged about half an hour, till, having lost four ships, they bore away for Conquet-Road.\* In this short action, Rear-admiral Carter was killed, whose last words effectually confuted the base reports spread to blemish his reputation; for, finding himself mortally wounded, he recommended it to Captain Wright, who commanded his ship, to fight her as long as she could swim.†

The 20th of May proved so dark and foggy, that it was eight o'clock before the Dutch discovered the enemy; and then the whole fleet began to chace, the French crowding away westward. About four in the afternoon, both fleets anchored; about ten they weighed again, and about twelve, Admiral Russel's fore-top-mast came by the board.‡

\* Burchet's Memoirs, p. 139, 140, 141. Life of King William, p. 332.

† The manner of his death shews how false the aspersion was, that he had taken ten thousand pounds to fire upon the French only with powder, who were to return the like, and then he was to go over to them with his squadron. As he certainly died like a man of honour, it is but just to believe, that he was strictly such while he lived.

‡ Burchet's Memoirs, p. 143.

On the 22d, about seven in the morning, the English fleet continued the chase with all the success they could desire; about eleven the French admiral ran a-shore, and cut her masts away; upon this her two seconds plyed up to her, and other ships began to hover about them; upon which the admiral sent to Sir Ralph Delaval, who was in the rear, to keep with him a strength sufficient to destroy those ships, and to send the rest, that were under his command, to join the body of the fleet. In the evening, a great number of the enemy's ships were seen going into La Hogue. On the 23d, the admiral sent in Sir George Rooke, with several men-of-war, fire-ships, and all the boats of the fleet, to destroy these ships in the bay. On their entering, it was perceived, that there were thirteen sail; but they were got up so high, that none but the small frigates could do any service. Sir George, however, was resolved to execute his orders; and therefore, having manned his boats, he went in person to encourage the attempt, burnt six of them that night, and the other seven the next morning, together with a great number of transport ships, and other vessels laden with ammunition. One would think this was a remarkable piece of service: indeed it was by much the greatest that happened during the whole affair; for it was performed under a prodigious fire from the enemy's battery on shore, and within sight of the Irish camp, and with the loss only of ten men: \* yet Bishop Burnet, by an odd stroke, either of ill humour or great negligence, has thought fit to blame Sir George, as if he had not been inclined to fight.

A.D. 1692. Sir John Ashby, with his own squadron and some Dutch ships, pursued the rest of the French fleet, till they ran

\* It appears by Admiral Allemande's letter to the States-general, that this was a most difficult and dangerous undertaking; and his letter was dated the very morning the thing was done, which is a much stronger proof of Admiral Rooke's merit, than if it had been written by an English admiral. *Le Clerc Hist. des Provinces Unies*, tom. iii. p. 422. *Mercurc Historique et Politique*, tom. xii. p. 624.

through the race of Alderney, among such rocks and shoals, that our pilots were absolutely against following them; for which that admiral has been also censured, though perhaps without cause; since some of the ablest seamen in England were of opinion, that there could not be a more desperate undertaking than the flight of the French ships through that passage. But though despair might justify them; yet, it does not appear to me an argument, that Sir John Ashby ought to have followed them. \* The two following original letters will set some other circumstances in a better light, and with greater weight of evidence, than could be done otherwise. Besides they are, the latter especially, become so scarce, as hardly to be met with.

SIR RALPH DELAVAL'S LETTER TO THE EARL OF NOTTINGHAM, FROM ON BOARD THE ROYAL SOVEREIGN.

" I believe it my duty to acquaint you, that on the 21st instant, Admiral Russel having made the signal for the fleet to cut their cables, I observed the French to be forced from the race of Alderney, where they anchored, to the eastward; and, finding that some of them endeavoured for the bay of Cherburgh, I stood in for that place, where I found three three-decked ships of the enemy, but so close to the shore, and within some rocks, that it was not safe for me to attempt them till I had informed myself of the road, they being hawled into shoal water.

" I immediately took my boats, and sounded within gun-shot of them, which they endeavoured to prevent by

\* The reader will be satisfied of this, if he cast his eye upon a sea chart, and consider the prodigious risk the French ran, in order to get through the race of Alderney. This circumstance is particularly taken notice of in our tar song on the victory of La Hogue, which shews what the seamen thought of it.

“ firing at us. And, that no time might be lost, I went immediately on board the *St. Alban's*, where, for the encouragement of the seamen, I hoisted my flag, and, having ordered the *Ruby* with two fire-ships to attend me, I stood in with them, leaving the great ships without, as drawing too much water. But, coming very near, they galled so extremely, and, finding the five ships could not get in, I judged it best to retreat without shot, and there anchored, and immediately called all the captains, where it was resolved to attack them in the morning with all the third and fourth rates, and fire-ships. But, after having drawn them into four fathoms and a half water, I found we could not do our business, the water being shoal. Upon which I ordered three fire-ships to prepare themselves to attempt the burning of them, going myself with all the barges and tenders to take them up, if by the enemy's shot they should miscarry.

“ Indeed I may say, and I hope without vanity, the service was warm, yet, God be praised, so effectually performed, that, notwithstanding all their shot both from their ships and fort, two of our fire-ships had good success by burning two of them; the other, by an unfortunate shot, was set on fire, being just going on board the enemy. Indeed, so brave was the attempt, that I think they can hardly be sufficiently rewarded, and doubt not but their majesties will do them right. The third French ship being run a-shore, and observing the people on board to go a-shore by boats-full, I ordered the *St. Alban's*, the *Reserve*, and others, to fire upon her, judging it might cause them to quit her. And, after having battered her some time, I observed she made no resistance, I took all the boats armed, and went on board her.

“ I found abundance of men on board, and several wounded, but no officers; and having caused all the

“ people as well those that were wounded as others, to be  
“ taken out, I set her on fire, and had I not had notice by  
“ my scouts, that thirty ships were standing with me, had  
“ sent all the French on shore, who are now very trouble-  
“ some to me. The ships we saw proved to be Sir John  
“ Ashby and the Dutch, coming from the westward. We  
“ are proceeding together to the eastward to La Hogue,  
“ where I am informed three or four of the enemy’s ships  
“ are ; and, if so, I hope God will give us good success.  
“ I expect to find the admiral to-morrow, where I hope  
“ to hear he has destroyed some of the enemy’s ships,  
“ having left him in chace of them last night, standing to  
“ the eastward, and pretty near them, as I judged. My  
“ lord I hope you will excuse me, if I presume to pray  
“ you will use your interest with the queen, that a reward  
“ may be given to the three captains of the fire-ships, and  
“ several of the others ; for greater zeal and greater  
“ bravery I never saw. I pray your excuse for being thus  
“ tedious, and thus particular. Pray God preserve their  
“ majesties ; and that their arms may be ever crowned  
“ with success by sea and land, shall be the prayers and  
“ endeavours of, &c.

“ Cherburgh, May 22, 1692.

“ P.S. Captain Heath burnt Tourville’s ship the Royal  
“ Sun, which was the most difficult; Captain Greenway  
“ burnt the other, called the Conquerant. The Admirable  
“ was burnt by our boats. Captain Fowles attempted the  
“ Royal Sun, but was set on fire by the enemy’s shot, yet  
“ deserves as well as the others.”

### Admiral RUSSEL's Letter to the Earl of Nottingham.

" MY LORD, Portsmouth, June 2, 1692.

" SINCE your Lordship seems to think, that an account  
" in general of the fleet's good success, is not so satisfactory,

" tory as one setting forth the particulars, I here send  
 " with as much brevity as the matter will admit of.  
 " must confess I was not much inclined to trouble you  
 " this nature, not being ambitious to see my name  
 " print on any occasion; but since it is your lordship  
 " command, I am the more inclined to give you the be  
 " information I am able of the action, having seen sever  
 " printed relations not very sincere.

" Wednesday in the evening, being the 18th of Ma  
 " standing over for Cape la Hogue, I ordered Capta  
 " Gillam in the Chester, and the Charles galley, to lay  
 " such a distance to the westward of the fleet, that the  
 " might discover any signals made from me.

" Thursday the 19th, standing with a small gale S. S. W  
 " the wind at W. and W. by S. hazy weather, Cape Ba  
 " fleur bearing then S. W. and by S. from me, distan  
 " about seven leagues. Between three and four in th  
 " morning, we heard several guns to the westward, ar  
 " in a short time I saw the two frigates making the sign  
 " of seeing the enemy, with their heads lying to th  
 " northward, which gave me reason to think that th  
 " enemy lay with their heads that way. Upon which,  
 " ordered the signal to be made for the fleet's drawin  
 " into a line of battle; after which I made the signal fo  
 " the rear of the fleet to tack, that, if the enemy stood  
 " the northward, we might the sooner come to engag  
 " But soon after four o'clock, the sun had a little cleare  
 " the weather, and I saw the French fleet standing to th  
 " southward, forming their line on the same tack that  
 " was upon. I then ordered the signal for the rear  
 " tack to be taken in, and at the same time bore awa  
 " with my own ship so far to leeward, as I judg'd eac  
 " ship in the fleet might fetch my wake or grain; the  
 " brought to again, lying by with my fore-top-sail to th  
 " mast, to give the ships in the fleet the better opportu  
 " nity of placing themselves as they had been befor

“ directed. By eight o'clock we had formed an indifferent  
“ line, stretching from the S.S.W. to the N.N.E. the  
“ Dutch in the van, the red in the centre, and the blue in  
“ the rear.

“ By nine o'clock the enemy's van-guard had stretched  
“ almost as far to the southward as ours, their admiral  
“ and rear-admiral of the blue, that were in the rear,  
“ closing the line, and their vice-admiral of the same  
“ division stretching to the rear of our fleet, but never  
“ coming within gun-shot of them. About ten they bore  
“ down upon us, I still lying with my fore-top-sail to the  
“ mast. I then observed Monsieur Tourville, the French  
“ admiral, put out his signal for battle. I gave orders  
“ that mine should not be hoisted till the fleets began to  
“ engage, that he might have the fairer opportunity of  
“ coming as near me as he thought convenient; and at the  
“ same time I sent orders to Admiral Allemande, that, as  
“ soon as any of his squadron could weather the enemy's  
“ fleet, they should tack and get to the westward of them,  
“ as also to the blue to make sail, and close the line, they  
“ being at some distance a-stern; but, as soon as the fleet  
“ began to engage, it fell calm, which prevented their so  
“ doing. About half an hour after eleven, Monsieur  
“ Tourville in the Royal Sun, (being within three quarters  
“ musket-shot) brought to, lying by me at that distance  
“ about an hour and a half, plying his guns very warmly,  
“ though I must observe to you, that our men fired their  
“ guns faster. After which time, I did not find his guns  
“ were fired with that vigour as before, and I could see  
“ him in great disorder, his rigging, sails, and top-sail  
“ yards being shot, and no body endeavouring to make  
“ them serviceable, and his boats towing of him to wind-  
“ ward, gave me reason to think he was much galled.  
“ About two the wind shifted to the N. W. and by W. and  
“ some little time after that, five fresh ships of the enemy's  
“ blue squadron came and posted themselves three a-head

“ of Monsieur Tourville, and two a-stern of him, and fired  
“ with great fury, which continued till after three.

“ About four in the evening there came so thick a fog,  
“ that we could not see a ship of the enemy's, which occasioned our leaving off firing for a long time; and then  
“ it cleared up, and we could see Monsieur Tourville  
“ towing away with his boats to the northward from us.  
“ Upon which, I did the same, and ordered all my division to do the like; and about half an hour after five we  
“ had a small breeze of wind easterly. I then made the  
“ signal for the fleet to chace, sending notice to all the  
“ ships about me, that the enemy were running. About  
“ this time I heard several broadsides to the westward;  
“ and, though I could not see the ships that fired, I concluded them to be our blue, that, by the shift of wind,  
“ had weathered the enemy; but it proved to be the rear-admiral of the red, who had weathered Tourville's  
“ squadron, and got between them and their admiral of  
“ the blue, where they lay firing some time; and then  
“ Tourville anchored with some ships of his own division,  
“ as also the rear-admiral of the red, with some of his.  
“ This was the time that Captain Hastings in the Sandwich was killed, he driving through those ships by  
“ reason of his anchors not being clear. I could not see  
“ this part because of the great smoke and fog, but have  
“ received this information from Sir Cloudesley Shovel  
“ since.

“ I sent to all the ships that I could think were near me,  
“ to chace to the westward all night, telling them I designed to follow the enemy to Brest, and sometimes we  
“ could see a French ship, two or three, standing away  
“ with all the sail they could make to the westward.  
“ About eight I heard firing to the westward, which lasted  
“ about half an hour, it being some of our blue fallen in  
“ with some of the ships of the enemy in the fog. It was  
“ foggy, and very little wind all night.



“ Friday the 20th, it was so thick in the morning that I  
“ could see none of the enemy’s ships, and but very few of  
“ our own. About eight it began to clear up: the  
“ Dutch, who were to the southward of me, made the  
“ signal of seeing the enemy; and, as it cleared, I saw  
“ about thirty-two or thirty-four sail distant from us  
“ between two and three leagues, the wind at E. N. E.  
“ and, they bearing from us W. S. W. our fleet chacing  
“ with all the sail they could make, having taken in the  
“ signal for the line of battle, that each ship might make  
“ the best of her way after the enemy. Between eleven  
“ and twelve the wind came to the S. W. The French  
“ plied to the westward with all the sail they could, and  
“ we after them. About four, the tide of ebb being done,  
“ the French anchored, as also we in forty-three fathom  
“ water, Cape Barfleur bearing S. and by W. About ten  
“ in the evening we weighed with the tide of ebb, the  
“ wind at S. W. and plied to the westward. About  
“ twelve my fore-top mast came by the board, having  
“ received several shot.

“ Saturday the 21st we continued still plying after the  
“ enemy till four in the morning. The tide of ebb being  
“ done, I anchored in forty-six fathom water, Cape la  
“ Hogue bearing S. and by W. and the island of Alderney  
“ S. S. W. By my top-mast’s going away, the Dutch  
“ squadron, and the admiral of the blue, with several of  
“ his squadron, had got a great way to windward of me.  
“ About seven in the morning, several of the enemy’s  
“ ships, being far advanced towards the race, I perceived  
“ driving to the eastward with the tide of flood. Between  
“ eight and nine, when they were driven so far to the  
“ eastward that I could fetch them, I made the signal for  
“ the fleet to cut and follow the enemy, which they all  
“ did, except the aforementioned weathermost ships,  
“ which rid fast to observe the motion of the rest of the  
“ enemy’s ships that continued in the race of Alderney.

“ About eleven I saw three great ships, fair under the  
 “ shore, tack and stand to the westward; but, after  
 “ making two or three short boards, the biggest of  
 “ them ran a-shore, who presently cut his masts away;  
 “ the other two, being to leeward of him, plied up to  
 “ him. The reason, as I judge, of their doing this, was,  
 “ that they could not weather our sternmost ships to the  
 “ westward, nor get out a-head of us to the eastward.

“ I observing that many of our ships hovered about  
 “ those, I sent to Sir Ralph Delaval, vice-admiral of the  
 “ red, who was in the rear of our fleet, to keep such  
 “ a number of ships and fire-ships with him as might be  
 “ sufficient to destroy those of the enemy, and to order the  
 “ others to follow me, I being then in pursuit of the rest  
 “ of the enemy: an account of the performing that service  
 “ I do not trouble your lordship with, he having given it  
 “ you already. About four in the afternoon eighteen sail  
 “ of the enemy's ships got to the eastward of Cape Bar-  
 “ fleur, after which I observed they hauled in for La  
 “ Hogue: the rear-admiral of the red, vice-admiral of  
 “ the blue, and some other ships, were a-head of me.  
 “ About ten at night I anchored in the Bay of La Hogue,  
 “ and lay till four the next morning, being

“ Sunday the 22d; and then I weighed and stood in  
 “ near the land of La Hogue; but, when we found the  
 “ flood came, we anchored in a good sandy ground. At  
 “ two in the afternoon we weighed again, and plied close  
 “ in with La Hogue, where we saw thirteen sail of the  
 “ enemy's men of war hauled close in with the shore.  
 “ The rear-admiral of the red tells me, that the night  
 “ before he saw the other five, which made up the  
 “ eighteen I first chased, stand to the eastward.

“ Monday the 23d, I sent in Vice-admiral Rooke with  
 “ several men of war and fire-ships, as also the boats of  
 “ the fleet, to destroy those ships; but the enemy had  
 “ gotten them so near the shore, that not any of our men

“ of war, except the small frigates, could do any service ;  
 “ but that night Vice-admiral Rooke, with the boats,  
 “ burnt six of them.

“ Tuesday the 24th, about eight in the morning,  
 “ he went in again with the boats, and burnt the other  
 “ seven, together with several transport ships and some  
 “ vessels with ammunition, the names of which ships I am  
 “ not yet able to give your lordship any other account of  
 “ than what I formerly sent you, which are as follow :

SHIPS NAMES.	COMMANDERS.	GUNS.
Soleil Royal.....	Count de Tourville.....	104
L'Ambitieux.....	{ Chevalier de la Villette, vice-ad- miral of the blue .....	{ 104
L'Admirable .....	Monsieur Bearjean.....	90
La Magnifique.....	{ Monsieur Cottologon, rear-admiral of the blue.....	{ 76
Le St. Philip .....	Monsieur Infreville .....	76
Le Conquerant.....	Du Magnon .....	76
Le Triumphant.....	Monsieur Bellemont.....	74
L'Etonant.....	Monsieur de Septime .....	80
Le Terrible .....	Monsieur Septville.....	80
L'Amiable .....	Monsieur de Raal.....	68
Le Fier.....	Monsieur Larsethoir .....	68
Le Glorieux.....	Le C. Chateaumoorant.....	60
Le Sereux.....	Monsieur Bernier.....	60
Le Trident.....	Monsieur Montaud.....	56

“ All the prisoners report a three-deck ship burnt by  
 “ accident, and the following sunk, how true I do not  
 “ know.

SHIPS NAMES.	COMMANDERS.	GUNS.
Le Prince.....	Monsieur Bagneuz .....	60
Le Sanspareil.....	Monsieur Ferille.....	60

“ Though these be all the names that I have been  
 “ able to learn, yet I am sure there are sixteen ships of  
 “ consequence burnt.

“ Wednesday the 25th, I sailed from La Hogue, order-  
 “ ing the admiral of the blue, with a squadron, of English

“ and Dutch ships under his command, to run along the  
 “ enemy’s coast, as far as Havre de Grace, in hopes that  
 “ some of the before-mentioned five ships, that stood to  
 “ the eastward, might have been got thither; but he  
 “ informs me that, upon his appearing before that place,  
 “ he could perceive but one or two small vessels. The  
 “ number of the enemy’s ships did not exceed fifty men of  
 “ war, by the best information, from fifty-six to one hun-  
 “ dred and four guns; and though it must be confessed,  
 “ that our number was superior to theirs, which probably  
 “ at first might startle them, yet, by their coming down  
 “ with that resolution, I cannot think it had any great  
 “ effect upon them: and this I may affirm for a truth, not  
 “ with any intention to value our own action, or to lessen  
 “ the bravery of the enemy, that they were beaten by a  
 “ number considerably less than theirs, the calmness and  
 “ thickness of the weather giving very few of the Dutch  
 “ or the blue the opportunity of engaging, which I am  
 “ sure they look upon as a great misfortune; and, had the  
 “ weather proved otherwise, I do not see how it was  
 “ possible for any of them to have escaped us.

“ This is the exactest account that I am able to give  
 “ you, which I hope will prove to your lordship’s satisfac-  
 “ tion. Vice-admiral Rooke has given me a very good  
 “ character of several men employed in the boats, and I  
 “ have ordered him to give me a list of the names of such  
 “ persons whose behaviour was remarkable, in order to  
 “ their reward. I am,\*

“ MY LORD,

“ Your Lordship’s most faithful,

“ humble servant,

“ E. RUSSEL.”

\* Admiral Russel’s Letter to the earl of Nottingham, containing an exact and particular Relation of the late happy victory and success against the French Fleet. Published by authority. In the Savoy printed by Edward Jones, 1692; folio.

It is very remarkable, that, though the confederate fleet was nearly double to that of the French, yet scarcely half of it could engage, which was owing to their original disposition; by which, as the reader may remember, the blue squadron, of which Sir George Rooke was rear-admiral, was directed to tack northward, and to weather, not at all to any deficiency in that admiral, as Bishop Burnet alledges: \* yet the defeat was one of the most signal that ever happened at sea. If, indeed, Sir John Ashby could have reached those that took shelter in St. Malo, it would have put an end in a good measure, to the French power at sea. † As it was, we must acknowledge it a most glorious victory, and that we ought to pay a just tribute of praise to the memories of all the brave men who atchieved it.

A.D.  
1692.

We find this affair, notwithstanding all the ruinous consequences that attended it, treated in such a style by the French writers, as to make it appear rather a victory than a defeat; and all this founded on the single circumstance of their attacking the English fleet. ‡ In order to explain that, we must observe, that Count Tourville found himself obliged to take this step, in obedience to his orders; which were so express, that they did not leave any room for him to exercise his judgment. He called a council of war, indeed, the night before the engagement; wherein most of the officers gave their opinions, that, considering the superiority of the confederate fleet, and the situation

\* See his History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 93.

† Burchet's Memoirs, p. 146. Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 640, 641. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 73. Columna Rostrata, p. 260, 261. Mercure Historique et Politique, tom. xii. p. 651.

‡ Hist. Militaire de Lewis XIV. tom. ii. p. 583. Journal Historique de Lewis XIV. par P. Daniel, p. 164. Hist. de Milice Francoise, tom. ii. p. 491. Memoirs de Forbin. Reincourt, tom. iii. p. 218. Histoire Chronologique du dernier siecle, p. 226. See Mercure Historique et Politique, tom. xii. p. 634, 639.

themselves were in, it was most prudent to avoid fighting. Upon this, after declaring his own sentiments to be the same with theirs, he produced the king's orders, which appeared to be so precise for fighting the English, whether strong or weak, that it was unanimously resolved to obey them.\* Several reasons have been assigned for the French king's giving such orders; and among these the most probable is, that he was mistaken as to the strength of both fleets.

A.D. 1692. As to his own, he looked upon it as certain, that Count d'Estrees, with his squadron, would have joined the fleet before any opportunity offered of fighting; and that Count Tourville's line of battle should have consisted of sixty-six ships at least. He was, however, deceived in both; Count d'Estrees met with such bad weather in passing the straits of Gibraltar, that, notwithstanding all the pains he could take, his squadron did not arrive at La Hogue till after the battle; and, though there were at that time sixty-six French men-of-war at sea; yet, from the detachments made for particular services, Count Tourville had but forty-four actually under his command, when he took this resolution to fight.† On the other side, it was presumed, that the English and Dutch fleets could not have joined so early; and that, if they had, still it would be impossible for them to unite with their two great squadrons then at sea, before the junction of the French fleets. In this, too, the king's foresight failed him; but then it was owing to that bold stroke of Admiral Russel before-mentioned, by which he joined the Dutch squadron ten days sooner than he could have done, if he had taken his pilot's advice. ‡

\* Hist. Militaire, tom. ii. p. 580, 581. Reincourt, tom. iii. p. 215. In all probability Count Tourville called this council of war to justify himself in respect to the sense in which he understood the king's orders.

† P. Daniel, M. de Quincy, and indeed all the foreign writers in general, agree in this.

‡ Burchot's Naval History, p. 467. I have likewise had the same confirmed to me by officers who served on board the fleet.

There is yet another circumstance mentioned by French authors, as supposed by some to have been a reason for the king's orders, and it is this, that the greatest part of the English fleet were expected to desert, from which it is pretended they were deterred by finding Count Tourville so weak. \* As these very authors treat this story as a calumny, there seems to be the less reason for my refuting it; yet, since it may be done in a very few words, I cannot but observe, that this is absolutely contradicted by another circumstance, in which both our writers and theirs agree, *viz.* that upon the junction of our fleet, the French king sent two orders by different routes to Count Tourville, to forbid his fighting for that reason; but the master of a small vessel, which carried one, was taken off Cape Barfleur, by Captain Wyville, before he could join the French fleet; and the other, which came over land, was too late by several days. † This, however, plainly proves, that King Lewis did not depend upon the desertion of the English fleet, but upon their not joining the Dutch.

After a particular account of the first day's engagement, the Marquis de Quincy proceeds thus: "As to the advantage gained in this fight, it must be allowed us, that Count Tourville did not lose so much as a ship, nor had he any that were disabled; while, on the other hand, the enemy lost two, one sunk, and the other disabled. The rest of their ships were as ill treated as his, besides their spending abundance of fire-ships without any effect. Thus, in spite of the prodigious inequality of the fleets, the success was at least equal in the first day's engagement; it is true, it happened otherwise in the succeeding days, in which, however, there fell out nothing that ought to tarnish the reputation of France at sea, since, while there remained any room for courage to exert itself, they not only acted gallantly in their

\* Hist. Militaire, *ubi supra*.

† Burchet's Memoirs, p. 468, and the French author last cited.

“ own defence, but made themselves respected by their  
 “ enemies. What afterwards followed was the effect of  
 “ unforeseen accidents, and inevitable misfortunes.” \*

Yet, after this fine flourish, the marquis fairly confesses, the French flags ran for it, and that their other ships did the best they could to follow them; but partly through the want of safe ports on their own coasts, and partly through the vigorous pursuit of the English, they were burnt and destroyed in the manner before related. † Neither doth this writer, or any other of the French historians, pretend to diminish their own loss, or to say that our admirals did not do their duty. On the contrary, they ascribe the safe retreat of part of their ships into the road of St. Maloes, to their lucky passage through that dangerous strait, which I have before mentioned. ‡

A.D.  
1692.

When Admiral Russel was satisfied that the grand fleet could not do any farther service against the French, the season of the year and their circumstances considered; he resolved to return to St. Helen's, as well to refit the vessels that were damaged in the late fight, as to obtain a supply of provisions and ammunition. This design he executed very happily, since he had scarcely left the French coast, before the weather became so tempestuous, that his heavy ships must have suffered exceedingly; and such as had lost their masts would probably have perished. Yet this measure, so prudent in itself, and so fortunate in its event, has been censured; as if the admiral had shewn too great eagerness to be at home, and too little care to prosecute his victory. §

However, before he took this step, he left Sir John Ashby with twelve English ships, and three fire-ships, in

\* Hist. Militaire, tom. ii. p. 587. But all these must be owned extremely modest to Father Daniel's account.

† Hist. Militaire, P. Daniel, &c.

‡ Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 640. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 73. Life of King William, p. 332.

§ Burnet's History, vol. ii. p. 94.



conjunction with a Dutch squadron of like force, commanded by Vice-admiral Callemberg, with orders to sail to Havre de Grace, and to endeavour the destruction of so many of the French fleet as had taken shelter there; which service, indeed, they did not perform, the enemy's situation, and the stormy weather, rendering it altogether impracticable. \* So that to blame the admiral for not exposing the fleet, when it was impossible for him to have done any thing; is to shew a disposition for finding fault at the expense of the nation's safety; since succeeding commanders are not likely to use their judgments freely, when they find their predecessors suffer in reputation for doing what prudence, and regard to the safety of the fleet, directed. The true reason, or rather the principal reason, which influenced Admiral Russel on this occasion, was his desire to make the most of his victory, by immediately taking on board the troops intended for a descent; and carrying them over, with all possible expedition, to the coast of France. †

It is, not easy to give any tolerable account of this descent, since neither our public historians, nor the writers of private memoirs, have been able to leave us any certain scheme of this design, farther than that it was to be a descent on the French coast, in order to alarm and distract that nation. Thus much is certain, that both we and the Dutch seemed to have very great confidence in this expedition, which was provided for at a vast expense, and in order to which a promotion of officers was made on purpose. At first, several regiments of horse were intended\* to have been sent; but, at last, these were reduced to fifty horse, and two hundred dragoons. ‡ It is evident enough

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 467, 468.

† Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 642, 648.

‡ *Memoires Historiques. Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xiii. p. 104, 215, 225. *Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts*, vol. ii. p. 74. *Columna Rostrata*, p. 261.

from his conduct, that Admiral Russel was not in the secret of this scheme, if indeed there were any such secret; but knew in general only, that these troops were designed to land in France, and therefore he thought this the most proper opportunity for executing the project, be it what it would.

This was his great motive for returning to the English coast; and, to be sure, he acted therein with great judgment and prudence. In his passage, however, he met with very rough weather, and, on his arrival, with a very great disappointment; for instead of finding the troops ready to embark, and himself furnished with orders and instructions for the execution of the enterprize, he was informed by letters from the secretary of state, that no certain resolution was as yet taken in what service to employ them; but that this was left to be settled by a general council of land and sea officers, when the fleet and the transports should be joined. \* The plain source of all this confusion was, that the ministers of state were not disposed to take upon themselves the direction of an affair, which they were apprehensive would miscarry; but were willing to put it upon the land and sea officers, that they alone might remain accountable for whatever happened.

A.D.  
1692.

At last, very late in the month of July, the transports, with the forces on board, joined the fleet; and, on the 28th of the same month, a council of war was held on board the Breda, where the schemes, or rather hints of the ministry were seriously considered, and, upon the whole, resolved to be impracticable.† The admiral,

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 471. Memoirs of Admiral Russel.

† We have this in Burchet from the original; and, as it is absolutely necessary for the perfect understanding this part of the history, I shall lay it before the reader.

At a council of war, held on board the Breda, the 28th of July, present, flag officers, the right honourable Edward Russel, admiral; Sir Ralph Delaval, vice-admiral of the red; George Rooke, Esq. vice-

however, sent Sir John Ashby with a stout squadron to endeavour, if possible, to intercept the French fleet, which

admiral of the blue; Sir Cloudesley Shovel, rear-admiral of the red; David Mitchell, Esq. first captain to the admiral.

DURCH. Admiral Allemande; Vice-admiral Callemberg; Rear-admiral Vandergoes; Rear-admiral Evertzen; Rear-admiral Muys.

General and Field Officers. His grace the duke of Leinster, lieutenant-general of all the forces; earl of Galway; Sir Henry Bellasis; Monsieur de la Meloniere; Sir David Collier; Colonel Beveridge; Monsieur de Cambon; Colonel Selwin; earl of Argyle.

The resolutions they came to, follow: "The matter of burning the ships at St. Malo, being maturely considered, Vice-admiral Rooke, and Vice-admiral Callemberg, who were lately sent with a squadron of ships before that port, representing the great difficulty of carrying the ships in there, by reason of the multitude of rocks, and the rapidity of the tides, and the pilots refusing to conduct any frigates or fire-ships into the harbour, because the marks might be removed, it was the opinion of the flag officers, that it was not practicable to attempt any thing against the enemy's ships at St. Malo, with any part of the fleet, until the town itself could be so far reduced by the land forces, as that ships might not receive any great annoyance from the enemy's guns in the attempt; and the general and field officers of the army were of opinion, that the troops could not do any service at that place without the assistance of the fleet.

"It was then considered, whether it was feasible to make any attempt on the enemy's ships at Brest; and although the flag officers were of opinion, that an attempt might be made there with some hopes of success, if the summer had not been so far spent, yet, considering the winter was approaching, they did not think it proper to attack the enemy's ships in that port, since the fleet might be exposed to very great inconveniences, should they be wind-bound near that place; and it was the opinion of the general and field officers of the army, that they should not be able to do any service there against the enemy, unless they could be protected by the fleet. The flag officers, likewise, thought it not safe for the fleet to attempt any thing against the enemy at Rochfort, the season of the year being so far spent, and the place itself lying so deep in the bay

"It was in the next place considered, whether the fleet might lay with safety on the coast of Normandy to protect the army in an attempt either at Havre de Grace, La Hogue, or any place thereabouts; and the flag officers judged that it might lay with safety on that coast, until towards the end of the next month, in case their majesties service should require it."

was every day expected to sail from St. Malo to Brest; and, as soon as this was done, the admiral, with the rest of the fleet and the transports, sailed for La Hogue.

Secretary Burchet seems to say, that in his passage he received orders from the queen to return, and that, in obedience to these orders, he came back in a few days to St. Helen's. \* Yet there is something very improbable in this, if we consider, that as soon as an express, despatched by the duke of Leinster, arrived at Whitehall with this news, the queen sent down to the fleet the marquis of Carmarthen, then lord-president of the council, the earl of Devonshire, lord-steward, the earl of Dorset, lord-chamberlain, the earls of Nottingham and Rochester, and the lords Sidney and Cornwallis, to know the reason of their return, and to take proper measures for their putting to sea again immediately. † These lords, on their arrival, found all the troops, except two regiments, on board, and the fleet wind-bound. Every body then expected that the troops would re-embark, and at last they did so; but, instead of proceeding to France, they sailed under the escort of a squadron of men-of-war, part to Ostend, and part to Newport. There were two hundred and forty transport-ships, six or seven thousand men, a prodigious quantity of ammunition of all sorts, and whatever seemed requisite for executing a great design, though so little came of it. ‡

The flags came also to the following separate resolution:

"That, since the transport ships with the land forces were come to the fleet, in order to try what might be done against the enemy either at St. Malo, Brest, or Rochfort, it was their opinion that something might have been attempted with probability of success, were not the season of the year so far spent as not to admit of the fleet's going with safety thither."

\* Naval History, p. 476.

† Life of King William, p. 344. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xiii. p. 226. Kennet.

‡ The Political Memoirs for the month of September, 1692, say, there were sixteen thousand; but all our historians mention the number I have inserted.

One cannot wonder, that, on so flagrant a miscarriage as this, the mouths of all the world were opened. The English, who are not very famous for their patience on such occasions, made no difficulty of saying, that the nation was plundered and abused; and that, after immense sums were drawn out of the people's pockets by the most grievous and burdensome taxes, they were idly squandered away in chimerical projects. The Dutch scrupled not to exclaim against the treachery of the king's counsellors; and to affirm that every thing that was transacted at London, was so speedily betrayed to the French court, that it was in vain to hope any success from designs concerted there. The French, according to their usual manner, exulted strangely on their deliverance, and attributed to the wisdom and power of Lewis XIV. what was the pure effect of cross accidents and party resentments. \*

I must not, however, forget, that some refined politicians pretended, that this scheme had its effect; that King William intended no more than alarming the French court, and obliging them to keep great bodies of men constantly on their coasts; and to be at a vast expense to watch the motion of this small body of troops, which gave his majesty the greater liberty of acting in Flanders. Yet this appears strangely improbable, if we consider the return of the fleet to St. Helen's; since, if this had been the design, it would certainly have proceeded directly to Ostend. Others would persuade us, that the intention of the court was to have landed the forces at port St. Sebastian; but, when the orders were opened at sea, all the admirals were of opinion, that it was utterly impracticable. The resolutions of the council of war shew, that this conjecture was groundless. The bottom of the business was a design upon Brest, which might have been executed, if the transports had been ready, as the admiral advised, in

\* See Burnet's History of his own Time, and the first volume of the State Tracts in the reign of King William.

May. \* It is certain, therefore, wherever the fault lay, it was not in him.

After the sending these troops into Flanders, the great ships were ordered about to Chatham, and the fleet divided into squadrons, as was judged most convenient for the service; and thus ended the public transactions of this year. † It may not, however, be amiss, before we speak of the parliamentary inquiry into the mistakes in the management of the navy, to mention one or two extraordinary exploits at sea, though of a private nature; and the rather, because otherwise things of this kind, though in respect to the persons who perform them, very worthy of remembrance, must naturally sink into oblivion.

A.D.  
1692.

On the 24th of February, a French privateer took a small ship called the *Friend's Adventure*, belonging to the port of Exeter; and on the 29th, Captain Fitzgerald, who commanded the privateer, took out of her the master and five of his men, leaving none on board but the mate, Robert Lyde, of Topsham; a man of twenty-three years of age, and John Wright, a boy of sixteen, with seven Frenchmen, who had orders to navigate the ship to St. Malo. But, when they were off Cape La Hogue, a strong south-east wind drove them from the French coast; upon which the man and boy, on the 6th of March, took their opportunity, when two of the Frenchmen were at the pump, one at the helm, one on the forecastle, and three sleeping in their cabins, to attack them. ‡ The mate,

\* The reader will find this clearly explained hereafter.

† Burchet's *Memoirs*, p. 167, 168, and *Naval History*, p. 476.

‡ A true and exact account of the retaking a ship, called the *Friend's Adventure*, of Topsham, from the French, after she had been taken six days; and they were upon the coast of France with it four days, where one Englishman and a boy set upon seven Frenchmen, killed two of them, took the other five prisoners, and brought the ship and them safe to England; their majesties customs of the said ship amounting to a thousand pounds and upwards. Performed and written by Robert Lyde, mate of the same ship. London, 1693, 4to. p. 2.

with an iron crow killed one of the men at the pump, and knocked down the other with one blow; the boy at the same instant knocked down the man on the fore-castle, and then they secured and bound the man at the helm. One of the Frenchmen, running up from between decks to the assistance of his companions, was wounded by the mate; but the two others, coming to his relief, seized, and would have secured him, if the boy had not come up briskly to his assistance, and, after a sharp struggle, killed one, and gave the other quarter. Having thus made themselves masters of the ship, they put the two who were disabled by their wounds, into bed, ordered a third to look after them, and secured them between decks; one they kept bound in the steerage, and made use of the remaining man to navigate the vessel, which, on the 9th of March, they brought safely into Topsham, with five prisoners on board.\*

About the same time one captain Richard Griffith, and his boy John Codanon, recovered their sloop, called the *Tryal*, from five Frenchmen, put on board them by a captain of a man-of-war; and having wounded three, and forced all five down into the hold, brought the vessel, with their prisoners, safe into Falmouth.† These, though strong testimonies of prodigious firmness of mind, and daring resolution, yet at the same time shew, how much our trade was exposed to the French privateers; and indeed it must be confessed, that it suffered far less in the preceding year, when the French were masters at sea, than in this, when their grand fleet was blocked up in their ports.‡

This circumstance of our losing so many ships, after so great a victory at sea, excited much clamour, especially among the merchants; though the reasons assigned for it

\* See the London Gazette, No. 2749.

† See the London Gazette, No. 2743.

‡ This we find very strongly insisted upon by Bishop Burnet, in the History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 94.

by the board of admiralty, were very plausible at least, if not satisfactory. They said, that the loss the French sustained so early in the year was the occasion of their seamen being dismissed the king's service, and suffered to go on board privateers; which rendered them more numerous, and of greater force than ever; while, on the other hand, our keeping so great a fleet so long at sea rendered it impossible for the admiralty to furnish the merchants with proper convoys; at the same time that so large a number of men, as were employed on board the navy, forced our commanders of merchant ships to proceed in their respective voyages worse manned than usual. \*

A D.  
1692. The king opened the sessions of parliament on the 4th of November, in which he took notice both of their great success, and great disappointments at sea, which gave occasion to the subsequent inquiries. On the 11th the house of commons thanked Admiral Russel, in very strong terms, for his courage and conduct in the affair of La Hogue; but this did not prevent a warm debate on account of the opportunities that were said to be lost after that signal victory. † The admiral furnished the house with all the letters, papers, and instructions that were necessary for their information, and entered into a large account of the whole affair. Then Sir John Ashby was examined as to his not executing the orders that were given him to destroy the French ships which got into St. Malo. Sir John cleared himself so handsomely, and set the whole matter in so fair a light, that the speaker, by order of the house, took notice of his ingenious behaviour at the bar, which gave such satisfaction, that he was dismissed from farther attendance. ‡

\* See Chandler's debates in the year 1692. My account is taken from a MS. intitled *Reflections on the present complaints of ill management at sea.*

† Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 647. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 103. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 78.

‡ See the Votes of the House of Commons, Chandler's Debates,



Then the business of the descent was brought on the carpet; which was also thoroughly explained by the admiral, who shewed, that there were no less than twenty days intervened between his letter to the earl of Nottingham and his lordship's answer. The house of lords entered also into an examination of this matter, where the earl of Nottingham not only justified himself, but reflected very severely upon Admiral Russel; and the house went so far into his resentments, that, at a conference, they communicated to the commons some papers which the king, at that lord's request, had directed to be laid before them. But this was so far from producing the desired effect, that, immediately on the reading them, the commons resolved, that Admiral Russel in his command of the fleet, during the last summer's expedition, had behaved himself with fidelity, courage, and conduct. \*

A.D.  
1689.

In these debates, it appeared clearly to the house, that one great check on the public service was the want of timely and sufficient supplies; to remedy which in the succeeding year, they, on the 2d of December, resolved, that the sum of one million, nine hundred and twenty-six thousand, five hundred and sixteen pounds, be granted to their majesties for the charge of the navy, including the charge of the ordnance, and the finishing their majesties naval yard at Hamoaze, near Plymouth, and the building four bomb-vessels and eight new ships of the fourth rate.† They likewise took notice of Admiral

&c. So much easier it is to satisfy one of the houses of parliament, than to escape a critical historian.

\* See the Votes. Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 618. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 103. The bishop says, that, notwithstanding Lord Nottingham aggravated the admiral's errors and neglects, the house justified him, and gave him thanks over and over again; and, with respect to the papers, that the commons did not deign to read them, but renewed their first votes that justified Russel's fidelity, courage, and conduct.

† This shews a true British spirit; they join amendment with the discovery of the mischief.

Russel's inveighing against the want of knowledge in sea affairs in such as pretended to direct them; and therefore a motion was made, that they should come to a resolution of addressing his majesty to constitute a board of admiralty, composed of such persons as were of known experience in maritime affairs; but here the weight of the board, as it then stood, fully appeared, by its passing in the negative. \*

Yet, to shew their distaste of the earl of Nottingham's interfering so much in maritime affairs, they addressed the king, that for the future all orders for the management of the fleet should pass through the hands of the commissioners of the admiralty. † But the admiral's victory here cost him too high a price; for the king, conceiving that he had shewn a much greater concern for his own interest and reputation than for his service; resolved, notwithstanding the great things he had done, to lay him aside for the present, and employ such as might make his affairs go easy; which design was executed soon after, though, as  
A.D. 1693. might have been readily foreseen, it failed of success. ‡

The warmth the parliament had expressed in providing for the sea-service, joined to the clamour that had been raised on the defeat of the late expedition, obliged the king to take very early care of whatever related to the affairs of

\* It was rightly foreseen, that a lord-high-admiral might be much more easily called to account than lords-commissioners, because, whenever the latter is done, the commissioners, if they have seats in parliament, must act against themselves. In this case the grand argument against the address was, that it reflected on his majesty's judgment, and so regard to compliment got the better of concern for the public.

† This address had a right intention; for, as things were managed before, the admiral was frequently more puzzled to understand his orders, than to execute them: and, whenever disputes arose about them, the admiral was sure to suffer; for the secretary entrenched himself behind his directions; so that there was no coming at him but through the council.

‡ Bishop Burnet represents the king's conduct in this respect in its true light, vol. ii. p. 103.

the navy, that nothing might hinder the sending a stout fleet to sea in the beginning of the spring. In the month of January, therefore, his majesty was pleased to make a great change in the command of the fleet, in which he was supposed to follow chiefly the advice of the earl of Nottingham. Instead of appointing an admiral and commander-in-chief, he granted a commission to Henry Killegrew, Esq. Sir Ralph Delaval, and Sir Cloudesley Shovel, to execute that office.\* Bishop Burnet says, that the two first were thought to be so much in King James's interest, that it was believed the king was putting the fleet into the hands of such as would betray him; for, though no exception lay against Shovel, yet he was but one to two.† Whether the bishop's conjecture was well grounded or not, I cannot pretend to determine; but the event very fully proved, that such a joint commission was a very bad expedient. Soon after his majesty made George Rooke, Esq. vice-admiral of the red, and Matthew Aylmer, Esq. rear-admiral of that squadron. John Lord Berkley, vice-admiral, and David Mitchell, Esq. rear-admiral of the blue; and these promotions were declared on the 8th of February following.‡

To give still a higher proof of the king's concern for, and attention to, this necessary part of the public service, his majesty soon after went down to Portsmouth, as well to take a view of the state of the place and its fortifications, as to examine in person into the condition of that part of the fleet which was then there. On this occasion, his majesty went on board the ship where Vice-admiral Rooke had hoisted his flag, and conferred the honour of knighthood upon that admiral; after which he returned to London very well satisfied as to the condition of the fleet at

\* London Gazette, No. 2839. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xiv. p. 231.

† See his *History of his own Time*, vol. ii. p. 104.

‡ London Gazette, No. 2843. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xiv. p. 232.

Spithead. \* On the 12th of April, the right honourable Anthony, lord-viscount Falkland; Sir John Lowther of Whitehaven, Baronet; Henry Priestman, Esq. Robert Austen, Esq. Sir Robert Rich, Baronet; Henry Killegrew, Esq. and Sir Ralph Delaval, Knight; were appointed commissioners of the admiralty. †

The war in Flanders requiring his majesty's presence early in the spring, the admirals were instructed to make all possible despatch in getting out the fleet to sea, to endeavour, if possible, to block up the enemy in their ports, especially in Brest, which was thought very practicable, and to take all possible care of the merchants. In order to comply with the first part of their charge, they began to take half the seamen out of privateers; but this, notwithstanding the pressing occasions of the public, and the great scarcity of men, was thought so heavy a grievance, and was besides so visible a favour to the enemy, that it was dropped. Then five regiments of foot were put on board, with a view to the disembarkation at Brest, which was a scheme of some of the land-generals, and was always thought, what it afterwards appeared to be, by the ablest of our seamen, a very dangerous, and at the same time a very impracticable project. Provisions running scarce, a mess was increased from four to six men; and yet, in spite of all these contrivances, they were not able to form a line of battle at St. Helen's till the 7th of May, 1693, which lost them the opportunity of blocking up either of the French squadrons. ‡

As to the merchants, their complaints grew still louder than ever: such as were concerned in the Levant or Mediterranean trade, had their ships lying waiting for a convoy many months, nay, some above a year and a half; and the excuses they received from the admiralty were of such a

\* See the Memoirs of Sir George Rooke in our subsequent volume.

† London Gazette, No. 2861.

‡ Burchet's Memoirs, p. 166, 167.

nature, as put it out of their power to judge when they might expect a convoy; for this, they were told, depended on the intelligence of the board, and the merchants were but too sensible they had no intelligence at all.\* This, indeed, appears to have been the constant defect, and to have been pregnant with numberless misfortunes. It may deserve consideration, whether this is not incidental to the very nature of such a commission. Persons might be found, who would risk corresponding with one great man; but to give informations to, or which may be laid before, a whole board, and which may afterwards be called for by a house of commons, is scarcely to be hoped for or expected. The single remedy for this is to leave the procuring intelligence chiefly to the first lord, and empowering him to reward and to promise secrecy.

When the English and Dutch fleets sailed, they made a formidable appearance, and every body expected something very considerable would be performed.† It appeared, however, but too soon, that things were in their

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1693.

\* Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 114, 115. See the Present State of Europe for the Months of May and June, 1693, p. 193, 227. The complaints made by the merchants did not only run high, but were extremely well supported. They shewed, beyond the power of refutation, the folly of suffering ambition, interest, or intrigue, to prefer unqualified men to that board, which directed the naval power of England: and yet the mischief was not, in truth could not, be amended, because the more experienced people, who had been long in the service, were thought disaffected; and so it was feared the remedy might have proved worse than the disease.

† The line of battle published here and in Holland stood thus:

	I.	II.	III.	IV.	V.	VI.	Five Ships.
Vice of the blue .....	0	3	5	1	0	0	3
Admiral of the blue ..	2	1	5	1	0	1	3
Rear of the blue .....	0	2	6	1	0	0	2
Rear of the red .....	1	2	5	1	0	0	2
Commander-in-chief ..	3	1	5	1	2	2	3
	6	9	26	5	2	3	13

In all, 51.

old condition ; that, in short, the admirals had not proper orders to warrant their doing any thing of moment ; and were too much divided in their opinions, to undertake any thing of themselves. In short, the only thing they could resolve on was, that Sir George Rooke should command the squadron appointed to convoy the Mediterranean fleet ; and that, in case they had no exact intelligence of the French squadrons, the fleet should accompany Sir George into a certain latitude. \*

If this design had been executed as soon as it was formed and talked of, it had been honourable for the nation, and happy for the merchants ; but the admirals were so timorous and diffident of their own power, that it was the beginning of June before they sailed ; and even then they had no intelligence of the enemy's motions, but took their measures at random : a circumstance not rashly to be asserted, and yet too important to be concealed, when supported by undeniable evidences. †

The French, on the other hand, acted with greater prudence, in the disposition of their naval strength this year, than they had done during the continuance of the war. In order to repair the mighty loss he had sustained at La Hogue, the French king bought several large ships, and turned them into men-of-war ; caused such as wanted

DUTCH.	I.	II.	III.	IV.	V.	VI.	Five Ships.
Vice-admiral .....	1	2	4	2	0	0	2
Admiral .....	2	1	6	1	0	2	3
Vice-admiral ... ..	3	0	4	3	0	1	1
	6	3	14	6	0	3	6

In all, 32.

\* Burchet's Memoirs, p. 181.

† Burchet's Naval History, p. 481, 482. Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 657. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 86. Life of King William, p. 363, 364. State Tracts in the Reign of King William, and, in short, all the Memoirs of that time. Authors differ as to the precise time of the sailing of this fleet. See the London Gazette, No. 2875, 2878.

repair, to be put, during the winter, into a condition to go to sea; and, that they might not be detained for want of men, he suspended in a manner the whole trade of France for a year, by forbidding any ships to go to sea till his squadrons were manned: lastly, to raise the spirits of the seamen, as well as to encourage such officers as had done their duty in the last unlucky engagement; he made a grand naval promotion, which had precisely the effect he expected from it; and excited such a spirit of diligence and emulation, as is easier to be conceived than described.\* The reader will be convinced of the truth of this, when he is informed, that the French fleet sailed from the ocean for the Mediterranean in the middle of the month of May, in three squadrons, consisting altogether of seventy-one ships of war, besides tenders, bomb-vessels, and fire-ships; so that they were actually on the coast of Portugal, before our Smyrna fleet sailed.† Almost all our writers agree, that the French fleet had very exact intelligence from hence; and laid their scheme for surprising this rich fleet very early in the winter. I cannot find any thing of this sort in the French writers I have met with; and yet they are ready enough to magnify the policy of their court upon other occasions: I would not, however, be understood to discredit what our authors say on this subject; since it is very probable they are in the right, and the French historians might either want proper information, or think it more glorious for the French arms to let this treacherous correspondence pass in silence.‡

The English fleet left Sir George Rooke with the Streight's squadron on the 6th of June in the evening,

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\* Hist. Militaire de Louis XIV. tom.ii. p. 593, 705. Memoires de Fourbin. P. Danel. Limiers, tom. ii. p. 377. Le Clerc Hist. des Provinces Unies, tom. iii. p. 426.

† Burchet's Memoirs, p. 183. Hist. Militaire, tom. ii. p. 707.

‡ These points are fully cleared in the proceedings against Mr. Abraham Anselm, secretary to the admirals Killegrow, Delaval, and Shovel, &c. 4to. 1694.

about fifty leagues W. S. W. off Ushant, and returned to take up the cruisers, having all this time had no intelligence of the enemy. The lords of the admiralty at home, however, had an account directly from Portugal of M. Tourville's coming into Lagos-bay, between Cape St. Vincent and Faro, with no less than one hundred and fourteen sail, great and small. This exceedingly alarmed the government; and advice was instantly despatched to the fleet, which consisted now of sixty-nine ships of the line of battle. \*

On the 23d of June, a council of war was held at Torbay, in which it was resolved to bear away for Lisbon directly, in case they could be properly victualled; but to prevent all danger, orders were immediately despatched to Sir George Rooke, of which we shall have occasion to speak hereafter. If this resolution had been pursued, and the fleet had actually sailed for Lisbon, something might have been done worthy of the English nation. But, upon the 1st of July, another council of war was held, in which, though the queen's orders were produced for their executing what themselves had before proposed; yet, the flags came to a new resolution, which was to submit it to her majesty, whether, if the French squadrons were joined, and should sail north-about, the coasts of England might not be exposed to some insult during their absence. †

This was doing what they had always charged the council with doing, *viz.* altering their scheme when it ought to be put in execution. They knew well enough, that a hint of the coast being in danger would be sufficient to prevent their quitting it; and this was certainly what they now intended, and might easily have been

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 483. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 115, 116. London Gazette, No. 2883. Mercure Historique et Politique, tom. iv. p. 83, 94, 95.

† Burchet's Memoirs, p. 185.



discerned to be, what its consequences shewed it; a weak and ruinous measure, which exposed Sir George Rooke, and the rich fleet under his care, to be attacked by the whole force of France, while we had a superiour fleet riding, to no purpose in the world, in our channel. But it is now time to leave it, and speak of the conduct and fortune of that vice-admiral on this critical occasion. All these disasters proceeded from the factions then subsisting, when every officer acted according to the humour of his patron in the ministry; and, as there was a strange disagreement in the public councils, this produced a like want of harmony amongst those who commanded the fleet.

It has been before observed, that the grand fleet quitted Sir George Rooke on the 6th of June, 1693, without having, at that time, any certain intelligence either of the force of the French squadrons, or where they had sailed; which put that admiral under very great difficulties, and therefore we cannot wonder, that he expressed some concern at the great risk the numerous fleet of merchantmen, under his convoy, was likely to run.\* It is true, his squadron was very strong, consisting of no less than twenty-three men-of-war; and he had under him two flag-officers of great courage and experience, *viz.* the Dutch vice-admiral Vandergoes and rear-admiral Hopson. But then the merchantmen under his care were nearly four hundred; and these not only English and Dutch, but Danes, Swedes, Hamburghers, Flemings, &c. so that our reputation as a maritime power was in a manner staked for their safety.†

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When he left the fleet, he had a very fair and strong gale of wind, which carried him at such a rate as prevented any of the advice-boats, sent with those fresh

\* Burchet's Memoirs, p. 185. See this matter farther explained in our memoirs of Sir George Rooke.

† Kennet, Burchet, Burnet, and the State of Europe for July, 1693.

instructions we mentioned, from coming up with him; and he was so unlucky too as not to meet with any ships at sea that could give him notice of Marshal Tourville's fleet being in that part of the world. In this situation of things he pursued, as was his duty, his original instructions; and having left by the way the vessels bound for Bilboa, Lisbon, St. Ubes, and other places, he continued his course for the Streights.\*

A.D. 1693. On the 15th of June, he ordered the Lark, a sixth rate man-of-war, and a prime sailer, to stretch a-head of his scouts in Lagos-bay, to get what intelligence they could of the enemy; but, through some oversight in the captain, this was not properly executed. The next day, the scouts discovered two of the enemy's ships, and engaged them in the afternoon, till, perceiving eight or ten sail under the cape, they thought fit to quit the Frenchmen, to inform the admiral of what they had seen. Upon this a council of war was called, in which the admiral's opinion, for lying by till the enemy's strength could be known, was over-ruled. †

\* The new orders sent him were to this purpose, that, in case he was obliged to go into the river of Lisbon, and received certain intelligence during his stay there, that the Toulon squadron had joined the rest of the French fleet, and were together gone northward from the coast of Portugal; he should leave a proper number of ships, both English and Dutch, to proceed up the Streights with the Turkey fleet, and himself return with the rest, and join the body of our fleet in those seas; and, not meeting them in his passage, to make the port of Plymouth, and there expect further orders. But these instructions could be of no use to him, since they were not sent till the 23d, and he fell in with the French three days afterwards. Secretary Burchet indeed says, they were sent the 3d of June; but his own account shews that to be impossible, since he owns, that Sir George did not quit the grand fleet till the 6th.

† This seems to have been the principal cause of all the mischief that afterwards followed. Indeed, the admiral was so sensible of the dangerous consequences that might attend the not taking this step, as to call in five or six captains who were on board his ship by chance, in order to have their opinions; and they agreeing with the council of war, he was forced to submit after all, directly contrary to his judgment. See the London Gazette hereafter cited.

On the 17th, about break of day, ten sail of French men-of-war were discovered, with some small ships, which were chased by part of the English squadron, and a fire-ship taken; the crew of which positively asserted, that the whole squadron, though there were three flags amongst them, consisted of no more than fifteen ships of the line. About noon, the falsity of this assertion was discovered; and Sir George Rooke easily counted eighty sail of men-of-war. Sixteen of these, among which were three flags, plied up to the English squadron, while the vice-admiral of the white stood off to sea, that he might fall in among the merchant-ships. \*

The Dutch vice-admiral, about three o'clock, sent a message to Sir George, that being now sensible of the strength of the French fleet, which he doubted before, as well as of their design, he thought it absolutely necessary to avoid fighting, as it could only tend to their absolute ruin. At this time they were within four miles of the enemy; and it was the sentiment of Sir George himself, that they were too far advanced to think of retreating; and therefore, before he received this message, he was resolved to push for it; but considering afterwards, that, if the Dutch admiral had formed a right judgment, and both the squadron and the fleet under their convoy should suffer greatly by this measure, the blame would fall entirely on himself; he brought to, and stood off with an easy sail, that the Dutch and the heavy ships might work up to the windward. He, at the same time, sent orders to the small ships that were near the land, and therefore not likely to keep up with the fleet, to use their utmost endeavours in the night to put into the neighbouring ports of Faro, St. Lucar, or Cadiz. This was all that was in the power of the admiral to do; and it is certain, that these orders were extremely well calculated for

\* Burchet's Memoirs, p. 189. See also Captain Littleton's Letters in the State of Europe for the month of August, 1693.

lessening, as much as possible, the misfortune; and it shewed great presence of mind in Sir George Rooke, to provide so wisely for the most distant part of the fleet, when himself and those about him were in such imminent danger. \*

The admiral and vice-admiral of the blue, with about ten sail of the enemy's fleet, fetched up the English squadron very fast; so that about six in the evening, they came up with two Dutch men-of-war, and some merchant-ships of that nation. The men-of-war were commanded by the Captains Schrijver and Vander-Poel, who finding themselves under the wind, and therefore in no probability of escaping, tacked in for the shore, and thereby drew the enemy after them, which saved the rest of the fleet. The Dutch captains made a most gallant and desperate defence, but were at last overpowered by numbers, and taken. †

.D. The admiral stood off all night, having a fresh gale at  
193. N. N. W. and the next morning found fifty-four ships

\* Burchet's Memoirs, p. 190. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol ii. p. 86. Account in the London Gazette. Le Clerc Histoire des Provinces Unies, tom. iii. p. 426.

† It is very strange, that even our best historians should be so inaccurate as to their dates. According to Burchet, this engagement happened on the 18th of June; according to Bishop Kennet, it must have been the 16th. One would have thought the former most likely to be in the right, on account of the opportunities given him by his office; and the rather in this particular, because I am satisfied he copied Sir George Rooke's narrative: and yet he is absolutely wrong, as appears not only from other accounts, but from his own. The marquis de Quincy places this action on the 27th, N. S. that is the 17th, and it must have happened on that day, even according to Burchet's account; for he tells us, that the day after the engagement was Sunday; now it appears that the 18th of June, 1693, fell on a Sunday; consequently the action must have happened on the 17th, and so, indeed, Sir George Rooke's original account, and all the papers of those times, have it, as hath also the London Gazette, No. 2888, in which the reader will find the relation published by authority. See likewise the London Gazette, No. 2893.

about him; among which were only two Dutch, and one Hamburger. Five sail of the enemy's ships appeared to the leeward, and two to the windward, which last dogged him all day. On the 19th, Sir George Rooke sent for the officers of the men-of-war, and merchant-ships, on board, in order to get the best account he could of the state they were in, and to concert the most proper measures for securing the remainder. In this council, most of the officers present were for going either to Lisbon, or bearing away for Ireland. The admiral, however, considering that they had not water enough on board, to enable them to carry the last-mentioned scheme into execution; and having also some hopes of meeting with part of his scattered fleet at the Madeiras, he determined to sail thither; which he accordingly performed. \*

If the enemy, in executing their design, had shewed the same dexterity as in contriving; it is not easy to conceive how any part of the fleet of merchant-men could have been saved. But whether their admirals made a wrong disposition; or whether their orders were but indifferently obeyed; certain it is, that they did not strike near so heavy a blow as they might have done. Yet the mischief they did was very great, and severely felt both by the English and Dutch trade. According to some accounts, besides four of the largest Smyrna ships, which M. Coetlogon burnt or sunk at Gibraltar; and seven which he took, M. de Tourville and the count d'Estrees took two Dutch men-of-war, burnt a rich pinnace, and an English man-of-war; took twenty-nine merchant-men, and destroyed about fifty more.† The value of the cargoes, and the men-of-war together, might amount to

\* Burchet's Memoirs, p. 196. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 116. Tindal's Continuation of Rapin. London Gazette, No. 2895.

† Kennet, Burnet; but more particularly the Present State of Europe, for the year 1693.

one million sterling, or thereabouts; whereas the French, if they had taken the whole fleet, as, considering their prodigious superiority, they might easily have done, must have been gainers of upwards of four millions. As it was, the loss fell very heavy upon us, without much enriching them. \*

The French writers treat this affair as one of the most glorious actions ever performed by their arms at sea. M. de Quincy gives us a very concise account of the engagement, and then runs into a long detail of the prizes that were taken, and of the rich cargoes with which they were laden. He seems to be mistaken in many circumstances; particularly in reporting our squadron to have consisted of twenty-seven men-of-war; and these, too, he makes much larger ships than they were. Father Daniel informs us, that M. Tourville at first apprehended the whole confederate fleet to have been ready to attack him; and, as he had not yet joined count d'Estrees, he thought proper to detach twenty sail of stout ships to fall upon the English, in case they proved the Smyrna fleet; and disposed the rest of his ships in the best order possible for supporting them. This, he says, was executed so vigorously, that sixty merchant-men were burnt, sunk, or run a-shore, and twenty-seven taken. †

The different relations published at that time, admit a great mismanagement in the French commanders; some of

\* I ground my computation on the account given by the Dutch writers; for notwithstanding the noise this affair made in England, and its becoming afterwards, as the reader will find, the subject of a parliamentary inquiry; yet no certain or exact account was ever published here.

† These accounts are to be found in the *Histoire Militaire*, tom. ii. p. 708, and in the *Histoire de la Milice Francoise*, tom. ii. p. 492. As to the account taken from the memoirs of the count de l'oubin, upon which some of our writers lay a great stress, I must confess I do not believe it, because I am convinced those memoirs are not genuine

them charge it upon M. Tourville, others on M. Gabaret.\* The truth seems to be, that M. Tourville's orders for stretching out to sea, at the beginning of the action, were not well obeyed; and that the pressing so hard on the two Dutch men-of-war, and the ships that remained with them, was a false step they could never afterwards recover. In order, however, to hide these mistakes from the eyes of the people of France, and to magnify the advantage gained to the utmost; a pompous account was printed at Toulon, full of very extraordinary circumstances, and swelling the loss of the English and Dutch to the amount of sixty millions of livres; that is, to about three times as much as it really was.† The modesty and impartiality of the Dutch accounts of this unfortunate affair, deserve particular notice. They state the loss very nearly as high as the best French writers; but, at the same time, they confess it had been much greater, but for the prudence of Sir George Rooke, on whose conduct they bestow such praises, as a complete victory would scarcely have extorted from his countrymen. I am, however, inclined to think he deserved them; because even Bishop Burnet, who was no great friend to that admiral, does not pretend to find out one wrong step in this whole proceeding.‡

\* I meet with this in the *Gazettes* and *Journals* of those times, which say, that M. Tourville threw the blame upon Gabaret, as not punctually obeying his orders; as, on the other hand, Gabaret charged it on the marshal, as not acting vigorously enough, which reflection is said to have put him upon exposing himself in such a manner at Malaga, as had like to have cost him his life.

† An extract of this account I have seen and read; and which, though calculated to do honour to the French nation, does in reality much more to the Dutch; for it is confessed, that eighteen French ships had much ado to master two of the states men-of-war.

‡ The *sieur du Mont*, who then wrote a political journal in Holland, gives this account of the matter:

“ This is certain, that they missed the greatest part of the convoy, and that Sir George Rooke, upon this occasion, acquired infinitely more honour than those who commanded the French fleet. While the one, though unable to resist such as attacked him, in the midst

But the consequences of this engagement were no less fatal than the action itself; for M. Tourville, to make amends for letting so great a part of the English fleet escape, resolved to do his utmost to take or destroy such ships as had retired into the Spanish ports. With this view, he came on the 20th of July before Malaga; and sent a message to the governor, that he had no design to injure the town, unless they attempted to defend the English and Dutch ships; in which case, he would bombard it. The governor answered, he had the king of Spain's orders to protect them, and therefore, as his duty required, he would do it to the utmost of his power. There were four Dutch ships and one English in the mole, which he attacked with great fury. \* The men on board the ships made a long and gallant defence, especially the Union frigate, which the French twice attempted to burn, and were as often repulsed. But when it appeared a thing impossible to preserve the ships any longer, against so unequal a force, the masters thought proper to bore holes and sink them. †

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To Cadiz they sent a squadron of fourteen men of war, and two bomb-ketches, and soon after followed with the whole fleet. But they were able to effect little; for the English and Dutch ships immediately retired out of the road into the port, where they were so well protected by the cannon of the place, that the French were forced to

“ of threatening dangers, by his prudence, dexterity, and courage,  
 “ saved the best part of the fleet committed to his charge, at a time  
 “ that others suffered themselves to be deprived, by the superiour  
 “ skill of this admiral, of a booty, which, if they could have kept,  
 “ fortune put into their hands.”

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 489. London Gazette, No. 2895. Quincy Histoire Militaire de Louis XIV. tom. ii. p. 597, 598. Mercure Historique & Politique, tom. xv. p. 332.

† Some have condemned this, as done too hastily; but, without question, the next thing to preserving a ship and cargo, is destroying it in time.



content themselves with burning two ships they had intercepted in the road, and had hindered from getting in with the rest.\* At Gibraltar, after an obstinate defence, several rich ships were burnt and sunk, together with a Dutch man of war. The Marquis De Quincy, after relating these exploits particularly, tells us, that Marshal Tourville sent twenty-four prizes into Toulon, and computes the whole loss at thirty-six millions of livres, or thereabouts.† It is now time to return to Admiral Rooke, and the care taken by him of the remainder of the fleet of merchantmen under his protection.

When he formed a resolution of going to the Madeiras, he sent home the Lark man of war with the news of his misfortune, and then continued his course for those islands; where he found at his arrival the Monk, Captain Fairborne, and no other ship.‡ After taking in water, and what else he had occasion for there, on the 27th of June he sailed for Ireland; and, on the 29th of July, 1693, he arrived safely at Cork, with about fifty sail of ships of all sorts, men of war and merchant-men.§ Soon after his arrival he received orders from the admirals, to send six of the largest ships to the fleet, and to go with

According to a Spanish list printed at Seville, the ships preserved here were three English men of war, sixteen merchant men, two Dutch men of war, eleven merchant ships, three Danes, two Hamburgers, one Swede, one Ostender, and one Venetian. Burchet reflects, notwithstanding this, on the governor of Cadiz; but, for all that I can find, without any reason; for, as to sending M. Tourville some fresh provisions for his own table, I look upon it as an act of civility, not of treachery.

† The marquis steers in the middle. Marshal Tourville's own account says, the masters of the ships that were taken, computed the loss at twenty millions; and the relation published by authority at Toulon, speaks of sixty millions.

‡ Burchet's *Memoirs*, p. 196.

§ The Sieur Du Mont, in his *Memoirs* for the month of August, 1693, says, Sir George Rooke arrived with twelve sail of English and Dutch men of war, and between forty and fifty sail of merchant ships. See also the *London Gazette*, No. 2894, 2895.

the rest to Kingsale. But Sir George, conceiving that little service could be expected from the latter, because they were in a very bad condition; chose, therefore, to send them under the command of Captain Fairborne to Kingsale; and went in person with the six men of war to the fleet; \* of the proceedings of which, from the time of Sir George Rooke's departure, we are next to speak, though that is both a difficult and unpleasant subject.

A.D. 1693. The flag-officers held a council of war on the 9th of July, in which it was resolved to sail forty leagues S. W. of Ushant; and there to consider what would be the next convenient step for intercepting the enemy's fleet in their return from the Mediterranean. In pursuance of this resolution, they put to sea two days after; but were so terribly ruffled by a storm, that they were forced to return into Torbay. Upon the 17th, the wind proving fair, they put to sea again, and proceeded to their intended station, from whence they sent out light ships in search of Sir George Rooke, and to cruize on the Spanish coast, in order to get some intelligence of the enemy. The former carried the orders we before mentioned to the admiral; but the latter were not so lucky as to give any light into the proceedings of the French fleet. †

While things were in this condition, an accident happened which might have been attended with very ill consequences. Our fleet had sailed when they were very indifferently furnished with provisions, upon a promise that these should be immediately sent after them. In the beginning of the month of August, fifty vessels, laden with provisions, proceeded from the river Thames in quest of the fleet, under the convoy of two English and five Dutch men of war: but the fleet being forced from their

\* Burchet's Memoirs, p. 196, 197. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 116. Present State of Europe for August, 1693, p. 298.

† Burchet's Naval History, p. 490.

station, they not only missed them, but lost their convoy. They met, however, with Sir George Rooke's squadron, in its passage from Kingsale, and he brought them safe to the fleet on the 16th of August;\* and on the 25th of the same month, they had orders to return to St. Helen's, where they put the four regiments, that had been on board the whole summer, on shore; and then the fleet was dispersed, having done as little for the honour of the English nation, as any fleet that ever was fitted out. †

On the 19th of September, 1693, fifteen Dutch ships of the line of battle, and two frigates, were ordered by his majesty to Holland; and twenty-six men of war, and seven fire-ships, were assigned for the winter-guard, ‡ which it was then thought would have put an end to the military operations of this year; but it soon after appeared, that there was yet a secret expedition to be attempted, in order to soften a little the joy of the French for having taken the Smyrna fleet. §

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On the 13th of November, Commodore Benbow, in conjunction with Captain Philips, the engineer, with a squadron of twelve men of war, four bomb-vessels, and ten brigantines and well-boats, sailed for St. Malo, where they arrived on the 16th, and about four in the afternoon anchored before Quince-fort. Three of the bomb-vessels, with the brigantines and well-boats, bore in, and anchored within half a mile of the town. About eleven they began to fire, and continued firing till four in the morning, when they were constrained to warp, to prevent grounding. On the 17th, they went in again, and threw seventy bombs that day. They continued

\* London Gazette, No. 2898. *Mercure Historique & Politique*, tom. xv. p. 341. *Memoirs of Admiral Rooke*.

† London Gazette, No. 2901. *Burnet's History of his own Time*, vol. ii. p. 116.

‡ Burchet's *Memoirs*, p. 201.

§ It is remarkable that this is not so much as mentioned by Secretary Burchet. See the *Present State of Europe for 1693*, p. 404.

firing on the 18th, but with frequent intermissions, which made the inhabitants believe they were about to withdraw: however, they landed on an island near the town, and burnt a convent. On the 19th, being Sunday, they lay still till the evening, when, by the favour of a fresh gale of wind, a strong tide, and a very dark night, they sent in an extraordinary fire-ship,\* of about three hundred tons burden, which the French will have to be a monstrous machine, and which was intended to have reduced the town to ashes; and indeed would have done it, but for an unforeseen accident, for she struck upon a rock, within pistol-shot of the place where they intended to have moored her.

The engineer, who was on board, did all he could to get her off, but to no purpose. At last, finding the vessel begin to open, and fearing she might sink, he set fire to her. The sea-water, which had penetrated in many places, prevented the carcasses from taking fire. The explosion, however, was terrible beyond description; it shook the whole town like an earthquake; broke all glass and earthen ware for three leagues round; and struck off the roofs of three hundred houses. The most extraordinary thing of all was this, that the capstern of the vessel, which weighed two hundred weight, was carried over the walls, and beat a house it fell upon down to the ground. †

\* I take these particulars from Commodore Benbow's account. See London Gazette, No. 2927. *Mercure Historique & Politique*, tom. xv. p. 669. Kennet's *Complete History of England*, vol. iii. p. 661.

† The French writers say, that this was one of those dreadful machines styled infernals; which the Dutch made use of to destroy the bridge over the Scheldt, when the prince of Parma seized Antwerp, in the year 1585. The reader will perceive, by the following description, that it was in fact a fire-ship, contrived to operate when moored close to the town walls. It was a new ship of about three hundred, or, as M. De Quincy says, three hundred and fifty tons. At the bottom of the hold were a hundred barrels of powder; these were covered with pitch, sulphur, rosin, tow, straw, and faggots; over

The greatest part of the walls toward the sea fell down also; and if there had been a sufficient number of land-troops on board, the place might with ease have been taken and pillaged. As it was, they demolished Quincefort, carried off eighty prisoners, and frightened most of the people out of the town. This expedition was well-timed, and well executed. It struck a panic into the inhabitants of St. Malo, whence the most troublesome of the French privateers were fitted out; and it served to awaken that whole nation from their golden dreams of the empire of the sea, by shewing them what a very small squadron of English ships could do, when commanded by men of resolution and experience.

The king returned to England in the latter end of the month of October, 1693, under the escort of a small squadron of men of war, commanded by Rear-admiral Mitchel.\* ' On the 6th of November, his majesty declared his resolution to employ Admiral Russel the next year at sea.† On the 7th, the parliament met, and his majesty opened the sessions with a speech,‡ which began thus: " I am always glad to meet you here, and I could " heartily wish that our satisfaction were not lessened at " present, by reflecting upon the disadvantages we have

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which lay beams bored through, to give air to the fire; and upon these lay three hundred carcasses, filled with grenadoes, chain-shot, iron bullets, pistols loaded, and wrapt in linen pitched, broken iron bars, and the bottoms of glass bottles. There were six holes or mouths, to let out the flames, which were so vehement, as to consume the hardest substances; and could be checked by nothing but the pouring in of hot water. The French report, that the engineer, who contrived this vessel, was blown up in her; because they found the body of a man, well dressed, upon the shore, and in his pocket-book a journal of the expedition. He was, however, only a mate to one of the vessels.

\* London Gazette, No. 2919. *Mercure Historique & Politique*, tom. xv. p. 589.

† Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 657. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 123. London Gazette, No. 2921.

‡ London Gazette, No. 2921.

“ received this year at land, and the miscarriages in our  
 “ affairs at sea. I think it is evident, that the former  
 “ were only occasioned by the great number of our  
 “ enemies, which exceeded ours in all places. For what  
 “ relates to the latter, which has brought so great a  
 “ disgrace upon the nation, I have resented it extremely ; \*  
 “ and, as I will take care that those who have not done  
 “ their duty shall be punished, so I am resolved to use  
 “ my utmost endeavours that our power at sea may be  
 “ rightly managed for the future. And it may well  
 “ deserve your consideration, whether we are not de-  
 “ fective both in the number of our shipping, and in  
 “ proper ports to the westward, for the better annoying  
 “ our enemies and protecting our trade, which is so  
 “ essential to the welfare of this kingdom.” Upon this  
 the house of commons came unanimously to a resolution,  
 that they would support their majesties and their govern-  
 ment; inquire into the miscarriages of the fleet in the  
 preceding summer; and consider of all possible ways and  
 means for conserving the trade of the nation.

The house of commons, to shew they were in earnest,  
 examined all the admirals strictly, particularly Sir George  
 Rooke, though he was so ill, as to be scarcely able to speak,

\* There had been an inquiry set on foot before the council, as  
 appears from the following notice, printed in the London Gazette,  
 October 26th, 1693, No. 2917:

“ Whereas a report had been raised, and spread, by Henry Kille-  
 “ grew, Esq. Sir Ralph Delaval, and Sir Cloudesley Shovel, admirals  
 “ of their majesties fleet, that the right honourable the Lord Viscount  
 “ Falkland, one of the lords of their majesties most honourable privy  
 “ council, (he was also at the head of the admiralty,) did, upon read-  
 “ ing a paper at the board, stifle something that was material to their  
 “ justification; the lords of the council, having considered and  
 “ examined into the matter, are satisfied, and do declare, that the  
 “ report is false and scandalous. Although, upon the said examination,  
 “ it did also appear, that something happened which might mislead the  
 “ admirals into that error. And it is ordered in council, that this be  
 “ printed and published in the Gazette.”

nd withal so lame of the gout, that a chair was set for him at the bar of the house. On the 17th of November, they came to a resolution, "That, upon examination of the miscarriage of the fleet, this house is of opinion, that there hath been a notorious and treacherous mismanagement in that affair." Yet, afterwards, a negative was put on a resolution to censure the admirals commanding in chief; and so, by degrees, after much noise and clamour, the matter blew over.

Two circumstances contributed principally to their safety; the first was, that it could not be made clear to the house, that the admirals had information of the Brest quadron's putting to sea on the 11th of May, though it was evident that such advice had been given to the privy-council; the second, that the Lord Falkland, who was very active in this prosecution of the admirals, fell under the displeasure of the house for very indirect practices in relation to the navy; which gave the more offence, because he was at that time first commissioner of the admiralty. Upon the whole, regard to truth obliges me to say, that there was enough done in this affair to irritate and inflame, and very little to calm or satisfy the nation; which last, however, ought to be the end of all parliamentary inquiries.\*

\* What Bishop Burnet says on this subject is so concise, and at the same time so strong, and to the purpose, that I think myself obliged to lay it before the reader for his farther information:

"The inquiry into the conduct at sea, particularly with relation to the Smyrna fleet, took up much time, and held long. Great exceptions were taken to the many delays, by which it seemed a train was laid, that they should not get out of our ports, till the French were ready to lay in their way, and intercept them. Our want of intelligence was much complained of; the instructions, that the admirals who commanded the fleet had received from the cabinet council, were thought ill given, and yet worse executed. Their orders seemed weakly drawn, ambiguous, and defective: nor had they shewed any zeal in doing more than strictly to obey such orders; they had very cautiously kept within them, and had been very

But, notwithstanding the admirals escaped, yet many things were laid open in the house of commons which reflected extremely on the management of the navy. It appeared, particularly, that the sum of one million thirty six thousand four hundred and fifteen pounds was due for seamen's wages. This struck the house with astonishment, and accounted, at the same time, very fully for the backwardness of the sailors in entering into the public service. To provide a remedy for so great an evil, and to encourage the seamen for the future, the commons voted five hundred thousand pounds toward the discharge of the debt; and two millions for the service of the fleet; that his majesty might be able to perform the promise he had made them of taking care that things should go next year better at sea.\* His majesty also made several changes in the ministry, which gave great satisfaction; for the late inquiries had made it evident, that the dependents on some great men were principally concerned in giving information to the French of all our motions; a conduct

"careful never to exceed them in a tittle. They had used no diligence to get certain information concerning the French fleet, whether it was still in Brest, or had sailed out. But in that important matter they had trusted general and uncertain reports too easily. Nor had they sailed far enough with Rooke to see him past danger. To all this their answer was, that they had observed their orders: they had reason to think the French were still in Brest; that therefore it was not safe to sail too far from the coast of England, when they had, as they understood, ground to believe, that they had left behind them a great naval force, which might make an impression on our coast, when they were at too great a distance from it. The getting certain intelligence from Brest was represented as impracticable. They had many specious things to say in their own defence, and many friends to support them: for it was now the business of one party to accuse, and of another to justify their conduct. In conclusion, there was not ground sufficient to condemn the admirals, since they had followed their instructions: so a vote passed in their favour."

\* Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 658, 659. The Present State of Europe for November, 1693, p. 448. Chandler's Debates, vol. ii. n. 418, 490.



which, however coloured or clouded, was a most gross and glaring treason against their country ; such as ought to have drawn upon them the severest punishment while living, and which deserves to be transmitted to posterity with a proper note of infamy, to prevent like practices in succeeding times.

Before we speak of the naval operations of the year 1694, it will be necessary to give some account of the sending Sir Francis Wheeler with his squadron into the Mediterranean ; as that was a measure not only concerted, but executed in the preceding year, though its being altogether independent of other affairs, made it not so proper to mention it before. The great blow the English and Dutch commerce had received there by the intercepting the Smyrna fleet ; and the danger there was in leaving the remains of that fleet any longer in Spanish harbours, engaged the board of admiralty to send their orders for Sir Francis Wheeler to proceed with a squadron of twenty-five men of war and frigates, in conjunction with a Dutch vice-admiral and his squadron, to the Mediterranean, where he had instructions to use his utmost endeavour to procure the safe return of the plate fleet into Cadiz ; then he was to leave a sufficient convoy for bringing home the ships in that port to England : he was next to convoy the Turkish ships as far as the channel of Malta ; then, in conjunction with the Spanish fleet, he was to annoy the enemy's trade, till he judged his detached ships were about to return ; and, after joining them at the appointed place of rendezvous, he was to bring back with him all the merchant-ships ready to sail from any of the ports in the Streights, or from Cadiz.\*

\* These instructions may be found at large in Burchet's Memoirs, p. 201 ; and are indisputably those given to the admiral. But the French published abundance of strange stories about Sir Francis Wheeler's commission, such as that he intended to bombard Genoa, in order to force that republic to comply with the demands of the king

On the 27th of November, in pursuance of these instructions, he sailed, and on the 4th of December sent the ships bound to Oporto thither under a convoy, as two days after he did those bound for Lisbon and St. Ubes; and, having by his vigilance prevented a design of the French to intercept part of the merchant-ships under his convoy, he arrived on the 19th of January in the bay of Cadiz; having lost company in his passage with only one of a hundred and sixty-five ships which sailed with him from England.\* So happy was the beginning of an expedition, which proved afterwards so unfortunate!

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On the admiral's arriving at Cadiz, he found the Spanish fleet in no condition to sail, but had the satisfaction of finding the flota safely arrived.† On the 25th of January, rear-admiral Neville joined him with the ships he had ordered to cruize off Cape St. Vincent, together with the detached convoys which the French in vain had endeavoured to intercept. Sir Francis Wheeler, upon this, appointed a squadron of four English and as many Dutch men-of-war, with a fire-ship, under the command of vice-admiral Hopson, to bring home the merchant-ships that were ready; and, on the 10th of February, sailed with the rest of the squadron to execute the remaining part of his instructions. On the 17th of the same month, being off the bay of Gibraltar, and having been driven out of the Straits-mouth, he met with a storm, which increased till the 19th in the morning; when the admiral, seeing the Gut, stood away for it, and made a proper signal to the rest of the fleet, and was followed by Vice-admiral Callemberg, who first saw his signal, and other ships. But they, having the bay of Gibraltar open, and in all probability mistaking it for the Straits-mouth,

of Spain; that he had views on the Pope's territories, and whatever else they thought might contribute to incense the Italian princes.

\* See the Present State of Europe for January, 1694.

† Burchel's Memoirs, p. 206.

put in there, which occasioned their unhappy misfortune; for it being a lee shore, foul ground, and their sails flying into the air, they were forced to let go their anchors, of which many were lost, most of their cables spoiled, and several of their ships run on shore.\*

In the mean time, the *Sussex*, on board which the admiral was, foundered at sea, and himself, with all his crew, to the number of five hundred and fifty were lost, only two Turks escaping. The admiral's body was soon after found on a sand-bank, in his shirt and slippers: it was guessed from thence, that, seeing the ship about to sink, he intended to have thrown himself into the sea, and attempt to save himself by swimming.† The whole squadron suffered extremely, and were obliged to remain, by contrary winds, a long time at Gibraltar; and at length, in the beginning of May, sailed for Cadiz.‡ In the mean time, vice-admiral Hopson, in pursuance of the orders before-mentioned, sailed with the homeward-bound ships,

\* The particulars of this misfortune may be seen in the following list:

	Men.
The <i>Cambridge</i> , a ship of 70 guns, run ashore about four in the morning, and lost .....	160
The <i>Lumley Castle</i> , lost .....	130
The <i>Serpent</i> bomb-vessel, foundered .....	15
The <i>William</i> ketch, ran ashore .....	15
The <i>Mary</i> ketch, foundered .....	16
The <i>Great George</i> , a Turkey ship, lost .....	90
The <i>Aleppo</i> Factor, lost .....	3
The <i>Golden Frigate</i> of Venice, lost .....	23
The <i>Berkshire</i> , a Turkey ship .....	15
The <i>Indian Merchant</i> , a Turkey ship .....	2
The <i>William</i> , for Leghorn, lost .....	1
*	409

† We have several accounts of this in the *Gazettes*; and his body was afterwards embalmed, and sent into England.

‡ *Kenner's Complete History of England*, vol. iii. p. 661. *Life of K. William*, p. 373. *Columna Rostrata*, p. 63.

and arrived safely off the *Lizard* on the 5th of April, 1694. \*

A.D. 1694. We have before observed, one of the first steps taken by King William after his return from Flanders, and his hearing of the unfortunate affair of the *Smyrna* fleet, was the appointing Edward Russel, Esq; admiral and commander in chief of the fleet which should put to sea the next spring. As a farther testimony of his majesty's confidence in that great man, he directed a new commission of admiralty, wherein Edward Russel, Esq; Sir John Lowther, Henry Priestman, Esq; Robert Austen, Esq; Sir Robert Rich, Sir George Rooke, and Sir John Hoblon, were included. † The command of the fleet being thus provided for, the next thing was, to fix on such designs as were proper for retrieving the glory of the English arms, and blotting out the memory of the unfortunate accidents that had lately happened. In the first place, it was resolved, that a formidable descent should be actually made on the French coast, in order to effect what had been long ago proposed, the erecting a fort on a certain promontory near Brest, which should command the haven, and entirely prevent the assembling, as the French were wont to do, their grand fleets there. ‡ It was also judged requisite to send a strong fleet into the Mediterranean, as well to succour the king of Spain, whose affairs were much distressed by the French naval power; as to prevent the *Toulon* squadron from coming into the ocean, and hindering the French thereby from making any figure this year at sea. § In order to accomplish these schemes, all imaginable pains were taken, and no expense spared, either in England or Holland, to

\* Burchet's *Naval History*, p. 494, 495.

† See the *Present State of Europe* for May, 1694, p. 166.

‡ *Hist. Militaire*. P. Daniel. *Memoirs du Temps*. Burnet's *History of his own Time*, vol. ii. p. 129, 130.

§ Kennet's *History of England*, vol. iii. p. 664. *Life of King William*, p. 376. Oldmixon's *History of the Stuarts*, vol. ii. p. 91.

fit out a more numerous fleet, and to send it earlier to sea, than in any year since the war began.

On the 1st of May, Admiral Russel took the command of the fleet at St. Helen's, which consisted of fifty-two English and forty-one Dutch ships of the line, besides frigates, fire-ships, and other smaller vessels. On the 3d, the admiral sailed with the grand fleet, leaving Sir Cloudesley Shovel with a strong squadron at Portsmouth, in order to embark the land forces. On the 9th, being fifteen leagues S. S. W. of the Lizard, the admiral was informed by the captain of a Swedish ship, that there lay in Bertaume-bay a fleet of French merchant-men, bound to the eastward; upon which he immediately detached Captain Pritchard in the *Monmouth*, together with the *Resolution* and *Roebuck* fire-ships, with orders either to take or destroy them. Accordingly, on the 10th, as soon as it was light, they made the French shore about seven miles from the fleet; and, by five o'clock, they saw several ships behind a point of land near Conquet-bay, which, upon a signal given from one of their scouts, immediately put to sea. In the mean time, Captain Pritchard pursued the man-of-war that was their convoy, and forced her to haul in with the shore, and run against the rocks under the outermost castle; and this man-of-war proved to be the *Jersey* frigate, which the enemy had taken from us in the West Indies, and which soon after blew up, and with her two sloops of between ten and sixteen guns. The merchant-ships were in all about fifty-five sail, of which, thirty-five were burnt or sunk; twenty-five in Whitesand-bay; four on the south side of the point of the bay; and six on the south side of Conquet; their lading being for the most part salt, wine, and brandy. Some few days after, two other ships took and destroyed seventeen French vessels laden with corn and other provisions. \*

\* *Life of K. William*, p. 376. *Present State of Europe for May, 1694*, p. 167. *Columna Rostrata*, p. 263. *Le Clerc Hist. des Provinces Unies*, tom. iii. p. 427.

The admiral returned back again to St. Helen's by the time he judged that Sir Cloudesley Shovel could have executed the orders he had left with him; and finding the land-forces completely embarked, and every thing ready, he sailed with the whole fleet on the 29th of May, having before given the necessary directions for the separating, at a proper station, of the squadron that was intended for the Brest expedition, and which was to be commanded by the Lord Berkley.\* On the last day of the month, at nine in the morning, a council of war was held on board the *Britannia*, at which were present the following persons, viz. Edward Russel, Esq; admiral of the fleet, the Lord Berkley, admiral of the blue, Sir Cloudesley Shovel, vice-admiral of the red, Colonel Aylmer, vice-admiral of the blue, Colonel Mitchel, rear-admiral of the red, the marquis of Caermarthen, rear-admiral of the blue, Captain Byng, eldest captain to the admiral, lieutenant-general Talmash, the earl of Macclesfield, the Lord Cutts, Sir Martin Beman, Admiral Allemande, admiral of the Dutch, Vice-admiral Vanderputtin, Vice-admiral Schey, Vice-admiral Vander-Goes, Rear-admiral Evertzen, and Captain Vander-Duffen; in which it was resolved, that the fleet designed for Brest should immediately proceed to Camaret-bay, and should land the forces on board under the direction of Lieutenant-general Talmash, and the necessary instructions were for this purpose given to Lord Berkley, and the officers that went to command under him.†

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On the 5th of June, the Lord Berkley parted, with his squadron, from the grand fleet, having with him twenty-nine English and Dutch men-of-war of the line, besides small frigates, fire-ships, machines, tenders, well-boats, and five bomb-ketches. On the 6th, a council of war was

\* Journal of the Brest expedition, by the marquis of Caermarthen, 1694, London, 4to. p. 5.

† See his instructions in Burchet's *Memoirs*, p. 215.

held, in which the proper measures were taken for landing the forces; and it was agreed, that Lord Cutts should command six hundred grenadiers, and Lieutenant-general Talmash advance in person at the head of the troops that were to support them. On the 7th, the fleet came to an anchor between Camaret-bay and the bay of Bertaume, the French playing upon them with bombs from four batteries. The marquis of Caermarthen demanded leave of Lord Berkley the admiral to go into Camaret-bay, in order to observe the situation of the forts, and the posture of the enemy. On his lordship's return, and making his report, the admiral ordered two sixty-gun ships to go in and cover the boats while they were landing: to which the marquis objecting that it was too small a force, a council of war was called on the 8th, in which it was resolved to send in three English and as many Dutch frigates, besides the two men-of-war before mentioned.

One of these, however, the *Richmond*, deserted the post assigned her, and the marquis of Caermarthen carried in the other five, and posted them in their proper places, which, though a very necessary, was a most dangerous service; since, at their going in, a bomb broke over the *Monk*, a great piece of which struck through her poop, and two decks more, and came out again into the water near one of the stern-ports on the larboard side, in the gun room, killing three marines, and one of them by the side of the marquis. So soon as the *Monk* got into the bay, and came up with the western point, Camaret-fort fired upon her very warmly; and, when the rest of the ships were properly disposed, they were surprised to find themselves played upon from three batteries, not one of which was discerned till they felt the shot from it. These military compliments they returned with great spirit; and, by keeping a brisk and continual fire, covered the troops in their landing, which was not, however,

performed with that regularity that might have been expected. \*

The reason of this, since I do not find it already set down in any of our historians, I think myself obliged to give, as I have had it from the mouths of many who were engaged in that warm service. The French had been so well informed of our design, and such strange delays had been made in embarking the forces; that, when our fleet came upon the coast, they found the French every where covered by impregnable entrenchments; and supported by a body of regular troops, more numerous than the forces intended for this descent. This was represented to Lieutenant-general Talmash in the council of war, and he was advised not to expose himself or his men: to which he answered; "This advice comes too late: the honour of the English nation is at stake, and therefore I must and will land. I know that I sacrifice myself and the men; but it is necessary, and must be done, that both our enemies and allies may know, that even desperate undertakings cannot daunt English courage." †

He embarked on board the small vessels, with about eight hundred men, and landed as many of them as he could, but to very little purpose; for several of the well-boats sticking, all that were in them were either killed or wounded before they could get to the shore; and those that did land were very soon driven back to their boats, and with much difficulty carried off again. Among the wounded was Lieutenant-general Talmash himself, who

\* See the marquis of Caermarthen's account, p. 21. Burchet's Memoirs, p. 222. Life of King William, p. 377.

† This project, as I have been informed, was first proposed by a land officer to the earl of Nottingham some years before; and hints of it having been given to the French, they resolved to spare no cost or pains, in order to prevent a scheme from taking effect, which they knew would have deprived them of the best port they have in this part of the world.



received a shot in his thigh; of which he soon after died.\* The marquis of Caermarthen, afterwards duke of Leeds, whose courage no man ever called in question, tells us on this occasion, that if the English force had been double to what it was, they would have found the attempt impracticable.

When the men on board the ships saw only a few boats come off again, and the whole affair over, they began to be out of heart, and the marquis had much ado to bring them out of the bay. The monk had not either a yard or a sail, but was towed off; the rest of the vessels were also brought away with great difficulty, except a Dutch frigate called the Teesep, of thirty guns, which had twelve feet water in her hold, all her men being killed except eight; and, of half an English company that was accidentally left on board her, only an ensign, a drummer, and a private man, escaped; so that they were obliged to leave her behind. A council of war being called in the evening, it was resolved therein to return to Spithead. The loss upon this occasion was computed at seven hundred of the land-forces killed, wounded, and taken, and about four hundred killed and wounded on board the ships. †

\* Both the marquis de Quincy and Father Daniel commend the bravery of some French officers, who, they say, attacked and routed the English troops that were landed, and this with so small a force, as one hundred and twenty men, supported, however, by a regiment of dragoons. The glory of this will be sufficiently diminished, when it is known, that not above three hundred did land, and that many of these were wounded in getting ashore, and were so much exposed to the enemy's artillery, that they never could be formed into any tolerable order.

† The marquis of Caermarthen in his account, does great justice to all the officers employed in this desperate service. He says, particularly, page 46. "My Lord Berkley, during all this expedition, has had a great deal of unusual trouble by reason of the embarkations of the soldiers; notwithstanding which, both by his advice at councils of war, and issuing of orders, which his lordship has

The marquis de Quincy, who is at once the most exact and most moderate of all the French writers, informs us, that, at the time this attempt was made, M. de Vauban had taken care to put the town of Brest into an excellent state of defence. It was surrounded with strong walls, good ramparts, large and deep ditches cut in the rock, with bastions and half-moons at proper distances. He had erected a new battery of sixteen pieces of cannon and six mortars on the bastion of the town, nearest the castle, between it and the grand battery, with several smaller batteries in other places. He had likewise taken care to render all the vaults in the castle bomb-proof, and had made the best disposition possible of ninety mortars, and three hundred pieces of large cannon. As for the vessels in the ports, they were placed out of the reach even of bombs; and, with respect of men, he had fourteen hundred bombardiers, three thousand gentlemen who served as volunteers, and of regular troops four thousand foot, and a regiment of dragoons. \*

General Talmash's landing, therefore, with eight hundred men, might well be called a sacrifice, and yet more than half of these could never be got on shore; we must, therefore, admit, that when the marquis says four hundred were killed, five hundred forty-eight soldiers and forty officers made prisoners, he carries the thing a little

"done very methodically, he hath behaved himself, in my opinion, with all the conduct and prudence that could be expected from a gentleman in his station."

"Lieutenant-general Talmash, the earl of Macclesfield, my Lord Cutts, and all the officers of the land-forces, I think, have shewn all the forwardness and readiness imaginable for the attempting any thing that was possible to be done on this occasion. There are no officers of note, that I can yet hear of, killed in this action, but Monsieur Lamote; and Lieutenant-general Talmash died, the Tuesday following, of the wound he received in his thigh. But there are several captains, &c. who are either killed or taken, of whose names I am as yet ignorant."

\* Hist. Militaire, tom. iii. p. 77, 78, 79.

too far. Father Daniel, however, and some other writers carry it as far; and indeed most of them agree in computing our whole loss at two thousand. As to what they say of ships being sunk, and hundreds of men drowned in the retreat, they are merely ornament; which from frequent use are become necessary to a French detail; as their having but forty-five men killed in this action is another stroke of the marvellous, which every reader perhaps may not be in the humour to credit. \*

After this unlucky attempt, the poor wounded Lieutenant-general proposed, that a small squadron of frigates and bomb-vessels might be sent into the harbour of Brest to bombard that town; but this was judged to be a rash, and, as things stood, an impracticable undertaking; and, therefore, Lord Berkley sailed immediately for our own coasts, and arrived on the 15th of June, 1694, at St. Helen's. There they found the queen's orders to call a council of war, to consider how the ships and troops might, after this fatal miscarriage, be best employed. After several consultations, it was resolved to keep no more than four regiments on board, and to make some attempts on the coast of Normandy. Advice of this being sent to court, and an answer being returned on the 27th of June; it was resolved, in another council of war, first to bombard the town of Dieppe; and then to proceed along the French coast, and do every where what prejudice they could. In pursuance of this resolution, they came before that place, but were forced to sea by a storm, and afterwards anchored off Dungeness, whence they sailed on the 5th of July, and arrived once more in Dieppe road on the 8th. The next day, they intended to have

\* Limiers, tom. ii. p. 565. *Journal Historique de Louis XIV.* p. 177, 178. See two letters written by Monsieur de Nointel, intendant of Bretagne to Louis XIV. giving an account of the action, in the *Present State of Europe for June, 1694*, p. 202—204.

bombarded the place, but were prevented by exceeding foul weather for several days together. \*

On the 12th, they began about nine in the morning to play upon the town of Dieppe, and continued without ceasing till about nine at night. About eleven, they sent in one of their machines which the French call infernals, with an intent to burn the pier; but several vessels full of stones, being very providently sunk before it, rendered that ineffectual; so that, except astonishing the town by the mighty noise, it did little mischief. †

Captain Dunbar, a Scotch gentleman, who commanded it, acquired immortal honour by his intrepidity on this occasion; for the train not taking effect as was expected, he went on board again, and finding the fuze out, set fire to it a second time, for which he and those who went with him were deservedly rewarded. ‡ They continued the bombardment afterwards till day-light; and the streets being narrow, the houses old, and most of them built of timber, the town was on fire in twenty places at once; so that the far greater part of it was consumed to ashes. § The French court did all they could to stifle the report of this, at least at Paris; but the place was too near for any such artifices to take effect; so that, by endeavouring to lessen, they really increased the people's apprehensions, and all the inhabitants of the sea coasts would have aban-

\* Burchet's Memoirs, p. 225. Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 664. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 131. Columna Rostrata, p. 264.

† Life of King William, p. 379. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 92. Present State of Europe, for July 1694, p. 236.

‡ Burchet's Naval History, p. 501.

§ In the dates I generally follow the French writers, reducing the new style to the old, because they are usually more exact than our own. Father Daniel owns the total destruction of Dieppe, but says it was immediately built up again at the expense of the French king. If so, the inhabitants must be daily put in mind of the English maritime power, by this very improvement of their town.

doned their towns and villages, if forces had not been sent to restrain them. \*

After the bombardment of Dieppe, the English squadron sailed along the coast, and obliged the French to march their forces night and day, in order to prevent the disembarking any troops; which, however, was a thing the English admiral never intended. † On the 15th, about noon, Lord Berkeley arrived at Havre de Grace, and about four o'clock he began to bombard it. On the 16th, 17th, and 18th, the French poured troops and militia into the place, in order to assist the inhabitants to put out the fires lighted from time to time by the bombs; and as the wind continued blowing all that time directly from the shore, the English were not able to do much, though they remained still before the place, which threw all the adjacent country into a terrible consternation. On the 21st, the wind being favourable, the small craft and bomb-vessels were sent in, and continued bombarding the place the whole night; by which a third part of the town was burnt down; a great part of the wall demolished; and, which was worst of all, abundance of poor people killed. ‡ All this, however, could not be performed

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\* See several letters printed in the Present State of Europe, for the month of July 1694, and the fact is confirmed by the French accounts.

† Burchet's Naval History, p. 500, 501. Kennet. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 92. Larrey, tom. ii. p. 226. Reincourt, tom. iii. p. 383. P. Daniel Journal Historique de Louis XIV. p. 178.

‡ The Marquis de Quincy asserts positively, that there were not above twenty houses burnt in the town; but then he admits, that not only the inhabitants, but a vast number of soldiers, who were sent thither on purpose, laboured excessively in putting out the fires wherever the bombs fell; which must have been attended with great loss of men and other inconveniences. But I must confess, I see no just cause why a medal should have been struck on the bombarding this place, rather than that of Dieppe. Yet such a one there was; having on one side the king's head in profile, with these words, *Gulielmus magnus invictissimus*; on the reverse was Perillus's bull, with this inscription, *Suis perit ignibus auctor*, alluding to the French king's

without loss ; many of the mortars melted ; the Grenado bomb-ship was blown up ; and the rest of the small craft were so shattered, that it was thought convenient to retire. But, even in doing this, care was taken to give the French infinite disquiet ; for, appearing before La Hogue, their forces were drawn that way ; but our squadron was in no condition to undertake any thing ; and therefore, after alarming the enemy as much as possible, Lord Berkeley returned to St. Helen's, on the 26th of July, 1694, in order to refit. \*

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The court was very desirous that something should be undertaken against Dunkirk, and for that purpose several expresses were despatched to the fleet ; but, upon a nice examination of the different proposals made by the engineers and pilots, they were all of opinion that the season was too far advanced, and that nothing could be undertaken this year with any probability of success. A plan was then sent of Calais, which came from the king in Flanders ; but the scheme of bombarding that place was also judged impracticable by a council of war, which resolution was chiefly owing to the diffidence of the pilots. † On the 27th of August, Lord Berkeley returned to London, and the command of the fleet, which consisted now only of frigates and small ships, devolved on Sir Cloudesley Shovel, whose instructions were expressed to undertake something against Dunkirk at all events.

Mr. Meesters, who was the inventor and director of the machines called infernals, was at this time in Flanders, endeavouring to collect pilots able to carry the squadron into the harbour of Dunkirk, or at least so far into the road,

having begun this barbarous kind of war, by burning the Palatinate, and bombarding Genoa. In the exergue, *Portus Gratia, exustus et eversus bombardis Anglo Batavis*, 1694. I. B. F. Gerard Van Loon *Histoire Metallique des Pays Bas*, tom. iv. p. 165.

\* Burehet's Memoirs, p. 227. Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 665. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 92.

† Burchet's Memoirs, p. 227.

as might enable them to destroy the enemy's ships. Sir Cloudesley sailed to the Downs in the beginning of September, and on the 7th was joined by Mr. Meesters, with twenty-six Dutch pilots; when Captain Benbow was appointed to command the small ships, and to follow the instructions of Mr. Meesters, whose pilots did not perform what was expected from them. \* On the 12th, however, Sir Cloudesley Shovel appeared before the town of Dunkirk, with thirteen English and six Dutch men-of-war, two bomb-vessels, seventeen machines, and other small craft. In the evening Captain Benbow went in, and sounded the western channel, between the Brake and the Main, notwithstanding a prodigious fire from the ships and the citadel. The next day all the boats and small vessels were sent in again, with the Charles galley, and two bomb-vessels.

In the afternoon, two of the machines were sent in. The first took fire before she was near enough to do any execution; whether it was that the cannon of the place set fire to it, as some of the French writers say, or that those on board, finding it impossible either to bring it nearer or to get it off, were obliged to let it burn there. The other, which was the biggest, went in boldly, and advanced very near the mole-head; but the tide set her on one side, so that she drove a cable's length, and then blew up. † It was found, that the French had, according to custom, early intelligence of this design; and by driving piles before

\* This ignorance, cowardice, or wilfulness of the pilots, seems to have been the chief cause of this miscarriage; and whoever considers attentively what has been written upon this subject, by such as are best acquainted with maritime affairs, will be of my opinion, that seamen, above all others, are least inclined to expeditions of this sort. And, as such expeditions can only be executed by seamen, it may well be supposed that this is the great reason why they so seldom succeed.

† Histoire Militaire, tom. iii. p. 84, 85. Journal Historique de Louis XIV. p. 197.

the pier-head, and sinking ships on the back of the westernmost pier, they had secured themselves against all attempts of this nature. Sir Cloudesley Shovel being informed of this, and knowing that the spring tides were over, sailed away for Calais, and on the 17th sent the bomb-vessels in, and threw so many shells into the town, that about forty houses were ruined ; but the wind blowing hard that night, and a great swell of sea happening, the admiral was forced to bear away ; and the storm continuing two days, he thought it not convenient to stay any longer, but returned with his whole squadron into the Downs, whence the bomb-vessels and machines were sent into the river Thames. \*

It was the opinion of a very intelligent person, who had, without question, good grounds for what he delivered, that the expense to which the nation was put by these bombardments, was more than equivalent to what the enemy suffered by them. † It is certain, that all the seafaring part of the world disapproved this manner of pursuing the war at that time; and that all the writers who have touched upon this subject, have been carried away by the stream of their authority ; which, however, has not the same effect on me. In the first place, I think the manner in which the French had conducted the war in Germany; their bombarding the city of Genoa ; but, above all, their piratically lying in wait for, and plundering our Smyrna fleet; and their pursuing and bombarding the remains of it in the ports of Spain, fully justified this manner of proceeding. The *lex talionis* certainly subsists between nations; and as the French set such an example at their expense, the allies could not be reasonably blamed

\* Present State of Europe, for September, 1694, p. 304, 305. Columna Rostrata, p. 265. Pointer's Chronological Historian, vol. i. p. 408,

† Naval Memoirs, p. 234.



for writing after their copy. In these cases, those who set the precedent are to bear the blame as well as the loss, that suffering and shame may teach them moderation for the future.

I must next observe, that, if we consider the expense the king of France must have been at in providing for the security of Brest; and the inconveniences that must have attended the sending M. Vauban that way, with a corps of no less than twelve thousand regular troops; the marquis de Beauvron, with a great detachment to Dieppe; Marshal de Choiseul to Havre de Grace; the duke of Maine, Count Toulouse, and Marshal Villeroy, with the greatest part of the army in Flanders, to Dunkirk. \* I say, take all these together, and it will appear the French suffered abundantly more than we.

But then, thirdly, this measure was absolutely necessary; the French now styled themselves LORDS OF BOTH SEAS, that is the ocean and the Mediterranean; their gazettes were full of the triumphs of their maritime force; and, therefore, the bombarding their ports was an effectual method to convince all Europe of the emptiness of their bravadoes. It exalted the maritime power of the English nation; raised the drooping spirits of the people; gave satisfaction to the merchants whose vessels had been plundered by the French privateers; and was, therefore, a great and glorious measure, whatever has been said against it by those who shew respect and compassion for a people who never shew us any marks of either, except when civility is the pure result of fear, or the consequence of deep distress.

A.D.  
1694.

We are now to turn our eyes towards the Mediterranean, whither Admiral Russel sailed with the grand fleet, as we have remarked, on the 6th of June, 1694. He arrived on the 25th off the rock of Lisbon, and thence sent orders to

A.D.  
1694.

\* I take the whole of this affair from the French historians.

Rear-admiral Neville, who, as we before observed, commanded the squadron which protected the English merchant-ships at Cadiz, to join him, which he did, with the Dutch Vice-admirals Callemberg and Evertzen, with sixteen ships of the line, which increased the number of those in the fleet to sixty-three. The admiral then resolved to steer immediately for Barcelona, in order to save that city, and the province of Catalonia, from falling into the hands of the French, who at that time had a numerous army, and a great naval force under the command of M. Tourville before, or at least very near the place.\*

This shews the wisdom of the administration in sending so great a fleet into those seas; for, without such assistance, the Spaniards must have been undone, or, which was the view of that armament, forced to make a separate peace; and the French would have continued boasting and vapouring, as they had lately done, of their mighty maritime power, persuading Algiers, and the rest of the States of Barbary, that the English were not able to look them in the face. But an end was now effectually put to those bravadoes, by the admiral's procuring leave from the Dutch and Spaniards, who were at war with those States, that some Algerine men of war might have permission to come and take a view of the fleet; which they did accordingly, and went home again very well satisfied. † On the other hand, the French admiral had no sooner

\* The Marquis de Quincy tells us, that Admiral Russel came into the Mediterranean very luckily for the preservation of Barcelona, before which port he appeared on the last of July, with a fleet of one hundred and thirty-six sail, of which eighty-eight were of the line of battle; and M. Tourville not being in a condition to look such a fleet in the face, retired, pursuant to his orders, into the harbour of Toulon. *Hist. Militaire*, tom. iii. p. 86.

† Burchet's *Memoirs*, p. 239, where we are told, that, notwithstanding the precautions taken by Admiral Russel, one of the Algerine frigates was soon after seized in his sight, by a Dutch man of war, though she was presently released upon his application.

intelligence of the approach of our fleet, than he retired precipitately from before Barcelona, and soon after shut himself up in the port of Toulon; which put it entirely out of dispute, that the maritime powers were now able to give law to France in all parts of the world.\* The siege of Barcelona too was raised, to the infinite joy of the king of Spain, who testified his gratitude for this signal assistance, in the warmest and most public manner possible.†

Our admiral, indeed, found the Spanish affairs in the most distressed condition imaginable. Their armada consisted but of ten ships, and of these four only were of the line of battle; the rest of small force, and so rotten, that they could scarcely endure the firing of their own guns. Their army in Catalonia was in a still worse condition; it consisted but of nine thousand men, without clothes, without pay, without provisions, without artillery, and even without tents. The towns on the sea-coast were so meanly fortified, that, on the approach of a French squadron, the people had no other way to secure themselves but by flight. Admiral Russel stated all this in a letter to the king; and, at the same time, offered the viceroy of Catalonia to do all that was in his power for his assistance; which, however, was not much, for, on the other hand, the demands made by the viceroy were excessively unreasonable, and what the admiral was able to do could not much benefit him; which was the reason that, together with an apprehension of provisions growing short, induced the admiral to desire the fleet might return home; for which, when he had made all the necessary preparations, and was on the very point of quitting the Spanish coast, he received an order under his majesty's signet and sign

\* Hist. Militaire, tom. iii. p. 86. Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 665. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 129. Life of King William, p. 376, 382.

† Present State of Europe for 1694, p. 267, 271. His Catholic majesty is said to have presented Admiral Russel with a jewel of the value of fourscore thousand crowns, and another to Vice-admiral Callemberg, of the value of twelve thousand crowns.

manual, directing him to winter at Cadiz. This embarrassed him extremely, and the rather, because no care was taken to send commissioners for victualling; so that this fell entirely upon the admiral, and was no small addition to the load of cares with which he was already oppressed.\*

Yet, considering the importance of the service; the dangers to which the men would be exposed by any mismanagement in this affair; and how far the honour of the English nation was at stake; he applied himself to this new employment with such diligence, that never men were better furnished with provisions and wine; and this too was managed with so great economy; that notwithstanding the apparent difference between obtaining provisions for a great fleet and single ships; yet, the former was victualled at as small an expense to the public as the latter, and, in many circumstances, at a much cheaper rate; nor did the admiral, when he found it necessary, make any scruple of engaging his personal credit and private estate, for the service of his country. †

A. D.  
1694.

While the fleet continued before Alicant, the admiral despatched a squadron of ten sail, under the command of Rear-admiral Neville, with orders to cruize between the islands and the Barbary coast, as well to intercept any French vessels that might pass that way, as to procure wood and other necessities for the fleet. Soon after this, the admiral falling ill of a fever and bloody flux, he devolved the care of the fleet on Vice-admiral Aylmer, with orders to join Rear-admiral Neville, and in case he

Burchet's Memoirs, p. 241. Columna Rostrata, p. 264. Burnet, vol. ii, p. 129.

† See the subsequent memoirs of the earl of Orford, where it will appear, that, notwithstanding all his pains and application, he was most cruelly and scandalously traduced on this account, as if he had procured the wintering of the fleet in the Mediterranean, purely to enrich himself, by the management of their victualling; whereas, that measure was not only concerted without, but against his advice; and the government saved a great sum of money by his frugal conduct in

had any news of the French fleet's being come out of Toulon, to sail in quest of them without delay; but if not, to return to Alicant, which he did on the 10th of September. The admiral, though in a very weak state of health, went very soon on board, and resumed the command of the fleet, with which he proceeded to Cadiz, where he arrived on the 8th of November, 1694, and took all the necessary precautions to prevent the French from passing the Straits, without receiving proper notice of their motions.

While he continued there, the Spaniards sent him frequent advices of the French fleet being ready to quit Toulon; which, however, he did not much regard, as having better intelligence of his own.\* It is true, the French fleet was kept clean and well rigged during the winter, with design to have brought it round to Brest; but the advices they had of Admiral Russel's force, and their knowledge of his diligence, had such an effect on the mind of M. Tourville, that he could not be prevailed on to risk the ships under his command in so dangerous a passage. His catholic majesty was all this time solliciting our admiral to undertake impossibilities; such as transporting five, then seven thousand men, from Genoa on board his men-of-war, though he knew them to be foul by their being so long at sea, and but indifferently provided with victuals; which, though the admiral refused, yet he did it with great decency; and, at the same time, offered unanswerable reasons in support of his own conduct; adding, that he would write home to demand, among other supplies, a reasonable number of land forces; and in this manner the remainder of the year was spun out.†

It is now requisite to take notice of what was done at home in relation to naval affairs; and, in the first place, I must observe, that the king, on his return from Flanders, under the escort of a small squadron, commanded by the

\*The Present State of Europe for 1694, p. 345, 378.

†Burchet's Memoirs, p. 265.

marquis of Caermarthen, called the parliament together on the 12th of November, and opened the sessions with a speech, which began thus: "I am glad to meet you here, when I can say our affairs are in a better posture, both by sea and land, than when we parted last. The enemy has not been in a condition to oppose our fleet in these seas; and our sending so great a force into the Mediterranean has disappointed their designs, and leaves us a prospect of further success." He recommended to them, at the same time, early and effectual supplies, and the passing some good law for the encouragement of seamen. The commons received these propositions very cheerfully; and having examined the estimates that were laid before them for the next year, voted a supply of two million, three hundred and eighty-two thousand, seven hundred and twelve pounds for the navy; which sufficiently shewed how easy it was to engage the nation to give money, when they had any tolerable prospect of seeing it well laid out. \*

The death of Queen Mary, which happened towards the latter end of the year, served not only to damp the spirits of the people, who had a wonderful affection for the person of that princess; but to give the enemies of the government an opportunity to attempt distressing the nation, by pretending that the parliament was legally dissolved by her majesty's demise. † This, however strange and sin-

\* Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 666. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 132. Present State of Europe for November, 1694, p. 376. Chandler's Debates, vol. ii. p. 446.

† This excellent princess was taken ill at Kensington, on the 21st of December, 1694. Her distemper proved to be the small-pox; a malady extremely fatal to her family, and which might therefore be supposed to make the greater impression upon her spirits; this, joined to a bad constitution, and, as some say, the ill management of her principal physician, brought her to her end in the space of a week. She was, at the time of her decease, in the thirty-third year of her age, and in the 6th of her reign. She was exceedingly lamented at home and abroad; and her death at this juncture, was a great disadvantage to her subjects.

gular, was the sentiment of her majesty's uncle, the earl of Rochester, and of some others; but certainly it was very ill founded. The executive part of the government was, by law, in King William only; though the title, as well as the right, was declared to be in their majesties jointly. The calling of a parliament was certainly an act of the executive power; and, consequently, it ought to have been understood in law as the special and immediate act of the king, though the writs ran in the joint names of both their majesties, as all other acts of state did, yet without impeachment or diminution of the king's authority. Upon this principle, and no body's seconding the earl of Rochester in his motion in the house of lords, the parliament was held to be no way affected by her death, but proceeded in its deliberations as if no such accident had happened. \*

It was then suggested, by such as disliked the administration, that the sending Admiral Russel with so great a fleet into the Mediterranean; keeping him there for so long a time; and directing him at last to winter in those parts; was contrary to the interest of the nation; an occasion for vast sums being remitted into foreign parts, and an act of too great complaisance toward our allies. But, upon a long and sharp debate, the house of lords saw reason to justify this measure, by a very warm address to the throne, in which they say, "That the sending so great  
 " a fleet into the Mediterranean, and continuing it in  
~~and~~

A.I  
169.

\* See Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 140. It is evident, if this could have been carried, and the parliament dissolved, things must have run into the utmost confusion; and therefore it is amazing that any man, who pretended the least regard for his country, should espouse so destructive a scheme, even though his sentiments had been opposite to those of the persons entrusted with the administration. But the misfortune in those days was, that private interest, covered with pretences to party, boldly undertook whatever avarice or ambition dictated; and often injured the public from what they imposed on the credulous for public spirit.

“ those parts, has been to the honour and advantage of  
“ your majesty and your kingdoms : and having spent  
“ some time upon consideration of the condition of the  
“ fleet both at home and abroad, and of the great increase  
“ of the naval force and strength of our neighbours, con-  
“ ceive it to be our duty to your majesty and the king-  
“ dom, humbly to represent, that the honour and safety  
“ of this nation, under the providence of God, chiefly de-  
“ pends upon your strength at sea. And whereas, by the  
“ long continuance of this war, the number of your ships  
“ must have been diminished, and those remaining greatly  
“ impaired, we think it of the highest importance to your  
“ majesty’s service, and the security and interest of your  
“ people, that you would be pleased to give such speedy  
“ and effectual directions for the repair and increase of  
“ your royal navy, as may enable your majesty not only to  
“ continue a strength in the Mediterranean during this  
“ war, which may be superior to that of our enemies, but  
“ likewise to maintain such a force here at home, and in  
“ the West Indies, as shall be a security for our coasts  
“ and plantations, and a protection of our trade, and suffi-  
“ cient both for the annoying of our enemies, and for the  
“ protecting and convoying all such stores and provisions  
“ as must be sent to the fleet in those parts, upon the  
“ effectual and timely providing whereof the safety of that  
“ part of your majesty’s navy does so much depend.”  
This address, which was presented in the beginning of the  
month of March, and to which the king returned a favour-  
able answer, satisfied the minds of all the sensible part of  
the nation on this head ; and reconciled them to the ab-  
sence of Admiral Russel, which otherwise they would not  
have borne but with great impatience.\*

\* The French took a great deal of pains to publish whatever was said in England against this measure ; and indeed they had good reason, since all those arguments were in their favour. The English fleet giving law to them in the Mediterranean, while our squadrons



A considerable supply being sent to the fleet in the beginning of the year, Admiral Russel resolved to send a small squadron up the Straits; it was composed of six stout frigates, and the command given to Captain James Killegrew, who had instructions to protect our own trade, and to annoy that of the enemy. In their cruize, on the 18th of January, 1695, they discovered two French ships, *viz.* the *Content*, commanded by the Marquis du Chalendar, of seventy guns, and the *Trident*, under Count d'Aulnoy, of sixty guns, between Cape Bona and the island of Pantalarea, on the Barbary coast. The French men-of-war mistook the English for merchantmen, and bore down upon them; but, quickly perceiving their mistake, endeavoured to get away. It was four in the afternoon before Captain Killegrew, in the *Plymouth*, could come up with them; and, the wind being then calm, she alone engaged both the French ships for more than an hour, in which time Captain Killegrew was killed by a cannon-shot. Then came up the *Falmouth*, Captain Grantham, who engaged them for nearly another hour, till the other four English frigates came in: whereupon the French separated, the *Carlisle*, *Newcastle*, and *Southampton*, pursued the biggest of them; and the *Falmouth* and *Adventure* the lesser; the *Plymouth* being forced to bear away for Messina, having lost her fore-topmast, and her other masts and rigging being very much shattered. The French made a running fight the night following and part of the next day, when, their ships being disabled, and the Count d'Aulnoy, one of their commanders, with many of their men killed, they both yielded. One of them, called the *Trident*, being leaky, and it blowing very fresh, the English sent her to Gorgonti, and car-

bombarded their ports on the ocean, sunk their pretensions to maritime power so low, that it is no wonder they were desirous of promoting the views of that party in England, which opposed measures so fatal to their glory.

ried the *Content* to Messina, where they arrived the 2d of March. The *Plymouth* had fourteen men killed, and thirty wounded, and there might be about twice that number killed and wounded on board the rest of the ships.\* The brave Captain Killegrew was interred at Messina with all the honours due to his rank and merit.† The news of this action reached home much about the time that the lords presented their address, which was a very fortunate circumstance for the friends of the court, who mentioned it on all occasions, as a fact which fully supported their arguments. On the other side, a large account of this affair was printed at Paris, in which the Marquis du Chalard said a great many fine things of himself and his nation, but after all admits they were beaten.‡

A.D.  
1695.

On the 5th of February, 1695, a great supply of provisions arrived from England, and soon after Admiral Russel detached Rear-admiral Neville, with a strong squadron, to watch the motions of the French. In the beginning of April arrived the land-forces, consisting of about four thousand five hundred men, under the command of Brigadier Stuart and other experienced officers, and with them came a large fleet of victuallers, and twelve bomb-vessels.§

\* Burchet's *Memoirs*, p. 266, 267. *Columna Rostrata*, p. 264.

† I think myself obliged to report from the mouth of an eye-witness, a very extraordinary circumstance in relation to this engagement. When Captain Killegrew came up with the *Content*, the whole French crew were at prayers, and he might have poured in his broadside with great advantage; which, however, he refused to do, adding this remarkable expression, "It is beneath the courage of the English nation to surprise their enemies in such a posture."

‡ I shall not trouble the reader with any of the flourishes in this or other French accounts of this affair, but content myself with observing, that the Marquis du Chalard says, the *Content* carried fifty-four guns, and three hundred and eighty men, the *Trident*, 42 guns, and three hundred men, though in several of their own lines of battle, in the years 1692 and 1693, I find the former to be a ship of sixty-four, and the latter of sixty guns; which is sufficient to shew the credit to these authors."

§ Burchet's *Memoirs*, p. 268, 271. The Spaniards were all this

The fleet then sailed from Cadiz, and proceeded to Barcelona, before which port they arrived early in the month of May; and found the Spanish affairs in Catalonia in the same declining way in which they left them, notwithstanding all the pressing remonstrances which had from time to time been made by our admiral to the Spanish court on that subject.

In the mean time, Rear-admiral Neville was sent to escort a body of Spanish troops, which were to be transported from Final into that province. He had also directions to apply himself to the duke of Savoy, in order to be informed, whether, with the assistance of the fleet, he could undertake to invade any part of the dominions of France, or to assist in a design that was then formed against Toulon. But his highness, being intent upon taking Casal, declined entering upon any measures of this nature; and therefore, Rear-admiral Neville was forced to content himself with the execution of the other part of his instructions, and to rejoin the grand fleet with the Spanish troops under his protection, which he very happily performed. \*

while soliciting for a convoy, and sometimes expressed a good deal of uneasiness on account of its not being provided. Yet this was entirely their own fault; for, while the admiral thought there was no danger of the French coming out of Toulon, he had pressed them as much to forward their embarkation at Final, telling them plainly, that after a certain time, which he fixed, he should not think it safe to spare them a convoy. But they suffered it to elapse, and then grew impatient, because Admiral Russel would not hazard part of his fleet, and all their forces, by sending the convoy at a time when the French fleet might have been at sea on purpose to intercept them.

\* This was one great end of sending Admiral Russel into the Mediterranean; for if, with the assistance of the duke of Savoy, he could have undertaken any thing against Marseilles or Toulon, it would have completed the ruin of the French power at sea. But the duke was so bent upon the conquest of Casal, that he could not be drawn to undertake any other enterprize. Admiral Russel, as soon as he understood this, resolved to give him all the assistance possible in that design, and, by hindering the French from sending any succours, enabled him to

It was about the middle of the month of July, when the Marquis de Gastanaga, the Spanish governor of Catalonia, formed the design of retaking Palamos, in which he desired the assistance of Admiral Russel. For this purpose he made him a visit on board the fleet; where the admiral told him the situation things were in; the necessity he was under of sending home Sir John Munden with some of the largest ships; and the impossibility there was of suffering the troops to continue for above a week or a few days longer on shore. However, in spite of all these difficulties and disappointments, he assured the marquis, that he was ready to do the very utmost in his power, both by landing the troops, and by sending in a squadron of light vessels to bombard the place. In consequence of these resolutions, the confederate forces, consisting of four thousand English and Dutch, were landed; the former under the command of Brigadier Stuart, the latter under that of Count Nassau.\*

This was on the 9th of August, and it was the next day before they joined the Spanish army, the very sight of which was sufficient to discourage them. To enumerate their wants, would be tedious and unnecessary, since in truth they were in want of every thing; and, if our people had not by accident brought with them some pick-axes and shovels on shore, they could not have intrenched themselves; which, however, was very necessary, since the French had not only a good garrison in Palamos, but an army at least equal to that of the Spaniards, within sight of the place. The bombardment, however, succeeded better; the greatest part of the town and castle were destroyed; but the admiral, being informed that the French fleet were coming out of Toulon, thought proper to reim-

make himself master of the place, which he could not otherwise have taken.

\*Barnet's Memoirs, p. 275. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 154, 155. Columna Rostrata, p. 264, 265.

bark his forces, and to sail for the coast of Provence, in order to watch the motions of the enemy. \*

After his departure from the coast of Catalonia, the admiral met with exceeding bad weather, which hindered him from accomplishing some things he had in view. He found also, that his intelligence as to the designs of the French had not been very exact, and therefore thought it advisable to retire down the Straits; which he did, and arrived, towards the latter end of the month of September, in the bay of Cadiz. † There he made the necessary dispositions for securing our trade in the Mediterranean from any interruption; by leaving a sufficient force to frustrate the designs of the enemy, and even to assist the Spaniards, in case they shewed any greater care of their own concerns after his departure than they had hitherto done: and, having taken these precautions, and given proper instructions to Sir David Mitchel, rear-admiral of the red, who was to be left with a squadron of three and twenty ships of the line, besides frigates and bomb-vessels, he turned his thoughts entirely to the carrying the rest of the fleet back to England, most of the great ships being very foul, and many of them but indifferently manned. This design he very happily accomplished, arriving in Novem-

A.D.  
1695.

\* The French writers give us another account of this matter; they say, that the duke of Vendome, who commanded their army in Catalonia, finding himself too weak to attempt raising the siege of Palamos by force, had yet address enough to effect it by a stratagem. He sent a letter by the master of a fishing-bark, directed to Mr. Nancas, governor of that place, acquainting him, that he might depend on speedy relief, the fleet having sailed from Toulon in the beginning of September. The master of the fishing boat had orders to put himself in the way of the English, which he did; and the admiral, being deceived by this letter, sailed immediately for the coast of Provence. Hist. Militaire, tom. iii. p. 178, yet, supposing this fact to be true, the French had no great cause to boast; for Palamos was reduced to so miserable a condition by being bombarded; that the duke de Vendome thought fit soon after to withdraw his garrison, and blow up the rest of the fortifications.

† Present State of Europe for 1695, p. 335.

ber with twelve sail of great ships, exclusive of the Dutch, a frigate or two, and some fire-ships, on our own coast. \*

We are now to consider what passed at home, and how those measures were prosecuted, which had been concerted for humbling the French on the ocean. Our attempts the year before had not indeed answered the sanguine expectations of ignorant people, who imagined that they were not to have left a house standing on all the French coast; and, on the other hand, seemed but to justify too well what such as were best skilled in maritime affairs had advanced as to the impossibility of performing any great services in the way of bombarding; yet it was resolved, that this should be pursued. † The great men in the cabinet, among whom was the famous earl of Sunderland, perhaps the ablest minister of his time, thought themselves better judges of these matters than either the seamen or the people; and while they were able to shew their own force for the present; lessen the French power for the future; and give infinite uneasiness to the whole French nation by such expeditions; the expense of them, though considerable, was, in their judgments, very far from being thrown away.

They were, besides, very sensible, that nothing could enable us and our allies to continue the war with any prospect of success, but our making such uses of our fleet as might lessen the visible superiority of the enemy's forces by land. This had been effectually done by Admiral Russel while he continued in the Mediterranean; for, though he found it impossible to enable the Spaniards to do any thing, who had little or rather no force at all; yet, he had visibly prevented the loss of Barcelona, and indeed of all Catalonia, which nothing but his presence could have kept, either this year or the last, out of the hands of

\* Barchet's Memoirs, p. 285, 286. *Mercur Historique et Politique*, tom. xix. p. 580.

† Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 207, 208.

the French; and the bombardment of last year had frustrated all the French schemes, and kept their whole naval force useless in their ports, which had been otherwise employed to our prejudice. \*

The fleet intended for this service was in such forwardness by the middle of June, that the Lord Berkley of Stratton, who was to command it, had orders to repair on board. On his arrival at Spithead, a council of war was called, in order to consider what should be first undertaken; and, upon mature deliberation, it was resolved, that there was the greatest probability of succeeding against St. Malo. But the Dutch Admiral Allemande having acquainted Lord Berkley, that he had the king's absolute orders to consider the project for attacking Dunkirk before all others, this occasioned a fresh delay. However, when it was proposed that the Dutch should act separately in this last undertaking, it was by them declared impracticable; and a full resolution taken to execute immediately the design against St. Malo. †

With this view the fleet sailed on the 23d of June; and, on the 4th of July, Lord Berkley, with all the ships under his command, came before the place, and began instantly to bombard Quince-fort to the westward, and the battery, raised by the enemy to the eastward, on point Danbour, between which is the channel of the town. The first service was performed by Colonel Richards, who had three English and two Dutch bomb-vessels under his command; and the latter was committed entirely to the Dutch, who employed therein four bomb-vessels for many hours. On the 5th, every thing being ready to attack the town, Lord Berkley, about four in the morning, gave the signal.

\* This is the judgment of some of the best political writers of those times: and indeed, if we consider facts, we cannot but be convinced, that it was better for us to alarm and burn the French coast, than to suffer them to alarm and burn ours, as they did some years before.

† Burchet's Memoirs, p. 293. Kennet, Burnet,

Upon this Captain Benbow went on board the *Charles* galley, and hoisted a flame-coloured flag; and immediately after, the English and Dutch frigates, appointed to guard the bomb-vessels, entered the channel, and came to an anchor within a mile and a half of the town, having Colonel Richards, with the bomb-vessels, in a line before them. About six the bombardment began. All this time the enemy fired very warmly from the shore, from the batteries on the great and little bay in the island of Danbour, from Fort-Vauban, Fort-Royal, Fort-Quince, &c. their gallies and boats taking also the opportunities of the tides, and rowing sometimes so near as to gall with their small shot the line of bomb-vessels. Yet, in spite of this interruption, the bombardment was so vigorously pursued, that about eight o'clock a great fire broke out in the east part of the town, and vast clouds of smoke were seen ascending in several places. Lord Berkley, Admiral Allemande, and Sir Cloudesley Shovel, came in their boats to encourage the seamen, and expressed much satisfaction as to the manner in which the attack was disposed.

An English and Dutch fire-ship set the wooden fort on the Quince rock on fire, which burnt for two hours; and, about four in the afternoon, a great fire broke out in the west part of the town. By seven in the evening the bomb-vessels had spent their whole cargo of nine thousand bombs and carcasses, and therefore the signal was made to put to sea. This enterprize was executed by six English and four Dutch men of war, nine galliots, fourteen flat-bottom boats, and two brigantines. The loss sustained by the enemy's fire was sixty men killed and wounded, a bomb-vessel called the *Terrible*, so shattered, that they were forced to set her on fire, two boats, and three or four barks sunk. The bombardment lasted somewhat more than eleven hours, with all the success that could possibly be expected; a great part of



the place being burnt, and the enemy reduced to the necessity of blowing up several houses, to prevent the whole from being destroyed.\*

The French accounts do indeed contradict these; but, at the same time, they are such as cannot either raise the reputation of France, with impartial judges; or discredit what has been advanced on this subject by the English and Dutch. M. Quincy tells us, that the court appointed Marshal Choiseul to command on the coast of Britany. At La Hogue he had two battalions of marines, three of militia, a regiment of horse, and a regiment of dragoons; and, besides these, he had a numerous corps de reserve. M. d'Estrees commanded in the neighbourhood of Rochelle another considerable body of forces. The care of Brest, and the adjacent country, was committed to M. Vauban, who had a special commission to enable him to command the marines, of which there were twenty-two battalions on the coast. All this shews how apprehensive the French were of these visits; into what confusion they put them; and what mighty expenses they were obliged to be at, in order to provide against their effects.

As to this particular affair of St. Malo, the author before-mentioned is pleased to say, our fleet consisted of seventy sail, of which, twenty-five or thirty were line of battle ships. He owns, that the bombardment continued eleven hours; that nine hundred bombs were thrown, of which five hundred fell into the town, whereby ten or twelve houses were burnt, thirty-five or forty damaged, and

\* See the London Gazette, No. 3090; where, however, it is said, that the fleet sailed on the 21st; but, in all probability, it put back again, and did not sail till the 29th, as appears from the London Gazette, No. 3092. The account of the engagement I have taken from my lord Berkley's narrative, published in the Gazette, No. 3096, after comparing it with what is said in Burchet's Naval History, and the Dutch accounts; all which agree perfectly together, and therefore I can see no reason to doubt any of the facts they contain.

eighteen or twenty people killed or wounded.\* Father Daniel gives us pretty nearly the same account; and both agree, that two infernal machines were spent on Fort Quince, one to very little and the other to no purpose.† Yet, when it is remembered that St. Malo was an old town; its buildings mostly of wood; the streets very narrow; and the place crowded with soldiers; it is not easy to guess how so many bombs could possibly fall, and yet do so little hurt; and this induced a Dutch journalist to say merrily enough, that the Maloins had taught their dogs, which every body knows they make use of to guard their city, to take up the bombs in their mouths, and run away with them out of town.‡

A.D.  
1695.

After this affair was over, it was resolved, that a small squadron should proceed to Granville, a place of some trade. This squadron consisted of eight frigates, and as many bomb-vessels, viz. five English and three Dutch. On the 8th of July, about nine in the morning, Captain Benbow anchored before the place; and Colonel Richards, about an hour afterwards, began the bombardment, which lasted till six in the evening; and then the squadron bore away, leaving this town all in flames, which is a fact the French have never offered to dispute, though most of their writers slip it over without saying a word. On the 9th,

\* *Histoire Militaire*, tom. iii. p. 323. But all that is said there may be thus accounted for. The French court always kept in pay a settled journalist, who was instructed to heighten all their successes, and to extenuate all their losses, by feigned relations; which relations are since reckoned proper documents for history; though at the time they were published their true value was very well known, and they very justly despised, not abroad only, but even by sensible people in France.

† *Journal Historique de Louis XIV.* p. 182. Both his and the marquis de Quincy's account, are copied from their Gazettes.

‡ Present State of Europe for 1695, p. 250, 271, 279. See Vice-admiral Allemande's Letter to the States, dated July 18th, 1695. *Life of King William*, p. 420. *Kennet's History of England*, vol. iii. p. 690.

he fleet appeared before Havre de Grace; not with any design to attack it, but merely to alarm and harass the enemy: which having performed, they sailed for Portsmouth, in order to make the necessary preparations there for an attempt upon Dunkirk; the destruction of which port would have given equal satisfaction to the English and Dutch, both nations suffering very much, though not equally, by her privateers, which were the very bane of all our northern and coast trade.\*

On the return of the fleet, four hundred soldiers were immediately embarked, and Mr. Meesters received orders to prepare his machines, on the success of which the whole affair depended. After this, all the proper measures were concerted with that engineer. But, whether through some backwardness in him, or from what other accident

is not very clear; so it was, that the month of July expired before the attempt upon Dunkirk was made. On the 1st of August, Lord Berkley sent in the bomb-etches, fire-ships, and machine-vessels, with several light frigates and brigantines, to protect them against the enemy's half-gallies, and other armed boats, of which they had a great many. About nine in the morning the bombardment began; about two in the afternoon, four smoke-ships were sent in, which were burnt to little or no purpose. The bomb-vessels, however, continued firing till about five, and then with the frigates, &c. were ordered off. Several of the shells fell into the rise bank and upon the pier-heads, and three of the enemy's half-gallies were sunk.

But they had, it must be allowed in all places made such great preparations for their defence, with boats, rafts, chains, piles, and pontoons, with guns upon them, as rendered this attempt altogether impracticable. The

\* Burchett's Memoirs, p. 298. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. II. p. 155. London Gazette, No. 3096. Mercure Historique et politique, tom. xix. p. 113.

French give a very long and pompous account of this affair, upon which they struck a medal; and, I think, do the English more honour than any of their own relations; for they make the miscarriage of this attempt the effect of the courage and conduct of several of their most experienced sea-officers; whereas our authors universally ascribe it either to the want of skill in Mr. Meesters, or to the misunderstanding between him and some of the sea-officers; which is the more probable, since he deserted the service in the night, and could not be prevailed on to take any share at all in the subsequent attempt upon Calais. \*

Lord Berkley, notwithstanding this disappointment, resolved to prosecute his orders, and coming before Calais, called a council of war; in which it was determined to endeavour first of all to burn a wooden fort erected at the entrance of the pier heads, which was furnished with fourteen heavy cannon; and, with several other batteries, defended the entrance of the place in such a manner, that it was absolutely impossible any thing could be undertaken till these obstacles were removed. To this end, Colonel Richards was ordered to fill two well-boats with the materials of a fire-ship, and to dispose the boats for making a formal attack. Several accidents prevented the execution of this design till the 17th of August in the morning; when anchoring eastward of the town, the bombardment began with such success, that by noon the place was on fire in several parts. About this time the

\* I have taken this account, as those before inserted, from all the relations I could meet with, either of our own or foreign writers, particularly that published in the *Gazette*, No. 3102. *Burchet's Memoirs*, p. 298. *The present State of Europe for 1695*, p. 284. *Quincy Histoire Militaire de Louis XIV.* tom. iii. p. 184, 185. *Reincourt*, tom. iii. p. 460. *Larrey*, tom. ii. p. 256. *Journal Historique de Louis XIV.* par P. Daniel, p. 182. But all they advance appears to be collected from the different relations printed by authority, to amuse and mislead the people.

enemy's half-gallies came out, and stood along under the shore, in order to break the line of bomb-vessels; but the frigates and brigantines standing in, put them into such confusion, that they retired with great precipitation, and with much difficulty recovered the pier-heads. The bombardment was then continued, without any farther interruption, till about five in the afternoon, by which time six hundred shells were thrown into the place. The magazine and the rise-bank were entirely burnt; several houses destroyed; and many more very much damaged; with this particular circumstance in our favour, that, notwithstanding all the efforts of the enemy, and a prodigious fire from their batteries, we suffered very little loss; only Captain Osborne, who commanded the Aldborough ketch, was killed by a cannon-ball.

M. Quincy affects to treat this attack as a very slight thing, asserting, that not above three or four houses were consumed, and about as many people killed; and yet he acknowledges that abundance of men had been ordered thither, and a great deal of pains taken to prevent their suffering at all by this attempt; which shews how not only great their apprehensions were, and how necessary it was to calm the minds of the people by publishing such accounts; but depreciates their judgments very much, who took all these precautions, where, if they are believed, no mischief could be done.†

This was the last attack of the kind that was made this year; and though, upon the whole, not only the English, but the confederates in general reaped very considerable advantages, from their ruining in this manner all the enemy's coasts, while their squadrons were shut up in

\* London Gazette, No. 3107. Burchet's Memoirs, p. 303. Pointer's Chronological Historian, vol. ii. p. 413. Mercure Historique et Politique, tom. xix. p. 277.

† Histoire Militaire, tom. iii. p. 189. P. Daniel Journal Historique, p. 183. Mercure Historique et Politique, tom. xix. p. 280, in which is inserted the French relation of this business.

their ports, and in no capacity to undertake any thing; yet, on the return of the fleet, the council thought fit to examine into the conduct both of the officers and engineers, who charged each other reciprocally with want of skill, or want of zeal; but, upon a long and strict examination into the matter, it was found, that their want of unanimity was the greatest misfortune; and it appeared so plainly, that, by proper management, the French ports might be ruined, notwithstanding the mighty pains and immense expense employed in fortifying them, that it was resolved to prosecute the same method; and it was particularly recommended to Mr. Meesters, not only to be more careful in providing for the supply of his machines with whatever was necessary for their acting effectually; but also to secure a sufficient number of experienced pilots, for want of which both the attempts on Dunkirk had miscarried. \*

That respect which is due to truth, and for the information without reserve of our readers, will not permit the passing over in silence some misfortunes that fell out at sea this year. When the French court found that, notwithstanding the vast expense they had been at in order to raise a maritime power, they were yet unable to look the English and Dutch in the face; they very prudently gave leave to many of their sailors to enter on board privateers, which enabled them to disturb our trade, and to enrich themselves. The marquis of Caermarthen, who had the command of a squadron stationed off the Scilly islands, was so unlucky as to mistake a fleet of merchant-men for the Brest squadron; whereupon, without taking any pains to be satisfied whether he was, or was not in the right, he retired immediately into Milford-haven, which exposed the Barbadoes fleet in such a manner, that many of them were lost; two East India ships were taken at sea; and

\* \* See a more satisfactory account of this matter in our memoirs of the lord Dorkley of Stratton.

three more were either burnt or taken near Galway in Ireland, by some privateers acting under King James's commission.\* These five ships, Bishop Burnet tells us, were worth a million; and therefore we need not be surprised, that by the loss of them, which affected so many people, a great clamour was raised among the merchants.

The admiralty excused themselves by producing the instructions given to the marquis of Caermarthen, and other officers; but, notwithstanding all that could be said, it appeared incontestibly, that the true source of our losses in this respect, and of the French success, was their having so good intelligence of all our motions; whereas it never appeared, that, with all the money spent for this purpose, we had any tolerable accounts of their motions. How far this was owing to their diligence and dexterity, and how far to our indolence and treachery, is what I shall not pretend to determine; but content myself with observing, that, in a time of war, no money is so ill spared as that which might be employed in gaining early notice of an enemy's preparations; for though their designs may, yet those never can be hidden.†

But in some measure to balance these, we may have leave to mention a few acts of extraordinary courage and conduct, which our own countrymen performed; and which, if it were for their singularity only, deserve to be remembered. On the 30th of May, 1695, as one William Thompson, master of a fishing boat belonging to the port of Pool in Dorsetshire, was fishing near the island of Purbeck, with only one man and a boy, and perceiving a privateer of Cherbourg to bear down upon him; he was so far from avoiding the enemy, that he made ready to defend himself the best way he could with two little guns,

\* *Memoires Publiques*, Quincy *Histoire Militaire de Louis XIV.* Reinecourt *Histoire de Louis XIV.* tom. iii. p. 479.

† Burnet's *History of his own Time*, vol. ii. p. 155. Kennet, *Oldmixon*, *Present State of Europe*, *Life of King William*.

received orders to proceed with all expedition to the fleet, with the squadron under his command. He was on this occasion declared admiral of the white, and admiral and commander in chief of his majesty's ships in the Mediterranean; with instructions to protect the English commerce; to annoy the enemy; and, in case they passed the Straits, to follow them with the whole fleet, or a strength proportionable to theirs.

Sir George parted from the English coast on the 16th of October 1695, with seventy sail of men of war and merchantmen under his command, and in thirty-eight days arrived safely in the bay of Cadiz. There he applied himself with the utmost diligence to the securing the safe return of the Turkey fleet; and protecting every where the English trade from the danger to which it stood exposed from the French privateers; but, as to the latter part of his instructions, he found himself scarcely in a capacity to carry them into execution; the force he had in the port of Cadiz being much inferiour to the strength he knew the French had at Toulon; and therefore he was obliged to provide the best he could for his security there: many of the great English ships, and most of the Dutch under his command, being so foul, that it would have been unsafe to have hazarded them in an engagement. In this situation Sir George Rooke remained for some time, and then received his majesty's commands to return for England.

A.D.  
1696.

We are now to enter on the transactions of 1696, a year in which both the French and the allies were resolved to exert their greatest skill and utmost force for continuing the war; though they were both heartily weary of it, and had sufficient reasons to wish for peace. At home our party-debates ran much higher than ever. The Tories were formed into a fixed and constant opposition to the

\* Burchet's *Memoirs*, p. 286, 290. Pointer's *Chronological Historian*, vol. ii. p. 416, 427. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xix. n. 573



government, making it a capital point of patriotism to perplex public affairs; the English merchants were exceedingly uneasy at the losses they had sustained in trade; and all Scotland was in confusion on account of the opposition given to the project they had formed for establishing an East India Company, and making also a settlement in the West Indies at Darien. To these sources of uneasiness there were added many others, some of greater and some of less importance: among the former may be reckoned the business of a general re-coinage; and, among the latter, an epidemic corruption, which had spread itself through almost every office in the kingdom, equally to the discredit of the government, and to the oppression of the people.

While, therefore, the parliament directed its councils to the finding out remedies proper for so many and so great evils; the French were contriving, as indeed it was but natural they should, how they might turn our domestic disputes most to their own advantage; and, at last, projected the means to set on foot a conspiracy here, while they were preparing there all things necessary for making a formidable invasion. Thus, at the close of the war, they made, as their policy commonly is, vast efforts, as well in hopes of carrying their point, as to justify their departure from it, in case, after so bold an attempt, they should meet with fresh disappointments.\*

It was pretty early in the winter that the French king formed the project of invading England, and by this means restoring King James. But the first suspicion, that was had here of his design, arose from his making a grand promotion of sea-officers, and amongst them no fewer than twenty captains of men of war; which looked as if they did not intend to let their fleets be idle, as they had done for two years past: and what greatly alarmed the nation

\* Kennet, Burnet, Oldmixon, Quincy, P. Daniel, &c.

was, that we had no considerable naval force at home to oppose them.\* Their greatest preparations being at Toulon, confounded our politicians not a little, and served to keep their attention fixed to the Mediterranean.

A.D.  
1696.

But in the beginning of January, 1696, the French scheme began to unfold itself, by the early sailing of a fleet to Dunkirk.† It was usual for them to send a large number of victuallers thither in the winter, escorted by a small squadron of men of war. But the fleet now sent was much greater than formerly, and the squadron, that sailed with it as an escort, consisted of seventeen men of war. Soon after this an army of twenty thousand men, drawn with all possible silence from the adjacent garrisons, was brought down to the sea-coasts, and five hundred transports provided with extraordinary diligence and secrecy, in order to carry over the greater part of them to England; while most of our large ships were laid up, and the rest either in the Mediterranean, or refitting here, in order to be sent thither.‡ So that hitherto all things seemed to favour the views of the enemy; who were not a little rejoiced at an accident that happened at Gillingham in the river Medway, where the Royal Sovereign took fire, and was totally consumed, though without prejudice to any of the ships which lay near her.‡

It was the intention of Louis XIV. to have embarked at Dunkirk, sixteen thousand men, who were to be commanded by King James in person, and under him by

*Histoire Militaire de Louis XIV. tom. iii. p. 201. Kennet, Burnet, Oldmixon, Life of King William, Supplement to Rapin, Mercure Historique et Politique, tom. xx. p. 58. London Gazette, N<sup>o</sup>. 3161, 3162.*

\* † Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 156. Life of King William, p. 447. Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 704. *Mercure Historique et Politique, tom. xx. p. 300.*

‡ I have met with the following account of this accident, which is very curious, in a pocket book of an old seaman, who some time belonged to her:

the Marquis of Harcourt, then lieutenant-general, and afterwards marshal of France. This embarkation was to have been escorted by two strong squadrons under the marquis of Nesmond and John du Bart, all which might have been executed, if bad weather and contrary winds had not prevented it. In the mean time the duke of Berwick, Sir George Berkley, and some other experienced officers, were sent over to dispose the malcontents here to perform their part in this undertaking. But, when all things were supposed to be in perfect readiness, the whole scheme was happily discovered; and, on the 24th of February; the king came to the house of peers, sent for the commons, and in a set speech informed them of the whole affair.\*

“ January 29, 1696. The Royal Sovereign was the first great ship that was ever built in England; she was then designed only for splendour and magnificence, and was in some measure the occasion of those loud complaints against ship-money in the reign of King Charles I. but, being taken down a deck lower, became one of the best men of war in the world, and so formidable to her enemies, that none of the most daring among them would willingly lye by her side. She had been in almost all the great engagements that had been fought between England and Holland, and, in the last fight, between the English and French, encountering the Wonder of the World, she so warmly plied the French admiral, that she forced him out of his three-decked wooden castle; and, chasing the Royal Sun before her, forced her to fly for shelter among the rocks, where she became a prey to lesser vessels, that reduced her to ashes. At length, leaky and defective herself with age, she was laid up at Chatham, in order to be rebuilt; but, being set on fire by negligence, she was, upon the 27th of this month, devoured by that element, which so long and so often before she had imperiously made use of as the instrument of destruction to others.”

\* As I do not enter any farther into the history of these times than is absolutely necessary to the understanding the facts I relate, so I chose to give this and other passages of a like nature, from the most authentic pieces I have met with. The following concise detail of the conspiracy was published in the London Gazette, No. 3161, with the king's speech, and the joint address of both houses :

At the same time orders were given for assembling, with the utmost diligence, the greatest number of ships possible; and Admiral Russel, after having assisted at a board of admiralty, where proper instructions were prepared, went down to Deal; and, on the 25th of February, hoisted the Union flag on board the Victory; and, in a few days, stood over to the coast of France, having under his command upwards of fifty ships of the line, English and Dutch, at a time when the French believed we could not assemble ten; which extraordinary expedition confounded all their designs; and rendered the invasion absolutely impracticable, after all the pains and expense that had been for some months employed about it\*.

On the 28th of February, the admiral came to an anchor off Gravelines, with part of the fleet; and Lord

“ By the great mercy of God a discovery has been made of a most horrid and detestable conspiracy, in which many wicked and traitorous persons were engaged to assassinate his majesty when he went abroad. At the same time a rising was intended within the kingdom, and an invasion from France; to which end divers French troops were drawn towards Dunkirk and Calais, and transport-vessels and boats were got together at those places, of all which his majesty having received several concurring informations and advices, orders were given for apprehending the conspirators; many of whom have been already seized, and such strict search is made after the rest, that it is hoped few or none of them will escape the hands of justice. The forces in England are in a readiness to march, and a considerable body of his majesty's troops in Flanders lye ready to embark at Ostend. Admiral Russel is in the Downs with a squadron of his majesty's ships, who will be daily reinforced by other men of war from the river and Spithead. And the care that has been taken for the defence and safety of the kingdom, will, we doubt not, with the blessing of God, be sufficient to disappoint the designs of our enemies.”

\* On the 24th of February, there were but eleven ships in the Downs, and by the 28th the admiral had with him one first-rate, twelve third, twenty-four fourth, and three fifth rates, besides fire-ships, and the following flags under him, viz. Lord Berkley, admiral of the blue; Sir Clondesley Shovel, vice-admiral of the red; Mr. Aylmer, vice-admiral of the blue; twelve Dutch ships under two rear-admirals.

Berkley, with a squadron under his command, lay between him and Dunkirk. As the admiral passed by Calais, he perceived the harbour crowded with all sorts of small vessels for the intended embarkation of the French troops. As for the seventeen men of war, which were to have escorted them, thirteen had run in as close to the pier of Dunkirk as possible, and proved to be all large ships. Sir Cloudesley Shovel, with some other experienced officers, were sent to look at them, to see if there were any possibility of burning them or not; but, after a long consultation with Mr. Meesters and the engineers, it was declared to be impracticable, and thereupon the admiral determined to quit that station, and return into Dover road, leaving a squadron under Sir Cloudesley Shovel to watch the motions of the enemy. \*

This squadron continued cruising in the Downs all the month of March, without attempting any thing; but, toward the end of the month, being reinforced with several Dutch ships, fire-ships, and bomb-vessels, he received orders, on the 2d of April, to undertake the bombardment of Calais; in pursuance of which, he immediately came before that town, and made the necessary dispositions for executing those orders. On the 3d, the bomb-vessels began to fire about noon; and continued firing till evening, in which time above three hundred bombs and carcasses fell into the town, or among the ships in the harbour, with such effect as to kindle fires in both, and must certainly have done a great deal of mischief. † But as most of the bomb-vessels and brigantines had their rigging destroyed, and their mortars dismounted, the wind too blowing very hard from the shore; Sir Cloudesley

\* Burchet's Memoirs, p. 325.

† Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 720. Burnet's History of his own Times, vol. ii. p. 179. London Gazette, No. 3173. Mercure Historique, tom. xx. p. 462, 473, 542. Memoires Historiques et Chronologiques, Reincourt, tom. iii. p. 485.

Shovel, having left a squadron to keep in the French men of war at Dunkirk, returned into the Downs, where he received orders, on the 11th of April, to join the grand fleet at Spithead. But, before he could execute these orders, Sir George Rooke arrived in the Downs with his fleet from the Straits, and took upon him the command.\*

All the views of France were now totally disappointed, and the English strength at sea become so formidable, that they were able to undertake little or nothing against it. Yet, to keep up the spirits of the people, and in some measure to embarrass the English and Dutch, orders were despatched to the Toulon squadron, directing that it should immediately sail into the ocean; and, at the same time, John Du Bart was commanded to proceed out of the harbour of Dunkirk, with eight men of war and two fire-ships. In the mean time, Sir George Rooke arrived at Spithead, after having detached several of his cleanest ships for particular service; receiving there a commission appointing him admiral and commander-in-chief of the fleet. His instructions were, to lye in such a station as should be most proper for preventing the Toulon squadron from getting into any of the ports of France; upon meeting them he was to fight, and, upon his receiving notice of their getting into any port, he was to use his utmost endeavours to burn or destroy them there; or, in case he had intelligence of their getting safe into Brest, he was then to return to Torbay, and to remain there till he should receive orders.

A D. On the 14th of May, 1696, Sir George Rooke with the  
1696. fleet, being on the coast of France, received certain intelligence, that the Toulon squadron was safely arrived at Brest. Upon this he held a council of war, wherein

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 539, 540. The Present State of Europe for the months of April and May, 1696. Pointer's Chronological Historian, vol. ii. p. 426. See our Memoirs of Sir George Rooke. London Gazette, No. 3174, 3180.

it was resolved; that, as many of the largest ships in the fleet were very foul, and the whole much inferior to the combined squadrons in the harbour of Brest, they should immediately pursue the last part of their instructions, and return to Torbay; which accordingly they did, and there the fleet was soon reinforced to the number in the whole of one hundred and fifteen sail, of which no fewer than eighty-five were of the line of battle. \*

A resolution having been taken in the privy-council for bombarding the French coasts, orders were sent to Sir George Rooke, toward the latter end of the month of May, to return to the service of the board as one of the lords of the admiralty; it being intended to entrust the fleet, or at least such a part of it as should be employed in the before-mentioned service, to the care of the Lord Berkley of Stratton, who had behaved so gallantly the year before. These orders reached Sir George Rooke on the 27th of May, 1696; but, before he returned to London, he received advice, that seventy French men of war were actually lying in Camaret Bay, with three blue flags, and a white one flying, of which he not only gave advice to the admiralty, but, on his coming to town, addressed himself to the duke of Shrewsbury, then secretary of state, to whom he made the following proposal:

“ That the body of the fleet should lye in Camaret and  
 “ Bertheaume bays, and a detachment be made to sustain  
 “ the small frigates and bomb-vessels, while they went  
 “ in to do what mischief they could. It was his opinion,  
 “ that thus blocking up the enemy’s fleet in their principal  
 “ port, insulting their coasts, and burning their towns all  
 “ at the same time, would expose them exceedingly to the  
 “ world, make them very uneasy at home, and give high  
 “ reputation to his majesty’s arms. And all this he be-  
 “ lieved might be done, if speedily undertaken, with

\* Burchet’s Memoirs, p. 341.

“ the assistance of some small frigates which were much “ wanted.”

If this scheme had been immediately pursued, it might, in all probability, have been executed with success. But, after being laid before and examined by the privy-council, it was at last sent down to the fleet to be reconsidered there by a council of war; when loss of time, and other accidents, had rendered it less practicable, and therefore we need not wonder that, upon this reconsideration, it was rejected. \*

A.D.  
1696.

Lord Berkley hoisted the union flag on board the *Britannia* on the 3d of June, 1696, the same day that Sir George Rooke set out for London; but he soon found, that, notwithstanding his commission, he was very far from having the command of the fleet: for having proposed to a council of war the attacking of Brest, which was the project approved by the privy-council; they resolved, that it was in their opinion impracticable, as, on the 16th of the same month, they did the same as to the proposal of Sir George Rooke, before-mentioned. His lordship being determined, however, not to remain any longer inactive, sailed on the 24th for the French coast. † On the 3d of July, the admiral sent the *Burford* and the *Newcastle*, with a fire-ship, to the island of Groy, with orders to land. On the 4th, the fleet came to an anchor about two leagues from Belleisle; and barges and pinnaces were immediately manned, in order to make a descent upon Hoat, one of the islands called Cardinals, which they performed, ravaged the whole island, and burnt the only town that was upon it: they did the

\* Burchet's *Naval History*, p. 546. *Memoirs of Sir George Rooke*. History of the last War. Though this proposition did not turn to the advantage of the nation, yet it was of some use to Sir George himself, when, as we shall hereafter observe, the house of commons inquired into the conduct of the fleet, and at the same time into his behaviour.

† London Gazette, No. 3197. Burchet's *Memoirs*, p. 342. Kennet's *History of England*, vol. iii. p. 720.



some in the island of Hodicke, and brought off a great number of cattle. On the 5th, a great reinforcement was sent to Captain Fitzpatrick, who had landed in the island of Groy, where they destroyed twenty villages, containing about thirteen hundred houses, took a ship from Newfoundland, and twenty small vessels, and carried off about fifteen hundred horses and black cattle. \*

The same day Sir Martin Beckman, who was sent to bombard the town of St. Martin in the isle of Rhé, performed his commission very exactly; throwing, in the space of one night, two thousand, two hundred, and thirty bombs and carcasses into the place; by which the best part of the town was entirely burnt down, with all their warehouses, and the goods contained in them, notwithstanding the place was well fortified, and our squadrons sustained a very warm fire all the time. On the 7th, the same squadron, which consisted but of ten men-of-war, bombarded Ollonne; and in one night threw into it almost two thousand bombs and carcasses, which had such an effect, that the town was seen to be on fire in fifteen places at once. † After this the admiral, not finding it convenient to land on Belleisle, continued to alarm the French coast till toward the latter end of the month; and then, through want of provisions, and the weakness of the fleet, occasioned by making several detachments, he found himself under a necessity of returning to Spithead. ‡

The French affected to ridicule these, as they had done former bombardments; and the same honour seems very

\* I have followed in the text the orthography of Lord Berkley's relation, as it is printed in the Gazette, No. 3203, but the proper names of these islands are Giouais, Houat, Heydie. The admiral certainly acted right in landing where he might do most mischief, and expose his men least.

† London Gazette, No 4204. Pointer's Chronological Historian. vol. ii. p. 431. Life of King William. Present State of Europe for 1096, p. 232.

‡ Burchet's Naval History p. 547. 548.

unaccountably to have possessed abundance of people at home. Even Mr. Burchet, speaking of my Lord Berkley's exploits, calls them LITTLE ENTERPRIZES; and yet nothing is more certain, than that the French were grievously affected by them, their country being kept in a perpetual alarm. This the reader will easily discern, when he is told, that between Brest and Goulet there were forty batteries erected on one side, and twenty-five on the other; that on these batteries were mounted nineteen mortars, and four hundred and eighty-nine pieces of heavy cannon, and above sixty thousand men, quartered up and down on the coasts to prevent the bad effects of an invasion. If France had been under no concern, such precautions would never have been taken; if she were, the bombardments that spread this terror must not have been such slight things as some writers endeavour to represent them, or, if they were, what were those whom they so frightened? \*

A.D. 1696. It is agreed on all hands, that the care taken this year of our trade was so great, and the orders of the lords of the admiralty were so well executed, that our several fleets of merchantmen returned safe, notwithstanding the French made it their principal business to intercept them. In two instances, indeed, we were somewhat unlucky: the

\* *Histoire Militaire*, tom. iii. p. 276. *Memoires Historiques et Chronologiques*. P. Daniel. Burchet's *Naval History*, p. 548. But M. Devise, the French gazetteer, exceeds them all in his account of the matter. The exploits of the English, says he, are so extravagant, that they are scarcely credible, and their expeditions so pitiful, that they serve only to excite scorn and contempt. All they did during their stay at Belleisle was to make a descent on the island of Grouais, a defenceless place, where they burnt a few houses, carried off a parcel of sheep, hamstringed one hundred and fifty horses, and killed the cattle in the church-yard: they burnt also a few houses in the islands of Houat and Heydic. In fine, continues he, the very powder they have spent in these fruitless attempts must have cost more than the damage they have done amounts to. This was certainly very proper news for the court to publish, in order to keep up the spirits of the people; but an historian surely deserves blame who copies after such an author.

first was in Newfoundland, of which an account will be given elsewhere: the other in respect of the Dunkirk squadron, of which the following is a very exact account. In the month of May, 1696, Rear-admiral Benbow had the command given him of a small number of ships, with orders to prevent Du Bart from getting out of that port. When the rear-admiral arrived before it, he found the French squadron ready to sail; and his own too small to guard both the east and north channel. He did, however, his best; but the weather proving hazy, and he cruizing before the north channel; Du Bart gave him the slip, and, having a fair wind, was quickly out of reach.\*

Rear-admiral Benbow resolved, however, to pursue him, and did so; but the Dutch, for want of proper orders, refused to follow him. Du Bart in the mean time executed his scheme, which was to attack the Dutch Baltic fleet in their return home, which he performed on the 8th of June. This fleet consisted of upwards of one hundred sail of merchant ships under an escort of five frigates. Du Bart took all the men of war, and at least half the merchant men. In the height of this victory the outward-bound Baltic fleet appeared in sight under an escort of thirteen men of war, who immediately attacked Du Bart, and forced him to burn four of the men of war, and thirty-five merchantmen, and to turn the fifth frigate, which had on board the crews of all the rest, adrift, so that she was retaken; but, according to the French accounts, he came back after all with fifteen prizes into the road of Dunkirk.†

Rear-admiral Benbow convoyed afterwards, with his squadron, our northern-bound fleet to Gottenburgh, and thence proceeded to Hamburg; and, returning homewards in the month of September, he had sight of Du

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 549, 550.

† *Histoire Militaire*, tom. iii. p. 279. *Reinecourt*, tom. iii. p. 489. *Limiers*, tom. ii. p. 606.

Bart's squadron, and chased him till he saw it was to no purpose: however, he had the satisfaction soon after of joining four English and eleven Dutch East India ships, which came north-about; and thereby escaped the French privateers, and luckily enough for them, even Du Bart himself, though they must have had sight of his squadron. \*

Thus ended the naval operations of this year in this part of the world, where we certainly disappointed all the French designs; did them no small damage on their coasts; kept the best part of their fleets blocked up in their harbours; and protected our trade better than it had been for many years past; yet, in the next session of parliament, which began on the 20th of October, 1696, one of the first things the House of Commons did was to enter into an enquiry into the late miscarriages of the fleet; and this exposed Sir George Rooke and Sir Cloudesley Shovel to several strict examinations; in which, however, nothing appearing that could be construed either an omission or breach of duty, the affair dropped; and the House afterwards voted the sum of two millions, three hundred and seventy two thousand, one hundred and ninety seven pounds for the maintenance of forty thousand seamen, of the two marine regiments, and for the ordinary of the navy, and the charge of the registry of seamen. †

We are now arrived at that period of our history, which naturally leads us to take a view of what passed in the West Indies from the beginning of the war to the close of the next year 1697; and, as our reasons for treating this subject at once have been already given at large, we shall enter upon it here without farther introduction. The revolution took place in our colonies as easily as it had done at home; on a principle which was very emphatically ex-

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 551.

† See the Journals of the House of Commons, Kennet, Burnet, Oldmixon, &c.

pressed by one of our governors, who, when he was summoned by a man of war to submit to King William and Queen Mary, very sensibly answered, that, if they were king and queen at Whitehall, they should be so there, and proclaimed them immediately.

By this mean the plantations were secured against every thing except foreign invasions, and to these they were not long exposed; since, toward the end of the year 1689, orders were given for fitting out a squadron for Barbadoes and Leeward Islands, under the command of Captain Lawrence Wright, who was directed to sail as soon as possible, and had very ample instructions given him.\* It fell out, however, in consequence of abundance of unlucky accidents, that he did not leave Plymouth till the 8th of March following. Arriving in Carlisle-bay on the 11th of May, 1690, he found all things there in a better posture than he expected; and toward the latter end of the month, when his men were pretty well recovered of the scurvy, he sailed for the Leeward Islands, in order to assist General Codrington, who was preparing for an expedition against St. Christopher, where we had been joint possessors with the French, who had now driven us out and had made themselves masters of the whole island.†

A.D.  
1690.

The commodore sailed on the 3d of June to Montserrat, where he was joined by the general from Antigua with such a force as the English colonies could supply. Thence they proceeded together to Nevis, in consequence of a re-

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 431. This squadron consisted of ten sail of men of war, viz. one third rate, seven fourth, and two fifth rates, two fire-ships, and a ketch. The duke of Bolton's regiment of foot embarked on board it; and the commodore was instructed to use his best endeavours to secure the English colonies; assist the Dutch; and distress the French; in all which he was directed to take the advice of councils of war, of General Codrington, the governor and council of Barbadoes, &c.

† Burchet, Kennet, Columna Rostrata. Histoire Militaire P. Daniel.

solution taken in a council of war, to make a descent as soon as possible upon the island of St. Christopher. On the 23d, Sir Timothy Thornhill landed, with five hundred men, to the east of Frigot's bay; and, having twice engaged and routed the French, marched on to Basse-terre, and in the way beat the French forces a third time. This broke the spirits of the enemy to such a degree, that they gave General Codrington no disturbance, when he landed with three thousand men, and marched the same way. The fleet, at the same time, sailed into the road, in order to batter the town and forts, while the general attacked it by land. The French, however, saved them the trouble, by abandoning the place, and setting it on fire. In about three weeks time, the whole island was reduced; and, the season of hurricanes coming on, the fleet returned triumphantly to Barbadoes; and the design of making farther conquests was postponed to another year.\*

A.D.  
1691.

In the month of January, 1691, the commodore received fresh orders from England, directing him to stay some time longer in America; upon which he took up six of the largest merchant-ships; turned them into men of war; and on the 12th of February, sailed for the Leeward Islands. There an unhappy difference sprung up between him and General Codrington, which ruined the expedition; for though in the month of April they landed

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 555, 556, 557. This was in some measure owing to the sickness of the troops, and to several ships being disabled; but was chiefly occasioned by the commodore receiving orders to return to England, which, as we shall see, were very quickly countermanded. See also a true and faithful relation of the proceedings of the forces of their majesties King William and Queen Mary, in their expedition against the French in the Caribbee Islands in the West Indies, under the conduct of his excellency Christopher Codrington, captain general and commander in chief of the said forces in the years 1689, and 1690, written by Thomas Spencer, junior, secretary to the honourable Sir Timothy Thornhill, Baronet, London, 1691, 4to. This succinct and sensible narrative is addressed to Admiral Russel; London Gazette, No. 2602.

in Marigallante, and in a great measure ruined that settlement, from whence they proceeded to Guadaloupe, and remained there some time; yet, on the news of a French squadron being in the neighbourhood, they hastily re-embarked their forces, and resolved to abandon the enterprize, at the same time almost that the French had determined to abandon the island. Soon after this, Commodore Wright returned to Barbadoes, where finding his conduct universally disliked, he quitted, under pretence of sickness, the command, having first separated the squadron to different services; and soon after returned, with very little reputation, to England. \* A certain author indeed tells us, that he was sent home a prisoner; of which, if it had been so, I think Secretary Burchet would scarcely have been ignorant; and yet the contrary is expressly said by him, though he does indeed intimate that he deserved it. † However, we hear no more of him or of his deserts!

The same year, some other expeditions were undertaken against the French in this part of the world. The colony of New England found itself so liable to disturbance from the settlement the French had at Port-Royal, in Nova Scotia, that it was resolved to attack it, and that too as soon as the war broke out. With this view, a considerable fleet, with seven hundred land-forces on board, was fitted out under the command of Sir William Phipps, who sailed from Nantascot on the 28th of April, 1690; and by the middle of the next month he completed his design, and reduced Port-Royal and the adjacent settlements under the dominion of the English. His quick success in this, induced the colony to undertake an enterprize of greater importance, which was no less than the reduction of Quebec; the capital of the French settlements in Canada. This was certainly a well laid scheme;

\* *British Empire in America*, vol. ii. p. 54. *History of the War.*  
*Present State of Europe*, 1691

† *Burchet's Memoirs*, p. 123.

and, if it had been executed with equal prudence, must have turned very highly to the advantage of the English, as experience has convinced us since. The colony shewed on this occasion a very extraordinary measure of public spirit, by raising no less than two thousand men, whom they embarked on board their fleet of thirty-two sail, great and small, without demanding or expecting any assistance from hence. \*

With this force Sir William Phipps sailed from Hull, near Boston, on the 9th of August; and arrived about the beginning of September, before the river of Canada; but was there unluckily, by contrary winds, detained in such a manner, as that it was three weeks before they arrived at Quebec. This gave the Count de Frontenac, governor there for the French, an opportunity to prepare for his defence, and of drawing all the strength of the colony to Quebec, which Sir William Phipps expected would have been divided, by an army marching over land and attacking Mount-Royal fort, at the same time that he fell upon the city. This army was to consist of a thousand men from New York, Connecticut, and Plymouth colonies, and fifteen hundred Iroquois. The English marched as far as the great lake of Canada, but not finding canoes ready for them to pass it, and the Indians not joining them according to their agreement, they returned; by which unfortunate miscarriage Count Frontenac had no need to make any detachments for the security of Mount-Royal.

Sir William summoned the count to surrender the city, but received a very insolent and haughty answer. On the 8th of October, the English landed, under Lieutenant-general Whalley, to the number of fourteen hundred, for to that number they were now reduced by the small-pox, and other diseases. In the mean while, Sir William brought his ships to bear on the west end of the city,

\* *British Empire in America*, vol. i. p. 22.



waiting till General Whalley should begin the assault. But this gentleman hearing that Count de Frontenac had four thousand men within, and was provided to make a vigorous defence, notwithstanding the entreaties of the English soldiers to the contrary, resolved immediately to re-embark. Sir William, expecting the signal for their attacking the town on the east side, sent a messenger on shore to know the reason of their not giving the assault; which when he understood, and saw many of the men were almost frozen to death, to which we may add, the colonel and others ill of the small-pox, he ordered them on board to refresh themselves; and calling a council of war, it was therein resolved to return. Thus ended this fruitless expedition, which cost the colony of New England so large a sum of money, and as to which mighty expectations had been raised. \*

Several accounts have been given of this unlucky expedition; but most of them written with a view to load the character of Sir William Phipps, or else purely to excuse his conduct. The bounds of this work will not permit an ample examination of the whole affair, much less a recapitulation of what has been said on both sides. Yet thus much, I think, from an impartial consideration of the facts stated by both parties, it is my duty to declare, that Sir William Phipps intended well, and did his best through the whole expedition; though, perhaps, he was not, either from education or experience, qualified for a command of so extensive a nature. But, besides any mistakes he might fall into, there were many untoward accidents which contributed to frustrate his design; and, therefore, it is equally cruel and unjust to lay the blame entirely at his door. This is certain, that no man could be more sensibly

\* See the Life of Sir William Phipps, by Nathaniel, published by Cotton Mather, sec. xi. Lahontan's Voyages, vol. i. p. 155. Letter from New England, dated November 22, 1690, containing an Account of the Quebec expedition.

affected than he was by this disappointment; and yet he made it the business of the remaining part of his life, to dispose all things for another attempt, in hopes the success of that might efface the memory of the former miscarriage, and this ought to be remembered to his honour.\*

In the latter end of October, 1691, Captain Ralph Wren, who then commanded the Norwich, had orders to sail with that and two other fourth rates to Barbadoes, and from thence to the Leeward Islands, where he was to take upon him the command of such ships as were in that station; and his general instructions were, to secure the trade and plantations, and to annoy the enemy. He sailed from Plymouth on the 12th of December, and on the 16th of the next month arrived in Carlisle-bay, in Barbadoes. He had not been there long, before he was informed, that the French had a stout squadron at sea, which had taken the Jersey, that was to have been added to Commodore Wren's squadron.

Upon the news of this, the governor and council of Barbadoes agreed, that two large merchant ships should be fitted out, in order to join the five men of war already under the commodore; and that with these he should attack the French squadron, though it consisted of nine sail. Accordingly, the commodore quitted Barbadoes on the 13th of January, and cruised for about a week, but without seeing the enemy, and then returned. Another council of war being held, it was therein resolved, that the commodore should proceed with his squadron, and the merchant ships that were then ready, for the Leeward Islands. This he accordingly performed; and, on the 21st of February, he fell in with a French squadron of eighteen men of war, from sixty to forty guns. They

\* British Empire in America, vol. i. p. 22. The New England letter before-mentioned, which was reprinted at London in 1691, in 4to. with remarks upon it, under the title of, The Humble Address of the Publicans of New England, to which king you please.

laboured all night to engage him ; and about eight in the morning, on the 22d, the enemy having a fresh gale, and most of the commodore's squadron not a breath of wind, four of their ships bore down upon the *Mary*, commanded by Lieutenant Wyat, who defended her very well, until the commodore could come to her assistance. At the same time, the *Mordaunt*, commanded by Captain Boteler, with one of the hired ships, and the *England* frigate, commanded by Captain Stubbs, were warmly engaged in the very midst of the enemy ; but they cleared themselves with all the bravery imaginable. The commodore finding the great disproportion as to strength, his squadron consisting then but of seven ships, and that the merchant ships, which were under his care, had taken the proper and usual methods for their own security ; he wisely provided, after a warm engagement of four hours, for the safety of the ships of war, under his command by bearing away. He did this, however, with so little sail, that he secured the three ships which the enemy gave chase to ; and they, as much tired of his company, readily stood away from him. Thus, by a due mixture of courage and conduct, the commodore saved his small squadron, and gained an high reputation ; this having been reckoned one of the best-conducted actions of the war. The gallant commander, however, did not long enjoy that satisfaction which must necessarily result from performing so signal a service as he had done to his country ; for as at the very time of the engagement he was in a declining state of health, so very soon after his disease carried him off, and in August following part of his squadron, under the command of Captain Boteler, returned to England.\*

The government being very sensible of the inconveniences resulting from their want of having a sufficient

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 459. British Empire in America, Life of King William, History of the last War, Present State of Europe for 1692, p. 181.

force in the West Indies, resolved, in the year 1692, to put an end to the complaints that had been made from most of the colonies on that subject, by sending a powerful fleet thither, under Sir Francis Wheeler, as gallant and as judicious an officer as any in the navy. The squadron he was to command consisted of twelve men of war, besides smaller vessels; and he was likewise empowered to take under his orders such ships of war as he should find in that part of the world. He had under his convoy also a certain number of transports, with fifteen hundred land-troops, and had assurance given him, that he should find another body of very good troops ready assembled in Barbadoes; and, in conjunction with them, he had instructions to fall upon some of the French settlements, which it was judged very practicable for him to reduce.

Sir Francis left our coasts in the beginning of January; and, on the 26th of the same month, touched at Madeira, whence he sailed for Barbadoes, and arrived there on the 1st of March. There it was unanimously resolved, in a full council of war, that Martinico should be the place attacked; and advice was sent to General Codrington of the arrival of the squadron, that he might draw together the forces of the Leeward Islands, in order to join the regiments brought from England, and the troops, about eight hundred foot, raised in Barbadoes; to which Sir Francis Wheeler offered to join another regiment, composed of seamen, to be commanded as colonel by him in person.

April the 15th, 1693, the squadron, with all these troops on board, arrived at Cul de Sac Royal, in Martinico; but,

\* The state of Sir Francis Wheeler's squadron was this: two third rates, six fourths, three fifths, one sixth, three fire-ships, a store-ship, hospital, and bomb-vessel. See Burchet's *Memoirs*, p. 168. *Life of King William*, p. 365. *Oldmixon's History of England*, vol. ii. p. 88.

instead of proceeding to perform without delay what they came thither about; it was resolved, in a council of war, held on the 20th, that the men should re-embark, and the squadron sail to Dominica, there to take in water, and to give the men, who were very sickly, an opportunity of refreshing themselves. As the commodore was very sensible this manner of acting would be indifferently relished at home; he desired and insisted, that every member of the council of war should give his opinion in writing; by which it appears, scarcely any but Sir Francis Wheeler, and Lieutenant-colonel Colt, were for landing and acting vigorously.\* The reasons advanced by such as voted for a contrary measure, were, that the enemy had a superior strength; that one full third of our soldiers were Irish Papists, not to be relied upon; and that hazarding an engagement in these circumstances, was hazarding the whole Leeward Islands; since, in case of a defeat, they had not a sufficient force to defend them. These were chiefly insisted upon by General Codrington, who declared, however, that he was ready to attempt Dominica, provided the fleet could remain in those parts six weeks or two months; but this being inconsistent with the commodore's instructions, and the troops from Barbadoes being impatient to return, was not, indeed could not, be complied with.† Such was the issue of this expedition, of which, in England, from the commodore's known character, there were high expectations. However, it may not be amiss to peruse his own state of the case.

“ On the 30th of March, the fleet sailed from Barbadoes, having on board the regiments of Foulke, Good-

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 477.

† The French made a grand affair of this, and have drawn up fine accounts of their repulsing and defeating the English, though there happened but two slight skirmishes. *Journal Historique de Louis XIV.* p. 172. *Histoire Militaire*, par M. Quincy, tom. ii. *Histoire de Louis XIV.* tom. 5

“ St. Christopher, Colonel Foulke at sea, with Major  
“ Abrahah, and several other officers.”

Sir Francis, toward the latter end of May, sailed for New England, and arrived at Boston on the 12th of June.\* He immediately proposed to Sir William Phipps, then governor, to attack Quebec a second time. But though nothing could have been more agreeable to that brave and public-spirited man; yet, as circumstances then stood, he could not close with it. Such an expedition required a strength of four thousand men at least, and these, having had no previous notice, the governor could not possibly draw together by the beginning of July, which was the very latest a fleet that was to be thus employed could sail; and therefore this grand design appearing every way impracticable, was dropt, even by those two men, who, of all others, had it most at heart.† This disappointment determined the commodore to quit Boston as soon as possible; and therefore, on the 3d of August, he left that place, and proceeded for Newfoundland, resolving to attempt something there worthy of the force with which he left England; and the honour allowed him of carrying the union flag, from a view to the advantages which, it was not doubted, would result to the nation from his expedition.

On the 18th of August, he arrived at Placentia, and found the enemy much stronger there than he expected; for, in the first place, the town was well fortified; next, there were in the harbour several stout privateers, the haven itself excellently provided with batteries, heavy cannon, bombs, &c. with at least two thousand soldiers and inhabitants, well disciplined, and most of them old buccaneers. Sir Francis, however, was not to be discouraged; he called a council of war, laid down the method in which the place ought to be attacked at once by sea and

\* London Gazette, No. 2901.

† Burchet's Memoirs, p. 173.

land, and took upon himself the going in with the men-of-war to batter the great fort, which was the most dangerous part of the undertaking. However, as there were eleven land to six sea officers in this council, they resolved the whole to be impossible and impracticable. Sir Francis Wheeler was exceedingly chagrined at this new disgrace; but, to shew how little this inactivity agreed with his disposition, he gave orders for destroying the French fishery at St. Peter; which was done effectually, and so that it was not soon or easily recovered.\*

On the 28th of August, he sailed from the bay of Bulls in Newfoundland for England, where he did not arrive till the 18th of October following, his ships in a bad, and his men in a much worse condition, so that they were scarcely able to navigate them. Yet, as unfortunate as this expedition proved from first to last, Sir Francis Wheeler never fell under the least censure. The accounts he transmitted home, joined to the letters from the respective colonies, and the extracts of proceedings in councils of war, justified him so clearly, and set his courage and conduct in so fair a light; that, when he arrived at Portsmouth, he had the satisfaction of finding a commission, appointing him rear-admiral of the red; a preferment, which, as it was obtained purely by merit, so it never exposed him to envy.† But to look now to another coast.

The royal African company, finding themselves much disturbed in their trade by the new settlements made by the French in the mouth of the river Senegal, and having exact intelligence of the schemes concerted by that nation for extending their own trade in those parts, and destroying ours; resolved to exert the great force they had in Guinea, to secure themselves from all these apprehensions,

\* Burchet's Memoirs, p. 171, 172. British Empire in America. Life of King William. Present State of Europe. History of the War.

† Ibid. p. 174.

by attacking the enemy immediately, in order, if possible, to the dispossessing them of their settlements, before they could gain any intelligence of the design. If, on their forming this project, they had applied themselves to the administration, and had either procured assistance for the execution of it, or assurance of having their conquests protected, they had certainly carried their point, and the French been beaten out of that advantageous trade, perhaps, for ever.

But they were at this time so much afraid of the enemy's penetrating whatever was transacted at the secretary's office, that the African company resolved to risk this undertaking, without communicating their secret to any body. With this view they sent orders to John Booker, Esq. then their agent-general in Guinea, to attempt, if he found it practicable, the execution of the design which they had formed; and, that he might be satisfied as to the authority upon which he acted, they sent him a copy of the commission they had received from the king and queen, empowering them to commit hostilities, and annoy the enemy in all places within their jurisdiction. \*

Mr. Booker, upon receipt of these letters and this commission, immediately applied himself to execute what the company directed; and in the month of December, 1692, having drawn together a sufficient force, he embarked them on board the company's ships and sloops; and sailing from the river Gambia, arrived in the mouth of the river Senegal on new-year's-day, 1693. † Having with some difficulty got over the bar, he made the necessary dispositions for attacking Fort Bourbon; but the governor, M. Dumoulin, knowing his own condition best, and that he must soon be compelled to surrender, sent to Mr. Booker to demand

\* Churchill's Collection of Voyages, vol. v. p. 428. Present State of Europe. London Gazette, hereafter cited.

† M. Booker's Letter in the Collection of Voyages, that has been before cited.



terms, upon which he offered immediately to give up the place. This proposition was accepted; and the English that evening entered into possession of the fort, which the French had held upwards of fifty years.

Mr. Booker continued here till the 25th of the same month, and then embarked his forces in order to make a descent on the island of Gorée, the only place which remained to the French in Guinea. He arrived there on the 1st of February; and, after alarming the enemy till the 4th, he landed in the night an hundred men under the old fort; whence he advanced to attack the new, called the fort of St. Michael, a well fortified place, furnished with twenty-eight pieces of cannon. They made some shew of defending themselves at first; but, being indifferently provided with ammunition, about noon they desired to capitulate; and, on the 5th, marched out with all military honours, and were carried to James-island, in virtue of the articles signed by Mr. Booker; whence they were to be transported into Europe on board the company's shipping, but at their own expense. \*

Affairs in the West Indies went all this time extremely ill: the French destroyed our trade by their privateers; disturbed our settlements continually; and frequently made descents upon them; particularly on Jamaica, where they committed great havock, and enriched themselves exceedingly at our expense. The few ships-of-war we had in those parts were so far from being able to defend our colonies effectually, that several of them were taken by the enemy; and, in short, things were in so bad a way, that the administration at home thought the loss of our colonies no improbable thing, as appears by the instructions given to the commodores of the squadrons, and the commanders-in-chief of the land troops. † On the other hand, our good

\* Memoirs of the Proceedings of the Royal African Company from 1690 to 1701, by Mr. John Snow, London Gazette, No. 2922.

† Burehet's Naval History, book iv. ch. 3, 9, 17, 21.

allies the Spaniards were no less, or rather were still more distressed by the enemy than we were ; all trade between their colonies was destroyed, their coasts plundered, and every thing subject to the mercy of the privateers, that were equipped in whole squadrons from the French settlements in Hispaniola. \* As I profess to speak truth without reserve as far as I can discover it, so, upon this occasion, I think myself obliged to say, that these advantages were not so much owing either to the force or courage of the French in those parts, as to the want of public spirit and right management in us, as well as in the Spaniards.

The French governors seem to have had nothing so much at heart as the glory of their country, and a just discharge of their duty ; whereas ours were generally involved in disputes with the people they should have protected ; and much more intent on increasing their own private fortunes, and that too at any rate, than desirous of vindicating the honour of the nation, and securing the properties of those they governed. In one thing only they were commendable, that from time to time they made the most pressing instances to the ministry at home to take more care of our concerns in the West Indies, by sending proper squadrons, and with them sufficient supplies of land forces into those parts. †

About the beginning of the year 1694, some proposals were laid before the council, for our undertaking, in conjunction with the Spaniards, to drive the French out of the island of Hispaniola. To this there was at first some attention given ; but afterwards it being represented, as indeed the truth was, that the Spaniards, at the bottom, were not either willing or able to join with us in any such undertaking, it was laid aside. Other business intervening, it does not appear that either the council or the board of

\* Present State of Europe for the year 1693.

† British Empire in America. History of the Past and Present State of Jamaica, &c.

admiralty thought any more of the plantations till toward the latter end of the year, when they were alarmed with the account of a brisk attempt made upon Jamaica by M. Ducasse, the French governor of St. Domingo. He sailed in the month of June with three men-of-war, and twenty-three transports, having on board fifteen hundred men for the coast of Jamaica, where they arrived on the 24th of the same month; and made a descent on Port-Morant, which they found abandoned; and, marching thence up the country, they plundered, burnt, and destroyed whatever they met, and carried off money and effects to a very great value.\* But they soon found, that the fine schemes of conquest they had formed to themselves were altogether impracticable, and that the only thing they had to do was to return with what they had gotten. The people of Jamaica, when they found their property in danger, assembled readily for its defence, and behaved themselves so well in an engagement with the French, that it contributed not a little to make the latter for the present sick of this design, and to hinder them from resuming any project like it afterwards. †

The complaints that were sent home on this affair, joined to the representations of other colonies; the remonstrances of the West India merchants, and the fear of a parliamentary inquiry, which was then a thing of all others the most terrible; obliged the ministry to resume this long neglected subject, and to think seriously of sending to America such a force, and under such officers, as might do more than had hitherto been done. With this view, they directed, that a squadron of five sail of men-of-war, and two fire-ships, with twelve transport-vessels, should be gotten ready, with the utmost diligence and secrecy, to

\* See a Detail of M. Ducasse's Expedition against Jamaica in *Histoire de St. Domingue*, par. le P. Charlevoix, vol. iii. p. 37.

† British Empire in America. *History of Jamaica*. *History of the Last War*. *Present State of Europe for the Month of October, 1694*, p. 347.

rendezvous at Plymouth in the beginning of the year 1695. The command of the squadron was given to Captain Robert Wilmot, an officer of great reputation and experience.\* The command of the land forces was entrusted to Colonel Luke Lillingston; and that they might be the more subject to orders, and better directed, they were reduced into a single regiment, consisting of twelve hundred men; and, besides these, there were spare arms for another regiment; and, in short, every thing else provided that could be desired for securing the success of such an expedition; and all this was done with such secrecy, that even the officers who were to be employed had no distinct knowledge of the particular design they were to execute; but only knew in general, that they were to be sent to the West Indies to protect our plantations, and annoy the enemy.

When all things were ready, the commodore had his instructions given him sealed up, with orders not to open them till he arrived in the latitude of forty degrees. Instructions were also given to Colonel Lillingston for the regulating of his conduct, and for giving him a clear view of the extent of his command. Before they set out for Plymouth, both the commodore and the colonel were separately exhorted to be extremely careful in keeping up a right correspondence; because hitherto all our expeditions had suffered more through the weakness and misunderstanding of our own commanders, than through any extraordinary courage or conduct shewn by the enemy; and, that this might be the easier, their commands were made as distinct as, the nature of the service considered, it was possible. †

The squadron sailed from Plymouth the latter end of

\* *Columna Rostrata*, p. 268. Burchet's *Naval History*, book iv. ch. 17. *Present State of Europe for 1695*, p. 377.

† Burchet's *Naval History*, p. 531. Colonel Lillingston's remarks on Burchet's *Naval History*, 8vo, 1704.

the month of January; but, before they were in a condition to act, the commanders differed, and all things were in confusion. Colonel Lillingston in his account asserts, that the commodore opened his instructions in an unwarrantable manner; and that, after he had done so, he proposed to the colonel to take what care they could of themselves at the expense of the public service. The colonel rejected this offer as became a man of honour; and the commodore thenceforward prepared to execute his scheme in spite of all that the colonel could do to prevent him. \*

Toward the latter end of March, 1695, they arrived before the city of St. Domingo, where the Spanish governor, on the receipt of the king of Spain's letters, promised them all the assistance in his power; but how he performed this promise, is not very well agreed. Mr. Secretary Burchet in his history, from the letters, no doubt, of Commodore Wilmot, charges him with creating unnecessary delays, which were of great prejudice to the expedition. † On the other hand, Colonel Lillingston asserts, that the Spanish governor behaved in every respect like a man of honour; concerted with him the measures necessary to be taken for attacking Cape François; and performed all he undertook with the utmost punctuality. It must be observed, that the force of the allies then in Hispaniola was such, that the ruin of the French settlements might have been well expected from it. The Spanish

\* Reflections on Burchet's Memoirs, p. 19. I have been the longer in my account of this business, that the reader may see what are the true reasons why conjunct expeditions never succeed; and how necessary it is to call officers strictly to account when they live to return home, in order to put an end to such shameful practices.

† Burchet's Naval History, p. 535. Indeed this gentleman seems to have an extraordinary pique against the Spaniards, whom, though our allies at that time, he never mentions but with reproach. This is the more injurious, since that writer, though he had so great opportunity, never supports what he advances by any authority. It would, however, be hard to set the judgment of a single man so high as to sacrifice to it the character of a whole nation.

governor marched one thousand seven hundred ; the commander of our land-forces was able to disembark about twelve hundred men ; the commodore promised to join his force with five hundred seamen ; the Spaniards actually added three men of war to our fleet ; and, to prevent any disputes about the command, the Spanish admiral took down his flag. \*

The first thing that was attempted was the ruin of the French settlement at Cape François. When the fleet was arrived within sight of the place, the commodore absolutely prescribed the place where the land-forces should go on shore ; and though Colonel Lillingston represented to him, that it was extremely hard to oblige the troops to a march of five leagues and a half, when, by only rowing one league and a half, the boats might land them close by the fort which they were to attack ; the commodore gave him barely the hearing, but pursued his own project, and they soon discovered with what view.

The English and Spanish troops joined ; and continued their fatiguing march till they arrived within five miles of Fort St. Francis, where they saw the French blow up their works, and abandon the place. When the troops came up, they were surprized to find the English colours hoisted on the fort, and a single seaman left to attend them : but the mystery was soon explained ; Commodore Wilmot no sooner saw the place abandoned, than he rowed to shore with five hundred men, entered it, and carried off all that was worth carrying. This disgusted, it well might, both the English and Spanish forces ; and, if they had not been composed of veteran troops, and men who had a great respect for their officers, a mutiny must have followed, which would have destroyed the whole design. But Colonel Lillingston pacified them as

\* Reflections on Burchet's Memoirs, p. 48, where the agreement itself is to be found ; for Colonel Lillingston always produces vouchers.

well as he could, by promising to take care they should not be treated in this manner for the future, if it were in his power to prevent it.

After this extraordinary exploit, it was resolved to attempt Port de Paix, where M. Ducasse commanded in person; but he quitted the place, leaving in it a garrison of six hundred men.

On the 1st of June, the English and Spanish troops marched by two different roads toward the place they were to attack; and the squadron sailed thither at the same time, but with this extraordinary circumstance; that, if the Spanish admiral out of pure humanity had not left some transports to take in our sick men, they must have been left to perish; for Commodore Wilnot had something else in his head than to take care of invalids, and had therefore sailed as soon as the resolution was taken. The march was very fatiguing: it took up sixteen days before they arrived in sight of Port de Paix, and then there was a great deal of time lost in getting the artillery and ammunition on shore. At last this too was performed, and then the siege of the place was begun in a regular manner: and the commodore, to shew his willingness to assist, landed a great body of seamen, and invested it on the other side.

On the 8d of July, the breach being practicable, and Colonel Lillingston employed in making the necessary dispositions for a general storm, the enemy took a resolution of deserting the place, and forcing their way through the quarter of the commodore. Their force consisted of about five hundred and thirty men, of which about one hundred and fifty were negroes, but well armed and disciplined. Their greatest difficulty was to carry off their women, children, and the most valuable part of their effects. The latter they packed up first, and put them in

small bundles on the backs of the women, who, with the children marched in the front, under a good escort; while three hundred men fell into the quarters of our seamen, and, by exposing themselves to a very brisk fire, which lasted for a long time, gave the rest an opportunity to retreat. The affair was conducted with equal resolution and address; but not without a very considerable loss.

Colonel Lillingston, as soon as he heard the firing, guessed at the cause, and immediately detached his brother, with two hundred and fifty men, to support the seamen. When Major Lillingston arrived, the affair was over, and he marched directly to take possession of the fort, in order to secure whatever the French had left behind them; and having posted centinels every where, and put the rest of his men under arms, he thought that all was safe, but in this he was mistaken; Commodore Wilmot, at the head of his whole corps of seamen, followed him instantly. As soon as the commodore came up to him, he clapped his hand upon his shoulder, with this familiar salutation, "Now, major, I am stronger than you." After which he removed his guards, broke open the store-houses, and carried off every thing that was worth taking, "with a dexterity," says Colonel Lillingston, "very natural to seamen."\*

This kind of proceeding was not likely to produce much good; the commodore offered to carry the sick men to Jamaica, and to leave Colonel Lillingston to attempt, in conjunction with the Spaniards, the taking Leogane and Petit-Guavas; but they were weary of such kind of treatment, and had so many men disabled by the unnecessary hardships to which they had been exposed; that it was resolved, in a council of war, not to prosecute either of the designs before-mentioned; but to demolish the fort,

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 536. Reflections on Burchet's Memoirs, p. 67. Histoire de St. Domingue, vol. iv. p. 73.



ruin the adjacent country, carry off the artillery they had taken, and sail with all the English forces to Jamaica.

To this the Spanish governor consented, because he saw the impossibility of their performing, in the condition they were in, what they had projected; and of this he was the better judge, because he had an exact account of the French forces that M. Ducasse was assembling at Cul de Sac, and with which, it was expected, he would march to give them battle, having no other means of preserving the French settlements; though in this there was a great deal of danger.\*

It must not be supposed, because this expedition was in itself very ill managed, and far from being glorious to those that undertook it; it must not, I say, be therefore supposed, that it did but very little prejudice to the French.

The confederate army, in sixty days, ruined their plantations for a hundred miles round; carried off a thousand negroes; demolished two strong forts, wherein they took one hundred and forty pieces of cannon, with a vast quantity of all sorts of ammunition and naval stores; so that there seems to be no reason to think Colonel Lillingston exaggerated, who computes the loss of the French at two hundred thousand pounds.† But what recompense

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 537.

† It is necessary for me here to give the reader some account of the authorities on which the facts mentioned in the text are founded. In the year 1703, Secretary Burchet published his memoirs of transactions at sea, during the war with France, from 1688 to 1697. In these Memoirs, p. 305, he gives a large account of this expedition, which is altogether in favour of Mr. Wilmot, and was very probably transcribed from his letters. In 1704, Colonel Luke Lillingston published his reflections on Mr. Burchet's Memoirs, in which he advances nothing but upon undeniable authority, producing instructions, letters, affidavits, and other necessary papers upon every occasion. Some months after Mr. Burchet published a justification of his naval memoirs, in answer to Colonel Lillingston, which are supported only by extracts from journals of persons, who are disposed to set their own proceed-

is this for the expense the nation was at in fitting out such a squadron, and in sending so great a body of land troops so far? What opinion must the commodore's conduct give our allies, the Spaniards, of English armaments, and what notions could they entertain of the significance of our naval force, when they saw it so flagrantly misapplied; our commander in chief having regard only to his private views, and encouraging his seamen upon all occasions to behave like pirates? How much must this miscarriage <sup>at</sup> once disgrace and discourage an administration; since it seemed to shew, that all attempts of this sort would prove as fruitless for the future, and serve only to exhaust the treasures of this nation, in order to enrich such as least deserved it? I am very sorry that I have been obliged to say so much; but every reader will do me the justice to own, that this subject compelled me to it. We suffer at this day, for the misdeeds of these times, and the false pity that was shewn in letting slip the public examination of a thing so scandalous as this was.\* Reflections like these,

ings in a good light, and, which is strange, acknowledges he neither asked or desired any account from Colonel Lillingston, in order to have an opportunity of comparing evidence on both sides. This was the more extraordinary, as King William (prejudiced by the admiralty accounts) looked coldly on the colonel, till, upon examining the affair, he was undeceived, and granted him a pension of two hundred pounds a-year, which was continued by Queen Anne. So that his memoirs seemed a censure upon their majesties bounty. Yet, notwithstanding all this, when Secretary Burchet came to publish his naval history in 1720, he in a manner transcribed what he had before said in his memoirs, correcting only a few facts from Colonel Lillingston's book, by which, however, he admits its authority, but without setting any mark of ignominy upon this most scandalous expedition. At this Mr. Lediard very honestly expresses his surprize; but, for my own part, when I consider the admiralty never thought this affair worth an inquiry, I do not at all wonder their secretary did not think proper to censure it.

\* The general answer to what has been said on this subject is, that all inquiry was prevented by the commodore's death. But, surely, this is a very poor excuse. To an intelligent reader it will appear,

on the slips of our ancestors, are proper lessons for the present generation; and I think it my duty to inculcate them, in order to prevent our being wanting, in the same manner to ourselves and our posterity.

The account given us of this affair, by French writers, agrees pretty well with our own. It is true, that they gave great commendations to M. Ducasse, governor of St. Domingo, who was certainly a very gallant man; but who, as certainly, had no opportunity of shewing his bravery on this occasion. In the main, however, they agree, that misunderstandings between the allies proved the ruin of the whole affair; and that nothing could amaze, and, at the same time, overjoy people more, than the news of the English troops embarking for Jamaica did M. Ducasse and his army. The same writers intimate, that the colony of Jamaica was much wanting to itself, in not laying hold of this opportunity to make a descent on the French settlements, in revenge for the mischiefs done them by the inhabitants of this colony, under M. Ducasse, the year before; which, if they had done, in all probability the French must have been driven out of Hispaniola; and, as things then stood, there is no great reason to doubt the Spaniards would have been very well pleased to have seen an English colony settled in their room, as well knowing their own inability to preserve the island without such assistance.\*

But all such views for the glory of England were effectually defeated by the sailing away of the English

that an effectual inquiry might have been more easily made after his death, than in the life of the commodore. His influence was then determined, he could not be hurt by the inquiry, all his creatures were at full liberty to speak; and, as knowing the truth only was of importance to the public, in order to prevent such detestable actions for the future, the burying all this villany, as far as possible, in oblivion, is inexcusable to the nation.

\* Hist. de St. Domingue, tom. iv. p. 63—75. Histoire Militaire, tom. iii. Histoire de Louis XIV. tom. v. &c.

squadron from Hispaniola, on the 23d of July, 1695, with the land-forces on board. The governor and people of Jamaica gave the commodore a very indifferent reception, having had previous intelligence of his behaviour through the whole affair. Several councils of war were holden, to consider how practicable a second attempt might be in conjunction with a considerable force from this island. But, after much deliberation, this design also came to nothing. The commodore, in the mean time, followed his business closely; that is to say, he converted the plunder he had taken into money, which he vested in all sorts of merchandize fit for the English market, and took in the goods privately on the back of the island. When this was done, his next care was to get back to England with his squadron, with the great wealth he had amassed on board of it. He left Jamaica on the 3d of September, 1695, but met with a very bad passage.

On the shoals of Florida he lost a fourth rate man of war, in a manner which gave great cause to suspect he never intended to bring her home.\* After this an epidemic distemper broke out on board the ships, which carried off a multitude of sailors and soldiers, and not a few officers, among whom was the commodore himself. This

\* One may see by Colonel Lillingston's whole book, how much more jealous men of honour are of their reputation, than statesmen of a nation's glory. The colouel's account of this affair was printed but seven years after the thing happened, and yet no search was made into the matter. His words are these:

"It would be a most diverting thing, abating for the disaster of it, and the lives lost in it, to hear a true particular of the loss of the Winchester man of war. If I am not misinformed, there would come to light a great many hidden circumstances, very useful to the nation in general, if the loss of that man of war were inquired into. If due examination were made, whether all the stores and guns that were pretended to be in her, were really on board her; and if the loss of that ship did not serve for a colour to pretend the loss of many things, which were otherwise disposed of" Lillingston's Reflections, p. 130.

disease prevailed at last to such a degree, that there were scarcely found men enough to bring home the squadron, which did not arrive till very late in the year. I cannot help closing this account by observing, that Commodore Wilmot left sixteen thousand pounds in effects on board his own ship, which engaged his family in a long suit with Captain Butler. Such are the wretched effects of sacrificing public concerns to the narrow views of private interest! \*

Toward the latter end of the year 1696, the nation was again alarmed with the report of an invasion. It was known that the French were fitting out a strong squadron at Brest; and for what service, the intelligence our secretaries had could not inform them. Sir Cloudesley Shovel, therefore, was sent with a considerable force to block them up, which, however, the French avoided; and it was then given out at home, that our vigilance had disappointed the designs of the enemy, and obliged them to abandon all thoughts of a descent. In this we only deceived ourselves; for our merchants quickly came at the knowledge of the true scheme, which was the sending a strong squadron into the West Indies, to attack some of the Spanish plantations in those parts.† The Sieur

A.D.  
1696.

\* Mr. Burchet confesses the epidemic sickness on board the fleet; and Colonel Lillingston informs us, that the commodore's widow was actually involved in a law suit with Captain Butler, in 1704, for the plunder so basely taken from the poor soldiers and sailors, who acquired a just title to it by the sweat of their brows, and the expense of their blood.

† In order to support this fact, I shall give the reader a passage from the Monthly Mercury for December, 1696. "The great ripose made about Pointis's squadron that was equipping at Brest, and which, as it was furnished with a vast number of scaling ladders, bombs, pontoons, and other materials for a descent, and for the attack of places on shore, had given the alarm to all the dominions of Great Britain, is at last over; and those that were most frightened, are now most inclined to treat it with contempt; for whether it was, that Pointis wanted a money-wind to carry him

Pointis was the person who formed the plan of this undertaking, and who had been no less than three years in bringing it to bear.

The French king had suffered a great number of private persons to contribute towards this enterprize; and the strongest assurances were given them, that whatever profits accrued thereby should be fairly divided among them. Orders were privately sent to M. Ducasse, in Hispaniola, to assemble as many Buccaneers as he could, with vessels proper to support them; and he was to have these ready to join M. Pointis's squadron as soon as it appeared. The true design all along was upon Carthage; but such as pretended to be in the secret at the French court, gave out, that the king intended this armament to execute a project, long ago formed by M. Ducasse, of driving the Spaniards entirely out of Hispaniola. But, notwithstanding this variety of reports, some of King James's adherents fancied that they had penetrated farther than any of these politicians, and that the true design of this mysterious armament was against Jamaica; and of this, as Englishmen, they thought it their duty to advise our court. \*

" out of port, or that his project had not received the least sanction  
 " of the court, so it was, that his Britannic majesty had time enough  
 " to send Sir Cloudesley Shovel with a strong squadron to inspect  
 " this fleet, which was reported to be strong enough to attempt the  
 " invasion of his kingdoms; and, on his looking into the port, it ap-  
 " peared there were but sixteen men of war of all sorts there; so  
 " that, whatever the design of Pointis's squadron was, it seems to be  
 " vanished into smoke."

\* The political tracts of that year best inform us what the sentiments of the world were upon that occasion. Because later writers are apt to impose upon us, by pretending, that this or that great Minister had actually discovered the secret very early, though, for certain reasons of state, it was not published. Now it clearly appears from those writings, that nothing of this kind happened; and it is as certain from Pointis's Journal, that he never had any other view than that of attacking Carthage, notwithstanding so many other projects were

At first this was considered as a very extraordinary piece of intelligence, which alarmed us the more, because, considering the force we had put in that part of the world, if they had really attempted this island, there was but too great probability of their succeeding.

When this matter, however, came to be deliberated upon in council, and several of the most intelligent persons there seemed convinced that the blow was meant at us; King William declared himself of a contrary opinion, for a reason which shewed how well he understood mankind, and how justly the French king dreaded his superiority capacity in the closet. His majesty observed, that the basis of the French king's new expedition was private interest, not public duty, or national glory; for which reason he concluded they would not either endeavour to conquer Hispaniola, or attack Jamaica, but attempt the taking the Spanish galleons, or the surprizing of Carthage. The good sense of this observation brought over every body to his majesty's opinion; and the sequel will shew, that the *Sieur Pointis* and the rest of the French commanders, *M. Ducasse* always excepted, never considered, in this expedition, what was best to be done, but how most might be gotten, in which piratical kind of knowledge they proved much greater proficient than the buccaneers themselves

talked of. The informations I speak of from France, I know from unquestionable authority; for, as the author of the Jewish letters rightly observes, the English refugees at St. Germain were quite a different sort of people from the refugees in Soho, for they loved their country, though they were banished from it; and, like the Greek exiles of old in the Persian court, shewed those who were inured to slavery, how great a blessing it is to be born and bred up FREE.

\* Bishop Burnet in his History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 195, expresses a good deal of dislike to the management of our affairs at sea in this critical conjuncture; but whoever considers the matter strictly, will find all the reason in the world to commend the disposition made by our court for preventing the French from executing their design in the West Indies. We ought always to distinguish between the

To frustrate this blow, wherever it was intended, orders were given for a small squadron to assemble at Portsmouth under the command of Captain Meeze; and other orders were at the same time despatched to Mr. Neville, who commanded our fleet in the Mediterranean, and who was now made vice-admiral; which he was directed to open, when he had taken due care of the homeward-bound fleet, and should be fifty leagues S. W. by W. from Cadiz. He found himself in this situation about the middle of the month of February, 1696-7; and, then consulting his instructions, found that he was to join Captain Meeze's squadron at the island of Madeiras; where, after cruizing a long time, he was met by the captain, now made a rear-admiral, in his own ship the Bristol; and, the Lightning fire-ship having lost company with the rest of his squadron in a fog, a little after he left the Isle of Wight. On the 17th of April, Vice-Admiral Neville arrived at Barbadoes, where he found most of the ships he expected, except the Dutch, who joining him, however, soon after, they bore away for Antigua, where they arrived the third of May, 1697. There it was resolved in a council of war to sail for Porto Rico, in order to take as much care as possible of the Spanish galleons. Before he reached his intended port, he had intelligence, that M. Pointis had sailed for Hispaniola on the 21st of March, N. S. with twenty-six ships small and great. It was then resolved in a council of war to proceed forthwith to Jamaica, in order to take in a supply of water and provisions.\*

laying of a scheme and the carrying it into execution; for the same praise is due to the contrivers of a good scheme, though it fails of its effects, as if it had met with the wished-for success. Here was a force superiour to the French, who, had been three years providing theirs, assembled in less than three months; and, if the orders given to our admirals had been strictly complied with, they had been as early in the West-Indies as the enemy; if they were not, it was no fault either of the council or the board of Admiralty.

\* Mr. Burchet tells us both in his memoirs and his history, that



On the 15th of May, 1697, the admiral, being off the east end of the island, met with a sloop, the master whereof informed him, there was a flying report of the French squadron's being before Carthagená; upon this he staid no longer than was absolutely necessary to take in water, but sailed from Port-Royal, and attempted to go through the Leeward channel; but in that he was prevented by the dying away of the land-breeze, and contrary to what had been ever known by all persons acquainted with those parts, the sea-breeze blew for six days and six nights together, during which time an English sloop came in, that left Porto-Bello the 18th of this month, in company with the galleons, which were fifteen in number, and two days after parted with them, steering away N. N. E. for Jamaica, where they intended to take provisions, for which they were so much straitened, that they had not enough to carry them to the Havannah. The vice-admiral sent out two sloops to look for them, the one off the keys of Point-Pedro, and the other off those of Porto-Morant, and to let their general know, that he was going to Carthagená to see what could be done against the French, but that he would return to Jamaica in a short time. The 24th of the same month he took advantage of a small gale from shore to steer for Carthagená, in hopes of finding the French either embarrassed in the siege of the place, or in embarking the plunder; for, according to the best accounts he could get, the Spaniards were very strong there, and had been so lucky also as to have pretty

A.D.  
1697.

Vice-Admiral Neville cruized fifty-eight days about the Madeiras, to which, if he thought himself bound by his instructions, he was justified; but however, this certainly proved the ruin of the whole affair; for, if he had stood away for Barbadoes, instead of cruizing there, he might have come time enough to have attacked the French before they left Hispaniola, or at least he might have followed them to Carthagená, where, if he had attacked their fleet while their army was engaged in the siege, their whole force must have been totally destroyed.

early intelligence of the visit that was designed them; but the cross accidents, that kept the vice-admiral so long on the coast of Jamaica, frustrated his good intentions; and hindered our retaking from the French the best part of what they took from the Spaniards, which must otherwise probably have happened.

In order to give a distinct account of this extraordinary affair, which is somewhat partially related both by English and French writers, I must pursue the history of Pointis's voyage, and shew how and when he executed the scheme proposed; for this will naturally bring us back to this very point of time when Vice-admiral Neville sailed in search of him and his squadron. As the success of Pointis's expedition depended upon the assistance he was to receive at St. Domingo, he sailed thither directly, and arrived on the coast February 19th, 1697. The Governor M. Ducasse had taken care to provide every thing pursuant to his instructions, so that the Sieur Pontis met with no retardment but what proceeded from his own imperious disposition, which hindered him from giving the buccaneers the satisfaction they expected; and this produced a mutiny or two, which nothing could have quieted but the presence of M. Ducasse, who was actuated wholly by public spirit, and exerted his utmost interest among these people to keep them steady; at the same time he suffered as much as they did from the insolence of the general,

\* The admiral's going to Jamaica was another misfortune; for, as it will be hereafter shewn, if he had sailed directly, on the first intelligence he had, for Carthagena, he must have surprized M. Pointis, and destroyed his whole force. But if, according to the admiral's journal, he was under an absolute necessity of taking in water; this is to be considered as an unavoidable misfortune. These are points I leave to the reader's judgment to determine; for none of our accounts afford us sufficient light to decide positively on the matters of fact, though this is certainly in the admiral's favour, that he was known to have as much personal courage as any man, and that he afterwards shewed as great an inclination to fight upon this occasion as any man ever did, or indeed could do.

who, proud of his commission, and full of himself, behaved without any regard either to the rank or circumstances of others. \*

After about a fortnight's stay to forward all necessary preparations, the whole fleet sailed for Carthageua, and arrived before that city on the 3d of April. The force brought from France by M. Pointis consisted of seven large ships of war, about ten frigates, and small vessels of several sorts, on board which were two thousand two hundred and sixty seamen, and one thousand seven hundred and fifty soldiers, in all four thousand and ten, to which M. Ducasse added another stout squadron, on board of which were fifteen hundred buccaneers, soldiers, and volunteers. They first attempted the strong fort of Boca-Chica, which was carried by assault; then they attacked Neustra Signora de la Popa, a monastery on a hill, which commands the place; they besieged and took likewise the Fort of St. Lazarus, and at length stormed the suburbs, which forced the governor to think of a capitulation; and this, being granted him on pretty good terms, was concluded April 24th, 1697, when the city was surrendered to the French, who lost before it upwards of five hundred men; neither could it have been ever taken but for the assistance of M. Ducasse, and the troops he commanded, though Pointis used them very ill through the whole affair; and, after it was taken, actually shut them out of the city, putting off from time to time the distribution of

\* In the whole of this relation I reduce all the dates to the old style for the sake of comparing them readily, which could not have been otherwise done. As to the facts, we have a vast variety of relations, though I think but two of any great authority, viz. Pointis's own memoirs, and the History of St. Domingo, written by Father Charlevoix and Father Pers, and from the registers in the public offices in the marine of France, where I find these differ too widely to be reconciled; therefore, I prefer without ceremony, the latter, because it is evident, that Sieur Pointis had views to serve, whereas Father Charlevoix writes without the least bias. Occasionally I have recourse to other authorities which I refer to in their proper places.

the booty, and not allowing so much as to put a check on such as received it. \*

Many disputes have been raised as to the value of the plate and other effects taken by the *Sieur Pointis* in this place. Some have carried this so high as forty millions of livres, and others, among whom is *M. Pointis* himself, reduce it to nine millions. There are several reasons which have induced different writers to impose upon their readers in this particular.† All the Spanish authors who have mentioned this, say, they had sent the nuns, together with one hundred and twenty mules, laden with gold and jewels, forty miles up into the country, before the French arrived; but then it is visibly their interest to abate, as much as possible, the credit of this expedition, and this perhaps is now become the French interest too. The *Sieur Pointis* and his partizans had also cause sufficient to state this account as low as possible: because, the lower they brought it, the less they had to account for, which was what they wanted. Our historians in those days were desirous of lessening the success of all French expeditions; and therefore, as we see in the celebrated work of *Bishop Burnet*, that prelate affected to treat this as a miscarriage, by which the French, on the whole, could scarcely be called gainers. ‡

\* This we find both in *Pointis's Memoirs*, and in the *History of St. Domingo*. The general indeed pretends the buccaneers behaved ill, but the court of France, on the closest examination, thought otherwise, and therefore so I think ought we.

† *Histoire de St. Domingue*, vol. iv. p. 146. *Memoires de Pointis*, &c. *Father Daniel*, in his *Journal Historique de Louis XIV.* p. 187, computes the riches brought home by *Sieur Pointis* at ten millions; and this, as I take it, was the commonly received calculation at that time.

‡ *Bishop Burnet* might possibly be deceived by the second accounts from France, which were all against *Pointis*; but if he had inquired into what followed, and how much money was recovered when this business came to be narrowly sifted, he would have altered his opinion. The French do not suffer a few great officers to cheat their owners

But one who is solicitous only about truth will make proper allowances on such occasions; and, by comparing these different accounts together, will endeavour to acquire a just notion of a thing, with which, for many reasons, surely both we and posterity have a right to be acquainted. After taking all imaginable pains to this purpose, I venture to assert, M. Pointis carried home upwards of twenty millions of livres; I believe I should not err in saying, twelve hundred thousand pounds sterling.\*

But there is no need of lessening the profits to abate the glory of this expedition. The *Sieur Pointis* certainly behaved very ill through the whole affair; he disgusted the buccaneers; he treated M. Ducasse excessively ill during the whole siege; he made an unfair distribution of the effects taken; he took no kind of care of the sick and wounded, but left them in the hospitals not only without medicines but food; and, to complete his blunders, he loitered till the 21st of May, and did not embark his men till the sickly season came on, and they could scarcely crawl to their ships. The buccaneers were so irritated by the behaviour of *Pointis*, and his breaking the agreement he made with them, to force upon them a dividend of forty thousand crowns; that, as soon as they saw him and his squadron ready to sail, they turned back to Carthage, in order, as they phrased it, to look for their

and the public by cooking up stories destitute of proof; their government is arbitrary, and therefore, in cases like this, generally speaking, just.

\* My calculation goes upon undeniable principles. The *Sieur Pointis* gave the buccaneers forty thousand crowns, or one hundred and twenty thousand livres, for their share, computing at the rate of one tenth from the first million, and a thirteenth from every other million; and this, by a very easy process, makes it clear he estimated the whole booty at nine millions. But, when M. *Pointis's* behaviour came to be scrutinized in France, they had a decree for one million, four hundred thousand livres more.

share of the plunder, which they did not fail of finding.\*

It is very evident from this account, that if our vice-admiral, on his having the first information of the enemy's having sailed for Carthageua, which was on the 15th of May, had proceeded thither instead of going to Jamaica, he had unquestionably surprized the French in the harbour of that place; and, as the Spaniards had actually assembled an army to retake the city, it is not easy to guess how the French would have escaped, who were by that time split into factions among themselves, and at least one half of them fallen sick.† But though he missed them then, yet on the 27th of May, 1697, being half seas over from Jamaica, he saw the Sieur de Pointis's squadron, consisting of seven men of war, and two or three frigates, at no great distance; upon which he endeavoured to engage them, but could not. The Warwick indeed exchanged some shot with one of the Frenchmen; but, in spite of all the sail she could make, the ship got away from her, as the rest did from the admiral. The Warwick, perceiving this, bore down on a fly-boat belonging to the French fleet, and took her, having on board a vast quantity of arms and ammunition, with as much plate as made the prize worth two hundred thousand pounds, and is a pretty good sample of what mighty treasures were on board the rest.‡

Five days the Vice-admiral continued the pursuit, in which five ships, among which his own and Rear-admiral

\* *Histoire de St. Domingue*, vol. iv. p. 157. The buccaneers undoubtedly carried away five million livres, though not above one million, five hundred thousand came to St. Domingo.

† Burchet's *Naval History*, p. 553. See also the *Memoirs of Sir G. Rooke*.

‡ Mr. Lediard seems to question whether the author of the *British Empire in America* had not set down two hundred thousand for twenty thousand; but upon examination I find two hundred thousand in the original accounts.

Meeze's were included, sprung their fore-top-masts, and their sails were so torn, that it was found impossible to continue the chase with any hopes of success.\* This again was a narrow escape; the French themselves own it, they were much inferiour in force, they were ill manned, most of their ships were foul; and, if they had fought, many of them must have been taken without doubt. I see no manner of cause to censure the vice-admiral's conduct on this occasion, as some have done, because it was beyond question his own and his officers interests to have fought, upon the presumption that their own superiour force would have put them in possession of all the plunder the French had obtained.

Besides, they all gave sufficient proofs afterwards, that fighting was what they did not desire to avoid. I am therefore satisfied as to this point, that there was nothing of treachery or neglect of duty in this business; but that Pointis's squadron escaped by a concurrence, with respect of us, of unlucky and unavoidable accidents; unless there might be some fault in those who furnished our sails, which did not wear so well as those of the French, for which however the sea-officers were not to blame. †

The buccaneers, on their return to Carthagena, met with no resistance; and therefore, having driven the inhabitants into the great church, they told them how General Pointis had treated them, which, as they alledged, obliged them, though against their will, to come back to make a demand of five millions, which once paid them, they promised to retire without doing any kind of violence. The poor Spaniards did their utmost to rake together this sum; but it was all in vain. The French took what they brought, and, as soon as they had done bringing, these miscreants

\* Burchet's Memoirs, p. 361. The present State of Europe for the month of August, 1697. London Gazette, No. 3317.

† Mr. Burchet acknowledges this, and so it appears on the strictest inquiry, though this does not seem to have satisfied Bishop Burnet.

had recourse to such cruelties, as are scarcely credible, to force discoveries. After all, in the space of about five days, they amassed near one million of crowns in money, and above as much more in rich goods; after which they fell out among themselves as to the division of it; the buccaneers refusing the inhabitants of Domingo an equal share, because, as they said, they were at a great expense on that island before they sailed, when the inhabitants were at home in their own houses. This dispute, however, was soon adjusted on the arrival of a ship from Martinico, with advice that a strong English squadron was in quest of them; they instantly quitted the place, embarked their plunder with all imaginable diligence, and contrived to get to sea as soon as possible, and retire to St. Domingo. \*

When our squadron found it impracticable to engage the French, the vice-admiral thought it expedient to proceed to Carthagena, in order to see if the galleons were safe, and how far he could be useful to the Spaniards. He arrived in the port in the evening of the 31st of May, and found the place quite abandoned; for the inhabitants were so much afraid of the buccaneers returning a third time, that they had fled into the woods. Two days the vice-admiral remained in the port before he prevailed upon the governor and some of the principal inhabitants to return; and then sailed, after sending a frigate to St. Jago to inform the governor of the Havannah, and the general of the gallies, of what had passed, that they might the better provide for the safety of the galleons.

On the 6th he discovered eight sail of buccaneers close under the shore; upon which a detachment was sent to destroy them. The enemy crowded all the sail they could, in hopes of escaping, but only four were so lucky as to effect it. One was forced upon the Spanish coast, not far from Carthagena, her crew taken by the inhabitants,

\* Histoire de St. Domingue, vol. iv. p. 161.



and compelled to work in the repair of their fortifications. Another was forced on shore on St. Domingo, and beaten to pieces. The *Christ*, a fine ship, commanded by Captain Cofuy, who had two hundred and fifty men on board, and about three hundred and fifty thousand crowns in silver, was taken by a Dutch ship; as was the *Flying Hart* of the same force and value, commanded by Captain Pierce, by Captain Dilkes, and her crew were brought into England.\*

The governor of Jamaica, at that time, was Sir William Beeston; who, considering that the fleet must soon be obliged to return home, resolved to suggest the destruction of that nest of pirates, Petit-Guavas, to the vice-admiral, as the most important service that, as things were circumstanced, could be done to the English colonies in general, and Jamaica in particular. Vice-admiral Neville instantly complied with it, and left the execution of the scheme to Rear-admiral Meeze, who was detached from the fleet, June 22d, 1697, for this very purpose, with nine ships of war, great and small. On the 27th, he arrived at a small distance from Petit-Guavas, and disembarked some of his forces, ordering the ships to come in next day.

On the 29th, he surprised Petit-Guavas, entering the place before it was light, and seizing the guard. He had, at first, thoughts of remaining there some short time; but the seamen, and at last, through their example, the landmen, began to plunder and drink so hard, that when the rear-admiral altered his sentiments, and resolved to burn and abandon it, there was not above fifty sober men under his command, out of nine hundred. When he gave out this order, the whole was executed with such precipitation, that notwithstanding there was abundance of gold and silver in the place, yet very little was saved or brought away. However, the burning the town, and carrying off prisoners a good number of negroes to Jamaica, was a

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 555. *Columna Rostata*, p. 268. Life of King William, p. 487, 488.

great and seasonable service to the English colonies, and gave the enemy a remarkable check, which they did not soon recover: to say the truth, it was one of the most important actions done during the war. \*

Vice-admiral Neville, having wooded and watered with all the diligence imaginable, sailed to meet Rear-admiral Meeze; and, then bringing away the homeward-bound ships from Jamaica, resolved to proceed to the Havannah, in order to preserve the galleons. He sailed in the beginning of July, and, coming about the middle of that month on the coast of Cuba, the seamen became excessively sickly, and Rear-admiral Meeze died before they reached the Havannah. On the 22d of the same month, the vice-admiral arrived before that port; and sent in advice to the governor of his want of water and other refreshments. The governor sent him a civil message, but refused to admit his squadron, and did not even supply his necessities, or, at least, not in all respects. As for the general of the galleons, when he was informed that the vice-admiral came on purpose to convey that rich fleet home, which was the principal point of King William's instructions; far from being satisfied with these unusual acts of kindness to allies, he excused himself from putting his ships under our protection, supposing, or at least pretending, his orders would not warrant it. The true reason, however, both of his and of the governor's conduct, might probably be, their fear of having the place of the greatest consequence in the West Indies, and the richest fleet of that age, for there were fifty millions on board the galleons, taken at once, since both had been left in the vice-admiral's power, if he had been once admitted into the haven. †

\* Burchet's *Memoirs*, p. 362. Kennet, *Life of King William*. *Columna Rostrata*, p. 269. *The present State of Europe for the month of September, 1697*. Pointer's *Chronological Historian*, vol. ii. p. 442. *London Gazette*, No. 3324.

† Burchet's *Naval History*, p. 553. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xxiii. p. 537, 654. *London Gazette*, No. 3351.

This kind of treatment, after the pains he had taken to save the galleons, and to serve the crown of Spain on every occasion, broke the vice-admiral's spirits very much. He had always counted upon escorting the galleons, and believed so acceptable a service would entirely efface the memory of former misfortunes; but being disappointed again, and reflecting on the little service that with so strong a squadron he had been able to do his country; it threw him into a kind of hectic fever, which hung upon him till he arrived in Virginia, on the 22d of August, and there he died; as much of grief as of his distemper, to the great regret of all who knew him; as he was a person of courage, prudence, and integrity; who wanted not either will or abilities to do his country service, though his fortune fell short of his zeal.\*

By his demise the command of the squadron devolved upon Captain Robert Dilkes, who, from Virginia, arrived safely in England on the 24th of October, 1697, with the whole squadron, though poorly manned, and the ships many of them foul and rotten; so that, notwithstanding the great hopes that had been entertained of our doing mighty things in the West Indies, all came to nothing; for, besides this, we met with other disappointments in that quarter of the world, that were no less mortifying than those we have mentioned.†

A.D.  
1697.

The Sieur Pointis thought himself safe when he arrived off Newfoundland, not having the least knowledge that we had a stout squadron there, under the command of the late Sir John, then Captain, Norris, so that he made no difficulty of going into the bay of Conception, and of lying there carelessly enough; though we had a force sufficient at St. John to have given a good account of him and his

\* I have this character from some who knew him well, and who served under him in this very expedition.

† Life of King William, p. 488. The present State of Europe for the month of October, 1697, p. 398. London Gazette. No. 3336. 3339.

Spanish plunder. It was on the 23d of July our squadron had advice, that five French ships were seen in Conception-bay, and they immediately concluded it was M. Nesmond's squadron come to attack them; and therefore, instead of going to look for the enemy, they wisely considered how, in case they fell upon St. John's, they should be best able to defend themselves, and bent all their endeavours that way.\*

Captain Norris was from the beginning a little suspicious that this was not the outward-bound French squadron; and therefore, sent the *Mary* galley, a clean tight ship, to discover what they were. But before they could have any news from her, he received a letter from one Mr. Alexander Cumberbatch, master of a ship taken by the French at sea, and put on shore at Newfoundland, in order to procure fresh provisions. In this letter there was a distinct account of M. Pointis's strength, and of his squadron having on board the rich plunder of Carthage. Captain Norris was ravished with this epistle; called a council of war immediately; and pressed that no farther time might be lost; but that without more ado they might sail in quest of the enemy. Other people, however, were in no such haste; they doubted whether Cumberbatch's letter might not be intended to draw them out of their strength, and thereby expose St. John and the whole country, to the French; and therefore, after a long debate, it was resolved in the council of war to remain where they were, and to expect the French in close quarters, without running unnecessary hazards.†

\* Burchet's *Memoirs*, p. 375.

† The reflections of Bishop Burnet on this business, are very well worth notice. "Commodore Norris's squadron," says he, "might have fallen upon the French, and would probably have mastered them; but as they had no certain account of their strength, so, being sent out on another service, they did not think it proper to hazard the attacking them; so the French got safe home, and the conduct of our affairs at sea was much censured."—In Burchet's

About noon, on the 26th, they received advice, that the five French ships were seen the night before at anchor a little eastward of Belle-isle, by Portugal Cove; and the next day, upon a message from Colonel Gibson, there was another consultation, where this intelligence was read; but

*Memoirs*, p. 378, and in his history, the blame is thrown entirely on the land officers, who out-voted the sea officers in the council of war. The whole is strangely skimmed over in our Gazette, No. 3319, as a thing not fit to be mentioned.

I have with some difficulty recovered the minutes of this famous council of war; and as I believe a list of the names of those who sat in it, and their votes, cannot but be agreeable to the reader, I shall transcribe them.

A council of war at St. John's, July 24th, 1697, at which were present,

## LAND-OFFICERS.

John Gibson.....	No.
Thomas Dore .....	No.
Thomas Handasyde...	No.
Cliff. Brexton .....	No.
Griff. May .....	No.
Hugh Boyd .....	No.
Y. Smith .....	No.
Rob. Dazzell .....	No.
H. Petit .....	No.
George Watkins .....	No.
Jos. Hargrave .....	No.

Eleven. No's all.

## SEA-OFFICERS.

Francis Dove.....	Yea.
Robert Stapilton ....	Yea.
James Littleton.....	No.
Charles Desborow....	Yea.
Cooper Wade .....	Yea.
John Roffey .....	No.
James Mighells.....	Yea.
Thomas Day.....	Yea.
John Cranby .....	Yea.
John Drake .....	No.
Nicholas Trevanion..	No.
John Norris .....	Yea.
Thomas Smith .....	No.

Thirteen. Yea's 8. No's 5.

This whole business was, in an ensuing session of parliament, examined in the house of lords; when, upon a full view of the evidence, their lordships came to the following resolutions:

*Die Lunæ*, 17th April, 1699.

1. It is resolved by the lords spiritual and temporal in parliament assembled, that the squadron commanded by Captain Norris, at St. John's in Newfoundland, not going out to fight Pointis, upon the several intelligence given, was a very high miscarriage, to the great disservice of the king and kingdom.

2. It is resolved, that the joining the land-officers in the council of war, on the 24th of July, 1697, was one occasion of the miscarriage in not fighting Pointis.

it was resolved to remain till the two captains arrived, who were sent to make a discovery. Soon after, one of them came with twenty-one Frenchmen, that he had taken in a boat at Carboniere, who said, they were sent by M. Pointis to procure fresh provisions. The other captain returned also from Portugal Cove, who saw the French ships at anchor, one of them of three decks, two from sixty to seventy guns, and two more of above fifty. The council adjourned till the next morning, and then calling the prisoners before them, they related all they knew, fearing that otherwise they should be very ill treated. They said the squadron had not been at any other port since they left the West Indies, and that hearing of an English squadron in those parts, they had appointed Placentia, in Newfoundland, for the place of rendezvous; but, through the haziness of the weather, were obliged to drop anchor in Conception-bay.

But notwithstanding all this and other corroborative evidence, to prove that this was in reality Mr. Pointis's squadron, the council of war still over-ruled Captain Norris, who was eager for fighting, and obliged him to remain in the harbour of St. John; which they fortified with such industry, that when Mr. Nesmond arrived, which was about two and thirty days after the other squadron had been first seen, the place was in so good a state of defense; that though the French squadron consisted of sixteen sail, of which ten were of the line-of-battle; yet they were so well satisfied with the sight of the preparations made for their reception, that they thought proper to retire without so much as firing a gun, and thereby left all Newfoundland in our possession, which was confirmed by the ensuing peace. \*

M. Pointis, however, though he got so happily clear of this affair, met with another, which gave him a good deal

\* Burchet's Memoirs, p. 381. Present State of Europe for October, 1697. Life of King William, p. 488. History of the last War.

more trouble ; for, on the 14th of August, 1697, he fell in with a squadron commanded by Captain Harlow, whom he boldly engaged about three in the afternoon. After a brisk dispute of two hours, the French made a signal for tacking, when one of their ships, being disabled, escaped with much difficulty, and put the rest into some confusion. They bore away as fast as possible, and by ten at night the English squadron lost sight of them. The 15th, being a clear day, the enemy was discovered by four in the morning, at the distance of four leagues ; upon which Captain Harlow continued the chase till evening, but with very little advantage, our ships being fouler than theirs, though they were returned from so long a voyage. The next day they got clear away, and the day following entered the harbour of Brest, having as happily and as strangely escaped variety of dangers, as any squadron that ever went to sea. \*

It is not easy to account for M. Pointis bearing down upon Captain Harlow's squadron ; nor can one readily apprehend, how the English ships, just come out of port, came to sail so much worse than the French. Some mystery there was in this, which was never revealed to the public ; though, in all probability, something might be discovered to the lords of the admiralty, which it was not proper should come abroad. † Thus we have run through

\* M. Pointis confesses this in his Memoirs. A Dutch Gazetteer says pleasantly, Ill luck put on leaden boots to pursue him. See Captain Harlow's own account, in the London Gazette, No. 3317.

† I ground what I advance in the text on the following advertisement, which appeared first, Thursday, September 23, 1697, No. 3325.

" Admiralty-office, September 23. " Whereas the right honourable  
 " the lords-commissioners of the admiralty did receive a letter by the  
 " post, signed A. B. which contains several things relating to the  
 " late action of Captain Harlow : these are to give notice, that if the  
 " person who writ the said letter will apply himself to one of the  
 " secretaries of the admiralty, his name shall not be made known,  
 " without his own consent, and he shall likewise be rewarded, and  
 " preferred by their lordships. "

the history of what passed in the West Indies during this war, and are now returned to the naval transactions in Europe, in the year 1697, where we shall find not many extraordinary actions to detain us.

A.D.  
1696.

His majesty going in the spring of the year to Holland, he was pleased to declare Edward Russell, Esq. \* then at the head of the admiralty, one of the lords-justices in his absence; and soon after it was known, that his majesty had created him baron of Shingey, viscount Barfleur, and earl of Orford. † These honours seemed not only fit but necessary, since his lordship, as Bishop Burnet well observes, had the whole authority of high-admiral, though not the title. ‡ His presence, therefore, being requisite at the board, Sir George Rooke was declared admiral of the fleet, and actually went down, in the beginning of June, to Portsmouth, in order to take upon him the command of it. § On his arrival, however, he found things but in a very indifferent condition: for though the ships made a handsome figure enough in the list of admiralty, yet they were in fact not half manned, and worse victualled; so that if a Dutch squadron had not happily joined them, it is on all hands agreed, they could not have put to sea. But by the latter end of the month, his force being augmented by two squadrons, which had been under the command of Vice-admiral Mitchel, and Rear-admiral Benbow; the admiral found his strength increased to forty-four sail of the line, and therefore he put to sea for some time, but was obliged to return sooner than he intended, for want of provisions. ||

\* Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 734. Pointer's Chronological Historian, vol. ii. p. 440. London Gazette, No. 3282.

† Present State of Europe for the month of April, 1696. London Gazette, No. 3283.

‡ History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 195.

§ Burchet's Naval History, p. 564. London Gazette, No. 3288. Mercure Historique et Politique, tom. xxii. p. 653.

|| Burchet's Memoirs, p. 389, 390. London Gazette, No. 3291, 3292, 3304, 3308. Mercure Historique et Politique, tom. xxiii. p. 191.



In the month of September, he detached Vice-admiral Mitchel with a squadron, to meet and sustain Vice-admiral Neville, who was expected home with the galleons from the West Indies; but before he reached the cape of St. Vincent, he had notice of the return of that squadron, and did not therefore think proper to continue any longer at sea. He was afterwards ordered out again in October, when he performed nothing worthy of remark, except the bringing in fifteen Dutch East India ships, which had lost most of their anchors and cables, and must otherwise have been in great danger of perishing themselves.\* Soon after he received the king's orders, to bring over the Czar from Holland, which he did; that monarch arriving in England on the 11th of January following; and he was so acceptable to that great prince, that, with the king's leave, he attended him during the whole time he staid in England; and had the honour also to command the squadron which escorted him on his return to Holland, in his way back to his own dominions. His behaviour toward that great and glorious prince, was such as gave him entire satisfaction; so that he retained a grateful remembrance of it many years after, when he came a second time into Holland, and expressed it by taking notice of many points in naval discipline, in which he was instructed by Admiral Mitchel. †

Rear-admiral Benbow sailed from Spithead on the 11th of April, 1697, with a squadron consisting of seven third-rates and two fire-ships, ‡ and with instructions to protect

A.D.  
1697.

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 565, 566. London Gazette, No. 3332. 3336.

† Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 739. London Gazette, No. 3357. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 167. Life of Peter the Great, p. 394.

‡ London Gazette, No. 3279. Mr. Burchet says, April 10th, but I prefer the author of the Gazette, in which I find an article that deserves a place here, and therefore I shall transcribe it. " Newcastle, " April 10th. Yesterday morning came to our bar eight colliers from

the trade of this nation in every instance in his power, and to annoy the enemy. With this view, he was stationed from ten to fourscore leagues from Scilly, but was able to perform nothing remarkable during the best part of the month of May; though he was joined by five ships-of-war more, and therefore he returned to St. Helen's about the 21st of that month; whence he sailed again on the 24th, with four third-rates and two fire-ships, for his former station; and, after having seen two East India ships pretty far out to sea, he received such intelligence relative to our homeward-bound Jamaica ships, as induced him to repair to Plymouth; in doing which, he had the good fortune to join the Virginia and West India fleets, and their particular convoys, off the Lizard; and, soon after meeting Vice-admiral Mitchel off the Start, he was by him directed to repair to Plymouth with the merchant-ships, where he received orders from Sir George Rooke to repair to the fleet then passing westward, and to take care for sending eastward a convoy with the trade.

But these orders were contradicted by others from the lords of the admiralty, dated the 10th of July; and he, in obedience to them, proceeded to the squadron before Dunkirk, which Captain Beaumont had commanded a considerable time before; consisting of six third rates, besides the Newark, two fourth, one fifth, and two fire-ships; but

“ London; one of them belonging to this town, Charles Newton, master, laden with merchants' goods, and carrying twelve guns, was, in her voyage here, attacked by a French privateer of fourteen guns and four pateraroes; Captain Newton made a vigorous defence, and another of the merchant ships coming to his assistance, they boarded the said privateer, took her, and have brought her into this harbour: of the French, twenty-three were killed in the fight, and the rest, sixty-six in number, are brought ashore, several of which are wounded, and the captain so dangerously, that it is thought he will hardly recover. There was another privateer in his company, who, seeing his companion come off so ill, fell astern, and stood off to sea.”

three of those third rates were ordered away to the Downs by the lords of the admiralty.\*

The rear-admiral, as soon as he arrived with his squadron, went in person with his boat before the pier-heads of Dunkirk; where, though he discovered not one vessel in the road, yet he saw fifteen or sixteen sail of great ships within, one of which bore a flag. With Captain Beaumont he found two orders from the lords of the admiralty, the first directing him to pursue and burn Du Bart's ships where-ever he could find them, except under the protection of the forts in Norway or Sweden; the other, to obey any orders he might receive from his majesty, who was then in Holland. On the 13th of July, Rear-admiral Vandergoes joined him with eleven Dutch ships; and it was proposed, that one of the squadrons should lie so, as that Dunkirk might be south of them, and the other in or near Ostend road; that, if Du Bart should attempt to pass out either at the north or east channel, they might the better discover him: but no other answer was made by the Dutch flag, than that his ships were foul, and not in a condition to pursue him.

The French ships at Dunkirk were in all eleven, from fifty to twenty-six guns; and, about the beginning of August, they were all, except M. Du Bart's own ship, hawled into the bason to clean; so that it was judged they were making ready to come out the next spring-tide. But since our ships, as well as the Dutch, were all foul, little service could be expected from their chasing; and it was almost next to an impossibility to block up clean ships at Dunkirk with foul ones. The rear-admiral, therefore, proposed, that four of his best sailers might be ordered to Sheerness to clean; and that the others might come to the Downs not only to take in water, which they very much wanted, but to heel and scrub; and this he

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 569, 570. London Gazette, No. 3279, 5308. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xxiii. p. 192.

judged might be done before the approaching spring could afford the French an opportunity of getting over the bar.\* But, at this time, it was not thought advisable, though afterwards he received orders to do it; so that for the present he only sent the ships from time to time to the Downs to water, as they could best be spared. It is evident enough from this large account of the matter, that our disappointments were frequently owing to the want of proper orders; and the not paying a due attention to such pieces of advice as the commanders of squadrons thought themselves in duty obliged to offer. On the 23d of August Du Bart left Dunkirk with five sail, having the prince of Conti on board, whom the French attempted to make king of Poland.† The rear-admiral pursued him, but to no manner of purpose; and, before he returned to his station eight other ships were gone, which he pursued likewise, but with the same want of success: and this was the last action of the war; for, on the 10th of September following, ‡ peace was concluded between England, Spain, and Holland, on the one side, and the crown of France, on the other, at Ryswick; by which the French king acknowledged King William's title, and, as the French historians say, § gave up more towns than the confederates could have taken in twenty years; but this was not from any principle either of justice or moderation, but with views of quite another sort, as was foreseen then, and in the course of a few years fully appeared. ||

\* Burehol's Naval History, p. 571.

† London Gazette, No. 3320. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xxiii. p. 282, 283. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 198.

‡ *Corps Universel Diplomatique du Droit des Gens*, tom. vii. partie ii. p. 399.

§ Quincy *Histoire Militaire de Louis XIV.* tom. iii. p. 412. *Larrey*, tom. ii. p. 337. *Limiers*, tom. ii. and other writers.

|| Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 739. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 201, 202. Life of King William, p. 482. The Present State of Europe for 1697, p. 356.

We have now brought this long war to a conclusion, and it is but just that we should offer the reader some reflections on the consequences of it to the naval power and commerce of England. First then, with respect of our navy, we have seen that the war opened with a very bad prospect; for though we had an excellent fleet, a vast number of able seamen, and perhaps as good officers as any in the world; yet the French got earlier to sea than we did; appeared with a greater force; and managed it better; though we acted then in conjunction with Holland, and, according to the general rule of political reasoning, ought to have had it in our power to have driven the French out of the sea.

All this proceeded from the sudden change in our government, which perhaps left many of our officers disaffected, and many more without having any proper degree of credit at court. Want of confidence between the administration and the commanders of our fleets is always destructive to our maritime power; and therefore, instead of wondering that things went on so ill in the three first years of the war, we may with more justice be surprized, that they went no worse. Our party divisions not only enervated our own strength, but created such jealousies between us and the Dutch as blasted the fruits that must have been otherwise produced by this close and fortunate union of the maritime powers. Of this we have the fullest proof in the case of the earl of Torrington, whom even the enemies of the government made it a point to support; because they knew that preserving him must give distaste to our allies, and who on the other hand was prosecuted by many who believed him innocent. \*

\* The reader will easily discern the force of this argument, if he considers the share the earl of Torrington had in the revolution, and the warmth with which, on his prosecution, he was supported by those who were least pleased with that event. This shews the effects of party spirit upon national affairs; for though it might be right in them to espouse the earl of Torrington, who probably acted accord-

But when once the government was thoroughly settled; and we acted cordially in conjunction with the states; it soon became evident, that we were much more than a match for France at sea. Our misfortunes at the beginning of the war created inquiries and censures, which were, and always will be, followed with victories; for, when officers find themselves in danger for acting ill, they will endeavour to escape it by doing well; whereas, if they once find that they prefer private profit to that duty which they owe the public, with impunity, they will not fail to run into that broad road. This accounts for our success in the middle of the war, and the declension of it afterwards; when the board of admiralty began to feel its own strength, and the management of naval affairs was reduced to a court-system, by which such men were sure of protection, as could be depended on in other respects than their commands in the fleet.\*

But notwithstanding these and some other miscarriages, no less prejudicial to the interest of the nation; yet, on

ing to the best of his judgment; yet they did it apparently from wrong motives, and with no better intention, than to mortify and distress the court.

\* It may possibly be thought, that I differ in my sentiments here from what I have said elsewhere as to inquiries; and therefore I take this opportunity of saying, that I would be understood so as to distinguish between proper inquiries and peevish inquiries. I call proper inquiries such as begin with things and end with men; and I take such to be peevish as presume things to be wrong, because they were done by this or that set of men. In this reign we had frequent examples of both: inquiries were set on foot in parliament, and, when they did not answer the intentions of a party, they were dropped. This certainly was very scandalous. On the other hand, Commodore Wilmot's disgraceful expedition, and several others of the same kind, were passed over without any serious inquiry at all. This, undoubtedly, was very suspicious dealing in the admiralty, who ought to have vindicated their own uprightness by justifying the characters of such as they employed, which appears to be the judgment of Bishop Burnet himself, who, though he loved the ministers, yet could not help seeing their faults.

the whole, the French suffered much more in their maritime power than we, as Mr. Burchet has shewn us; and consequently, if we consider the situation of both nations; the ease with which it was in our power to repair our losses; and the almost insuperable difficulties the French had to struggle with in this respect; we must conclude, that not only they, but the whole world had full evidence, from thence, of their being no way able to struggle against the Dutch and us in a maritime war. To make this still more apparent, I must observe, that King William, in his speech to both houses of parliament at the conclusion of the war, asserted our naval force to be nearly double what it was at his accession; \* whereas I do not find in any of the French historians, that they attempted to build new ships during the progress of the war, or to do any thing more than finish such as were then upon the stocks, purchasing, as occasion required, large merchantmen, which they converted into frigates.

In this light, therefore, we were gainers by the war, of which the French seemed to be very sensible, since they avoided all general engagements; † and, in particular

\* See his majesty's speech, Dec. 3, 1697, in Chandler's Parliamentary Debates. Upon carefully comparing the lists of the royal navy, this very clearly appears.

† Account of the loss sustained by the French in their navy, during the war, from the year 1688 to 1697:

No. Ships.	Force.	Total Guns.	No. Ships.	Force.	Total Guns.
2 of 104 guns.....		208	Bt.		
1 of 90 .....		90	over 21 .....		1422
2 of 80 .....		160	5 of 32 .....		160
3 of 76 .....		228	5 of 30 .....		150
1 of 74 .....		74	5 of 28 .....		140
1 of 70 .....		70	1 of 26 .....		26
1 of 68 .....		68	3 of 21 .....		72
2 of 60 .....		120	3 of 20 .....		60
4 of 56 .....		224	6 of 18 .....		108
1 of 50 .....		50	1 of 16 .....		16
1 of 48 .....		48	2 of 12 .....		24
1 of 42 .....		42	6 of 10 .....		60
1 of 40 .....		40	1 of 6 .....		6
21		1422	Tot. 59		2311

actions between small squadrons or single ships, the strictness of their discipline gave them great advantages; since their vessels, generally speaking, were much cleaner than ours, and consequently were able to leave us whenever they found themselves too hard pressed; of which several instances have been given in the foregoing sheets. At the same time, however, it must be confessed, that the French fleets, generally speaking, behaved very well at sea; and that we suffered considerably even in those actions where we were victorious, as well as where our ships were taken by surprize, or beaten as convoys, by a superiour force. \*

But, with respect of our trade, it is certain, that we suffered infinitely more, not only than the French, for that must have been expected, but than ever we did in any former war, where there was a nearer balance between our trade and that of the enemy. This proceeded, in a great measure, from the vigilance of the French; who, as we have already shewn, made it their choice, nay, their great monarch made it his glory, to carry on the war in a piratical way, on purpose to distress our merchants, and excite a loud clamour here for a peace. Another reason why our commerce suffered so much, was that spirit of

\* The loss sustained by the English in their navy, during the war, from the year 1688 to 1697:

No. Ships.	Force.	Total Guns.	No. Ships.	Force.	Total Guns.
1 of	70 guns	70	Bt.		
1 of	54	54	over 23		848
2 of	48	96	2 of	18	36
1 of	46	46	2 of	16	32
3 of	42	126	2 of	12	24
3 of	36	108	11 of	10	110
6 of	32	192	5 of	8	40
2 of	30	60	1 of	6	6
4 of	24	96	4 of	4	16
23		848	Tot. 50		1112

The number of guns on board the French ships, which were either taken or burnt, more than in the English, were 1132, and most of them much superiour in their weight of metal.



avarice which prevailed, and which engaged many merchants to attempt making a sudden fortune by suffering their ships to run, instead of waiting for a convoy. It cannot indeed be denied, that a third principal cause of our miscarriages was the want of proper attention at the board of admiralty, where officers were generally heard with too much, and merchants with too little favour. To this we may add that spirit of rapine and corruption which prevailed among the sea-officers at this time; and which too often induced them to consider their commissions rather as powers given them to provide for themselves and their families, than as trusts received for the benefit of the public.

We must not forget, in this enumeration of the causes of our losses in this respect, the ill conduct of our governors abroad, who were likewise totally employed in amassing fortunes; while the strictness of the French discipline obliged such as had the care of their plantations to pay a proper regard to the public service, to which alone was owing their preserving their settlements at St. Domingo, whence they might have been driven with the greatest ease by the English and Spaniards; and yet were suffered to retain their possessions, though both nations were continually distressed by their invasions; and, in respect of this, it is no less evident, that the Spaniards were not so much to blame as we.\* But, after all, the principal source of these mischiefs was the necessity both the Dutch and we were under of fitting out such great fleets every year, whereby all our seamen were in a manner employed in the public service; so that, on the one

\* This appears plainly from the French history of that island, where it is owned, that a storm delivered them, in the beginning of the year 1698, from a descent from Jamaica, and that the news of the peace of Ryswick came so opportunely as to preserve them from being totally destroyed by the Spaniards, who had already passed the mountains with a body of between five and six hundred men. *Histoire de St. Domingue*, vol. iv. p. 177.

hand, the merchants were forced to send their ships to sea worse manned than formerly ; and, on the other, our grand fleet and annual squadrons required so many ships, that it was impossible to furnish the necessary convoys for the security of our trade. At least this was pretended, and the very pretence, perhaps, was another cause of our losses. This, however, is out of doubt, that, taking all together, our trade suffered excessively ; our merchants were many of them ruined ; and though inquiries into the mismanagements, which heightened these misfortunes, were not prosecuted with that vigour they might have been ; yet, such discoveries were made as produced an absolute distrust of, and distaste against such as had the direction of naval affairs, a loud clamour against the war, and an universal desire of peace at any rate. \*

After this impartial representation of the state of our affairs at its conclusion, we need not wonder that a peace, and a peace so advantageous as that of Ryswick was, should give the greatest satisfaction to the nation in general, and to the trading part in particular. That it did so, may appear from the government causing a special gazette to be published, on purpose to make known the French king's ratification and proclamation of the peace at Paris two days sooner than it would have otherwise been ; † and by the numerous addresses of thanks and congratulation, which were sent up from all parts of the kingdom to felicitate his majesty upon that occasion, and to express their just sense of being delivered from the

\* Kennet, Burnet, Oldmixon, Life of King William, Present State of Europe.

† The Gazettes came out in those days on Mondays and Thursdays. This paper, said to be printed by authority, is dated, Whitehall, October 26, which was Tuesday. It is printed but on one side, and the French king's proclamation is in Italic, in order to render it the more remarkable. The same thing had been done on the exchange of the ratifications, October 18, 1697. But that was in the nature of a post-gazette.

burden and expense of so bloody and destructive a war. Neither ought it at all to abate the merit of this treaty, that the French struck medals, magnifying their success in the war, and their demonstrating themselves thereby a match for all the rest of Europe; since, if they had really been so victorious, and had gained such advantages, the wonder was so much greater that they should stoop to such a peace.\* But though it may be true, that in many respects the French had the advantage in this war; yet, undoubtedly, they foresaw they were unable to support so vast an expense as it brought upon them; and as their weakness increased much faster in proportion than that of the maritime powers, this in a few campaigns would have quite changed the face of things; and either would have brought on the total ruin of France, or would have obliged her to make peace upon still worse terms than were demanded now.

It must therefore be allowed, to the honour of this reign and of this administration, that, however they managed the war, they gained by the peace; all, and indeed more than could be expected. By the fourth article, the French king engages his word and faith not to disturb the king of Great Britain in any of his dominions; not to assist, directly or indirectly, any of the enemies of the said king; nor to give shelter to any rebels or conspirators against him. By the 5th, the free use of commerce or navigation is restored between the subjects of both kings. By the seventh, all places taken during the war, either in Europe or in America, are restored. As great care was taken of our allies: every thing was stipulated for them which, with any shew of justice, they could desire; so that, by the conclusion of this treaty, the general peace of Europe was restored;† and we were left at full liberty to

\* *Histoire de Louis XIV.* tom. 1. p. 153, 157, 158, 159.

† Among other medals, struck on the occasion of this peace there was one very remarkable. On the face of the medal was represented

improve the advantages, afforded thereby, for rectifying whatever was amiss in our domestic economy, extending our commerce, and easing our people. How far these points were studied or neglected, shall be our business to examine in the next chapter.

a temple, the doors of which are shut by the plenipotentiaries. Before the temple there is an altar, on which a sow is offered; the legend, *Cæsar firmabat fœdera porca*, alluding to the custom of the Romans, who, on the conclusion of a peace, sacrificed a swine. On the door of the temple stands, *Jano sacrum*, i. e. "Sacred to Janus." On the reverse are the arms of the several powers comprehended in the treaty, and in the centre the royal castle of Ryswick, with this inscription, *Ryswick, Gulielmi III. Dei gratia Magnæ Britannię regis palatium*, i. e. "The palace of William III. by the grace of God king of Great Britain." Gerard Van Loon Hist. Metallique des Pays Bas, tom. iv. p. 273.

## CHAP. III.

The Naval History of GREAT BRITAIN, continued through the remaining part of the Reign of King William III. comprehending the most remarkable Transactions in relation to our Commerce and Plantations, with the Memoirs of such eminent Seamen as flourished in this period of time.

THE affair of the East India Company in Scotland has been mentioned in the former chapter; but I did not insist upon it then, because it would have interrupted the thread of our history, and because I apprehend it would come in more naturally here. It is certainly, even at this distance of time, a very delicate subject, especially for one who professes to follow truth at the expense of all parties and characters whatever. But the pleasure which results from acting fairly in matters of this nature, is a sufficient compensation for any risk that a writer can run by his impartiality; and therefore, I shall lay, without reserve, the true state of this matter before the reader, as it appears to me.

The revolution brought back to Scotland several worthy patriots, whom the jealousy of former reigns had driven into Holland, Germany, and other countries. These, from the time of their return, thought of nothing so much as putting the trade of Scotland, which had been hitherto in a manner totally neglected, on a proper footing. With this view, they procured, in 1693, an act of parliament, that is, of the parliament of Scotland, for the encouragement of foreign commerce; and, in consequence of that law, procured another in 1695, for setting up an East India Company. When this was done it was found requisite to take in subscriptions: and, as it was not easy to find money

enough in Scotland for the carrying on so expensive a design; the company's agents endeavoured to procure subscriptions abroad, particularly in London, Hamburgh, and Amsterdam; in which they were certainly sufficiently supported both by the royal and legislative authority.

But as the carrying this scheme into execution gave great umbrage to the East India Companies in England and Holland, they took, as it was very natural for them to do, the best measures they could to hinder the success of these applications. This, however, had some very untoward consequences, since these companies could effect nothing but by the interposition of their respective governments; and by this means his majesty's name, as king of England, and Stadtholder of Holland, came to be made use of, to thwart those designs which actually had his sanction as king of Scotland. This, as might have been easily foreseen, embarrassed King William prodigiously; for it forced him to act in a manner little suitable to his inclinations, since, on an application of the Scots, he was obliged to promise that he would not countenance any such attempts to their prejudice; and, to gratify the English and Dutch, he found himself obliged to part with two very useful and able ministers, the Marquis of Tweeddale and Secretary Johnston; because the former had given the royal assent to the law which established the Scots East India Company, in which, however, he had only followed his instructions; and the latter for promoting the design, which, no doubt, he took to be, what it really was, an act of duty to his country. Yet these steps served only to palliate things for the present, and, instead of healing the breach, widened it, as will be seen hereafter. \*

\* Kennet, Burnet, Oldmixon, Life of King William, and other histories of those times. I have been extremely careful here, to lay aside all sorts of prejudices, and to present the reader, in as few words as possible, with a genuine representation of things as they really fell

In the ensuing session of parliament, in 1698, the government found itself not a little embarrassed with the affairs of the English East India Company. A scheme had been offered for erecting a new company, which was to advance two millions for the public service at eight *per cent.* and were to carry on this trade by a joint stock. To make way for this, it was proposed to dissolve the old company, though they had very lately a new charter granted them upon an address from the House of Commons; and, in virtue of that charter, had increased their capital by a subscription of so considerable a sum as seven hundred thousand pounds. The pretence for dissolving it, was a clause in that very charter, reserving such a power to the crown. But as it was not so much as asserted, that, since the granting this new charter, they had done any thing which ought to subject them to a dissolution, by moderate and impartial people, who knew nothing of stock-jobbing; this was thought not a little hard.

A.D.  
1698.

The real cause why this step for erecting a new company was taken, as Bishop Burnet and other intelligent writers fairly own, was the public wanting and having no way so ready to get money. However, the dissolving scheme, notwithstanding it was so powerfully supported, did not take place; the new company had large privileges given them; and Sir William Norris was sent by his majesty's ambassador to the Great Mogul, on purpose to promote this scheme; which, notwithstanding, miscarried in respect of trade: for the old company, being possessed of the forts and factories in the East Indies, took care to prepossess that monarch, and indeed all the other princes in those parts, so strongly against the new company, that the ambassador was but very indifferently received; and

out, stript of all those colourings which party<sup>W</sup> writers and partial historians have bestowed upon them.

the whole affair, instead of improving our commerce, tended only to hurt both it and the credit of the nation in those parts, at the same time that, as I have observed, the acts for establishing this new company, created very great discontents at home. \*

The managers of the East India Company in Scotland, finding their designs for carrying on that trade so vigorously opposed; and having, as they conceived, very large powers vested in them by the late act of parliament; resolved to turn their endeavours another way for the present; and to attempt the settlement of a colony in America, on the Isthmus of Darien. Every body knows, that this is a very narrow tract of country, which unites the two great continents of North and South America; and that, consequently, it must be very advantageously seated for commerce. As the inhabitants had never been conquered by the Spaniards; and as the new colony sent thither actually purchased their lands from the native proprietors; and settled there by consent; it was apprehended that the Spaniards had no right to dispute their establishment; and that, if they did, the planters might defend themselves without involving the nation in a war.

The colony was accordingly settled at a vast expense; but it was soon found, that great mistakes had been made in relation to the consequences excepted from it. For the Spaniards not only considered it as an invasion of their rights, and began to take our ships upon it; but the English also grew very uneasy, and made warm representations to his majesty on this subject; which produced

\*Bishop Burnet, in his History of his own Time, has treated this matter very fairly, and, as far as I can judge, set this matter in a true light. It is a great misfortune, that we have not any HISTORY of public companies, which would be both a useful and entertaining work. What I have offered is very succinct, as the nature of this history obliged me to make it. To give the reader an accurate account of this business would take up some sheets, and indeed the business deserves it.



private orders to the governors of Jamaica, and other neighbouring plantations, not only to avoid all commerce with the Scots at Darien, but even to deny them provisions. As it was foreseen that these measures would naturally occasion great disturbances in that part of the world, it was found requisite to send a squadron thither to protect our trade; to awe the Spaniards; and to hinder the increase of pirates; which had been very great ever since the conclusion of the peace, occasioned chiefly by the multitude of privateers that were then thrown out of employment; and having been long used to live by plunder, had not either the will or the means to procure a subsistence for themselves by any honest employment. There were also some other reasons which made the sending such a naval force requisite, as will appear in the subsequent account of its proceedings.\*

Rear-admiral Benbow was made choice of to command this squadron, which consisted of three fourth rates, and a small French prize. He sailed from Portsmouth on the twenty-ninth of November, 1698, and arrived at Barbadoes the twenty-seventh of February following. He executed there, and at the Leeward Islands, what he was directed by his instructions to do, and being informed that the Spaniards at Carthagena had seized two of our ships, with an intent to employ them in an expedition they were then meditating against the Scots at Darien; he, like a brave and public-spirited commander, as he really was, resolved to prevent it, and restore these ships to their right owners. With this view he stood over to the Spanish coast, and coming before Boca-Chica Castle, he sent his men on shore for wood and water; which though he

A.D.  
1699.

\* Kennet, Burnet, State Tracts in the time of King William, and particularly a little treatise, intitled, an Inquiry into the Causes of the Miscarriage of the Scots colony of Darien, 8vo. 1700, which is not printed in the folio collection of tracts before mentioned.

asked with great civility of the Spanish governor, he would scarcely permit him to take. \*

This highly nettled the admiral, who thereupon sent his own lieutenant to the governor, with a message, importing, that he not only wanted these necessaries, but that he came likewise for two English ships that lay in the harbour, and had been detained there some time; which, if not sent to him immediately, he would come and take by force. The governor answered him, in very respectful terms, that if he would leave his present station, in which he seemed to block up their port, the ships should be sent out to him. With this request the admiral, without the least hesitation, complied; but finding the governor trifled with him, and that his men were in danger of falling into the country distemper, which doubtless the Spanish governor foresaw; he sent him another message, that if, in twenty-four hours, the ships were not sent him, he would come and fetch them; and that, if he kept them longer than that time, he would have an opportunity of seeing what respect an English officer had to his word. The Spaniards, however, did not think fit to make the experiment, but sent out the ships within the time; with which the admiral returned to Jamaica, where he was received with much kindness and respect. †

There he received an account, that the Spaniards at Porto-Bello had seized several of our ships employed in the slave-trade, on the old pretence, that the settlement

\* London Gazette, No. 3150. Most people thought this squadron too small, too weakly manned, and sent too late in the year; and many reflections to this purpose were thrown out in pamphlets, to disturb the minds of the people, and alienate the affections of the seamen. But Rear-admiral Benbow's conduct was irreproachable; and, though he was a downright sailor, his manner of acting was so engaging, that he not only performed more than was expected, but returned with ample commendations from all our colonies.

† Burchet's Naval History, p. 577.

at Darien was a breach of the peace. At the desire of the parties concerned, the admiral sailed thither also, and demanded these ships; but received a surly answer from the admiral of the Barlovento-fleet, who happened to be then at Porto-Bello. Rear-admiral Benbow expostulated with him on this head, insisting, that, as the subjects of the crown of England had never injured those of his Catholic majesty, he ought not to make prize of their ships for injuries done by another nation. The Spaniards replied shrewdly, that since both the crowns were placed on the same head, it was no wonder he mistook the subjects of one crown for the other. After many altercations, however, and when the Spaniards saw that the colony at Darien received no assistance from Jamaica, the ships were with much to do restored. The admiral, in the mean time, sailed in quest of one Kidd, a pirate, who had done a great deal of mischief in the East and West Indies, and of whom we shall have hereafter occasion to speak more largely. On his return to Jamaica, towards the latter end of the year, he received a supply of provisions from England, and soon after orders to return home; which he did with six men-of-war, taking New England in his way. \*

While Rear-admiral Benbow was thus employed, Vice-admiral Aylmer was sent with a strong squadron into the Mediterranean, in order to confirm our treaties with the governments of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, which he performed very effectually; for, being a man of a generous temper, he executed all things with such magnificence, and treated the deputies sent on board him in a manner so well suited to their tempers, that they were easily drawn to do those things for him, which an officer of another disposition would never have obtained. †

\* Burchet, Kennet, *Life of King William, Present State of Europe, &c.*

† London Gazette, No. 3427. This fleet sailed from Portsmouth, Sept. 13, 1698. But Mr. Burchet's account is so indistinct, that Mr.

It was intended, too, that he should have secured the galleons, in case the French attempted to seize them on the death of the king of Spain, which was daily apprehended; but for this he certainly came too late, and though no body pretended to fix any imputation upon his character in this respect; yet, there was great blame laid on the board of the admiralty, for not fitting out the fleet sooner. This, among many other things, made up part of the charge brought against the management of the navy by the house of commons, in their address to the king, presented in the month of April, 1699; wherein, after taking notice of the late sending of this fleet, they add, " That the victualling any of his majesty's ships, by  
 " others than by the victuallers appointed for that service,  
 " or their agents, was contrary to the course of the navy,  
 " and might be of ill consequence. That many and new  
 " unnecessary charges had, in an extraordinary manner,  
 " been introduced into the navy, which was a great mis-  
 " management. That the deductions of poundage, taken  
 " by the pay-masters of the navy, for slop-cloths, dead-  
 " men's wages, tobacco, chest at Chatham, chaplain, and  
 " surgeon, was without warrant, and ought to be ac-  
 " counted for. That it was inconsistent with the service  
 " of the navy, for the same person to be one of the com-  
 " missioners for executing the office of lord high-admiral  
 " and treasurer of the navy at the same time. And that  
 " the passing of any account of monies impressed for the  
 " contingent uses of the navy, without regular vouchers,  
 " or such other proofs as the nature of the service would  
 " admit, either with or without a sign manual, was con-  
 " trary to the rules and methods of the navy, and of dan-

Lediard, in transcribing it, thought this fleet was fitted out in 1700, and under that year has placed it in his *Naval History*, p. 729. I am the more surprized at this, because he takes notice of the commons address in 1699, which actually took its rise from an inquiry into the late fitting out of this squadron.

“gerous consequence. All which they begged leave to lay before his majesty, desiring that he would be graciously pleased to take effectual care, that the mismanagements herein complained of might be prevented for the future.” The king gave a soft answer, which yet was satisfactory enough to this charge. It ran in these words: “Gentlemen, I will consider of your address. It is my desire, that all sorts of mismanagements and irregularities should be prevented or redressed. You may be assured, that I will take the best care I can in relation to the navy, the right management whereof is of great concern to the kingdom.” \*

The earl of Orford, who was at this time at the head of the navy, and who, as all our writers agree, governed pretty absolutely; on a supposition that bringing over to the court a body of men who had been formerly looked upon as stubborn male-contents, would justify every measure that he should think necessary for so salutary a purpose; saw at what the commons were driving, and therefore very prudently resolved to abate the edge of their resentment, by laying down his employments, which he did accordingly; and thereupon a new commission of admiralty passed, in which the earl of Bridgewater, the Lord Haversham, Sir Robert Rich, Sir George Rooke, and Sir David Mitchel, were constituted commissioners. And thus things were twisted about, rather as the interest and influence of parties required, than as was fitted for the public service; which, though always pretended in speeches and addresses, yet this was so visibly a cloak for the pernicious designs of party, that we may safely assert, *private interest*, was never more considered than at this time, when nothing was so much talked of as *public spirit*; † may we live to see things conducted with more sincerity!

\* Chandler's Debates, vol. iii. p. 102.

† The earl of Orford was afterwards impeached, as we shall have occasion to shew; but there was never any proof offered on that im-

We are now come to a necessary part of this history, which will appear one of the strongest instances of the truth of the foregoing observation; I mean, the affair of Kidd, the pirate, which by an unaccountable strain of party-resentment, makes a considerable figure in our general histories, and belongs, in a particular manner, to this; for which reason, I shall treat it circumstantially, and, to the best of my judgment, exactly agreeable to truth. There had been for many years loud and very just complaints of piracies in the West Indies; which, for the sake of the profit made by purchasing their ill-gotten goods, had met with too much encouragement from the inhabitants of several of our plantations. This induced King William, in the year 1695, to declare the earl of Bellamont, a nobleman of Ireland, and a person of very great worth and honour, governor of New York and of New England; believing him to be a proper person to restrain such mischiefs, and in time to put an end to the complaints made about them.

After he was raised to this station, and before he set out for his government, he began to enquire as to the most proper methods for extinguishing these abuses; and represented it to one Colonel Levingston, a gentleman of considerable property in New York, as a thing which nearly concerned the honour of that plantation. This induced the colonel to mention to his lordship one Captain William Kidd, who was lately arrived from New York in a sloop of his own, as a brave bold fellow, who knew most of the pirates haunts, and might therefore be employed against them with great probability of success. The earl readily approved the scheme, and knowing how much the king had the business at heart, mentioned it to his ma-

peachment; and to be sure his lordship's faults were in his ministerial character, and not as a commander. He was very sincere and servicable to his party, at the head of the admiralty board; but at sea he forgot all distinctions, and had regard to nothing but merit.

jesty; who applauded the design, and recommended it to the board of admiralty. But the public affairs being then in a perplexed situation, and great difficulties found in manning the fleet, the board, though they signified their approbation of the thing, thought fit to lay it aside. \*

Colonel Levingston, having exact information of all that had passed, applied himself a second time to the Earl of Bellamont, and offered an amendment to his first project. He observed, that this was a thing which would admit of no delay; and since the public could not immediately bear the expense or consequently undertake the intended expedition; it might not be amiss if some few persons of distinction should venture on carrying it into execution at their own expense. This, too, was attended with much difficulty; but at last it was agreed, that the lord-chancellor, then Lord Somers, the duke of Shrewsbury, the earl of Romney, the earl of Orford, and some other persons, together with Colonel Levingston and Kidd, who were to have between them a fifth of the whole undertaking, should raise six thousand pounds for the expense of the voyage. †

The king was so well pleased with the thing; and thought it of so great consequence as well as of so much benefit to the public; that he likewise promised to contribute; and therefore a tenth part of the goods taken from pirates was reserved to his majesty in the grant made of the rest to the persons engaged in fitting out Kidd. But,

\* Bishop Burnet and Mr. Oldmixon have both insisted pretty largely on this matter. As to the former, he did not certainly understand it; for he actually took the grant of pirates' goods to be illegal and unjustifiable, and seems to intimate some hastiness or imprudence in this business; whereas nothing can be clearer than that public spirit was the sole motive to this design, and that Kidd's owners became so, because he could not be fitted out otherwise. As to the latter, though very prolix, yet his account wants, in a great measure, the light of evidence, which arises very fully from an impartial stating of the matters of fact, and therefore I have dwelt so long upon it.

† See an impartial account of the affair of Captain Kidd, &c.

when the business was brought to bear, the king could not advance the money conveniently; and so the persons above-mentioned were obliged to be at the whole expense. Captain Kidd had a commission, in the common form, to take and seize pirates, and bring them to justice, without any special clause or proviso whatever. He knew none of the adventurers but the Lord Bellamont, who introduced him to the earl of Orford, and another person carried him to the earl of Romney. As for the rest, he never saw them; and so little was there of secrecy or management in this business, that he had no instructions either public or private; only the earl of Bellamont gave him sailing orders, in which he was directed to act according to the letter of his commission.\*

Thus furnished, Captain William Kidd sailed in the *Adventure* galley towards the end of the year 1695, for New York, and in his way took a French prize. Thence he sailed to Madeira; thence to Bonavista and St. Jago; whence he proceeded to Madagascar; and from thence he cruized at the entrance of the Red Sea; but, effecting nothing, he sailed to Calicut, and took a ship of one hundred and fifty tons; the master and three or four of the crew were Dutchmen, the rest Moors: this ship he carried to Madagascar; from thence he sailed again, and about five weeks after took the *Quedah Merchant*, of four hundred tons; the master was one Wright an Englishman: she had on board two Dutch mates, and a French gunner; the crew were Moors, in all about ninety persons.†

The ship he carried to St. Mary's near Madagascar, and there he shared the goods with his crew, taking forty shares to his own use. Here ninety of his crew, who were a hundred and fifty-one in all, left him, and went on

\* This plainly shows, there was nothing secret or mysterious in this expedition, but that he was sent on the design expressed in the king's commission, and on that only.

† This is taken from his trial, and other authentic accounts of him.



board the Mocha Merchant, an East India Company ship, which had turned pirate; and there was every grain as much reason to charge that company with the piracies the Mocha Merchant's crew committed, as there was to charge Kidd's adventurers with his. He and his men burnt his own ship the Adventure galley at St. Mary's; and they all went on board the Quedah Merchant, and sailed for the West Indies. Being denied succour at Anguilla and St. Thomas; he sailed to Mona, lying between Porto-Rico and Hispaniola, and there, by the means of one Bolton, got some provisions from Curacoa. He bought a sloop of Bolton, in which he loaded part of his goods; and left the Quedah Merchant, with the rest of the goods, in trust with Bolton, and seventeen or eighteen men in her. In this sloop he touched at several places, and disposed of a great part of his goods; and, at last, came to Boston in New England, where the earl of Bellamont seized him and what goods he had left; for this fellow either had, or pretended to have a notion, that the Quedah Merchant, being manned by Moors, was a lawful prize; though there was no proof that the commander of her and his crew had committed any piracies on the English or any other European, or indeed Indian nation.

As soon as this was done, his lordship sent advice, of his taking Kidd, to England, and desired that a ship might be sent to bring him home. This was accordingly complied with; but the Rochester, which was the ship employed in this service, being disabled, was forced to return; which heightened the clamour that had been already raised about this transaction, and which was outrageous in the very same proportion it was groundless.\*

The source of this clamour was undoubtedly a private pique to particular persons, which induced some warm

\* The noise made about this fellow disturbed the government so much, that it was one reason for sending Rear-admiral Benbow to the West Indies.

men to put a question in the house of commons, " That  
" the letters-patent, granted to the earl of Bellamont and  
" others, of pirates' goods, were dishonourable to the king,  
" against the law of nations, contrary to the laws and  
" statutes of this realm, an invasion of property, and de-  
" structive to commerce." This was carried in the nega-  
tive; but, it did not hinder those who supported the  
question from charging Lord Somers and the earl of Or-  
ford with countenancing pirates; and to give some colour  
to this groundless and most improbable charge, as soon as  
it was known that the Rochester was returned, it was sug-  
gested, that the sending that ship was mere collusion;  
that the earl of Bellamont was as deep in this affair as the  
rest; and upon this a motion was made, and carried in the  
house of commons, for an address to his majesty, that Kidd  
might not be tried till the next session of parliament;  
and that the earl of Bellamont might be directed to send  
home all examinations and other papers relating to this  
business, which the king ~~promised~~ very readily. \*

This affair must naturally give his majesty, and indeed  
the whole world a strange opinion of the patriotism of  
those times. He knew the whole matter better than any  
body; and was pleased to say, with great truth and jus-  
tice, that, if he might be admitted as a witness, he could  
vindicate, from his own knowledge, the noble persons now  
attacked, in all they had done. He must, therefore, be  
thoroughly persuaded, that this was a very unjust and  
iniquitous prosecution; in relation to which he had reason  
to think himself happy, that he was not able to perform his  
promise of contributing towards this design; since that  
might have given a handle to some warm member for  
calling him *pirate*, as Mr. Howe actually called him a

\* Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 774. Burnet's History  
of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 237. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts,  
vol. ii. p. 205.

*felon*, for making the treaty of partition, to which we shall speedily come.

But, how clear soever the king and other impartial judges might be, this spirit was still so prevalent in the house of commons, that even after making some inquiries into this fact, and having not only his examination, but Kidd himself in their power, whom they ordered to be brought to their bar, and questioned him there, very little to their credit or to the purpose; yet, when they afterwards found an opportunity of attacking the earl of Orford and Lord Somers by impeachments, they did not fail to throw in their encouragement of Kidd as part of the charge.\* In the articles against the earl of Orford they make the fifth and sixth, which for the satisfaction of the reader I shall insert, to shew with how great solemnity the most trifling affair may be made to appear.

“ V. And whereas complaints were made to the commissioners for executing the office of lord-high admiral of England, where the said earl at that time presided, by the company trading to the East Indies, of divers piracies committed in the South-seas to the destruction of their trade, desiring they might have letters of marque granted to them, whereby to be empowered, though at their own charge, to suppress such piracies: but the said earl, preferring his own interest, discouraged and rejected their request and proposal, and in some short time after, jointly with others, did procure a commission for one William Kidd, as likewise a grant under the

\* It was pretended that Kidd would make discoveries, and upon this he was sent for to the bar of the house of commons, where he behaved very meanly; and Sir Edward Seymour, who sent for him, said, “ The fellow was not more a knave than fool.” But the true intent of bringing him thither was to set up another discovery, viz. That, before he returned to Newgate, he went to the house of the earl of Halifax, and conferred there with the lords who were said to be concerned with him; but of this the proof was as weak as the story incredible.

“ great seal of England, to and for the use of him the said  
“ earl and others, of the ships and goods of certain persons  
“ therein named, and also of all the goods found on board  
“ the said ships. And the said company having intima-  
“ tion of a commission granted to the said Kidd, being  
“ apprehensive of the ill consequences of the same, did  
“ apply themselves to the said board of admiralty, desir-  
“ ing to know what powers and instructions were given :  
“ but such their reasonable request was denied, and Kidd,  
“ who was known to be a person of ill fame and reputa-  
“ tion, ordered to pursue the intended voyage, in which  
“ he did commit divers piracies and depredations on the  
“ high seas, being thereto encouraged through the hopes  
“ of being protected by the high station and interest of the  
“ said earl, in violation of the laws of nations, and the in-  
“ terruption and discouragement of the trade in England.

“ VI. That the said earl, within the time aforesaid,  
“ when an horrid conspiracy was discovered against his  
“ majesty’s sacred person, and the kingdom was under an  
“ apprehension of an immediate invasion from France,  
“ and divers<sup>d</sup> ships of war, particularly the ship *Duchess*,  
“ were armed out, and equipped and manned in defence  
“ of the realm, to oppose the intended invasion, did his  
“ utmost endeavour to prejudice his office, being the first  
“ commissioner for executing the office of lord high-admi-  
“ ral of England, without the privity of the other commis-  
“ sioners, contrary to his oath and duty, and preferring  
“ his hopes of gain to himself to the safety of the public,  
“ did order Captain Steward, commander of the ship  
“ *Duchess*, to deliver over, and put on board, the said  
“ Kidd, mentioned in the foregoing article, out of the said  
“ ship the *Duchess*, a great number of able seamen, levied  
“ and provided at the expense of the public, and then dis-  
“ charging their duty in defence of their country, and  
“ against their own consent, to the prejudice of the public

“ security, and to the endangering the said ship the Duchess, if it had been attacked by the enemy.” \*

The earl of Orford's answer will sufficiently declare how little foundation there was in fact for what the commons advanced, and therefore I shall give what he offers, as to these two articles, in his own words: “ As to the fifth article,” says his lordship, “ the East India Company, about the beginning of March, 1696, did apply to the admiralty-board, of which the said earl was one, to empower their ships and officers to seize and take all pirates infesting the seas within the limits of their charter, and likewise to erect a court of admiralty in those parts to try and condemn such pirates as they should take. Upon which application, the board of admiralty did take advice, and were informed they had no authority to grant the same, and denies he, the said earl ever discouraged or rejected the Company's request therein, unless it were by telling them, that the admiralty by law could not grant the same; and denies that the Company was ever denied letters of marque in common form, to the knowledge of the said earl: and saith, as to the matter of Kidd in this article mentioned, he was gone upon his expedition about twelve months before that time; and as to his commission, and the grant in the said article mentioned, the said earl humbly conceives, and is advised, the same were not contrary to law, but sure he is the said expedition was intended for the public good and service; and saith, the said Kidd had no powers or instructions from the board of admiralty, other than the ordinary and common letters of marque, the contents whereof are common and well known to merchants; and the said earl doth deny that he knew the said Kidd to be of ill fame and reputation. But, in case the said Kidd had committed any

\* See the articles of impeachment against Edward earl of Orford, printed by order of the house of commons in 1701.

“piracies, he the said Kidd is answerable, and ought to  
 “answer for the same, he never being ordered by the said  
 “earl so to do, nor had he ever any the least encourage-  
 “ment given him by the said earl, or any other, to his  
 “knowledge, to expect or hope for any protection therein,  
 “or in any illegal action done or committed by him.” \*

But his lordship's answer to the latter article is still stronger. In that he says, “He believes it to be true,  
 “that there was a horrid and barbarous plot and conspi-  
 “racy against his majesty's sacred person, and that there  
 “was an apprehension of an immediate invasion. But the  
 “said earl hopes, no neglect of duty in his station can be  
 “imputed to him to prevent the same. And as for the  
 “ship *Duchess*, which was amongst many others armed  
 “and equipped in defence of the realm, the said earl saith,  
 “that the men, in the said article mentioned to be taken  
 “from on board her, were but some of the very persons  
 “that were just before taken from on board Captain Kidd,  
 “and returned by their own consent on board Captain  
 “Kidd again, not being above twenty in number; and  
 “saith, all fears of the invasion were then over, and at an  
 “end; and denies that the same was intended to weaken,  
 “or did weaken, the said ship, or the navy-royal, or that  
 “the said seamen, so returning on board the said Kidd,  
 “were levied or provided at the expense of the public, or  
 “did return or were put on board the said Kidd against  
 “their own consent, or to the prejudice of the public  
 “security, or that the ship *Duchess* was thereby endan-  
 “gered, if she had been attacked, as in the said article is  
 “alleged.”

A.D.  
1701.

These articles were agreed to by the house of commons on the 8th of May, 1701, the day that Kidd was brought upon his trial for piracy at the Old-Bailey, where he was

\* See these answers in the same collection. They are very indifferently abridged by most of our historians; as in truth they must be, since, by abridging them, some facts must necessarily be left out.

convicted, with many of his companions, and soon after executed ; but could never be prevailed upon, as weak and as bad a man as he was, to charge any of the noble persons, who were his owners, with having any thing to do with his proceedings. Yet, even after his death, the commons, in an impeachment by them preferred against John Lord Somers, charged him as lord-keeper of the great seal of England, in conjunction with the earl of Orford, first commissioner of the admiralty, and Richard earl of Bellamont, governor of New York and of New England, and of others then in great stations, and in high power and authority, for sealing a commission to one William Kidd, a person of evil fame and reputation, since convicted of piracy ; and with procuring a grant of pirates' goods to be taken by the said William Kidd, under colour of the said commission, in trust for himself and other persons, with abundance more to the same purpose, intended purely to hurt that lord's character, and rendered it impossible for his majesty to employ him longer in his service ; though his lordship, conscious of his own innocence, took every measure possible to have this matter brought to a fair, open, and speedy trial.\*

But while things were thus carried on at home, the nation suffered exceedingly for want of due care being taken to put an end to those depredations committed by pirates abroad ; and, therefore, several experienced officers were sent to Madagascar, where they had made a very strong settlement, in order to root out and destroy them ; but with so little success, that the government began at last to despair of effecting any thing in this way, till Mr. Secretary Burchet, and I speak it to his honour, devised a \*method which answered the end very speedily. This was, sending a proclamation by Captain James Littleton, who

\* This affair went off by the lords appointing a day for the trial of the peers, and the commons refusing to be present at that trial. or to make any proofs.

was afterwards a flag-officer, and commissioner of the navy, promising pardon to all the pirates who surrendered, and a reward in case they would secure and deliver up any of their commanders. This soon brought in many of the private men, and made the rest, especially their chiefs, so jealous of each other, that they could not hold together, or venture upon any new enterprizes : so that Captain Littleton, having brought off some and separated the rest, very soon destroyed such as was most refractory, and re-established that free navigation which had been so long interrupted in those parts. \* I know that this will seem to some a very trivial affair to be so long insisted upon ; but as it shews the spirit of those times, and accounts for a very famous persecution ; I hope the majority of those who peruse this work, will not think it impertinent, especially as it has some connection throughout with the subject of this book.

A.D.  
1690.

But we now return to matters of a more public concern. A war had arisen between the kings of Denmark and Sweden, which greatly affected the peace of the north ; a thing that can never happen without interesting the maritime powers. It will be necessary to say something as to the grounds of this war ; because the part we took in it was very much to the honour of the English nation ; and ought to establish it as a maxim, that whenever it is really necessary to assist our allies, we ought to do it vigorously, and at once ; which is the way not only to serve them, but to save a very considerable expense to ourselves. There was, toward the close of the year 1699, a private treaty made by several princes for attacking the king of Sweden, afterwards the famous Charles XII. but then a perfect youth, and even for dismembering the Swedish monarchy. According to this scheme, the king of Denmark was to invade Holstein ; the elector of Bran-

\* Kennet, Burnet, Burchet, Oldmixon, *Life of King William*, &c.



denborough was to fall into Swedish Pomerania; the king of Poland was to attack Livonia; and in case the dukes of Zell and Hanover moved to the assistance of the Swedes, the Landgrave of Hesse, and the duke of Wolfenbuttle, were to fall upon them.

This was an alliance founded entirely upon interest and ambition, for the Swedes had done nothing to deserve this treatment; and therefore, upon the first breaking out of this confederacy, his Swedish majesty addressed himself to King William and the States-general, as guarantees of the treaties made for securing the tranquillity of the north, by preserving there a proper balance of power. At first it was thought requisite to interpose only our good offices. But when the king of Denmark over-ran Holstein; and the king of Poland first attempted to surprize, and then besieged Riga in Livonia; it became necessary to take other measures, especially when it was known that the Czar was inclined to enter into the confederacy. The point in debate with his majesty was, whether he should do what was necessary, and what he was obliged to by treaties, without consulting the house of commons; or whether he should lay the whole matter before the parliament, and leave the decision of it to them. Some of the ministry were for taking the latter method, but the king was for the former, and with good reason; he said, the executive part of the government was in him; and therefore he would do what was fit for him to do, and acquaint the parliament with it at their next meeting. \*

His majesty, in the spring of the year 1700, sent over a strong squadron to Holland, under the command of Sir

A.D.  
1700

\* The reader may consult our general histories, and particularly the Memoirs of Bishop Burnet on this subject, which he has treated fully and freely. The truth is, the scheme, however fair in appearance, was likely to be attended with such consequences, that Baron Plesse, who was a very honest man, and had served his Danish majesty long as prime minister, could not digest it, but resigned his employments.

George Rooke, who, in the latter end of May, was joined by a Dutch squadron; and, having the command of the whole fleet, he sailed for the Sound, where he arrived about the middle of June.\* There he found the Danish fleet, consisting of twenty-eight sail of line-of-battle ships, ranged athwart the narrow passage, under the guns of their castle of Cronenburg, opposite to Helsingburg; and here also he received assurance from Count Wutchmeister, admiral-general of Sweden, that he would take the first opportunity of joining him with the squadron under his command. Not long after a signal was made, as had been agreed, from Helsingburg, that the Danish fleet were under sail; whereupon our admiral weighed anchor, and advanced into the Sound, to prevent any mischief which might otherwise happen to the Swedes. But the Danish ships anchored again on this side of the grounds, not only to guard the passage, but to prevent our joining with the Swedish squadron, which were now come down to the south-side of that channel.

In this posture the fleets lay for some time, Sir George Rooke expecting that the Swedes would, according to what had been promised, have pushed through; which in all probability they might have done in less than two hours, for it had blown fresh at S. S. E. But the opportunity being lost, he got under sail, and came nearer to the island of Huen.† Meanwhile, the Danes plyed towards him in a line of battle, but anchored about noon near three leagues off, in the mouth of the channel leading up to Copenhagen; and the Swedes were much about the same distance on the other side of the grounds. The Danes then endeavoured to amuse the admiral with an

\* Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 786. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 243. London Gazette, No. 3602. Pointer's Chronological Historian, vol. ii. p. 462.

† Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 213. Columna Illustrata, p. 270, 271. Burchet's Naval History, book v. chap. iii.

account of a treaty, in hopes that, while it was negotiating, he would suspend hostilities; but he pursued the spirit of his instructions, which required him to promote not a negotiation, but a peace; and therefore, being informed that the Swedish fleet had passed the channel of Flinterena on the third of July, he sailed the next day, and anchoring off Landscroon, the Swedish fleet joined him on the 6th; upon which the Danes retired into their harbour, where they were very well secured: and though the united fleets pretended to bombard them in the port of Copenhagen, yet either they could not, or would not, do them much mischief. \*

The confederate fleet consisted of fifty-two ships of the line; but as so great a strength was not necessary to keep in the Danes, a part was detached for other purposes; for there were sent to Gottenburg a fourth and a fifth rate of the English, and three ships of the States-general, to cover the forces which the king of Sweden intended to transport to Tonningen, on the river Eyder; and three English, with six Swedish, together with three Dutch ships, were ordered into the south channel going into Copenhagen, with the bomb-vessels, from whence they bombarded the Danish fleet some hours, but not with much greater success than before; nor did those on our side receive any damage from their shells, or the shot from the town, the ships and the puntoons. Preparations were now making for a vigorous descent in Roge-bay, and between Copenhagen and Elsinore at the same time; but the winds being contrary, those troops which embarked at Udstedt, being chiefly horse, could not get over to the bay before-mentioned, as was intended, so that they were put on shore, and ordered to Landscroon and Helsingburg, to be transported from thence; and the latter end of July, the king of Sweden landed with about five thousand foot,

A. D.  
1700

\* Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 241. Oldmixon, Burchet, and the present State of Europe for the year 1700.

near four miles on this side Elsinore, without any great loss, although the Danes had brought down a body of horse and foot, and three or four field-pieces, to oppose them.

This quick motion was intended to accelerate the negotiations that were then carrying on, and it had the desired effect; for the Danes, excessively alarmed at so unexpected a proceeding, sent orders to their plenipotentiaries at Travendahl to sign the preliminaries on the terms proposed by the mediators; and this being signified to Sir George Rooke, he refused to let the combined fleet cover any longer the descent of the Swedes, there being enough already done to secure a peace, which was signed on the 18th of August, 1700; and left the king of Sweden at liberty to act against the Czar and the king of Poland, who had both invaded his dominions in this critical juncture. \*

This whole transaction was extremely honourable, and at the same time, very advantageous to the maritime powers, who cannot, as I observed, be at any time, consistently with their interests, tame spectators of a war in the north. If they had not assisted the Swedes, who were then the weakest; the Danes would have drawn the negotiation into a great length, while their allies were distressing the king of Sweden in different parts of his dominions; and, on the other hand, if the combined fleets had acted as vigorously as the king of Sweden would have had them; the island of Zealand must have been reduced; and, perhaps, the city of Copenhagen taken; which would have inclined the balance too much the other way. This was the true reason that the bombardment had so little effect, and Sir George did not affect to conceal it: for when King Charles complained to him, that the English bombs flew over, and the Dutch fell short of the Danish

\* *Corps Universel Diplomatique du Droit des Gens*, tom. vii. part ii. p. 480, 485. Burnet, Kennet, vol. xi. p. 786. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xxix. p. 226, 311.

fleet, and that he wondered the maritime powers sent so great a strength to do nothing; Admiral Rooke answered him very calmly, "Sir, I was sent hither to serve your majesty, but not to ruin the king of Denmark." "Why then," replied the king, smiling, "you have certainly executed your commission, and have made such a war as will make a peace."

When the business was done, the combined fleets returned; and the States-general were so sensible of the prudent management of the English admiral, that they thanked his majesty for having entrusted him with the commission. I cannot help observing upon this occasion, that when Sir George Rooke was so unlucky as to labour under the displeasure of a powerful party in England, he was known and acknowledged in Holland to be the best officer, and the greatest seaman of the age. This, perhaps, was the reason, that, notwithstanding the difference of parties, King William always preserved a good opinion of this gentleman; and employed him as long as he lived in the most important commands.

In Scotland, things ran very high on the old subject of complaint, viz. the ruin of the Darien colony. Things were printed on both sides on purpose to inflame the minds of the people, and many thought that it would at last have created a breach between the two nations. The coldness of the king's temper prevented this; he could not either be heated by the English representations, or blown into a passion by the hasty resolutions of the Scots parliament; and his moderation toward each of them, if it did not bring them both to a good temper, which was indeed never effected in his reign; yet it gave him an opportunity to keep the wisest people in England and in Scotland firm to his government; while, in the mean time, many unforeseen accidents brought about the ruin of the Scots company; so that the ends of their English adversaries were answered, without their having recourse to any harsh

means; for after Captain Drummond ran away with the Rising Sun, and engaged in some exploits which had too much the air of piracy, it was found impracticable to restore the affairs of the company; though the matter hung in suspense, and the fire of dissension lay raked up under the embers as long as King William lived, and had nearly blazed out in the reign of his successor; as will be hereafter shewn in its proper place. \*

A.D.  
701.

We are now to return to affairs nearer home. The death of the king of Spain changed all the affairs of Europe; and forced us, who had so lately made a very necessary peace, upon a new, expensive, and dangerous war, contrary to the genius, at least, if not, as the patriots of those times asserted, to the interest of the nation. † It is certain that the king did all he could to avoid it; and that this was the great, if not the sole foundation of the two famous partition treaties, which were so much exclaimed

\* Kennet, Burnet, Burchet, Oldmixon, &c.

† In order to be sensible of this, we need only cast our eyes on the following passage of my Lord Somers's letter to King William, dated from Tunbridge-wells, August 18, 1698, in answer to one written by the king in relation to the first treaty of partition.

"The second thing considered was the very ill prospect of what was like to happen upon the death of the king of Spain, in case nothing was done previously in providing against that accident, which seemed probably to be very near, the king of France having so great a force in such a readiness, that he was in a condition to take possession of Spain, before any other prince could be able to make a stand. Your majesty is the best judge whether this be the case, who are so perfectly informed of the circumstances of parts abroad.

"But, so far as relates to England, it would be want of duty not to give your majesty this clear account: That there is a deadness and want of spirit in the nation universally, so as not at all to be disposed to the thought of entering into a new war; that they seemed to be tired out with taxes, to a degree beyond what was discerned, till it appeared upon the occasion of the late elections. This is the truth of the fact, upon which your majesty will determine what resolutions are proper to be taken."

against by those, whose steady opposition to a war had first brought the king and his ministry to think of them.

It has been much disputed, whether the French king or the confederates meant least to keep these treaties when they were made; but it so falling out, that the French king had a fairer opportunity of breaking the last than the confederate princes; this furnished them with an opportunity of charging him with breach of faith; and forging the king of Spain's will; which, however, were things believed by such only as knew little of the matter, since there never was a state-resolution taken with better advice, and more deliberation, than that of King Charles II. calling the duke of Anjou, afterwards King Philip V. to the succession.

It has been also said, that the proclaiming the prince of Wales on the death of King James II. by the French king was one of the causes of the war; and whoever looks upon the public acts of those times, I mean declarations, addresses, votes, &c. will think the facts certain. Yet I am pretty confident it was quite otherwise; since King William signed the grand alliance at the Hague a week before King James died. But this pretence of the French king's breach of treaty and of his word was very plausible; and therefore it was very prudent to lay so great stress upon it, because it served to raise the resentments of the nation, and to excite that spirit that was wanting, and which much better motives never would have raised. \*

\* The citation in the last note sufficiently shews the king's sentiments, and those of his minister, upon this subject; and therefore, as I write at such a distance of time, when truth must be serviceable, and can do hurt, I think I have a right to speak plainly, otherwise I should not have exercised it. As to the addresses from all parts of England, in which the French king's character is very roughly treated on account of his proclaiming a person whom some call Prince of Wales, and others an impostor, I can only say, that it was politically right at that time to encourage it. But as to the perfidiousness of the

I would by no means be understood to censure this war as unreasonable or unjust; in doing this I should quit my character as an historian, and, at the same time, write contrary to my opinion. All I aim at is to distinguish grounds from pretences; and to justify King William's measures in this respect from their true motives, rather than from those which were used only to colour them in compliance with the temper of the nation at that time. The king, who was a very wise man, and a consummate politician; saw plainly, that the Spanish succession, if it fell entirely into the hands of the house of Bourbon, would leave it absolutely in the power of that house to give law to the rest of Europe; and to destroy the independence so necessary to Great Britain and Holland, which yet results from the balance that had hitherto been kept between that family and the house of Austria. He saw, too, that the sense which other powers had of their particular grievances and immediate danger from the power of the French king, afforded the means of combining such a force as might be able to bring that monarch to reason; and to consent to such an establishment as would leave things in their former state, and secure the several potentates of Europe in the possession of their just rights.

This induced him to engage reciprocally Papists and Protestants to support each other's pretensions; for, by the grand alliance, Great Britain and the States under-

French king, it is not so clear in this case; because he knew at the time, King William had negociated a new grand alliance, and consequently stood to him in the light of his capital enemy. The excuse, indeed, he made for proclaiming the son of King James was trifling and disingenuous. He said it was no breach of the treaty of Ryswick, because he gave him the titles only of king of England, &c. but did not assist him to recover them. On the other hand, King William wrote a letter to the new king of Spain, to felicitate him on his accession, though he never intended to own him. These are acts of policy, not of perfidy.



took to procure satisfaction to the Pope; as, on the other hand, the emperor and other Catholic princes stipulated to support the Protestant interest, and maintain the rights of the maritime powers in respect of their commerce. This it was that made the whole a common cause; and, though these articles exposed the alliance to very popular objections among party-men at home and abroad; yet, to persons of judgment and sagacity, of clear heads and candid hearts, nothing could recommend it more. In all confederacies the good of the whole must be regarded; and to this the particular views of all the separate princes and powers who compose it must give way; and therefore, if, considering things in this light, the general alliance formed against France in 1701, was right and well founded, all the cavils, raised against it from the party-spirit that prevailed here, were equally frivolous and unjust. \*

When the resolution was once taken to have recourse again to arms in order to preserve the balance of power, the first care was for the fleet, which his majesty resolved should be much superiour to that of the enemy; his majesty being extremely sensible of the ill consequences that attended the want of this salutary precaution at the beginning of the last war. Preparatory to this was the new commission of the admiralty in the spring of the year 1701, at the head of which was placed the earl of Pembroke, a man universally beloved and esteemed. †

The command of the fleet was very judiciously bestowed upon Sir George Rooke, who on the 2d of July went on board the *Triumph* in the Downs, where he

\* This is the substance of all the State Tracts that were written in those times, and which served, as they generally do, only to puzzle and confound people; whereas we, being now out of the reach of their influence, see things as they were, and are able to crowd the substance of many pamphlets into a single paragraph.

† Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 824. Pointer's Chronological Historian, vol. ii. p. 462. London Gazette, No. 3692.

hoisted the flag. He soon after sailed to Spithead, where he was speedily joined by the rest of the fleet, consisting of forty-eight ships of the line, besides frigates, fire-ships, and small vessels.\* He had under him some of the greatest seamen of the age, *viz.* Sir Cloudesley Shovel, Sir Thomas Hopson, John Benbow, Esq. and Sir John Munden: he was, not long after, reinforced by fifteen Dutch men-of-war of the line, besides frigates and small vessels, under the command of Lieutenant Allemande, Vice-admiral Vandergocs, and Rear-admiral Waessenaar.

The whole fleet was obliged to wait at St. Helen's until the middle of August for the want of provisions; and when he put to sea, the wind blew in a few hours so high, that he was constrained to put back again into Torbay. Toward the latter end of the month, he sailed thence, and the 2d of September, he detached Vice-admiral Benbow with a stout squadron for the West Indies: and as this was the principal business of the fleet, and indeed a thing in itself of the highest importance, the admiral detached a strong squadron of English ships under the command of Sir John Munden, and ten sail of Dutch men-of-war, besides frigates, under Rear-admiral Waessenaar, to see the West India squadron well into the sea. The French expected that this fleet would have actually proceeded to the Mediterranean; and, it was to confirm them in this belief, we had demanded the free use of the Spanish harbours: but this was only to conceal things, and to gain an opportunity of sending a squadron early to the West Indies, without putting it in the power of the French to procure any exact account of its strength: the admiral, after performing this, cruized according to his instructions for some time, and then returned with the largest ships into the Downs. †

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 588. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xxx. p. 597, 699. London Gazette, No. 3700, 3720.

† Burchet's Naval History, book v. ch. 4. Burnet's History of his

After this fleet was sent to sea, his majesty, on the 18th of January, thought proper to revoke his letters-patent to the commissioners of the admiralty, and to appoint the right honourable Thomas earl of Pembroke and Montgomery, lord high-admiral of England and Ireland, and of the foreign plantations.\* The design of this promotion was to be rid of the disadvantages attending a board: and this end it answered perfectly; for his lordship immediately sent away Captain Edmund Loades to Cadiz to bring home the sea stores, and the merchants' effects, before the war broke out, as also two hulks that had been left in that harbour, from the time of the last war, for the greater conveniency of careening our ships which remained in that port. This the captain with his small squadron, consisting but of three frigates, effectually performed.†

His Lordship also took the like care of our trade in all other parts; and by his extraordinary prudence, remarkable patience, and being very easy of access; gave much more satisfaction to the merchants and to the officers of the fleet, than any of the boards of admiralty, since they were first introduced, had ever done. Indeed his lordship's merit and success in this arduous employment was so conspicuous and so universally acknowledged; that it is not easy to understand upon what principles the management of the fleet was changed in the ensuing year,

own Time, vol. ii. p. 288. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xxxi. p. 181, 433. Some of these people seem to find fault with Sir George Rooke on account of his doing little while he was at sea with so great a fleet. But the merit of this admiral was, that he always knew, and did what was to be done. This was a fleet of amusement, the war was not declared, and therefore, the longer Sir George could keep the French and their allies in suspense, the greater service he did; though, without this key, hasty people might mistake the thing, and believe he did no service at all.

\* Kennet, vol. iii. p. 831. *Pointers's Chronological Historian*, vol. ii. p. 470. *London Gazette*, No. 3776.

† Burchet's *Naval History*, book v. ch. 7.

except that it might be thought necessary to raise Prince George of Denmark to that dignity, that he might appear to have had a principal concern in advising and managing affairs ; which, however, was in this respect but very little to his royal highness's advantage, as will be shewn in our account of transactions under the next reign. \*

The war was now the great object of our councils as well as those of France, though hitherto it was not declared ; and negotiations were still carried on in Holland, as if both parties had inclined to an amicable determination of these differences, which was, however, the intention of neither. The expectation of a rupture made our sea officers exceedingly alert, and put them upon shewing their mettle sometimes a little too much. For instance, the marquis of Caermarthen's yacht fired upon a French ship in the harbour of Rotterdam to oblige her to strike, which she did immediately. The commander of the yacht, not satisfied with this, sent for the master of the French vessel on board, and obliged him to pay twelve livres for the shot. This was complained of by Count d'Avaux, the French minister, in very high terms ; and it is very probable, that the States would have expressed their dislike of it at another season ; but things were then in such a situation, that it was not thought proper to animadvert upon these accidents, whatever might have been thought of them at another time. The States indeed were obliged to unite themselves closer than ever to Great Britain, since their

\* This is a strong proof of King William's justice and good sense. Many of the enemies of that prince have remarked, that he introduced here the Dutch custom of boards, by putting all great offices into commission ; but hitherto no body has remarked, that, when he resolved to enter into a second general war, he very prudently and honestly altered this method in the navy, by appointing a lord high-admiral ; which shews, that he was more intent on the nation's being well served at sea, than on his minister's being well supported in the house of commons.

safety, as well as ours, depended upon the force of this alliance, as that did upon our union. \*

In the midst of these preparations, however, care was taken of a point which nearly concerned trade, and that was the uniting the two East India Companies, which was done under an act of arbitration, wherein Lord Godolphin and Mr. Harley, afterwards earl of Oxford, were for the old company, and Lord Halifax for the new. By this instrument it was agreed, that the old company's stock in the funds should be transferred to the new; and that the old company should purchase of the new as much of their stock as, with that which was transferred by the old, should make up a moiety of the whole capital of the united companies. The old company were likewise to give an equivalent for the new company's dead stock. During seven years each company was to have an equal power in the administration of the fund and trade; and to that end twelve persons were to be yearly appointed by the general courts of each company respectively, who were to be styled **MANAGERS OF THE UNITED TRADE TO INDIA**; and, after these seven years were expired, the old company were to surrender their charters, and the new company was thenceforward to change its style, and to be called **THE UNITED COMPANY OF MERCHANTS TRADING TO THE EAST INDIES**: and this agreement was the foundation of that company which has subsisted with so great

\* This steadiness of the States was chiefly owing to their confidence in King William, which, without question, induced them to enter into this long and dangerous war, though they were so much exhausted by the former. His majesty no doubt pressed them to it, because he thought it their interest, as it really was, and ours too. Yet such has been the violence of parties, that the Tories here have charged King William with making us principals in this war to serve the Dutch; while the patriots in Holland have loaded his memory with the imputation of sacrificing the interest of the republic to those of his three kingdoms. It is hard to say which is most wonderful, the wisdom and integrity of the king, or the ingratitude of the people in both countries.

credit to themselves, and benefit to the nation, ever since. \*

One of the last acts of King William's administration, was a solemn message to the lower house of parliament, in relation to an union between England and Scotland, in which he said, "He should esteem it a peculiar felicity, "if, during his reign, some happy expedient for making "both kingdoms one might take place, and therefore he "was extremely desirous a treaty for this purpose might "be set on foot, which he therefore recommended in the "most earnest manner to the house of commons." In compliance with this message the house did appoint a day to consider of the proposition contained therein; but the death of the king prevented their coming to any resolution.

Before this happened, however, they resolved that forty thousand men should be granted for the service of the fleet in the ensuing year, and shewed such an inclination to enter heartily into all the measures necessary to render the grand alliance effectual towards the ends for which it was made; that the French, who little expected that such a spirit would be shewn in this parliament, were much surprized; easily foreseeing that the new war would distress them much more than the old had ever done, because it was likely to be better managed. †

His extraordinary attention to business is thought to have hastened the king's decease, which happened on the 8th of March, 1701-2, about eight in the morning. He died, as he lived, with great steadiness of mind, and shewed himself in his last moments as much a hero as he had ever done in the field. I ought now to say somewhat of this

\* Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii, p. 296.

† I do not take this upon the credit of Larrey and other historians of his rank, but from the best French memoirs that I have met with. in which it is confessed, that their court was deceived by the strong assurances given them by the late king's party, who, to do them justice, were in all probability deceived themselves.

prince's character, and to sum up all with a general view of the capital events in his reign ; but as I have already treated very copiously of such as have any affinity with the principal design of this work ; and as the fame of King William III. stands in no need of my feeble assistance ; I shall content myself with saying, that never any prince better understood the general interest of Europe, or pursued it with greater firmness ; and that whatever unlucky accidents fell out in his reign, to the prejudice of our affairs, were not so much owing to any mistakes in his conduct, as to the circumstances of the times ; to our own unfortunate divisions ; and to the fatal consequences of both. \*

The only thing now left to be performed, before we proceed to another chapter, is the collecting, as far as the slender memoirs that have come to our hands will allow, some account of the most eminent seamen who died in this reign ; and in treating of these the reader is desired to remember, that no party is espoused ; that every man is considered as a person of worth and honour so far as he pursued his principles, and was just to the prince he served, and faithful to the interest of his country. By the help of this necessary and well founded distinction we shall be able to do strict justice to all those brave men who exposed their lives in their country's service at sea, of what party soever they were, or were reputed to be ; which, however, hath been seldom done in a work of this kind, where, generally speaking, the heroes are all on one side, and there are none but indifferent people on the

\* The reader, if he be inclined to pursue this subject farther, may consult Kennet, Burnet, Oldmixon, the Life of King William, &c. where he will often find that flattery is as dangerous to the reputation of a prince as prejudice itself. Some writers, out of pure zeal, would make King William more than man ; and others, blinded by malice, refuse to see, what his actions made visible to all the world, that he was one of the greatest men, and one of the wisest princes, in every respect, of the age in which he lived.

other : whereas in truth there is no foundation for such characters, honest and brave men being found alike on both sides ; though they have sometimes had the misfortune to be hated and defamed by such as have less regard to merit than opinion ; and who thought it excusable to raise a clamour against a great man in an opposite interest, though they were sensible this clamour sprung from prejudice, and not from any love of justice. These reflections I thought necessary, to prevent the reader's being surprized by what he meets with in the following pages, wherein I have as much disregarded the common cry, as I have been careful, by an accurate comparison of facts, to come as near, in every instance as I could, to the naked truth, which, when discovered, I have not either exaggerated or concealed.

MEMOIRS OF GEORGE LEGGE, BARON OF DART-  
MOUTH, &c.

IF remarkable loyalty, and a steady adherence to the interest of the prince who raised him, joined with all the abilities requisite to fill the many high employments he possessed, ought to render the memory of a man valuable to posterity, then the memoirs of Lord Dartmouth deserve our utmost attention ; for he was, even in the opinion of such as were not his friends, one of the ablest and best men of the age in which he lived ; or, to express it in the words of a writer who ought always to meet with credit when he speaks well of the dead, “ the worthiest noble-  
“ man of the court of King James II.”\* to whose fortunes

\* The author mentioned in the text is Bishop Burnet, whose character of this noble lord is to be found toward the end of his first volume. What he says of him is so just and generous, that it deserves the reader's notice. That prelate, speaking of the uneasiness King James was under on the fitting out of the Dutch fleet in 1688, and of the preparations he made for the defending himself, proceeds thus : “ He recalled Strickland, and gave the command to the Lord



he adhered, though he had always opposed with firmness the counsels which were the causes of his distress.

The family of Legge came over hither from Italy, where to this day the eldest branch are nobles of Venice. \* Here in England there are two flourishing families of this name; one in Herefordshire; the other settled at Legge's Place near Tunbridge in Kent; from whom the present earls of Dartmouth are lineal descendants, coming in a direct line from Thomas Legge of that place, who was sheriff of London in 1344, twice lord-mayor, and twice representative for the city in parliament. †

In the reign of Henry VII. the family settled in Ireland, where Edward Legge, Esq. was vice-president of Munster, and died in the year 1616, leaving behind him a very numerous posterity, viz. six sons and seven daughters, all of them distinguished by their great merit, and several of the daughters especially, by living to a very extraordinary age; Elizabeth, the eldest, to one hundred and five; Margaret, who married Mr. Fitzgerald, to upwards of one hundred; and Anne, the wife of William Anthony, Esq. who died in 1702, aged one hundred and two. ‡ But let us now return to the person whose actions we are to record.

He was the eldest son of the famous Colonel William Legge, groom of the bed-chamber to King Charles I. and

"Dartmouth, who was indeed one of the worthiest men of his court. He loved him, and had been long in his service and in his confidence, but was much against all the conduct of his affairs; yet he resolved to stick to him at all hazards"

\* Hist. de Venise, par le Sieur Amelot, de la Houssai, tom. ii.

† See Fabian's Chronicle, vol. ii. p. 219, 224, 230, edit. 1559. He served the office of lord-mayor in 1347, and again in 1354. Stowe's Survey of London, p. 516, edit. 1603, 4to. As to his being in parliament for the city, I have that in a MS. list of Members for London, in which it appears he was chosen in 1349 and 1352.

‡ These particulars are chiefly collected from the memoirs of the family, though they are likewise confirmed by several monumental inscriptions.

a most constant follower of all his fortunes. Soon after the Restoration, his father thought proper to send him to sea under the care of that great and gallant admiral, Sir Edward Spragge, in the first Dutch war in 1665, when Mr. Legge was barely seventeen. \* He distinguished himself in all the actions of that and the succeeding year by such remarkable testimonies of conduct as well as courage; that, in those days, when naval preferments were earned before they were enjoyed, he was without envy raised to the command of the Pembroke in 1667, when he was yet short of twenty, a preferment which did him as much honour as any he afterwards obtained. †

After the peace, he applied himself assiduously to the study of the mathematics, especially to such branches of that extensive science as have relation to the military art; and, having attained to great skill as an engineer, he was employed by his majesty in that character; and in 1669 succeeded his father in the command of an independent company of foot. In 1671, he was made captain of the Fairfax; and, in 1672, of the Royal Catharine, in which he served with the highest reputation; having beaten the Dutch out who boarded her while she was sinking, and, after he had stopped her leaks, brought her safe into harbour; in which desperate service he received several wounds. In acknowledgment of this and other marks of military virtue shewn in that memorable year; he was made, toward the end of it, lieutenant-governor of Portsmouth, under his royal highness James duke of York; in 1673, he was made governor of that place, and at the same time master of the horse, and gentleman of the bed-chamber to the duke. ‡

\* The reason of his going to sea under Sir Edward Spragge was, because of his near relation to the Legge family, his mother being second sister to Colonel William Legge, this gentleman's father.

† This and several other particulars are taken from the family memoirs.

‡ See the Memoirs of the Dutch War, p. 119.

In 1677, he was added as an assistant in the board of ordnance, with a salary of 300*l. per annum*; and, the same year, was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general of the ordnance, and had also a regiment of foot bestowed upon him. These extraordinary marks of royal favour were soon followed by still greater testimonies of esteem and confidence; for, in 1681, he was sworn of the privy-council to King Charles II.; and, in 1682, had a special commission to review all the forts and garrisons throughout the kingdom of England, and was also constituted and appointed commander-in-chief. On the 2d of December, in the same year, he was raised by letters-patent, to the dignity of a peer of this realm by the title of baron of Dartmouth in the county of Devon; with remainder in case of failure of his issue-male, to his brother William Legge, Esq. and his issue; and, in the preamble of the patent, his own and his father's services are very justly and gratefully acknowledged.\*

In 1683, the king finding it impossible to support the garrison of Tangier out of his own revenue; and having little hopes of obtaining any supply for that purpose from a parliament; his last having shewn a remarkable dislike to the keeping up of forces there, resolved, notwithstanding

\* The preamble of this patent recites, "That his majesty remembering the great merits of William Legge, one of the grooms of the royal bed-chamber to his late father King Charles I. especially in that unparalleled rebellion raised against him, in which being a person of singular skill and experience in military affairs, as also a valiant and expert commander, he faithfully served him in most of the battles and sieges of those unhappy times; also performed several eminent services to the said king since his most happy restoration: and further considering that George Legge, eldest son of the said William, following his father's steps in divers military employments, especially in sundry sharp and dangerous naval fights, wherein he did freely hazard his life; for which respect being made general of the ordnance and artillery, and one of his most honourable privy-council, his majesty thought fit to dignify him with some farther honour," &c.

ing the immense sums it had cost him in fortifying the place, and in building a mole, which rendered the port both convenient and safe, to destroy the whole, and to bring back the troops he had there into England. The management of this affair required great secrecy, and much conduct in the commander-in-chief, and this probably determined the king to make use of Lord Dartmouth, who was appointed governor of Tangier, and general of his majesty's forces in Africa, as well as admiral of the fleet, in order to enable him to execute his instructions, which he did very exactly and effectually; so that, on his return home, the king was pleased to make him a grant of 10,000*l.* as a reward for that service, besides other acknowledgments. \*

Upon the accession of King James II. his lordship met with all the testimonies of royal favour and friendship which his many services, and unspotted fidelity to that prince, deserved; for he not only continued him in all the offices he then possessed, but raised him also to posts of still greater consequence; so that he was at once master of the horse to the king, general of the ordnance, constable of the Tower of London, captain of an independent company of foot, and one of the privy-council.

These employments he executed with so great diligence and reputation, that he stood as high in the favour of the people as he did in that of his prince; and was always considered as the greatest encourager of merit, and the most upright man in the administration of public affairs, that the age produced. He preserved the affection and confidence of his master to the last; and yet he was so far

\* Particularly a grant of a fair to be held twice a-year, and a market twice a-week, upon Blackheath, in the parish of Lewisham, in the county of Kent. It may not be amiss to observe here, that the greatest difficulty in executing his commission in Tangier was to blow up all the works there, without exposing the garrison to the Moors; which service he performed with equal caution and success.

from giving in to the king's fatal inclinations to Popery and arbitrary government, that he opposed all counsels, looking either way, with much firmness and freedom; though he took care to restrain all his remonstrances within the just bounds of decency and duty. \*

In 1687, King James making a short progress, and Lord Dartmouth attending him therein at Coventry, the city presented his majesty with a large gold cup and cover, which he immediately gave to his lordship, and that too with a compliment as generous and as acceptable as the present. "I would have your lordship," said he, "receive this cup and cover as a mark of the city of Coventry's concern for the sufferings of your father in it." For, in the time of the civil wars, old Colonel William Legge had remained long a prisoner in Coventry-gaol, after being taken at the battle of Worcester. †

When it was absolutely certain that the prince of Orange intended to invade England, King James saw the necessity of employing some more considerable person than Sir Roger Strickland, who had hitherto commanded the fleet; and whose being a Papist, though it recommended him to

\* Present State of England for the year 1687, by Dr. Edward Chamberlayne, p. 167.

† This story of his father's sufferings at Coventry certainly deserves the reader's notice; and therefore, not to be wanting either to his entertainment, or to the illustration of the history, I subjoin it here. The great share Colonel William Legge had in the favour of King Charles I. made him so obnoxious to the rump, that they intended to have executed him, as they did the earl of Derby, for being in arms against them, and with that view they confined him in Coventry-gaol. His lady, knowing their cruelty, and having tried all her interest with the people in power in vain, at last contrived a very artful method for making his escape, which was as successfully executed. With this view she hired an old woman to lend him her clothes, which he put on; and, having a close-stool pan well filled between his hands, the smell kept the keepers at such a distance, that he walked fairly off, without their making any inquiries. After the murder of King Charles I. he was about the person of the duke of York, which inspired his majesty with a great tenderness for him and all his family

that trust, rendered him very disagreeable to the seamen. In this situation of things, his majesty certainly made a very proper choice of Lord Dartmouth for the important office of admiral; since no man had greater abilities, scarcely any so great an affection for his majesty's person, or so hearty a zeal for his interest.

His lordship was much beloved by the seamen, and so universally esteemed by the officers of the navy, that he very soon put his fleet in a posture fit for service; and though, as I have shewn elsewhere, it has been strongly reported, that his lordship declined fighting the Dutch fleet; yet it is certain that it was never in his power; and that, if it had, both he and his officers would have performed what they took to be their duty. But, after being severely ruffled by the storm, the fleet was forced into Portsmouth, where his lordship quitted the command to Sir John Berry, and returned to London. \*

After the Revolution, Lord Dartmouth lived quietly, and submitted to the new government; yet was always suspected to retain his old sentiments for the person who had been so long, and withal, so kind a master. For this reason, and on account of some suggestions that he carried on a secret correspondence with the exiled king, he was committed prisoner to the Tower of London. While he continued there, some rumours flew abroad of his being ill treated, which had such an effect on the sailors, who loved him as their father, that they assembled in great bodies on Tower-hill, where they expressed their resentment in such language, that it was at length found expedient to desire Lord Dartmouth to confer with them; and, on his assuring them that the report they had heard was void of

\* In the second volume we have already given<sup>n</sup> so full an account of this affair, that it would be tedious to add any thing more here, except that Lord Dartmouth laid down his command as soon as he came on shore; and, when he could not act for his majesty, would not, as another favourite did, act against him.

any foundation, they gave a cheerful huzza, and dispersed immediately.

It is thought, however, that his confinement, and the want of his usual exercise, might contribute to the shortening his days; for on the 21st of October, 1691, he was seized with an apoplexy, which put an end to his life in the forty-fourth year of his age.\*

His relations applied themselves, on his decease, to the constable of the Tower, then Lord Lucas, for leave to remove his body in order to his interment; which his lordship scrupled, without receiving express directions from the king. But, upon application made to his majesty, he not only ordered, that the body should be immediately delivered to his lordship's relations; but, upon his being informed that they intended to bury it near the remains of his father in the Little Minories church, in a vault belonging to his family; his majesty gave further orders, that all such marks of respect should be paid at his funeral, as would have been due to him, if he had died possessed of all his employments. Which is a circumstance equally honourable to the memory of King William and Lord Dartmouth; since it shews impartiality and greatness of soul in the former, and the true merit of the latter, which produced such a testimony of respect from so penetrating a judge. †

A monument of white marble, adorned with a proper inscription, was erected to the memory of his lordship, by his consort Barbara, baroness of Dartmouth, the daughter of Sir Henry Archbold, of Staffordshire, who died in 1718, and lies buried there by him. ‡

\* King James received the news of his death with great concern, and said, with a deep sigh, "Then faithful Will. Legge's honest son George is dead! I have few such servants now!"

† This is taken from the memoirs of the family.

‡ The inscription is very long, otherwise we should have inserted it, and his lordship's memory too fresh, to make this pass for an indifferent excuse.

His lordship had by her an only son William, afterwards earl of Dartmouth, so created by her majesty Queen Anne, in the tenth year of her reign. His lordship had also the honour of being secretary-of-state and lord-privy-seal in the same reign, and discharged both those high offices with that integrity hereditary in his lordship's family, and deceasing December 15, 1750, at his house on Blackheath in Kent, in the seventy-ninth year of his age, was succeeded in his honour and estates by his grandson William, now earl of Dartmouth.

MEMOIRS OF SIR JOHN BERRY, KNIGHT, REAR-ADMIRAL OF ENGLAND.

THERE cannot be a stronger testimony of real ability, than a man's surmounting, by his spirit and diligence, a long series of crosses and misfortunes; and thereby forcing himself, as it were, into an easier situation, and by degrees into a condition worthy of his merit. Fortitude in suffering is a virtue no less honourable than courage in atchieving; and the distresses of heroes, like the shades in a fine picture, afford a graceful relief to the brighter parts of the piece, and thereby considerably heighten its beauties. This observation cannot more fully be illustrated, than it will be by the account we are to give of the life and actions of Sir John Berry, who, without any assistance other than resulted from the contemplation of his courage and conduct, arrived at the dignity of rear-admiral of England, and shared the confidence of three succeeding kings.

The family of the Berries in Devonshire were seated at Berry-Nerber near Ilfracombe, where they had flourished for some hundreds of years. \* But the father of our gal-

\* Pole's Survey of Devonshire, MS. This village lies in Branton-hundred, in the middle between Combe-Merton and Ilfracombe, at a



lant sea-officer was never in any extraordinary circumstances. He owed his reputation, which still subsists in his neighbourhood, not to the goods of fortune, but to his learning and abilities, and above all to his courage and loyalty. He was a clergyman, and vicar of Knoweston and Molland in that county; where he discharged his duty with equal fidelity to the church and to the state. For this the saints of those times not only turned him out of his livings, but plundered his house, and took even his bed from under him; all which they sold by public auction, except his books, which being a large and valuable collection; they, to shew their moderation and generosity, bestowed them upon an independent preacher. Soon after this the truly reverend Mr. Daniel Berry, a victim to his honest principles, died of grief and want in the forty-fifth year of his age, and left behind him a widow, Elizabeth, daughter of John Moore of Moorhays, Esq; and nine small children, of which seven were sons and two daughters. \*

The eldest, Robert, betook himself to the sea, where he succeeded very well. The second, John, of whom we are to speak, and who was born in his father's vicarage-house at Knoweston, in the year 1635, being at the good old man's death about seventeen, went to Plymouth, where he bound himself apprentice to Mr. Robert Mering, a merchant in that town, and part-owner in several ships. He went to sea in his service, and was extremely unfortunate in setting out, being twice taken by the Spaniards, and suffering a long imprisonment, which, however, did him no great hurt in the main. On his return to England he found his master in very bad circumstances; which was no prejudice to him; for, in a short time after, Mr.

small distance from the sea, and about twenty-seven miles from Exeter.

\* Most of these particulars are taken from a monument erected in the year 1684, by Sir John Berry, to the memory of his father. His

Mering told him, that, having no farther occasion for his service, he would, in reward of his past diligence, give him the remainder of his time, which he did freely. \*

Mr. Berry, thus at large and at liberty to act for himself, immediately came up to London; where, by the help of some friends, he was preferred to be boatswain of a ketch belonging to the royal navy, called the Swallow; which, under the command of Captain Insam, was ordered to the West Indies in company with two of his majesty's frigates, both of which were lost in the gulph of Florida; but the Swallow, by cutting down her masts, and heaving her guns overboard, as also her provisions, got clear, and in the space of sixteen weeks, during which they had nothing to eat but the fish they caught, or to drink but rain-water, they arrived at Campeachy. There they furnished themselves with provisions, and then sailed for Jamaica, where they arrived in three weeks. †

Sir Thomas Muddiford, who was a native of Devonshire as well as Mr. Berry, was then governor of that island, and he ordered the Swallow to be refitted, put eight guns on board her; and having intelligence that a pirate, who had taken one Mr. Peach bound from Southampton to Jamaica, and marooned him and all his crew, was still in those seas; he ordered the Swallow, now well victualled and manned, to put to sea in quest of her, and gave his countryman Berry the title of lieutenant.

In three weeks after they sailed from Jamaica, they found the pirate at anchor in a bay off the island of His-

two churches of Knoweston and Molland were not above two miles asunder, lying both in Moulton-hundred, at the distance of about eighteen miles from Exeter.

\* The particulars mentioned in this life were most of them collected by Mr. Daniel Berry, brother to the admiral; but, as he wrote at a considerable distance of time, he often omits dates, and sometimes mistakes them.

† It is not easy to fix the time of Mr. Berry's first voyage to the West Indies; but probably it was in the year 1661.

paniola. He had about sixty men and twenty guns, whereas the Swallow had but forty men and eight small guns. Captain Insam, having considered the enemy's strength and compared it with his own, called up all his men, and addressed them in these words: "Gentlemen, the blades we are to attack are men at arms, old buccaneers, and superiour to us in number and in the force of their ship, and therefore I would have your opinion, whether"—"Sir," interrupted Lieutenant Berry, "we are men at arms too, and, which is more, honest men, and fight under the king's commission; and, if you have no stomach for fighting, be pleased to walk down into your cabin." The crew applauded this motion, and declared one and all for Lieutenant Berry, who undertook this affair with great disadvantage.

The pirate rode at anchor to the windward, by which the Swallow was obliged to make two trips under her lee, in which she received two broadsides, and two volleys of small shot, without returning a gun. Mr. Berry then boarded her on the bow, pouring in his broadside, which killed the pirate twenty-two men on the spot: they then fought their way to the main-mast, where they called to the doctor and his mate to get overboard, and hang by the rudder, which they did; and soon after the pirate was taken, having only seven men left, and those all wounded, though they lived long enough to be hanged afterwards in Jamaica; and, which is still more remarkable, there was nobody killed on board the Swallow but the boatswain's mate.\*

On their return to Jamaica, Captain Insam confined his lieutenant, and brought him to a court martial; where,

\* These particulars are preserved in the MS. accounts of his brother's achievements, written by Mr. Berry; and I find the principal facts confirmed in an account of the most remarkable passages under Lord Windsor, Sir Thomas Muddiford, and Sir Thomas Lynch, successively governors of Jamaica.

on the evidence of the men, the court declared he had done his duty; and ordered the captain to live peaceably with him in their voyage to England, which he did: and Mr. Berry, notwithstanding what was past, behaved toward him with all imaginable modesty and submission.

In a short time after he came home, the Dutch war broke out, and Mr. Berry had a sloop given him, called the *Maria*, of fourteen guns, with the king's commission. He held this small command for about four months, in which time he took thirty-two prizes; and for his extraordinary diligence, had the command given him of the *Coronation*, a hired ship of war of fifty-six guns.

In this ship he was soon after sent to the West Indies, where our colonies were in no small danger, having both the French and Dutch upon their hands. On his arrival at Barbadoes, the governor bought some large merchant-ships, converted them into men-of-war, and having made up nine sail, including the *Coronation*, manned and put them under the command of Commodore Berry. With this little fleet he sailed for Nevis, in order to protect it from the French, who had already made themselves masters of St. Christopher, Antigua, and Mountserat. He was scarcely arrived before he had intelligence, that the French were preparing at St. Christopher a very great force, which was intended for the conquest of Nevis. They had twenty-two men-of-war and frigates, six large transport ships of their own, and four Dutch. With these they sailed toward Nevis as to a certain victory.

Commodore Berry sailed with his nine ships to meet them; and, as he turned the point of the island, one of his best ships blew up, which struck his men with astonishment. "Now you have seen an English ship blow up," said the commodore, "let us try if we can't blow up Frenchmen. There they are, boys! and, if we don't beat them, they will beat us." Having said this, he immediately began the fight with the French admiral;

and, after a brisk engagement of upwards of thirteen hours; he forced this mighty fleet to fly for shelter under the cannon of St. Christopher, whither he pursued them, sent in a fire-ship, and burnt the French admiral: seeing her in flames, he said to his seamen, "I told you in the morning, that we should burn a Frenchman before night; to-morrow we will try what we can do with the rest." But, while he was refitting his ships, the enemy wisely stole away; the French to Martinico, and the Dutch to Virginia. \* Sir John Harman being sent with a squadron to relieve him, Commodore Berry returned to England, and served with great honour in the channel and in the Mediterranean.

In the second Dutch war, as it was called, though properly speaking it was the third, he had the command of the *Resolution*, a seventy-gun ship, in which he was present at the famous action in Southwold-bay, on the twenty-eighth of May, 1672. In this battle, the captain observing that his royal highness the duke of York, then lord high-admiral of England, was very hard pressed; he left his station, and came in to his relief, where the service

\* We are in some measure enabled to fix the date of this enterprize by the following remarkable passage, preserved in the *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society*: "On the nineteenth of August, 1667, there was a terrible hurricane in this island. at which time Sir John Berry, captain of the *Coronation* man of war, was in the harbour with that and several other ships, of which one was commanded by Captain Langford, who, having learned some of the prognostics of a tornado from a Charibbean, perceiving them, he told Sir John and the other commanders of it, who, depending upon his intelligence, made their ships ready for the sea; and in the morning, about four of the clock, the wind coming very hard northerly, they put to sea, and came all back, in four or five days time, safe to the road again. Captain Langford was ashore, and being confident of the hurricane's coming, took such care before-hand to secure his sugars and goods in the store-house, that when the hurricane had carried away the roof of the house, all, except one hog's-head of sugar, remained safe." Lowthorp's abridgment, vol. ii. p. 106.

proved so hot, that in less than two hours he had no fewer than one hundred and twenty men killed, as many more wounded, and his ship scarcely able to float : upon this he was towed out of the line, stopped his leaks, and fell into his place again in an hour ; and there did such service, that when his majesty came to meet the fleet, and dined on board the Royal Sovereign at the Buoy in the Nore, he, of his own motive, called for Captain Berry, and, having knighted him, said very graciously, “ As our “ thoughts have been now upon honour, we will here- “ after think of profit ; for I would not have so brave a “ man a poor knight.” \*

In the year 1682, it was thought expedient to send the duke of York down to Scotland, and for this purpose the Gloucester frigate, under the command of Sir John Berry, was ordered to be ready : and accordingly, on the twenty-eighth of April, the duke of York embarked on board that ship. In their passage Sir John observed, on the third of May, when in the mouth of the Humber, as he apprehended, an error in the pilot's conduct ; though he was looked upon as a man of great abilities in his employment. Of this he informed the duke, and desired they might lie to, at least for that night, which the pilot opposed ; and, being a great favourite of the duke, his advice prevailed. But his royal highness was soon convinced of the superiority of Sir John Berry's judgment ; since, in three quarters of an hour afterwards, the ship was lost, and about three hundred people in her, among whom were some persons of the first rank ; and the duke himself narrowly escaped in the long-boat, Sir John Berry standing with his sword drawn in the stern of the boat to hinder people from crowding in, which undoubtedly saved the duke, since a very few more would have overset the long-boat. †

\* Catalogue of knights made by King Charles II.

† This accident happened by their striking upon the sand called

For the loss of this ship Sir John, according to the rules of the navy, was tried by a court-martial; but, it appearing clearly to have happened through another man's fault, he was not only acquitted, but continued still in as great favour as ever, both with the king and the duke, who frequently consulted him as to the management of the navy.

When a resolution was taken, in 1683, to blow up Tangier, and a considerable fleet was sent thither under the command of Lord Dartmouth, Sir John Berry was made choice of to be his vice-admiral; and had the sole command of the fleet, while his lordship was on shore directing the blowing up of the works. In this critical expedition, Sir John gave such remarkable testimonies of his courage and conduct, and took such care in bringing off all the English and their effects; that upon his return home, he was made a commissioner of the navy, in which post he continued to the day of his death. \*

Under the reign of King James II. he was in as high favour as he could desire, the king constantly con-

the Lemon and Ore, sixteen leagues from the mouth of the Humber. Two things were very remarkable, that the duke took extraordinary care of Colonel John Churchill, afterwards duke of Marlborough, and called him first into the boat. The other was, that the mariners aboard the sinking vessel gave a loud huzza, when they saw the duke in safety. Bishop Burnet's account of this matter is too remarkable to be forgotten. "The duke," says he, "got into a boat, and took care of his dogs, and some unknown persons, who were taken, from that earnest care of his, to be his priests. The long-boat went off with very few in her, though she might have carried off above eighty more than she did. One hundred and fifty persons perished, some of them men of great quality." The Gloucester frigate was a ship of forty guns; there were upwards of fifty persons saved with the duke; and that eighty more should be able to go into her long-boat, is a fact that will gain but little credit at Wapping. Besides, the keeping the people out was Sir John Berry's act; and, if there had been any such circumstances of cruelty, one can scarcely believe the sailors would have testified so much joy at his royal highness's escape.

\* *Memoirs of the Lord Dartmouth, cited in the former life*

sulting him in matters relating to the management of the fleet; and he was one of the commissioners called in on that great reform of the navy, mentioned in the close of the 17th chapter; and had the chief hand in bringing things into that exquisite order in which they were found when the king withdrew to France. \* He was not, however, considered solely as a commissioner, and as a man no longer fit for active employment; for when it was known that the Dutch meditated an invasion; and a fleet was fitted out to defend our coasts; Sir John Berry was appointed vice-admiral, and hoisted his flag on board the *Elizabeth*, a third rate; the admiral, Lord Dartmouth, being in the *Resolution*, and the rear-admiral, Lord Berkeley of Stratton, first in the *Montague*, and then in the *Edgar*. After the landing of the prince of Orange, when lord Dartmouth thought fit to leave the fleet, the sole command of it devolved on Sir John Berry, who held it until it was laid up. †

The change of the government wrought none in the condition of our admiral. An experienced officer, and a man of honour, will be a welcome servant to every prince. King William was one who valued abilities, and understood them; and therefore he often sent for Sir John Berry to confer with him on naval affairs; and once particularly the king engaged with him in so close and earnest a conversation, that it took up the whole night; and Sir John was not dismissed the royal closet, until it was pretty far advanced in the morning. Yet this favour brought him no accession either for post or profit; he kept what he had, and probably thought that sufficient, being commissioner of the navy, governor of Deal-castle, and captain of an independent company. ‡

\* *Memoirs relating to the state of the Royal Navy of England*, by Samuel Pepys, Esq. p. 52.

† Burchet's *Naval History*, book iv. ch. 1.

‡ From the *Memoirs* before-mentioned.



We now hasten to the last scene of his life, over which such a curtain has been drawn, as leaves it not in our power to let in the light. He was ordered, in the beginning of the month of February, 1691, to Portsmouth, to pay off some ships there; and, while he was employed in the discharge of this office on board one of them, he was suddenly taken ill, and thereupon carried on shore to Portsmouth, where, in three or four days, it was given out that he died of a fever; but, upon opening his body, it appeared clearly to the physicians and surgeons who were present, that he did not die a natural death, but that he had been despatched out of the world by poison; though by whom, or for what reason, never appeared, or, at least, it was never made public.\*

In his private life, his wisdom, beneficence, integrity, and unfeigned attachment to the church of England, were as conspicuous as his courage and other military virtues in his public character: so that he died equally lamented, by all who knew him, either as a private gentleman, or as an English admiral. His corpse, according to his own direction, was carried from Portsmouth to London, and decently interred in the chancel of Stepney-church; where a noble monument is erected to his memory, all of white marble, adorned with his bust in alabaster. Over his head are the arms of his family, *viz.* in a field, gules, three bars, or; and, on a white marble table underneath, the following inscription:

“ Ne id nescias, lector, D. Johannes Berry, Devoniensis,  
 “ dignitate equestri clarus, mari tantum non imperator,  
 “ de rege et patriâ (quod et barbari norunt) bene meritus,  
 “ magnam ob res fortiter gestas adeptus gloriam famæ  
 “ satur, post multas reportatas victorias, cum ab aliis

\* This gentleman might be said to die in the flower of his age, if we consider him as an admiral, since he was little more than fifty-six, when thus carried off.

“vinci non potuit, fatis cessit 14mo Feb. 1691; baptizatus 7mo Jan. 1635.”

The lady of Sir John Berry survived him many years, but he left no issue by her, nor, so far as I have been able to learn, ever had any. \*

MEMOIRS OF ARTHUR HERBERT, BARON HERBERT  
OF TORBAY, EARL OF TORRINGTON, AND ADMIRAL  
AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE FLEET OF ENGLAND.

IT is the duty of historians to report things fairly, and to speak of men impartially, without exaggerating their virtues, or extenuating their vices, by exhibiting their characters to posterity in that light, in which, after the best enquiry they are able to make, they appear to themselves; for, as water never rises higher than its source, so it is impossible that an author should do more for his reader than his talents and his informations will permit. The latter were so inconsiderable when this work was first written, that it was thought more expedient not to attempt a life of this noble person, than to repeat a few facts and dates, so indifferently connected as that it could not be presumed they would give even the most indulgent peruser any satisfaction.

After much pains and search, some better materials have been found; and as almost every remarkable transaction of this great man's life fell within the compass of King William's reign, or at least not much later, and is more or less allied to those transactions of which we have been speaking; it seemed more natural to place what we have to say of him here, than at the time of his death, when they could not fail of making an apparent breach in the order of our history.

\* This particular is likewise taken from his brother's Memoirs.

He was the son of Sir Edward Herbert of London, knight, of the noble family of Herbert of Cherbury, a branch of that of Pembroke; which suffering severely for the loyalty of Sir Edward, obliged his sons to think of making their fortunes by their industry and merit.\* Arthur the eldest, though he had a small estate of his own, made the sea his choice, as his younger brother Edward did the law; and both attained the highest stations, the latter becoming chief-justice of the king's bench,† as well as the former, admiral of the fleet of England.

Our young seaman, immediately after the restoration, was much taken notice of by his royal highness James duke of York, by whose favour he was very early promoted to the command of one of his majesty's ships of war; and, in the first Dutch war, in the reign of Charles II. he commanded the Pembroke in the Straits.‡ He distinguished himself there, according to the manner of those times, in a very high degree, as appears from the following extract of a letter from Cadiz, dated in March, 1667; which I chuse to produce in the same plain and artless language in which it was written, rather than hazard any variation in the facts, by attempting to give it a better dress.

“ Captain Herbert in the Pembroke is now in this port,  
 “ being newly returned from a fresh dispute with a Zea-  
 “ land man of war, of thirty-four guns, and one hundred  
 “ and eighty men, with whom he fought some days before,  
 “ in sight of that bay, from two in the afternoon, till the  
 “ night put an end to that day's work. All that night  
 “ the Pembroke frigate carrying out a light for the Zea-  
 “ lander, and the next morning, being to the windward,

\* Peerage of England, vol. iii. p. 317.

† Wood's Athen. Oxon. vol. ii. p. 992.

‡ An impartial account of some remarkable passages in the Life of Arthur, earl of Torrington, p. 2.

“ fired a gun, and bore up to re-engage her ; but the  
“ Zealander, being the nimbler sailer, bore away once or  
“ twice before the wind, declining any farther dispute,  
“ which the frigate perceiving, and fearing to be put to  
“ the leeward of the port by a fruitless pursuit, the wind  
“ then blowing a strong levant, came again for the bay,  
“ which the Zealander wanted not the confidence to boast  
“ of as a mark of his victory. Since this, the frigate being  
“ put ashore to wash and tallow, the Zealander made  
“ several challenges, but went out again to sea, before the  
“ frigate could get ready. Yesterday morning the Zea-  
“ lander coming in, the frigate, being ready, went out to  
“ meet him, and passed five times upon him within pistol-  
“ shot, until the Zealander, finding the service too hot,  
“ bore in for the bay, pursued for a long time by the  
“ frigate, which, being unable to overtake him, fired her  
“ chace gun, and stood out again to sea, the Zealander  
“ answering her challenge with a friendly salute of three  
“ guns to leeward, but yet thought it convenient to put  
“ into the bay, where he triumphantly fired all his guns,  
“ leaving the Pembroke at sea in vain attending him till  
“ the next morning. The captain of the Zealander after-  
“ wards came ashore, endeavouring to persuade the peo-  
“ ple that his main-mast was disabled, and that he wanted  
“ shot for his guns. In this dispute the frigate had seven  
“ men killed, and five hurt, but none mortally, and her  
“ fore-mast somewhat disabled, but will speedily be re-  
“ fitted and made serviceable.”

He continued after this affair in the Straits for about  
ix weeks, till he had advice that Rear-admiral Kemp-  
thorne \* had sailed with his squadron for the Straits  
mouth, where he took care to join him with a small fleet  
of sixteen or seventeen merchantmen under his convoy, in  
order to proceed with the rear-admiral to England. They

\* See the Memoirs of Admiral Kempthorne.

met with nothing extraordinary in their passage till about the middle of the month of May, when, being off the island of Portland, the Pembroke ran foul of the Fairfax in the night, and sunk at once; but Captain Herbert and most of his crew were happily saved, there being none lost in the vessel but a few sick men, who were not able to help themselves; and whom the suddenness of the accident, and the confusion every body was in, hindered from being assisted by others. After this narrow escape, Captain Herbert went on board another ship of the squadron, and arrived safely at Portsmouth. \*

It was not long before he had another ship given him; and both in that, and in the second Dutch war, he behaved upon all occasions with great spirit and resolution, receiving several wounds, and losing the sight of one of his eyes in his country's service; all which considered, it must seem very strange, that, when he fell afterwards under misfortunes, his courage should be disputed. In one of the last sea-fights in the second Dutch war, he had the command of the Cambridge, in which Sir Fretchville Hollis had been killed in the battle of Solebay; and, as Captain Herbert succeeded in his command, he was very nearly succeeding also to the same disaster, being desperately wounded in the action, and his ship so disabled, that together with the Resolution, which was in as bad a condition, she was by Prince Rupert sent home to refit. †

After that war was over, Captain Herbert had leisure to attend the court, and to solicit the rewards that were due to his services; in which he met with all possible kindness from the duke of York, who, as he had been hitherto careful of his fortunes, thought himself obliged to assist him in his pretensions; so that in the year 1680 or 1681, he was

\* Monthly Intelligence, Foreign and Domestic, May, 1667.

† Account of the proceedings of his majesty's fleet under the command of his serene highness Prince Rupert, Palatine of the Rhine, and duke of Cumberland, p. 4.

made rear-admiral of the blue; \* and from that time was considered as a person who had as much probability of rising as any in the service. It was not long before an occasion offered which justified this conjecture; for it being found necessary to send a supply of troops and military stores to Tangier, then in our hands, as also a squadron to curb the insolence of the Algerines, who, notwithstanding the treaties that had been concluded but a few years before, began again to disturb our commerce; it was resolved, that the command of this armament should be given to Admiral Herbert; † who was accordingly instructed to contribute as much as possible to the raising the siege of Tangier; and, when that was done, to use his best endeavours to bring the Algerines to a submission, and to a new treaty, upon better and more explicit terms than were contained in that they had lately broken, which they pretended to explain in such a manner as to justify their piracies.

In 1682, Rear-admiral Herbert sailed into the Mediterranean with a strong squadron, and a considerable number of tenders and store-ships, which arrived very safe under his convoy at Tangier. He found that fortress not a little straitened by the Moors, by whom it was so closely blocked up, that nothing could enter it by land. Mr. Herbert not only relieved the garrison by the seasonable supply that he brought of provisions and military stores; but resolved also to restore his countrymen to liberty as well as plenty, by compelling the enemy to raise the blockade. He landed, with this view, as many seamen out of the fleet as he could possibly spare; formed them into a battalion; and by attacking the Moors on one side, while the garrison made a brisk sally, and drove them from most of their posts, on the other; obliged them to leave

So I find it in an account of Naval Promotions extracted from secretary Pepy's Papers.

† Burchet's Naval History, p. 404, 405.

the neighbourhood of the place, and to retire farther within land. \*

He executed the other part of his charge with respect to the Algerines, with equal spirit and success; destroyed some of their ships; and disposed things in such a manner to disturb and distress that state by sea; as obliged the dey to summon a divan, in which it was resolved to enter into an immediate negotiation with the English admiral: the terms were very speedily settled, without any of those ambiguities, which left them pretences for breaking their treaties when they pleased; and, the business of his expedition being happily over, he returned home safe, with the squadron under his command, toward the latter end of the same year. †

Some time after this, but whether in the reign of King Charles II. or King James, I am not able to say, he was promoted to the rank of vice-admiral; and was much esteemed by the seamen, and in as high credit at court, as any officer in the service. He was also appointed one of the commissioners for executing the office of lord-high-admiral of England, in conjunction with Daniel, earl of Nottingham, Sir Humphry Winch, Bart. Sir Thomas Meeres, Knt. Sir Edward Hales, Bart. Henry Saville, Esq; Sir John Chicheley, Knt. and John Lord Vaughan, on the seventeenth of April, 1684, his name appearing in the commission, after that of Sir John Chicheley. ‡ The favours he had received from the duke of York gave him room to expect farther preferments upon the accession of that prince to the throne; nor was he deceived in his expectations; since, in the beginning of the new reign, he

\* Columna Rostrata, p. 252.

† An impartial account of some remarkable passages in the Life of Arthur, earl of Torrington. Pointer's Chronological Historian, vol. i. p. 299.

‡ The Laws, Ordinances, and Institutions of the Admiralty of Great Britain, vol. ii. p. 367.

was made vice-admiral of England, and master of the robes; \* there being at that time no man of his rank who was more heartily attached either to the government or to the person of that prince.

But when the scheme for repealing the test-act came under consideration, and King James thought fit to closet such of his officers in the army and fleet as had seats in the house of commons, it quickly appeared, that Vice-admiral Herbert was none of those complying spirits, who for the sake of private profit would sacrifice the interest of the public. † His brother, the lord chief-justice Herbert, had exposed himself to public odium by giving judgment in his court, in favour of the king's dispensing power, upon an action brought against Sir Edward Hales, who had accepted an employment, without qualifying himself for it by taking the oaths the law required; and, though this seemed in some measure to have done all that the king wanted, he still persisted in his design of having the test-act repealed; which, among other extraordinary consequences, produced the disgrace of Vice-admiral Herbert, who to that hour had never done any thing to disoblige the king, or had perceived the least coldness in his majesty towards him. ‡ We have this story at large in Bishop Burnet's History of his own Time, § with some inferences from it that are very just; I shall give it the reader, therefore, in his own words.

“ So little regard,” says that prelate, “ had the chief-justice's nearest friends to his opinion in this particular, that his brother Admiral Herbert, being pressed by the king to promise that he would vote for the repeal of the test, answered the king very plainly, that he could

\* Reresby's Memoirs, p. 241. Standford's History of the Coronation of King James and Queen Mary, p. 21, 79.

† Reresby's Memoirs, p. 241.

‡ An impartial account of some remarkable passages in the Life of Arthur, earl of Torrington, &c. § Vol. i. p. 671.



“ not do it either in honour or conscience. The king  
“ said, he knew he was a man of honour, but the rest of  
“ his life did not look like a man that had great regard to  
“ conscience. He answered boldly, he had his faults,  
“ but they were such, that other people who talked more  
“ of conscience were guilty of the like. He was indeed  
“ a man abandoned to luxury and vice : but though he  
“ was poor, and had much to lose, having places to the  
“ value of four thousand pounds a-year, he chose to lose  
“ them all rather than comply. This made much noise ;  
“ for, as he had great reputation for his conduct in sea  
“ affairs, so he had been most passionately zealous in the  
“ king’s service, from his first setting out to that day. It  
“ appeared by this, that no past service would be con-  
“ sidered, if men were not resolved to comply in every  
“ thing.”

The bishop bears very hard, in the beginning of this account of the vice-admiral’s behaviour, upon that of his brother the chief-justice, as he does likewise in many other places ; it is therefore but common justice to the character of that gentleman, who was a great lawyer, and, in private life, a very generous worthy man, to take notice, that he was very far from being so absolute a time-server as he is frequently represented ; for the truth is, that he suffered as well as his brother for his regard to the public, and there seems to be no reason that this truth should not be as well known. When King James found it was in vain to think of attaining his purposes by a parliament, he placed all his hopes in what was certainly a fitter instrument for answering his design, and that was his standing army. Yet in the management of this there was some difficulty : for, being composed of Englishmen, they shewed an inclination rather to desert their colours than to act against their country. To prevent this, it was resolved to make use of an act of parliament by which it was made felony for any soldier to quit his colours, after

being duly inlisted in the king's service, in time of war, either in parts beyond the seas or in Scotland. But, to make this law operate in England was not very consonant to law, how much soever it might be to the king's will in this point; therefore the lord chief-justice Herbert was as far from complying in this, as his brother the admiral had been in that of the test; upon which he was removed, and was succeeded in his high office by Sir Robert Wright, who not long after hanged a poor soldier upon that statute, by way of wetting his commission. \*

It is true, that Sir Edward Herbert followed the fortunes of his master, and remained with him in France, which shewed that what he did upon the bench, proceeded purely from conscience, and not from any private reason of hope or fear whatever. But this conduct of the chief-justice in succeeding times, was thrown in the teeth of his brother; and ill-natured people took occasion to suggest, that it was very unlikely one should be faithful to King William, while the other was excepted out of all acts of indemnity for his adherence to King James.† But let us now quit this short digression, which, however, shews what sentiments the soundest lawyers had of a standing army in those days; in order to return to the conduct of Vice-admiral Herbert after he was removed from his employments, and reduced to the state of a private man, with no very considerable fortune to support even that.

The small appearance there was of his being able to live with honour or even with safety at home, and his inclination to follow many persons of great reputation, who at that juncture chose to retire abroad, induced him to withdraw to Holland; whither he was either accompanied or quickly followed by his brother Colonel Charles Herbert, and by his cousin Henry Herbert, Esq. whom King

\* Wood's Athen. Oxon. vol. ii. col. 692.

† In many of the pamphlets after the earl's disgrace, this was reflected on, and the author of the impartial account apologises for it.

William afterwards created Lord Herbert of Cherbury. Upon his arrival at the Hague, the vice-admiral was exceedingly well received; and not long after taken into the service of the States, which was a very prudent, and, in its consequences, beneficial step; numbers of English seamen following, and entering for his sake into the Dutch service;\* which convinced the States that things were come to a crisis in England; and that the king had lost the affections of the subjects to a strange degree, when the seamen, who of all others had shewed themselves most hearty in his cause, began to forsake him.

At the prince of Orange's court, Vice-admiral Herbert was very sincerely welcomed; he was known to be a man of great weight and experience, one that perfectly understood the state of the English fleet, and the temper and characters of the officers who commanded it; so that there is no colour of reason to wonder he was treated with very high respect, and received into the most entire confidence; more especially as he took care to maintain his dignity by a very cautious and reserved behaviour, contrary to that heat and vehemence expressed by some other persons, who thought to make their court, by representing an attempt upon England as a thing that might be easily accomplished; whereas the vice-admiral understood and spoke of it as an undertaking that required a very considerable strength, exceedingly discreet management, and much deliberation.†

The same prelate we have before quoted gives us, on this occasion, a very different character of Mr. Herbert from that which he had drawn before, in order to shew how great his own merit was in managing a man who was altogether untractable in the hands of others, and even of the prince himself; the passage is very curious, and there-

\* Sir John Reresby's Memoirs, p. 266.

† An impartial account of many remarkable passages in the Life of Arthur, earl of Torrington, &c.

fore the reader shall see it in the bishop's own words : \*

" Admiral Herbert came over to Holland, and was received with a particular regard to his pride and ill-humour ; for he was on every occasion so sullen and peevish, that it was plain he set a high value on himself, and expected the same of all others. He had got his accounts past, in which he complained, that the king had used him not only hardly, but unjustly. He was a man delivered up to pride and luxury ; yet he had a good understanding, and he had gained so great a reputation by his steady behaviour in England, that the prince understood, that it was expected he should use him as he himself should desire, in which it was not very easy to him to constrain himself so far as that required. The managing him was in a great measure put on me ; and it was no easy thing. It made me often reflect on the providence of God, that makes some men instruments in great things, to which they themselves have no sort of affection or disposition ; for his private quarrel with the Lord Dartmouth, who he thought had more of the king's confidence than he himself had, was believed the root of all the sullenness he fell under toward the king, and of all the firmness that grew out of that."

It must appear more wonderful than any thing observed by our historian, if this was the real character of the man, that the States-General and the prince of Orange should give him the title of lieutenant-general-admiral ; and entrust him with the supreme command† of their fleet. It is true our author says, that this was not very easy to the States, or to the prince himself, who thought it an absurd thing ; but why did they do it then ? Nothing less, says he, would content Herbert. If this were so, we have

\* History of his own Time, vol. I. p. 762.

† Le Clerc Histoire des Provinces Unies, tom. iii. p. 409. Mercure Historique et Politique, tom. v. p. 1286.

some reason to believe, that the States and the prince of Orange had a very high opinion of his talents, or of his interest, in taking so extraordinary a step, merely because he would not be content without it. \*

But it was more probable, that he was put at the head of the fleet, because there were many reasons that made him the properest man for that command; such as the nature of the design itself; his interest among the officers of the English navy; his perfect acquaintance with our coasts; his being most likely to engage the governors of sea-port towns to come in to the prince; and, above all, the necessity they were under of having some Englishman in a high post, to prevent the people from considering this as a hostile invasion. Now, if we view this matter in these lights, it is no difficult thing to see, that, of all the English who were about his royal highness, Vice-admiral Herbert was, in every respect, the fittest man to be intrusted with that command; and therefore, if nothing else would content him, it might not proceed from pride, from ambition, or ill-humour, but from his making a right judgment of things, and knowing that nothing could contribute so much to the success of the enterprize; yet, of the two, it is infinitely more probable, that he did not insist upon this himself, but that the States and the prince of Orange conferred the command upon him as a thing which they saw to be very expedient, or rather absolutely necessary. †

It was certainly a very extraordinary undertaking in all respects, and will appear so, if we reflect that a great army was to be embarked; that seven hundred transports were to be prepared for that embarkation; that provisions, ammunition, and every thing requisite for the service, as well of the army as of the fleet, was to be procured in a short time, and with the utmost secrecy; all which was

\* History of his own Time, vol. i. p. 762.

† History of the Revolution, p. 13.

actually done by the indefatigable diligence of four commissioners, viz. Bentinck, Dykvelt, Van Hulst, and Herbert. It is plain therefore, that his skill in directing what was requisite for the fleet was entirely relied upon; and, if he had been such a haughty, morose, overbearing person, he could have hardly maintained a fair correspondence with his colleagues for so long a time as they were engaged in making these preparations; as to which our historian tells us, that they were two months constantly employed in giving all the necessary orders, which they did with so little noise, that nothing broke out all that time. \*

After such an instance of his capacity and indefatigable care, they might well expect that the rest of his conduct would be of a piece. But what seems farther to explain the real intention of the States and the prince of Orange in trusting Vice-admiral Herbert, though a stranger, with so high a command; was, the publishing his letter to the commanders of the English fleet at the very same time with the prince of Orange's declaration; for, if they had not placed very strong hopes upon that, without question it had never been published at all; and, if they had such hopes, this alone will sufficiently account for the giving him the chief command under the prince of Orange, to whom, by the nature of his commission, he was lieutenant-general by sea. Neither were these hopes of influencing the English seamen slightly grounded, since the pamphlets written in those times universally agree, that the seamen had a very general and warm aversion from Popery; disliked and despised such of their officers as had embraced that religion; and were very prone in their cups to drink Admiral Herbert's health; so that these were very strong indications of their ill-will on one side, and their good-will on the other. †

\* History of his own Time, vol. i. p. 781.

† An impartial account of many remarkable passages in the Life of the Earl of Torrington, &c.

It is however true, that this letter had not the effect that was expected from it, or rather had not such an effect so soon as it was expected; but this was chiefly owing to unforeseen and inevitable accidents; neither can any thing be affirmed about it with much certainty: but, as the letter itself is curious, and as it is not commonly to be met with, unless in a French translation, it may not be disagreeable to the reader here; and there is the more reason to insert it, because nothing can have a closer relation to this noble person's memoirs, since it must be allowed to have been the most remarkable and most important paper that ever fell from his pen, and was conceived in the following words:

TO ALL COMMANDERS OF SHIPS AND SEAMEN IN HIS  
MAJESTY'S FLEET.

GENTLEMEN,

I HAVE little to add to what his highness has expressed in general terms, besides laying before you the dangerous way you are at present in, where ruin or infamy must inevitably attend you, if you do not join with the prince in the common cause for the defence of your religion and liberties; for should it please God, for the sins of the English nation, to suffer your arms to prevail, to what end can your victory serve you, but to enslave you deeper, and overthrow the true religion in which you have lived, and your fathers died? of which I beg you as a friend to consider the consequences, and to reflect on the blot and infamy it will bring on you, not only now, but in all after-ages; that by your means the Protestant religion was destroyed, and your country deprived of its ancient liberties; and if it pleases God to bless the prince's endeavours with success, as I do not doubt but he will, consider then what their condition will be that oppose him in this so good a

design, where the greatest favour they can hope for, is their being suffered to end their days in misery and want, detested and despised by all good men.

It is, therefore, for these and for many other reasons, too long to insert here, that I, as a true Englishman, and your friend, exhort you to join your arms to the prince for the defence of the common cause, the Protestant religion, and the liberties of your country.

It is what I am well assured, the major and best part of the army, as well as the nation, will do as soon as convenience is offered. Prevent them in so good an action, while it is in your power; and make it appear, that as the kingdom has always depended on the navy for its defence, so you will yet go further, by making it as much as in you lies the protection of her religion and liberties; and then you may assure yourselves of all marks of favour and honour, suitable to the merits of so glorious an action. After this I ought not to add so inconsiderable a thing, as that it will for ever engage me to be in a most particular manner,

Your faithful friend, and humble servant,

AN. HERBERT.

Aboard the *Léyden*, in the *Goree*.

When every thing was ready, the troops were embarked with so much speed and secrecy, that no advices could be given in England that could be of any use; but, notwithstanding this care, the fleet was obliged to return. They sailed on the 19th of October, 1688, and they put back into port on the 22d. This was a great disappointment; and, without doubt, had things been managed by a prince of less firmness, or by an admiral of less experience, their expedition had been lost.\* It is reported, that Admiral Herbert advised putting off the business to that late season

\* History of the Revolution by R. T. Hist. de Guillaume III. Prince d'Orange.



of the year, because he judged that the winds would be more favourable; that the king's fleet would be less able to act; and that, when the enterprise was so long delayed, it would be concluded in England to be given over.

His serene highness came into this proposition for the reasons before assigned, and for one as weighty as any of them, which was more immediately known to, and more fully comprehended by himself; and this was, that the season of the year for a campaign being over, the French were not likely to make any attempts; and, consequently, the States-General ran little or no hazard by their troops being thus employed at this juncture.\* It is on all sides acknowledged, that it was owing to reasons suggested by Admiral Herbert, that the prince of Orange laid aside his intention of sailing northward to the Humber, which must have been attended with great inconveniences, as no fleet could lye long with safety on that coast:† but it is not certain whether he gave the advice, which however was followed, of publishing in all the Dutch gazettes, that the fleet had been very roughly handled by the storm; that abundance of horses had been thrown overboard, that many persons of distinction, and particularly Dr. Burnet, were cast away and drowned; which had the effect, that was expected from it, of persuading such as were not in the secret, that the expedition was totally overthrown, or that it must be postponed for some months at least.‡

It is very certain, that this unexpected check made many people mighty uneasy, and occasioned some very extraordinary proposals to the prince. Among the rest one was, that Admiral Herbert with a stout squadron should proceed to the English coast, and fight the king's fleet, from

\* *Mercure Historique et Politique*, Octobre, Novembre, et Decembre, 1688.

† Burnet's *History of his own Time*, vol. i. p. 178.

‡ Kennet's *History of England*, vol. iii. p. 526. *Life of King William*, p. 131. *History of the Description*, p. 59.

which he was not at all averse ; but the weather rendered it impracticable. The prince of Orange, however, never altered his intention in the least ; but having given the necessary orders for repairing the ships, and refreshing the troops, which was soon done ; the fleet sailed again upon the 1st of November, \* and, as we have shewn elsewhere, arrived speedily and safely on the English coast ; where, by the skill and care of Admiral Herbert, the troops were very soon landed ; and, by his intelligence with several persons of distinction in the neighbourhood, amply supplied with provisions and other necessaries. In a very few days after, the good effect of the admiral's letter appeared by the coming in of several ships, the first of which was the Newcastle, lying at Plymouth, under the command of Captain Churchill ; † and, the way being once broken, the seamen declared in general for the prince ; from all which it fully appeared, how much the success of this great affair was owing to the valour, vigilance, and prudence of this noble person.

On the 8th of March, 1688, King William granted a commission for executing the office of lord-high-admiral to the following persons, viz. Arthur Herbert, Esq. John, earl of Carbery, Sir Michael Wharton, Sir Thomas Lee, baronet, Sir John Chichely, knight, Sir John Lowther of Whitehaven, baronet, and William Sacheverel, Esq. but the last declined accepting that post, declaring, that, as he understood nothing of maritime affairs, he could not accept the salary with a safe conscience. ‡ As for the command of the fleet, that was intrusted with Admiral Herbert from the beginning, and he had likewise the honour of bringing over the new queen. §

\* Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. i. p. 787, 788. Kennet, vol. iii. p. 527. Life of King William, p. 133, 134.

† Remarkable passages in the Life of Arthur, Earl of Torrington, &c.

‡ History of the Proceedings of the House of Lords, vol. i. p. 343

§ See the Naval History in 1689.

We have already given a large account of his behaviour in the business of Bantry-bay; \* of the motives which induced him to fight the French fleet; and of the consequences of that action; collected as well from the French as our historians: but after all, perhaps the reader will not be displeased to see the account published by authority, drawn from the admiral's own letter from on board the Elizabeth, dated May the second, 1689, and which imported,

“ That Admiral Herbert, having refitted at Milford-haven the damages which some of his ships had sustained by ill weather on the coast of Ireland, intended to go directly for Brest; but the wind coming easterly, which might bring the French fleet out, he stood, on the 24th past, over to Kingsale, which he judged the likeliest way to meet them.

“ That accordingly, on the 29th, our scouts made signal, that they discovered a fleet keeping their wind, which made us likewise keep our own all night, to hinder them from getting into Kingsale. The 30th they heard the enemy was gone into Baltimore, being forty-four sail; whereupon ours bore away to that place, but found there was no sign of them. That in the evening our scouts got sight of them again to the westward of Cape Clear: we steered after them, and found they were got into the Bantry; we lay off the bay all night. and the next morning, by break of day, stood in, where we found them at anchor. That they got presently under sail, and bore down upon our fleet in a line composed of twenty-eight men-of-war and five fire ships. That when they came within musket-shot of the Defiance, the headmost of our ships, the French admiral put out the signal of battle, which was begun by them, they firing their great and small shot very furiously on the Defiance and the rest,

\* Printed in a sheet and a half in the Savoy.

“ as we came in our line. That then we made several  
“ boards to gain the wind, or at least to engage them  
“ closer; but, finding that way of working very disadvantageous, Admiral Herbert stood off to sea, as well to  
“ have got our ships into a line, as to have gained the  
“ wind of the enemy, but found them so cautious in bearing down, that we could never get an opportunity of  
“ doing it; and in this posture continued battering upon  
“ a stretch until five in the afternoon, when the French  
“ admiral tacked from us, and stood away farther into the  
“ bay.

“ That Admiral Herbert's ship, and some of the rest,  
“ being disabled in their rigging, we could not follow  
“ them; but we continued some time after before the bay,  
“ and our admiral gave him a gun at parting. In this  
“ action Captain Aylmer in the Portland, who came in  
“ soon enough for the battle, with others of the squadron  
“ mentioned, and ninety-four seamen were killed, and  
“ about two hundred and fifty wounded, as appears by a  
“ survey taken after the fight; and our ships received  
“ little damage, except in their sails and rigging.

“ That, as for our officers and seamen, that right must  
“ be done them, they behaved themselves with all the  
“ courage and cheerfulness that could be expected from  
“ the bravest men; and that on the other side, without  
“ lessening the enemy, it may be said that they either  
“ wanted courage or skill to make use of the advantage of  
“ the place, the wind, their fire-ships, and their number,  
“ being at least double our force, they having eighteen  
“ ships, the least of which was as big as the Elizabeth;  
“ and it so happened, at the time of the engagement,  
“ Admiral Herbert had with him but eight third-rates, ten  
“ fourth-rates, one fifth-rate, and two tenders. And that  
“ the fleet designed to rendezvous and refit at Scilly.”

As to the personal behaviour of Admiral Herbert in this action, it was altogether unexceptionable; he was in the

hottest of the service himself, had several of the largest of the enemy's ships upon him at a time, notwithstanding which he continued to expose himself to encourage the seamen, sword in hand upon the quarter-deck, and to do all that lay in his power to continue the engagement; inso-much that many thought, that, if the rest of the officers had done their duty as well as he, they had given a better account of the French than they did: \* for which some officers were called to a court-martial, and broken; so much was the admiral a lover of discipline. On the 15th of May, when the king dined on board his ship, he was pleased to express great satisfaction in his conduct, and declared his intention of creating him a peer, as he afterwards did, viz. on the 29th of the same month, by the title of *Baron Herbert, of Torbay, and earl of Torrington*. † The house of commons also were pleased to give him thanks for the service he had done the nation, in taking the first opportunity to fight the French in Bantry-bay. ‡

The reader will, without doubt, be pleased to see this matter set in the most authentic light from the journal of the house, in which it appears, that Arthur Herbert, Esq. then burgess for the town of Plymouth in the county of Devon, being in his place, had their thanks in consequence of an order made the Saturday before, which are thus entered:

*Martis 21<sup>o</sup> die Maii, primo Wilhelmi et Mariae.*

Mr. Speaker gave Admiral Herbert the thanks of the house according to their order of Saturday last, to the effect as followeth, viz.

\* Impartial account of some remarkable passages in the Life of Arthur, Earl of Torrington, p. 19.

† Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 594. Life of King William, p. 232. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 10, 11.

‡ Chandler's Debates, vol. ii. p. 318.

“ Admiral HERBERT,

“ THIS house hath taken notice of the great service  
“ you have performed in engaging the French fleet : they  
“ do look upon it as one of the bravest actions done in  
“ this last age, and expect it will raise the reputation of  
“ the English valour to its ancient glory. I do, there-  
“ fore, by the command of this house, return you their  
“ hearty thanks for this service, and desire that you will  
“ communicate the like thanks, in their name, to the  
“ officers and seamen that served under your command,  
“ and to let them know that this house will have a parti-  
“ cular regard of their merits, and take care, as much as  
“ in them lies, to give them all due encouragement.”

Whereupon Admiral Herbert spake to the effect as fol-  
loweth :

“ SIR,

“ I AM in some confusion at this great and unexpected  
“ honour, and the more, because I want words to express  
“ my sense of it. The best return that I think myself  
“ capable of making, is to assure this honourable house,  
“ that, with my utmost hazard, I will endeavour, by my  
“ future actions, to deserve it, and will not fail to obey  
“ their commands, in acquainting the officers and seamen,  
“ who were with me, of the favourable acceptance, by  
“ this house, of their service. And, since the house have  
“ so favourable an opinion of their actions, I would beg  
“ their leave to make an humble motion, and I think it is  
“ a thing becoming the greatness of this nation, and  
“ indeed has been the care of almost all the nations that  
“ have any commerce at sea : it is, to assign some place  
“ and revenue for the support of such as are maimed in  
“ the service and defence of their country. There is no  
“ sufficient provision made at present in this kingdom,  
“ and indeed it is too great a charge for the crown. I  
“ therefore humbly move, it may be ordered by this

“ house, that an act may pass, that they may have a support and subsistence, after they have by wounds been made incapable of farther service.”

Resolved, That the house will take care to make a provision for such seamen as are, or shall be wounded in their majesties’ service, and for the wives and children of such as are, or shall be slain therein; and that a committee be appointed to consider how the same may be done.

And it is referred to Admiral Herbert, Mr. Hales, Mr. Boscawen, Mr. Ashburnham, Sir William Williams, Mr. Garway, Mr. Elwel, Lord Cooke, Mr. Holles, Mr. Papillon, Mr. Gwyn, Lord Falkland, Lord Sherrard, Mr. Bickerstaff, Mr. Henry Herbert, Mr. Edward Russel, Mr. Bromley, Mr. Thomas Foley, Sir Duncan Colchester, Mr. Leveson Gower, Mr. P. Foleys, Sir Henry Capell, Sir Christopher Musgrave, Mr. Sacheverel, M. Cooke, and Sir Thomas Littleton.

As he was at this time possessed of all that a man could well desire, the esteem of his prince, the favour of the people, and the love of the seamen, so it is allowed that he behaved in a manner every way worthy of his station; living very magnificently when in town; and shewing a great respect for his officers when at sea, which gained him a wonderful interest in the fleet; to this, though some have given a sinister turn, as if it were the chief cause of his acquittal by the court-martial that tried him; yet impartial judges will hardly believe, that he could have gained such an interest but by an extraordinary degree of merit, and by a readiness to distinguish it in other men; for which, while it was not in some degree criminal to affirm it, he was generally famous in the navy.\* When he went down to take the command, in the spring of the

\* Inquiry into the conduct of maritime affairs since the revolution, p. 21.

year 1690, of the confederate fleet, his character stood as fair as any officer's could do; and even the Dutch in their relations allow, that his conduct was very great in shifting and avoiding an engagement in pursuance of the advice of a council of war, founded upon the enemy's great superiority, till such time as he received positive orders to fight; and then he shewed likewise great judgment in the disposition he made for an engagement. \*

We have little to add to the account we have already given of the action off Beachy-head, on the 30th of June, except that in the battle there was not so much as one English man of war lost, and but one of the Dutch; that, in the whole course of the retreat, the earl of Torrington gave his orders with great prudence, and in such a manner as prevented the French from making any great advantage of what they called a victory; notwithstanding the inequality of the fleet, and some unlucky accidents that happened in spite of all the precautions that could be taken. Neither was his lordship at all discomposed, when, upon his being sent for up to town, he found so general a clamour, raised against him; but, on the contrary, gave a very clear account of the matters before the council; insisted, that he had done all that was in his power to do, which made him easy in his mind as to the consequences; being persuaded, that, of the two, it was much better for him to ruin himself than to ruin the fleet, as he absolutely must have done, if he had acted otherwise than he did. †

All he could say, however, had little effect at that time; so that he was committed to the Tower, and commissioners were sent down to inspect into the condition of the fleet, and to make the necessary inquiries for framing a

\* See the letter of Admiral Evertson in the former part of this volume.

† Kennet's History of England, vol. iii. p. 603. Burchet's Naval History, p. 428. Life of King William, p. 275.



charge against him; it being held absolutely requisite to bring him to a trial, that the justice of the nation might not suffer in the opinion of her allies; the resentment of the Dutch having risen so high as to threaten pulling down the house of Lord Dursley, who then resided at the Hague. \*

When the parliament met, October the 2d, 1690, his majesty was pleased to take notice in his speech, in a very particular manner, of the disaster that had happened off Beachy-head; and the paragraph being but short, we shall insert it: † “ I cannot conclude without taking notice also how much the honour of the nation has been exposed by the ill conduct of my fleet in the last summer’s engagement against the French, and I think myself so much concerned to see it vindicated, that I cannot rest satisfied till an example has been made of such as shall be found faulty upon their examination and trial, which was not practicable while the whole fleet was abroad, but is now put into the proper way of being done as soon as may be.” But, notwithstanding this, the proceedings against the earl of Torrington were not very expeditious; and therefore he applied himself by way of petition to the house of peers, who took his case into consideration; but, after having fully debated it, left him to the ordinary course of proceedings; or, in other words, referred him to a court-martial.

Yet, in order to the constituting of such a court, as we have elsewhere observed, there were some difficulties to be got over, and those of such a nature as demanded the attention of the legislature; in order to effect which, a bill was brought in for vesting in the commissioners, of the admiralty the same power in regard to granting

\* Impartial account of some remarkable passages in the Life of Arthur, Earl of Torrington, p. 24.

† Debates in the House of Commons, vol. ii. p. 384.

commissions, which was already vested by law in the lord high-admiral of England. \*

It may not be amiss to observe, that on the 20th of January, 1689, the king had appointed a new board of admiralty, in which Thomas earl of Pembroke and Montgomery, was first lord instead of the earl of Torrington, and Sir Michael Wharton was left out. On the 5th of June, 1690, the board was again changed and augmented from five to seven. These were Thomas earl of Pembroke and Montgomery, John, earl of Carbery, Sir Thomas Lee, Bart. Sir John Lowther, Bart. Edward Russel, Esq; Sir Richard Onslow, Bart. and Henry Priestman, Esq; and to this board it was that the intended act gave the power of appointing court-martials for the trial of any officer of what rank soever, as a lord high-admiral might do. When this bill came to be read a third time in the house of peers, it occasioned very warm debates; many lords being of opinion, that it would have been better, if, instead of a new board, his majesty had appointed a lord high-admiral, in which case there would have been no need whatever of a new law: but at length, however, it was carried by a majority of two only; upon which many of the lords entered their protests for the following reasons: †

“ Because this bill gives a power to commissioners of  
 “ the admiralty to execute a jurisdiction, which, by the  
 “ act of the 13th of Charles II. intituled, *An act for establishing articles and orders for the regulating and better*  
 “ *government of his majesty’s navy, ships of war, and*  
 “ *forces by sea,* we conceive they had not; whereby the  
 “ earl of Torrington may come to be tried for his life,  
 “ for facts committed several months before this power  
 “ was given or desired; we think it reasonable that every

\* See this act in the statutes at large.

† The History and Proceedings of the House of Lords, vol. i. p. 405.

“ man should be tried by that law that was known to be  
 “ in force when the crime was committed.

“ It is by virtue of the said act of the 13th of Charles  
 “ II. that the earl of Torrington was judged by this  
 “ house not to have the privilege of a peer of this  
 “ realm for any offences committed against the said act;  
 “ and there is no other law, as we conceive, by which the  
 “ said earl could have been debarred from enjoying the  
 “ privilege of a peer of this realm: which act making no  
 “ mention of commissioners of the admiralty, but of a  
 “ lord high-admiral only, by whose authority all the  
 “ powers given by that act are to be exercised, and with-  
 “ out whose consent singly no sentence of death can be  
 “ executed, we think it of dangerous consequence to ex-  
 “ pound a law of this capital nature otherwise than the  
 “ literal words do import; and as we conceive it without  
 “ precedent to pass even explanatory laws, much less such  
 “ as have a retrospect in them in cases of life and death,  
 “ so we think it not at all necessary to make such a pre-  
 “ cedent at this time, there being an undoubted legal way  
 “ already established to bring this earl to a trial by a  
 “ lord high-admiral.

“ Thirdly, the judges having unanimously declared,  
 “ that the law-marine was no where particularised in  
 “ their books, whereby the power or jurisdiction of the  
 “ lord high-admiral may be ascertained, so that practice  
 “ is all that we know of it; we conceive it unprecedented,  
 “ and of dangerous consequence, that the jurisdiction ex-  
 “ ercised by the lord high-admiral should by a law be  
 “ declared to be in the commissioners of the admiralty,  
 “ whereby an unknown, and therefore unlimited power  
 “ may be established in them.

“ Rivers, Huntington, Rochester, Weymouth. Stam-  
 “ ford, Dartmouth, Oxford, Macclesfield, Thomas  
 “ Roffen, Crew, Bath, Granville, Herbert, Craven.  
 “ J. Exon, Bolton. J. Bridgewater.”

As soon as the bill had passed both houses, and had received the royal assent, the earl of Torrington was removed out of the Tower into the custody of the marshal of the admiralty, where he had not been long before he brought his case into the house of commons. This was done by a member's acquainting the house, that this noble peer was desirous of being heard at their bar in respect of the matter for which he was in custody. Upon this an order was made for his lordship's being brought thither the next day; the serjeant at arms was directed to serve the marshal of the admiralty with a copy of it, which he did accordingly; and, November the 12th, the house being informed, that his lordship was in the lobby, directed him to be brought in by the serjeant, with the mace, to a chair set for him within the bar on the left-hand of the house as he came in; and having sat down thereon for some time covered, and the mace being laid upon the table; his lordship rose, and stood at the back of the chair uncovered, and was heard before the house; after which his lordship withdrew, the mace attending him. \*

This is all we meet with in the journal; but a writer of those times assures us, that his lordship found himself so much embarrassed in the presence of that assembly, as not to be able to express himself as he intended; upon which he acquainted the commons, that, being accustomed rather to act than to speak, he found himself at a loss for words, and therefore desired to make use of his papers, which was allowed him. He then took notice how early he had entered into his country's service; how many years he had spent therein, and of his having spilled much blood, as well as been deprived of his eye, in their quarrel. He proceeded next to the loss he had sustained for supporting the Protestant religion, and the laws and liber-

\* Journal-book of the House of Commons, *die Martis*, Nov. 11, and *die Mercur*, Nov. 12, 1690.

ties of England under King James II. Last of all, he spoke of the engagement with the French fleet off Beachy-head, in respect of which he excused his not fighting, from the want of intelligence, want of ammunition, shortness of wind, inequality of numbers, and, in support of what he said, produced some letters; but all this was of little or no use to his lordship. The house remitted him to that trial for which the late act had made way, and of which the highest expectations were raised at home and abroad, the king being resolved not to embark for Holland till it was all over. \*

Accordingly, Saturday the 6th of December, 1690, his lordship went down to Sheerness in his yacht, the court-martial sitting there on board the Kent: on Monday, December 8, Sir Ralph Delaval, being in the chair as president, the commission was opened and read, and other preliminaries adjusted; after which the court adjourned to Wednesday the 10th, when the witnesses were heard on the part of the crown, as well Dutch as English: † but, notwithstanding the loudness of the common reports, there was very little appeared in proof, although the court took all the pains they could to sift things to the bottom; his lordship then made his defence in the manner that has been before-mentioned; insisted largely on the superiority of the French fleet; on the shifting of the wind; which put it out of his power to succour the Dutch; on the care taken to secure a retreat; and the small advantage that the enemy reaped from their so much boasted success in this action, which had drawn upon their admiral, Count Tourville, as many censures as upon himself, and with pretty much the same reason. After mature

\* Impartial account of some remarkable passages in the Life of Arthur, Earl of Torrington. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. ix. p. 657, 658.

† Minutes of the court-martial on board his majesty's ship the Kent, Sir Ralph Delaval, president, December 8, 1690.

consideration, both of the charge, of his defence, and of the evidence offered; the court, *nemine contradicente*, acquitted him wholly of any imputation whatever, from his conduct on that occasion. To which, when required to sign it, they most steadily adhered. It is said, that a certain Dutch rear-admiral, who was present, expressed his resentment very warmly; and it is certain, the proceedings were quickly after printed in Dutch, with some animadversions. \*

On Thursday, December the 11th, the earl of Torrington returned to town in his barge, with the union flag flying, as bearing still the king's commission of admiral and commander in chief. He returned to his own house, where he received the compliments of his friends, and the news, which could not surprize him much, that his commission was superseded. He was almost the only victim in that reign, for he never received any mark of favour, much less enjoyed any command afterwards. † He came, however, in a few days to the house of peers, where he constantly attended for above twenty years after, without altering his conduct in the least, which is a manifest proof that he was not governed by caprice, but by principle. He was always on the side of the crown, and very rarely in an opposition to its ministers; sometimes, however, he was, and then he commonly protested, that the reasons of his opposition might appear, and that the world might not ascribe his disagreement with men in power to prejudice or spleen. In matters that related to the navy, he was generally most forward; and in respect of them, the house heard him with much respect and attention; and upon such occasions he shewed himself commonly a friend to strict discipline, and a frugal management in the navy. ‡

\* Impartial account of some remarkable passages, &c.

† Kennet, Burchet, Burnet, Life of King William, Oldmixon, &c.

‡ History and Proceedings of the House of Lords, vol. i. p. 426, 444, vol. ii. p. 5, 22, 39, 46, 72, 74, 430.

He raised, while in employment, a considerable fortune, upon which he lived in a manner becoming his rank, during the remainder of his life. His lordship was twice married, and never had any children; \* and at length, after having spent the latter part of his life in as much privacy and quiet as he had done the former scenes of it in action; he breathed his last, April the 13th, 1716, in a good old age, leaving the bulk of his estate to the right honourable Henry, earl of Lincoln, merely out of respect to that noble person's steady adherence to the same cause, which the earl of Torrington supported during his whole life. † These particulars, which had hitherto lain scattered in a variety of authors, we have, with the utmost diligence, gathered and digested according to the natural order of time; that the memory of so brave a man might not be altogether buried in oblivion; or that clamour, which the best of judges thought without foundation, be as fatal to his frame after death, as while living it was to his power.

These, however scanty, are all the memorials that we have been able to discover from books or information, as to the eminent seamen who flourished in this reign, except it be a very few dates in respect of the following illustrious persons.

John Lord Berkley, of Stratton, was the son of Sir John Berkley, the faithful servant of King Charles I. and King Charles II. by whom, during his exile, he was created baron of Stratton, in the county of Somerset, and younger brother to Charles, Lord Berkley, of Stratton, who died at sea in 1682. This noble lord was rear-admiral at the time of the revolution, groom of the stole, and first gen-

\* Peerage of England, printed for Abel Roper, London, 1709, 8vo p. 278.

† Historical Register for the year 1716, p. 219.

tleman of the bed-chamber to Prince George of Denmark : and, as we have seen, often admiral of the fleet in the reign of King William, and colonel of the second regiment of marines ; of all which employments he was possessed when he died, February 27, 1696-7, leaving behind him no issue male, so that the title devolved on his younger brother William, father to the present worthy nobleman, John Lord Berkley of Stratton. \*

The honourable Edward Neville, Esq. was the second son of George Lord Abergavenny, and notwithstanding his high birth, arrived at his station in the navy by pure dint of merit. He died on board the *Lincoln*, the 12th of September, 1701, in the thirty-seventh year of his age, as his squadron made the land of Virginia, and left behind him a son, the late Lord Abergavenny, who deceased at Bath, the 21st of September, 1744, and a daughter. †

We cannot shut up our account of this reign better than by an abstract of the royal navy, as it stood at the decease of King William ; that the reader, by comparing it with the abstract at the end of Chapter XVII. may from thence discern how far, notwithstanding so long a war, and so many other interruptions and misfortunes, our naval force increased in the space of thirteen years.

ABSTRACT OF THE ROYAL NAVY, AS IT STOOD  
DECEMBER 25, 1701.

Rates.	Number.	Guns.	Men.
I. ....	7 .....	714 .....	5,312
II. ....	14 .....	1,276 .....	8,324
III. ....	45 .....	3,199 .....	18,561
..	<hr/> 66	<hr/> 5,189	<hr/> 32,697

\* Collins's Peerage of England, vol. iv. p. 168.

† Collins's Peerage of England, vol. iv. p. 12. Supplement to the Peerage, by the same author, vol. vi. p. 409.



Rates.	Number.	Guns.	Men.
Brought over .....	66	5,189	32,697
IV. ....	63	3,253	15,329
V. ....	86	1,094	4,680
VI. ....	29	512	1,215
	<hr/> 194	<hr/> 10,078	<hr/> 53,921
Fire-ships .....	8	Tonnage	
Bomb-vessels.....	13	In Dec. 1688 .....	101,022
Yachts .....	10	In Dec. 1701 .....	158,992
			<hr/>
Increase .....			57,969

## CHAP. IV.

Containing the Naval History of Great Britain, from the Accession of her Majesty Queen Anne, to the Union of the two Kingdoms.

D. 01. WE are now come down to that reign, under which the nation was extremely happy at home, and her reputation carried to the greatest height abroad. A reign that will always be remembered with honour, and make a shining figure in our histories, as long as histories shall last: a reign, in the beginning of which all party animosities were buried in oblivion, and the Tories seemed as sensible of the necessity of a war, as the Whigs, and as ready to carry it on; which was the true reason why it was prosecuted for so many years with such vigour and success as had never attended our arms since the glorious days of Queen Elizabeth; and which ought therefore to convince us, that we are never to hope for a thorough domestic settlement, with an effectual support of our just claims to respect and freedom of commerce abroad, until there is a new and undissembled coalition of parties, founded not in private views, but arising from public spirit; and all men are taught to think that he is a public enemy, who avows any other or narrower interest than that of his country.

Queen Anne acceded to the throne on the eighth of March, 1701-2, in the flower of her age, if we consider her dignity, being then about thirty-eight.\* She had shewn a very just moderation of her conduct from the time of the revolution, and knew how to temper her relation to the state, with that which she bore to her family; of

\* Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 309. † Oldmixon's Hist. of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 273. Boyer's Life of Queen Anne. Conduct of Sarah, Duchess dowager of Marlborough, p. 121.

which she gave a remarkable instance in the latter part of her life, by procuring the island of Sicily for her cousin the duke of Savoy.

She opened her reign with a very wise and well-considered speech to her privy-council, in which she declared, how sensible she was of the unspeakable loss the nation had sustained by the death of the late king, and the burden it brought upon herself; which nothing, she said, could encourage her to undergo, but the great concern she had for the preservation of the religion, laws, and liberty of her country: and that no pains should be wanting on her part, to defend and support them, and to maintain the Protestant succession. She expressed plainly her opinion for carrying on the preparations against France, and supporting the allies; and said, she would countenance those who concurred with her in maintaining the present constitution and establishment.

In pursuance of this declaration, the queen wrote to the States-general to assure them, that she would follow exactly the steps of her predecessor, in the steady maintenance of the common cause against the common enemy: and as a farther proof of her sincerity, she appointed the earl of Marlborough, whom the late king had sent ambassador and plenipotentiary to the states, captain-general of her forces, and gave him a blue ribbon. † She likewise

\* It is very remarkable, that the conduct of the queen at the beginning of her reign was such, as gave the highest satisfaction to all parties; for she avoided the error of Nero, by not either screwing up the strings of government too high, or letting them run too low. It had been happy for her, and for her subjects, if she had steadily pursued this conduct through the course of her reign, instead of putting herself into the hands of one party first, and then of another; both which had very ill consequences, with respect to her majesty's quiet, and to the good of her subjects. This reflection I thought necessary here, because, by inserting it, I shall avoid being obliged to say something like it, on several other occasions.

† Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 313. Lediard's Life of John, Duke of Marlborough, vol. i. p. 94. London Gazetteer, No. 3702.

declared Sir George Rooke vice-admiral of England, and George Churchill, Esq. admiral of the blue, \* in the room of Matthew Aylmer, Esq. afterwards Lord Aylmer; whom we have mentioned already, and of whom we shall have occasion to speak very honourably hereafter. These steps were sufficient to demonstrate the reality of the queen's intentions; and therefore we have all the reason in the world to believe, that her majesty had a very good design in placing her consort, George prince of Denmark, † at the head of the admiralty; though to do this it was found requisite to remove the earl of Pembroke, then lord high-admiral, who was actually preparing to go to sea. It is true, a large pension was offered him; but his lordship answered, with great generosity and public spirit, ‡ that however convenient it might be for his private interest; yet, the accepting such a pension was inconsistent with his principles; and therefore, since he could not have the honour of serving his country in person, he would endeavour to do it by HIS EXAMPLE. §

\* London Gazette, No. 3810.

† Boyer's Life of Queen Anne. Complete Hist. of Europe for the year 1702, p. 151. London Gazette, No. 3812.

‡ Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 313.

§ The advancement of the earl of Pembroke to this eminent dignity of lord high-admiral of England, was not owing at all to court favour; but merely as I have hinted before, to the expediency of laying that board aside, and lodging the power of it in a single hand. There were few of our nobility who could have been competitors for such an office; and none with justice who could be preferred to the earl of Pembroke. He had much prudence, which tempered great vivacity in his constitution, and zeal for the service of his country; which was very observable in all his actions, though he did not make so much shew of it, as others might do in words. He had a steadiness of mind, not to be shaken by power or titles; and a virtue so heroic, as not either the vices of these, or of worse times could corrupt. He showed, on this occasion, his loyalty as well as spirit; for though he refused a pension, yet, through the course of her reign, he served the queen with the same cheerfulness and fidelity, as if he had retained his post; and therefore, in 1708, when Prince George of Den-

The new lord high-admiral had a council appointed him by his commission, viz. Sir George Rooke, Sir David Mitchell, George Churchill, Esq. and Richard Hill, Esq. who were to assist him with their advice, and also in the execution of his office.\* How far all this was legal, has been, and, I believe, ever will remain, very doubtful; but, at that time, no body questioned it, and therefore we shall proceed to shew what was done under it; observing, as nearly as may be, the order of time in which events fell out, and that method in relating them, which is most likely to set them in a proper point of light.†

The first expedition in the new reign, was that of Sir John Munden, rear-admiral of the red, which was intended for intercepting a squadron of French ships, that were to sail from the Groyne, in order to carry the new viceroy of Mexico to the Spanish West Indies. This design was concerted by the earl of Pembroke; and Sir

A.D.  
1701

mark died, her majesty restored him to it. A full proof of her removing him at this time, from no other motive than that of making way for her consort, who had been several times mentioned for that high post in the late reign.

Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 113. Oldmixon, vol. ii. London Gazette, No. 3812.

† It is not easy to find a reason why, since the illegality of this commission was so quickly suspected, it should afterwards lie so long asleep, and then be revived again, as soon as complaints were made to parliament of the conduct of the navy. Those who advised this commission, and those who drew it, were certainly very much to blame; and since this is a charge of a high nature, and against great men, I think myself obliged to explain it particularly. As King William's creating a lord high-admiral, was a benefit to the public; so Queen Anne's commission was an injury to it. For, by appointing Prince George of Denmark a council, she established again that evil which King William took away; and whereas, the powers of the lords commissioners of the admiralty were settled by an express act of parliament, here was a new board established, vested with like powers; but those unknown to the law, which could take notice only of the lord high-admiral, notwithstanding that his council was appointed by his commission.

John was made choice of, on account of the proofs he had given of both courage and conduct, as well as zeal and diligence, in the service. He sailed on the twelfth of May, 1702, with eight ships of the third rate, the Salisbury, a fourth rate, and two frigates; when he was at sea, he communicated his orders to his captains, which hitherto had been absolutely secret. On the sixteenth, he found himself on the coast of Galicia; whereupon he sent the Salisbury and Dolphin to gain intelligence, in which they failed. He then sent them a second time, and they brought off a Spanish boat and a French bark, with several prisoners, who asserted, that there were thirteen French ships of war, bound from Rochelle to the Groyne; and therefore Sir John issued the necessary orders for keeping his squadron between them and the shore; that he might be the better able to intercept them. These orders were issued on the twenty-seventh; and, the very next day, he discovered fourteen sail between cape Prior and cape Ortugal, close under the shore, to whom he instantly gave chase; but they outsailed him very much, and got into the Groyne before he could possibly come up with them. These dates are settled from the minutes of the court-martial, which will be hereafter mentioned.

Upon this he called a council of war, wherein it was concluded, that, since the accounts they had received from their prisoners agreed perfectly well, and seemed to make it clear, that there were no less than seventeen of the enemy's ships of war in the harbour, which was strongly fortified, and had a narrow and dangerous entrance; it was therefore most expedient for them to follow the latter part of their instructions; by which they were directed, in case they could do nothing on the coast of Spain, to repair into the Soundings, there to protect the trade, and to give notice of their return to the board of admiralty immediately. This Sir John accordingly did, about the middle of June; but then the squadron being much distressed for

provisions, it was found necessary, on the twentieth of that month, to repair into port. \*

The miscarriage of this design made a very great noise : it was discovered that only eight of the twelve ships that had been chased into the Groyne, were men of war, and that the rest were only transports : it was also said, that Sir John Munden had called off the Salisbury, when she was actually engaged with a French man of war ; and that he had discharged the prisoners he had taken very precipitately. To quash these reports, and to explain the whole affair to the world, which is, to be sure, the best method in all such cases, the high-admiral Prince George issued his commission for a court-martial, for the trial of Sir John Munden, at which several persons of distinction, for their own satisfaction, were present.

This court sat on board her majesty's ship the Queen at Spithead, on the thirteenth of July, 1702; where were present Sir Cloudesley Shovel, admiral of the white, presi-

A. D.  
1702.

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 613, wherein he observes, that after chasing these fourteen sail into the Groyne, Sir John Munden called a council of war, in which his captains took into consideration;

" I. The intelligence from a person who belonged to a French merchant-ship, from Rochelle, and some Spaniards taken from the shore ; the former affirming, that when he came from Rochelle, he left these twelve ships of war in the road, ready to sail to the Groyne with the first fair wind ; that one of them had seventy guns, one fifty, and all the rest sixty; and that the Faulcon, a fourth rate, taken from us last year, was going thither before them.

" II. That the Spaniards are very positive the Duke of Albquerque was at the Groyne with two thousand soldiers ; and that there were already in that port, three French ships of war of fifty guns each, and twelve more expected from Rochelle ; and since both these accounts so well agreed, and it was judged there were seventeen ships of war in that port, that the place was so strongly fortified, and the passage thereinto very difficult, it was unanimously determined, that they could not be attempted there with any probability of success ; and that, by remaining in the station, they could not have any prospect of doing service : so that it was judged proper to repair into the Soundings for protecting the trade."

dent, and the captains following, viz. Cole, Myngs, Leake, Greenhill, Turvill, Swanton, Good, Mayne, Kerr, Clarke, Ward, Cooper, Bridges, Maynard, Crow, Littleton, and Hillyman; who, being all sworn, and having examined the several articles exhibited against rear-admiral Munden, gave their opinion, that he had fully cleared himself from the whole matter contained in them; and, as far as it appeared to the court, had complied with his instructions, and behaved himself with great zeal and diligence in the service. But, notwithstanding this acquittal, it was thought necessary\* to lay him aside, that the strictness and impartiality of the new administration might the better appear.†

Bishop Burnet indeed charges Sir John Munden roundly with stupidity and cowardice; and blames Sir George Rooke still more, for having recommended such a man.‡

In the London Gazette, No. 3833, we find the following article: " Windsor, August 9th. The queen having required the proceedings, upon the trial of Sir John Munden, rear-admiral of the red squadron, to be laid before her, and having considered all the circumstances relating to the expedition to Coruuna; her majesty finding that Sir John Munden has not done his duty pursuant to his instructions, does not think fit to continue him in her service, and has therefore declared her pleasure, that his royal highness the lord high-admiral of England, should immediately discharge him from his post and command in the royal navy, and his royal highness has accordingly given the necessary orders for it." See Sir John Munden's justification of himself in a letter to a worthy friend, dated August 9th, 1702, in the Appendix to the first vol. of the Annals of Queen Anne, p. 5.

† Complete History of Europe for 1702, p. 273.

‡ This is so harsh a charge, that I find myself obliged to support it, by citing the bishop's own words, which are these:

" Advice was sent over from Holland, of a fleet that had sailed from France, and was ordered to call in at the Groyne. Munden was recommended by Rooke, to be sent against this fleet; but though he came up to them, with a superiour force, yet he behaved himself so ill, and so unsuccessfully, that a council of war was ordered to sit on him. They, indeed, acquitted him; some excusing themselves, by saying, that if they had condemned him, the



But Mr. Oldmixon, who was of the same party with the Bishop, is pleased to suggest, that it was not so much for any fault he had committed; but because he was not in Sir George Rooke's good graces, that Sir John Munden was dismissed.\* For my own part, I am inclined to believe what the president and council of war declared upon their oaths, that this officer did his duty as far as he possibly could; and it would be a very great satisfaction to me, if I could account as well for every miscarriage that I shall be obliged to relate in the course of this work.†

On the 4th of May, 1702, her majesty declared war against France and Spain;‡ and I mention it, because this

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"punishment was death; whereas, they thought his errors flowed from a want of sense, so that it would have been hard to condemn him for a defect of that, which nature had not given him. Those who recommended him to the employment, seemed to be more in fault." But Mr. Secretary Burchet, who was better acquainted with all the proceedings on this affair, than the bishop could possibly be, delivers his judgment in these words: "This was a very unlucky accident; yet the same misfortune might have happened to any other good officer as well as Sir John Munden; who, to do him justice, had, during his long services in the fleet, behaved himself with zeal, courage, and fidelity; and though himself and all the captains in his squadron, did unanimously conclude, that at least, twelve of the fourteen ships which they chased into the Greynne, were men of war, their number agreeing exactly with the intelligence from several persons taken from the shore; yet, even in that case, it is reasonable to think, that he would have given a very good account of this affair, could he possibly have come up with them." *Naval History*, p. 613.

\* Oldmixon's *History of England*, vol. ii. p. 289. It is very remarkable, that though these two writers flatly contradict one another; yet they agree in having each a stroke at Sir George Rooke; but as their poisons are opposite, so they very happily prove antidotes to each other.

† *Mercurius Historicus et Politicus* pour l'année, 1702, vol. ii. p. 201, 234. The truth seems to be, his acquittal was an act of justice, the removing him a stroke of policy. At the beginning of the former war King William rewarded a well-timed temerity. At the opening of this Queen Anne punished an ill-timed caution.

‡ *London Gazette*, No. 3807. *Complete History of Europe*, for 1702, p. 137.

declaration was thought necessary before the grand fleet sailed; the design of which, as far as I am able to judge, has been hitherto very imperfectly accounted for.

The great view of King William, for it was by him the Cadiz expedition had been concerted, was, to prevent the French from getting possession of the Spanish West Indies; or, at least, to prevent their keeping them long, if they did. With this view he resolved to send a grand fleet, under the command of the then high-admiral the earl of Pembroke, with a body of land forces under the command of the duke of Ormond, on board, to make themselves masters of Cadiz. By these means, and by the help of a squadron he had sent into the West Indies, and which was to have been followed by another, as soon as Cadiz was taken, he hoped this might be effected; and he knew very well, if this could be once done, an end would be put to all the French designs; and they must be obliged to terminate the matter, to the satisfaction, at least, of the maritime powers. \*

The scheme was undoubtedly very well laid, and the secret surprisingly well kept; for though the preparing of so great an armament could not be hidden; yet the intent of it was so effectually concealed, that not only France and Spain, but Portugal too, that crown being then in alliance with France and Spain, had equal cause to be alarmed; which had consequences very favourable to the grand alliance in all those countries, as will hereafter fully appear. In some cases, delay does as much as despatch in others. All the maritime provinces in the Spanish and French dominions were alarmed; the Italian states were intimidated, in short, it every where emboldened those who were inclined to the high allies to declare; and, on the other hand, heightened the fears of those who, but for them, would have espoused the interest of King Philip.

\* The more this scheme is considered, and the better it is understood, the more it will be admired.

After the queen's accession, Sir George Rooke, as we observed, was declared admiral of this fleet, vice-admiral, and lieutenant of the admiralty of England, and lieutenant of the fleets and seas of this kingdom: the duke of Ormond remained, as before, general of the land forces; and the Dutch having joined the fleet with their squadron, which had its quota of troops on board, the admiral hoisted the union flag on board the Royal Sovereign on the 13th of May, 1702; and, on the 1st of June, his royal highness the prince of Denmark dined on board the Admiral, and took a view of the fleet and army, which was soon in a condition to sail.\* Besides Sir George Rooke, there were the following flags, viz. Vice-admiral Hopson, who carried a red flag at the fore-top-mast-head of the Prince George; rear-admiral Fairbourne, who carried the white at the mizen-top-mast-head of the St. George; and rear-admiral Graydon, who carried the blue flag in the same manner in the triumph. There were five Dutch flags, viz. two lieutenant-admirals, two vice-admirals, and a rear-admiral. The strength of this fleet consisted in thirty English, and twenty Dutch ships of the line, exclusive of small vessels and tenders, which made in all about one hundred and sixty sail. As to the troops, the English consisted of nine thousand six hundred and sixty-three, including officers, and the Dutch of four thousand one hundred and thirty eight, in all thirteen thousand eight hundred and one.†

\* Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 313, 320. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 289. Burchet's Naval History, book v. chap. x. London Gazette, No. 3816, 3820. See also an impartial account of all the material transactions of the grand fleet and land forces, from their first setting out from Spithead, June 29th, till his grace the duke of Ormond's arrival, at Deal, November 7th, 1702, in which is included a particular relation of the expedition at Cadiz, and the glorious victory at Vigo, by an officer that was present in both those actions, London, 1703, 4to.

† That this was a very great force, and that the public had reason

On the 19th of June, the fleet weighed from Spithead, and came to an anchor at St. Helen's. On the 22d, the two rear-admirals, Fairbourn and Graydon, were detached with a squadron of thirty English and Dutch ships, with instructions first to look into the Groyne, and in case there were any French ships there, to block them up; but if not, to cruize ten or twelve leagues N.W. off Cape Finisterre, till they should be joined by the fleet. \*

On the 10th of August, the fleet reached the rock of Lisbon, where, the next day, they held a council of war. On the 12th, they came before Cadiz, and anchored at the distance of two leagues from the city, Sir Thomas Smith, quarter-master-general, having viewed and sounded the shore on the backside of the Isle of Leon, in which Cadiz stands, and reported, that there were very convenient bays to make a descent: the duke of Ormond vehemently insisted in a council of war, upon landing in that isle, in order to make a sudden and vigorous attack upon the town, where the consternation was so great, that in all probability the enterprize would have succeeded; but several of the council, especially the sea-officers, opposing the duke's motion, it was resolved, that the army should first take the fort of St. Catharine, and Port St. Mary, to facilitate thereby a nearer approach to Cadiz. †

to frame sanguine expectations to themselves, as to its success, all the world must allow: but, on the other hand, our expectations ought never to prejudice us so far, as to resolve not to be satisfied with a just account of their disappointment. Bishop Burnet says, that Sir George Rooke spoke coldly of the expedition before he sailed; and this he tells us, to prove that Sir George intended to do the enemy no hurt. But the mischief lies here, that Sir George suspected they should do no great good, because this expedition was of a doubtful nature; for, on the one hand, they were enjoined to speak to the Spaniards as friends; and, at the same time, were ordered to act against them as foes.

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 619. The Complete History of Europe for 1702, p. 279. London Gazette, No. 3821.

† Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 290. Annals of Queen Anne, vol. i. p. 79. London Gazette, No. 3842, 3843.

The next day, the duke of Ormond sent a trumpet with a letter to Don Scipio de Brancacio, the governor, whom the duke had known in the Spanish service, in the last confederate war: but, in answer, to the letter, inviting him to submit to the House of Austria; Brancacio declared, he would acquit himself honourably of the trust that was reposed in him by the king.\* On the 15th of August, the duke of Ormond landed his forces in the bay of Bulls, above a mile on the left of St. Catharine's fort, the cannon of which fired on his men all the while, but with little execution.† The first that landed were twelve hundred grenadiers, led by Brigadier Pallant, and the earl of Donnegall; they were obliged to wade to the shore, and were all very wet when they reached it. In the mean time, Captain Jumper in the *Lenox*, and some English and Dutch light frigates, kept firing on the horse that appeared near the coast, and they were soon after repulsed by the English foot.‡

The duke of Ormond, as soon as the troops were

\* The reader will be better satisfied as to this matter, if he consults the collections of Lamberti, tom. ii. p. 251. When the duke of Ormond summoned Fort St. Catharine, he declared, that if the governor did not accept his terms, he should be hanged, and none of his soldiers receive quarter. To this the governor answered with great spirit and justice, "That if he must be hanged, it was all one to him, whether by the duke of Ormond, or the governor of Cadiz; and therefore, he desired leave to send to him for his orders, which was refused." These quick proceedings, instead of drawing the Spaniards to declare for the House of Austria, rendered them averse from it. At least, this was Sir George Rooke's sentiment, who did all he could to serve the common cause without provoking the people of that country, whom his instructions directed him to protect.

† The Complete History of Europe for 1702, p. 312, 313. Burnet, vol. ii. London Gazette, No. 3815.

‡ *Mercure Historique et Politique*, pour l'année 1702, vol. ii. p. 443. The prince of Hesse d'Armstadt was the principal mover of this expedition. He persuaded the ministers at Vienna, London, and the Hague, having first persuaded himself, the Spaniards in general were zealous for the House of Austria. The consequences by no means made this good, as the duke and admiral found.

landed, sent to summon fort St. Catharine; but the governor replied, he had cannon mounted, with powder and ball sufficient to receive him. On the 16th, the whole army marched to a camp marked out for them near La Rotta, a town within a league of the place, where they landed, and from which most of the inhabitants had fled; but strict orders being given against plundering, many of them returned; and, had the Spaniards given due attention to the duke's declaration, published at his first coming on the Spanish coast, they needed not to have been in any consternation.

The duke of Ormond having left a garrison of three hundred men in La Rotta, marched, on the 20th of August, toward Port St. Mary. Some squadrons of Spanish horse, about six hundred in number, fired upon the duke's advanced guards, and killed lieutenant-colonel Gore's horse, among the dragoons; but retired on the approach of the English grenadiers, of whom a detachment under colonel Pierce, of the guards, were sent to take fort St. Catharine; which they did, and made a hundred and twenty Spaniards prisoners of war.\* The duke entered Port St. Mary, attended by most of the general officers, viz. Sir Henry Bellasis, lieutenant-general; the earl of Portmore, Sir Charles O'Hara, and Baron Spaar, majors-general; Colonel Seymour, Colonel Lloyd, Colonel Matthews, Colonel Hamilton, and Colonel Pallant, now brigadiers-general: and, notwithstanding the strict orders the duke had issued against plunder, there was a very great failing in the execution of them; for which Sir Henry Bellasis and Sir Charles O'Hara were put under arrest.† When they came to England, Bellasis was dis-

\* Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 331. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 290. Burchet's Naval History, p. 620, 621.

† Boyer's Life of Queen Anne, p. 30. London Gazette, No. 3847.

missed the service; and though O'Hara escaped public, he did not private censure.

Mr. Methuen, her majesty's envoy in Portugal, in a letter to the duke of Ormond, dated August the 1st, gave this wholesome advice concerning the conduct of the army: that the point of greatest importance, was, to insinuate to the Spaniards, and shew by their proceedings, that they came not as enemies to Spain, but only to free them from France; and give them assistance to establish themselves under the government of the house of Austria. It being found too difficult to approach Cadiz while the Spaniards were in possession of Matagorda fort, over against the Puntal, it was ordered to be attacked, and a battery of four pieces of cannon erected against it; but upon every firing, the guns sunk into the sands; and after a fruitless attempt, the design was given over, and the troops ordered to embark, which was done accordingly, with intention to make the best of their way home. \* The Spaniards endeavoured to disturb them in their retreat, but with very little success; a detachment of English and Dutch troops, under the command of Colonel Fox, having quickly repulsed them, with the loss of a few of their horse, who was the most forward in the attack; which discouraged the rest so much, that few or none of our people were lost in getting aboard their ships. †

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 622, 623. The complete History of Europe for 1702, p. 349. London Gazette, No. 3830, 3858.

† The truth of the matter was, that the confederates found Cadiz in a much better situation than they expected; themselves worse received than they hoped; and the general officers so much divided in their opinions; that a retreat was thought more advisable than any other measure in a council of war. If Sir George Rooke, before he put to sea, foresaw any of the difficulties they then met with, few people at this time of the day, I believe, think such a foresight a discredit to him, either as a statesman or an admiral. As to his own conduct, he was called to an account for it before the house of lords; and, as we shall see elsewhere, defended it so well, that no imputation could be fixed upon him.

In most of our historians, the Cadiz expedition is treated as not much to the reputation of the nation in general, and of Sir George Rooke in particular. As to the disorders at St. Mary, of which we shall hear much more in another place, they did not at all affect Sir George Rooke, who had nothing to do with them, nor was ever charged with them. That he did not pursue with great eagerness the burning the ships, or destroying the place, has indeed been imputed to him as an act of bad conduct. Bishop Burnet charges him with it flatly; and says, that, before he went out, he had in a manner determined not to do the enemy much hurt \* I believe this prelate spoke as he thought; but as to Sir George, I am thoroughly persuaded that when he went out, and while he was out, he intended nothing more or less, than to obey his instructions.

The spirit of these instructions, we may easily guess at from the passage in Mr. Methuen's letter, before cited; which very fully shews, that this expedition was originally concerted on a supposition, that the Spaniards had a natural affection for the house of Austria, and would join with us in their favour against the French. But in this it seems we are mistaken; and yet it was not thought proper to make this conclusion too hastily, especially after what passed at port St. Mary; which, considering the disposition of the nation, might be presumed to have provoked the Spaniards to a degree not to be appeased by all the fine words we gave them in our manifesto. † A candid reader will therefore easily discern the true reason of Sir George's conduct. He thought it madness to expose the lives of the queen's subjects, where they might be spared to better advantage; and, therefore, was not over fond of burning towns, and cutting throats, to convince the Spaniards of our hearty affection for them; which,

\* History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 330.

† The complete History of Europe for 1702, p. 316.



however, was the language of our declarations and his instructions.\* Mr. Oldmixon therefore concludes, after a candid relation of facts, very justly, and like a man of honour, that however the expectations of the nation might be disappointed in the Cadiz expedition; yet, there was nothing blameable in the conduct, either of the duke of Ormond or Sir George Rooke.† Foreign writers do the same justice to our commanders, and even such of those authors as are visibly in the French interest; so that if we decide according to evidence, it is impossible for us to join in that clamour, which discontented people raised upon this occasion.‡

While the admiral was intent on bringing the fleet and forces safely home; Providence put it in his power to do

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\* This is the substance of Sir George Rooke's defence before the house of lords, who inquired into this affair, and addressed the queen, that the duke of Ormond and Sir George Rooke might lay the whole transaction before them; which was done in the beginning of the next year, and what I have offered in the text, is only to avoid repetitions. A more distinct account of the inquiry will afterwards be found in the Memoirs of Sir George Rooke.

† History of England, vol. ii. p. 292. The reader will observe, that I lay hold of every opportunity of doing justice to our historians; and therefore, I hope will believe, that whenever I differ with them, it is purely out of respect to truth.

‡ The French historians say, that the prince of Hesse D'Armstadt, whom the emperor had appointed general and commander-in-chief of such Spaniards as should manifest their fidelity to the house of Austria, did little or no service by the violent memorials which he published, filled with personal reproaches and warm threats against such as adhered to King Philip. At first, however, it is admitted, that the Spaniards did not shew any great zeal for their new prince; but after they were provoked by the barbarities committed at the port of St. Mary, they lost all patience, and fought with such bitterness and indignation, as is scarcely to be expressed. The same historians say, that the duke of Ormond, and his forces, when they attacked Matagorda fort, were exposed to a prodigious fire from the place, while they were able to form no better battery than two field pieces, and two small mortars, the ground being so swampy, as not to bear heavy artillery. *Histoire Militaire*, tom. iii. p. 702. *Limieres*, tom. iii. p. 101. *Larrey*, tom. iii. p. 544.

his country a more signal and effectual service, than even the taking of Cadiz would have been. Captain Hardy, who commanded her majesty's ship the *Pembroke*, was sent to water in Lagos bay; where he understood from his conversation with the French consul, who industriously sought it in order to boast of their good fortune, that they had lately received great news, though he would not tell him what it was. \* Soon after an express arrived from Lisbon, with letters from the prince of Hesse and Mr. Methuen; which, when he was informed they were no longer on board the fleet, he refused to deliver, and actually carried them back to Lisbon. In discourse, however, he told Captain Hardy, that the galleons, under the convoy of a French squadron, put into Vigo the 16th of September. Captain Hardy made what haste he could with this news to the fleet, with which, however, he did not meet until the 3d of October; and even then the wind blew so hard, that he found it impossible to speak with the admiral till the 6th, when he informed him of what he had heard. †

Upon this Sir George called a council of war immediately, composed of English and Dutch flag-officers, by whom it was resolved to sail, as expeditiously as possible, to the port of Vigo, and attack the enemy. For this purpose, some small vessels were detached to make a discovery of the enemy's force, which was done effectually by the *Kent's* boat; and the captain understood that

\* Captain Hardy, on his arrival in England, was presented to the queen, who was pleased to confer the honour of knighthood on him, in consideration of his good service, in gaining and giving to Admiral Rooke the intelligence, which was the occasion of the great success at Vigo, *London Gazette*, No. 3833.

† *Memoires pour l'histoire d'Espagne*, par le marquis de St. Philippe, vol. i. p. 185. This bad behaviour had a terrible effect, for it gave the Spaniards an idea, that they were to have to do with an impious, drunken, and debauched people, without morals, and without discipline.

Mons. Chateau-Renault's squadron of French men-of-war, and the Spanish galleons, were all in that harbour; but, the wind blowing a storm, drove the fleet to the northward as far as Cape Finisterre, and it came not before the place till the 11th of October.\* The passage into the harbour was not above three quarters of a mile over, with a battery of eight brass, and twelve iron guns on the north side; and, on the south, was a platform of twenty brass guns, and twenty iron guns, as also a stone fort, with a breast-work and deep trench before it, ten guns mounted, and five hundred men in it. There was, from one side of the harbour to the other, a strong boom composed of ships-yards and top-masts, fastened together with three-inch-rope, very thick, and underneath with hausers and cables. The top-chain at each end was moored to a seventy-gun ship, the one was called the Hope, which had been taken from the English, and the other was the Bourbon.† Within the boom were moored five ships, of between sixty and seventy guns each, with their broadsides fronting the entrance of the passage, so as that they might fire at any ship that came near the boom, forts, and platform. ‡

\* After reading this account, it must surprize any man to hear, that Bishop Burnet charges the admiral with want of diligence, neglect of duty, and a dislike to this service; when nothing can be plainer, than that he acted throughout the whole of this business, with all imaginable vigour; and that, if he had been inclined to do otherwise, he had the fairest opportunities that could possibly have offered, for avoiding or delaying the attack.

† Quincy *Histoire Militaire de Louis XIV.* tom. iii. p. 717. Marquis de Santa-Cruz *Reflections, Militaires et Politiques*, tom. viii. p. 93, 94. *Memoires pour servir a l'Histoire d'Espagne*, par le Marquis de St. Philippe, vol. i. p. 201—209.

‡ The French writers are very copious in their description of the measures taken by the French admiral for the defence of the fleet; and indeed, it must be allowed that the disposition was as good as the place would admit. The Count de Chateau-Renault was a very gallant and experienced officer; and if, as these writers say, his reputation was heightened by this accident, then it plainly proves, that

The admirals removed the flags from the great ships into third rates, the first and second rates being all too big to go in. Sir George Rooke went out of the Royal Sovereign into the Somerset; Admiral Hopson out of the Prince George into the Torbay; Admiral Fairbourne out of the St. George into the Essex; and Admiral Graydon out of the Triumph into the Northumberland. A detachment of fifteen English, and ten Dutch men-of-war, with all their fire-ships, frigates, and bomb-vessels, were ordered to go upon the service. \*

The duke of Ormond, to facilitate this attack, landed on the south-side of the river, at the distance of about six miles from Vigo, two thousand five hundred men; then Lord Shannon at the head of five hundred men, attacked a stone fort at the entrance of the harbour, and having made himself master of a platform of forty pieces of cannon; the French governor, Mons. Sozel, ordered the gates of the place to be thrown open, with a resolution to have forced his way through the English troops. But though there was great bravery, yet there was but very little judgment in this action; for his order was no sooner obeyed, than the grenadiers entered the place sword in hand, and forced the garrison, consisting of French and Spaniards, in number about three hundred and

our officers acted as well as men could be expected to act. *Histoire Militaire*, tom. iii. p. 717. Rapin Thoyras continued, tom. xi. p. 487. *Memoires Historiques, et Chronologiques*.

\* It is perfectly clear from the manner of making this attack, that Sir George Rooke had the honour of his country as much at heart as any man could have; and it is very strange, that among so many observations, no body should take notice of the great prudence shewn in the forming this disposition; and the courage and alacrity of the admirals in quitting the large ships, that they might have a share in the danger, as well as in the reputation of this action. If it had miscarried, we should have had reflections enough on the admiral's mistakes in this matter, and, methinks, it is a little hard to pass in silence this extraordinary mark of his conduct, and leave it to be commended as it is by the Dutch historians only; as if they alone knew how to value merit, and we were concerned only to lessen and to traduce it.

fifty, to surrender prisoners of war. \* This was a conquest of the last importance, and obtained much sooner than the enemy expected; who might otherwise have prevented it, since they had in the neighbourhood a body of at least ten thousand men, under the command of the Prince of Brabant. It was likewise of prodigious consequence in respect of the fleet, since our ships would have been excessively galled by the fire from that platform and fort. †

As soon, therefore, as our flag was seen flying from the place, the ships advanced; and Vice-admiral Hopson in the Torbay, crowding all the sail he could, ran directly against the boom, broke it, and then the Kent, with the rest of the squadron, English and Dutch, entered the harbour. The enemy made a prodigious fire upon them, both from their ships and batteries on shore, till the latter was possessed by our grenadiers; who seeing the execution done by their guns on the fleet, behaved with incredible resolution. In the mean time, one of the enemy's fire-ships had laid the Torbay on board, and had certainly burnt her, but that luckily the fire-ship had a great quantity of snuff on board, which extinguished the flames when she came to blow up: yet the vice-admiral did not absolutely escape. Her fore-top-mast was shot by the board; most of the sails burnt or scorched; the fore-yard consumed to a coal; the larboard shrouds, fore and aft, burnt to the dead eyes; several ports blown off the hinges; her larboard-side entirely scorched; one hundred

\* The duke of Ormond, though lame of the gout, marched all the way through bad roads, at the head of the troops. Lord Viscount Shannon who commanded the attack, distinguished himself exceedingly, and all the officers and forces in general, behaved with the utmost spirit and intrepidity.

† The French writers say, that at the first appearance of the duke of Ormond's grenadiers, the Spanish militia, threw down their arms, and fled; and they likewise admit, that they forced their way on the opening the gate, as is asserted in our accounts.

and fifteen men killed and drowned; of whom about sixty jumped overboard, as soon as they were grappled by the fire-ship. The vice-admiral, when he found her in this condition, went on board the Monmouth, and hoisted his flag there. \*

In the mean time, Captain William Bokenham, in the Association, a ship of ninety guns, lay with her broadside to the battery, on the left of the harbour, which was soon disabled; and Captain Francis Wyvill, in the Barfleur, a ship of the same force, was sent to batter the fort on the other side, which was a very dangerous and troublesome service; since the enemy's shot pierced the ship through and through, and for some time he durst not fire a gun, because our troops were between him and the fort; but they soon drove the enemy from their post, and then the struggle was between the French firing, and our men endeavouring to save their ships and the galleons. In this dispute the Association had her main-mast shot, two men killed; the Kent had her fore-mast shot, and the boatswain wounded; the Barfleur had her main-mast shot, two men killed, and two wounded; the Mary had her bowsprit shot. † Of the troops there were only two lieutenants and thirty men killed, and four superiour officers wounded; a very inconsiderable loss, considering that the enemy had fifteen French men-of-war, two frigates, and a fire-ship, burnt, sunk, or taken; as were also seventeen galleons. As for the particulars of the enemy's loss, and

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 627. Complete History of Europe for 1702, p. 388. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 291.

† It is very apparent from this account, that the action was extremely warm, and that all who were concerned in it, did their duty; and if we consider how many attempts of the same kind failed in the former reign, and with how small a loss this great action was achieved, we shall be satisfied that all our admirals deserved the highest commendations.

of what we gained by this great victory, they are accounted for at the bottom of the page.<sup>1</sup>

This event gave a great deal of trouble to the Paris gazetteer: when he first spoke of this misfortune he affirmed, that all the plate was carried on shore, and secured; and that we had five men of war sunk in the attack. Afterwards he retracted the first part of the tale, and owned that a little silver was taken; but then he added, that nine of our ships were wrecked in their return, and all their men lost: which shews how great an impres-

* French ships taken, burnt, and run ashore.		No. of guns.	
Ships burnt.		No. of guns.	
Le Fort .....	76	L'Esperance .....	70
L'Enflame .....	64	L'Assue .....	66
Le Prudent .....	62		—
Le Solide .....	56	Taken by the Dutch.	
La Dauphine .....	46	Le Bourbon .....	68
L'Entreprenant .....	22	Le Superbe .....	70
La Choquante .....	8	La Sirene .....	60
	—	Le Modere .....	56
	334	Le Voluntaire .....	46
Le Favori, a fire-ship		Le Triton .....	42
Eight advice-boats			—
			342
Taken by the English, and brought home.		Total, ships 21.	Guns 960
Le Prompt .....	76		
Le l'erme .....	72		

Six galleons were taken by the English, and five by the Dutch, who sunk six. As to the wealth on board the galleons, we never had any exact account of it. It is certain, that the Spanish and French ships had been twenty-five days in Vigo harbour, before the confederates arrived there; in which time they disembarked the best part of the plate and rich goods, and sent them up the country. The galleons had on board, when they arrived, twenty millions of pieces of eight, besides merchandize, which was thought of equal value. Of the silver, fourteen millions were saved; of the goods about five. Four millions of plate were destroyed, with ten millions of merchandize; and about two millions in silver, and five in goods, were brought away by the English and Dutch.

sion this loss made on those who had the direction of this Gazette. Father Daniel gives a pretty fair account of this matter; and a late French historian very candidly owns, that by this blow the naval power of France was so deeply wounded, as that she never recovered it during the war.\*

There were certain circumstances attending this success at Vigo, which heightened its lustre not a little. Our statesmen had all along kept their eyes upon the galleons, and had actually fitted out a squadron on purpose to intercept them, under the command of Sir Cloudesley Shovel. Orders likewise had been sent to Sir George Rooke, by the earl of Nottingham, which never reached him; and after all their precautions, Sir Cloudesley Shovel's squadron would scarcely have been strong enough to have undertaken so dangerous an enterprize. Yet Bishop Burnet, not at all dazzled with the brightness of this exploit, tells us, that Sir George Rooke performed this service very unwillingly, and did not make the use of it he might have done; in which, no doubt, he was imposed upon, since the fact, upon which he grounds it, is certainly false.†

Sir Cloudesley Shovel arrived on the sixteenth of October, as the troops were embarking; and the admiral left him at Vigo, with orders to see the French men of war, and the galleons that we had taken, and that were in a

\* See the complete History of Europe, for the year 1702, p. 391.

† If Sir George Rooke had been so negligent as the bishop makes him, we had certainly never heard of the Spanish fleet at Vigo at all; for though the bishop says, that the admiral sent to none of the ports, whereas expresses were sent to them all from Lisbon; yet the matter of fact is clearly this, that Sir George sent Captain Hardy to Lagos-bay, and there he met with the only express that was sent from Lisbon; so that here we have a charge, not only without proof, but directly in the teeth of proof. Burchet's Naval History, p. 629. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 322. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 291, 292. Annals of Queen Anne, vol. i. p. 134, 135.



condition to be brought to England, carefully rigged, and properly supplied with men. He was likewise directed to burn such as could not be brought home, and to take the best care he could to prevent embezzlements : and, having appointed a strong squadron for this service, the admiral, with the rest of the fleet, and one of the Spanish galleons, sailed home, and arrived in the Downs, on the seventh of November, 1702 ; whence the great ships were, about the middle of the month, sent round to Chatham.\*

Sir Cloudesley Shovel, in the course of a week, put the French men of war, and other prizes, into the best condition possible ; took out all the lading from a galleon, which was made prize by the *Mary* ; and brought along with him the *Dartmouth*, which had been taken from us in the last war, and was now made prize by Captain Wyvill ; but as there was another ship of that name in the navy, this prize was called the *Vigo*. He also took out of the French ships that were run on shore, fifty brass guns, and brought off sixty more from the forts and batteries ; after which on the twenty-fourth of October, he set fire to the ships he could not bring away. The next day, he left *Vigo* ; but it proving calm, he anchored in the channel between that port and Bayonne, where he sent several prisoners on shore with a flag of truce, and had our men returned in their stead.†

On the twenty-seventh of October, he was again under sail, intending to have passed through the north channel ; but the wind taking him short, he was obliged to pass through that which lies to the south, where the galleon, which was the *Monmouth's* prize, struck upon a rock, and

*Columna Rostrata*, p. 275. *Boyer's Life of Queen Anne*, p. 32. *London Gazette*, No 3860.

† This squadron sailed from Spithead, the 29th of September, 1702. Sir George Rooke arrived in the Downs, November 7th ; and Sir Cloudesley sailed the 25th of October, from *Vigo*, and arrived on the 10th of November, off the Isle of Wight. See the *London Gazette*, No 3861.

foundered; but there being several frigates on each side of her, all her men were saved except two. He was the very same day joined by the Dragon, a fifty-gun ship, commanded by Captain Holyman, which had been attacked by a French man of war of much greater force, and the captain and twenty-five men killed; but his lieutenant fought her bravely, and at last brought her safe into the fleet. In their passage they had extreme bad weather, and though the Nassau had the good fortune to make a very rich prize, which was coming from Morlaix; yet that vessel foundered the next morning, and the weather was then so bad, that the squadron separated, every ship shifting for itself; though all had the good luck to get safe to England, but in a very shattered condition. \*

A.D.  
1702.

We have now attended the grand fleet throughout the whole expedition, and are next to mention what was performed by several detachments made for particular services. Among these the squadron commanded by Captain John Leake, claims the first notice. On the twenty-fourth of June, 1702, he received instructions from his royal highness, to proceed to Newfoundland, with a small squadron, in order to protect the trade, annoy the enemy, and bring the homeward-bound ships under his convoy. He sailed in pursuance of these instructions, and arrived in Plymouth Sound, on the twenty-second of July; where, having gained the best intelligence he could, as to the state of our own affairs, and of those of the enemy, he so effectually pursued the design on which he came thither, that by the end of October he found himself ready to proceed with the homeward-bound ships for England, having taken twenty-nine sail of the enemy, and burnt two. Of these, three were laden with salt; twenty-five with fish; and one from Martinico with sugar and molasses; eight

\* See the London Gazette, No. 3862, 3863, where it is said, that the remainder of the fleet came in, under the command of Sir Stafford Fairbairn.

of which fell into the hands of the Exeter, nine were taken by the Medway, four by the Montague, as many by the Litchfield, three by the Charles-galley, and one by the Reserve. Besides which, he burnt and destroyed all the fishing-boats and stages, &c. at Trepassy, St. Mary, Colonel, Great and Little St. Lawrence, and the island of St. Peter, at the entrance of Fortune-bay; being all very considerable establishments of the French in Newfoundland, and of the greatest importance for carrying on their fishery there, and breeding their seamen. At the latter of these places, there was a small fort of six guns, which he totally demolished: after all which extraordinary success, he sailed home safely, though the weather was bad; and arrived with the squadron under his command at Portsmouth, on the tenth of November in the same year. \*

In this, as in the former war, nothing gave us or the Dutch more disturbance, than the expeditions made from time to time by the French ships at Dunkirk, where this year they had a small squadron under the command of the famous Monsieur de Pointis. This induced his royal highness to equip a particular squadron under the command of Commodore Beaumont, which had orders in the latter end of the month of June, to sail to the mouth of that port, to keep the French ships from coming out. The States-general had, for the same purpose, a much stronger squadron, under the command of Rear-admiral Vanderduffen, for reasons of great importance, as they apprehended; though it afterwards appeared, that the French kept seven or eight ships there purely to amuse us and the Dutch, and to keep us in perpetual motion. According to the informations we had here, the French were sometimes said to have a design of intercepting our homeward-bound ships from Sweden and Russia; according to others, they meditated a descent upon Scotland; and

\* See the London Gazette, No. 3961

a great deal of pains and expense it cost us, to guard against both these designs. \*

On the other hand, the Dutch, who always piqued themselves on having the best and earliest intelligence, were thoroughly satisfied, that the Dunkirk squadron was not intended to attack us, but them; and, that the true scheme of the French was, to make a descent upon Zealand; to which purpose they had likewise information, that a body of eight thousand land-forces were assembled near Ostend. Full of apprehensions on this account, they re-inforced their squadron before Dunkirk to eighteen men of war of the line, and sent Vice-admiral Evertzen to command it. This officer found himself so strictly tied up by his instructions, that he could not afford any assistance to our commodore, when, in pursuance of orders from home, he sent to demand it. However, after several months fruitless attendance, and frequent informations given to the earl of Nottingham, that the French were at sea, and gone here and gone there; it appeared at last, that Commodore Beaumont had been all the while in the right, who affirmed in his letters, that they never stirred out of the harbour. †

It may not be amiss to observe here, that, in the begin-

\* The Present State of Europe for 1702, p. 317.

† Burchet's Naval History, p. 635. Memoirs of John du Bart. p. 315. London Gazette, No. 3857. In all probability, the French themselves were the authors of these pieces of false intelligence, on purpose to alarm us and our allies, and to keep up the reputation of this formidable squadron. Thus much indeed was true, that the people in Scotland were in a great measure disaffected, and the French, from time to time, promised them assistance from Dunkirk; but the condition of their marine was such, as did not enable them to undertake any thing of importance; and indeed the whole strength of the Dunkirk squadron was altogether insufficient for performing any of the enterprizes that it was supposed to be designed for. In this, therefore, lay the error of our ministry, that they had not proper intelligence as to the force of that squadron, for this would have rendered it impossible for them to have been played upon as they were.

ning of 1702, died the famous John du Bart. He was a native of Dunkirk, as some say, though others alledge that he was born at Newcastle-upon-Tyne, but being carried over a child, was bred up from his infancy in the sea-service at Dunkirk.\* This is certain, that his mother was an English woman, and that he spent the first part of his life in the English and Dutch service; but having nothing but his merit to recommend him, he obtained very little preferment; which disgusted him so much, that, upon the breaking out of the former war, he entered into the service of France, and rose there to the command of the Dunkirk squadron; in which post he rendered himself sufficiently terrible to the English and Dutch, by taking more of their ships, than almost all the other French privateers together.†

He was succeeded in command by the Sieur Pointis, who had taken Carthagera, and whom the French therefore thought it proper to reward; though it is certain he had not either the industry or the capacity of his predecessor. But if he had nothing but the instance of this year's trouble and expense, in which no less than thirty English and Dutch ships were employed in watching the

\* See the complete Hist. of Europe, for the year 1702, p. 480, 481.

† This Du Bart performed most of his great exploits by mere dint of knowledge. He derived from nature a wonderful genius for maritime affairs, and improved this by a steady application to them. His perfect acquaintance with all the coasts, enabled him to perform wonders; because he, generally speaking, had to do with men much inferior to himself in this kind of skill. He was besides, a most excellent seaman, and never trusted to the care of others, what it was in his power to see done himself. By this means, he kept his ships constantly clean and in readiness to go to sea whenever an opportunity offered; and his sagacity and success placed him so high in the esteem of Louis XIV. that he generally made choice of him for the execution of the most difficult enterprizes undertaken during his reign; such as the convoying the prince of Conti to Poland, and the escorting the transports for the intended descent on England, in 1697.

Dunkirk squadron; it would be sufficient to shew the absolute necessity of keeping that port in its dismantled situation, and never permitting the French to gain by plunder, the effects of other people's industry; for it is impossible any slight commerce carried on there, in times of tranquillity, can make the maritime powers the least amends for the risk they must run, on the breaking out of a war, should this port ever be restored, and left in that condition at a peace. \*

I am now to speak of Admiral Benbow's expedition to the West Indies, and of his unfortunate death, the memory of which I could, for the honour of my country, wish should be buried in oblivion; but since that is impossible, I shall give the fairest and fullest account of the matter that I am able; having taken all the pains that I possibly could, to be perfectly informed of every circumstance relating to that affair; and shall be particularly careful to avoid concealing truth on the one side, and no less attentive not to exaggerate it on the other. We have already mentioned the cause and the manner of Admiral Benbow's putting to sea with his squadron, which consisted of two third, and eight fourth rates.

He arrived at Barbadoes on the 3d of November, 1701, from whence he sailed to examine the state of the French, and of our own Leeward-islands. He found the former in some confusion, and the latter in so good a state of defence, that he did not look upon himself under any necessity of staying, and therefore sailed to Jamaica. † There

\* I hint this, the rather because some people have laid a great stress on our commerce, by means of that port, which, they would have us believe, turns in the main more to our advantage, than to that of the French. It is certain, however, that such as are of this opinion, have little acquaintance with the maxims of the French government, or the attention that the present French ministry pay to things of this nature; there being perhaps no nation in the world where nicer inquiries are made into whatever regards commerce.

† See the London Gazette 3862, where it is said, that all the sea-

he received advice of two French squadrons having arrived in the West Indies, which alarmed the inhabitants of that island and of Barbadoes very much. After taking care, as far as his strength would permit, of both places, he formed a design of attacking Petit Guavas; but, before he could execute it, he had intelligence that Monsieur Ducasse was in the neighbourhood of Hispaniola, with a squadron of French ships; having an intent to settle the assiento in favour of the French, and to destroy the English and Dutch trade for negroes.

Upon this he detached Rear-admiral Whetstone in pursuit of him, and on the 11th of July, 1702, he sailed from Jamaica, in order to have joined the rear-admiral: but having intelligence that Ducasse was expected at Leogane, on the north-side of Hispaniola, he plied for that port, before which he arrived on the 27th. Not far from the town he perceived several ships at anchor, and one under sail, who sent out her boat to discover his strength, which coming too near was taken; from the crew of which he learned, that there were six merchant ships in the port, and that the ship they belonged to was a man of war of fifty guns, which the admiral pressed so hard, that the captain, seeing no probability of escaping, ran the ship ashore, and blew her up. On the 28th the admiral came before the town, where he found a ship of about eighteen guns hauled under their fortifications, which however did not hinder his burning her. The rest of the ships had sailed before day, in order to get into a better harbour, *viz.* Cul de Sac, but some of our ships, between them and that port took three of them, and sunk a fourth. The admiral, after alarming Petit Guavas, which he found it impossible to

men, as well as the admiral and officers, were so well accustomed to that climate, that they were in very good health, and not above ten men sick in the hospital. See also Burchet's Naval History, book v. and the Complete History of Europe for 1702, in the appendix. *Annals of Queen Anne*, vol. 1. p. 144.

attack, sailed for Donna Maria Bay, where he continued till the 10th of August; when, having received advice, that Monsieur Ducasse was sailed for Carthagena, and from thence was to sail to Porto-Bello: he resolved to follow him, and accordingly sailed that day for the Spanish coast of Santa Martha.\*

A.D.  
1702.

On the 19th in the evening, he discovered near that place, ten sail of tall ships to the westward: standing toward them, he found the best part of them to be French men-of-war; upon this he made the usual signal for a line of battle, going away with an easy sail, that his sternmost ships might come up and join them, the French steering along-shore under their top-sails. Their squadron consisted of four ships, from sixty to seventy guns, with one great Dutch-built ship of about thirty or forty; and there was another full of soldiers, the rest small ones, and a sloop. Our frigates a-stern were a long time in coming up, and the night advancing, the admiral steered alongside of the French; but though he endeavoured to near them, yet he intended not to make any attack, until the *Defiance* was got a-breast of the headmost.

Before he could reach that station, the *Falmouth*, which was in the rear, attempted the Dutch ship, the *Windsor* the ship a-breast of her, as did also the *Defiance*; and soon after, the vice-admiral himself was engaged, having first received the fire of the ship which was opposite to him; but the *Defiance* and *Windsor* stood no more than two or three broadsides, before they luft out of gun-shot, inso-much that the two sternmost ships of the enemy lay upon the admiral, and galled him very much; nor did the ships

\* *Mercure Historique et Politique*, 1702, p. 657, where there is a very exact account of his proceedings, while on the coast of Hispaniola. See also an account of the proceedings of Vice-admiral Behn, in the West Indies, in the *Complete History of Europe*, for the year 1702, drawn up from his own journal, p. 515. *London Gazette* No. 3866, 3878.



in the rear come up to his assistance with that diligence which might have been expected. From four o'clock until night the fight continued, and though they then left off firing, yet the admiral kept them company; and being of opinion, that it might be better for the service if he had a new line of battle, and led himself on all tacks, he did so, and the line of battle then stood thus:

## Guns.

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The Ruby .....	Captain George Walton	48
The Pendennis .....	Captain Thomas Hudson	48
The Windsor .....	Captain John Coustable	48
The Falmouth .....	Captain Samuel Vincent	48

On the 20th, at day-break, he found himself very near the enemy, with only the Ruby to assist him, the rest of the ships lying three, four, or five miles a-stern. They had but little wind, and though the admiral was within gun-shot of the enemy, yet the latter was so civil as not to fire. About two in the afternoon, the sea-breeze began to blow, and then the enemy got into a line, making what sail they could: and the rest of the ships not coming up, the admiral and the Ruby plied them with chase-guns, and kept them company all the next night.†

Burchet's Naval History, p. 594. Columna Rostrata, p. 291. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 303.

† Hence it appears, that if the Ruby had deserted Admiral Beubow with the rest, he could have done nothing; but must have been obliged to return to Jamaica, which was what his captains aimed at; and if this could have been effected, they had in all probability carried their point, and the whole blame had been thrown upon the admiral; which sufficiently demonstrates the merit of the gentleman who commanded the Ruby, viz. Sir George Walton, who had, however, been tampered with in his turn by the other captains; but when he came to be sober, and to consider the matter better, discharged his duty as became him.

On the 21st, the admiral was on the quarter of the second ship of the enemy's line, within point-blank shot; but the Ruby being a-head of the same ship, she fired at her, as the other ship did likewise that was a-head of the admiral. The Breda engaged the ship that first attacked the Ruby, and plied her so warmly, that she was forced to tow off. The admiral would have followed her, but the Ruby was in such a condition that he could not leave her. During this engagement, the rear ship of the enemy's was a-breast of the Defiance and Windsor, but neither of those ships fired a single shot. \* On the 22d, at day-break, the Greenwich was five leagues a-stern, though the signal for battle was never struck night or day; about three in the afternoon the wind came southerly, which gave the enemy the weather-gage. †

On the 23d, the enemy was six leagues a-head, and the great Dutch ship separated from them. At ten, the enemy tacked with the wind at E. N. E. the vice-admiral fetched point-blank within a shot or two of them, and each gave the other his broadside. About noon they recovered from the enemy a small English ship, called the Anne galley, which they had taken off the rock of Lisbon. The Ruby being disabled, the admiral ordered her for Port Royal. The rest of the squadron now came up, and the enemy being but two miles off, the brave admiral was in hopes of doing something at last, and therefore continued to steer after them; but his ships, except the Falmouth, were soon a-stern again; at twelve, the enemy began to separate. ‡

\* Boyer's Life of Queen Anne, p. 43, 49. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xxxiv. p. 210, 211. Admiral Benbow's Journal.

† See Burchet's Naval History, and the account of the proceedings of Vice-admiral Benbow, from which, indeed, most of the other accounts are transcribed.

‡ In this, all the accounts we have, agree; and nothing can be plainer than that, if these captains had now returned to their duty, most of Duras's squadron must have been taken.

On the 24th, about two in the morning, they came up within call of the sternmost, there being then very little wind. The admiral fired a broadside with double round below, and round and partridge aloft. At three o'clock, the admiral's right leg was shattered to pieces by a chain-shot, and he was carried down; but he presently ordered his cradle on the quarter-deck, and continued the fight till day. Then appeared the ruins of the enemy's ship of about seventy guns; her main yard down and shot to pieces, her fore-top-sail-yard shot away, her mizen-mast shot by the board, all her rigging gone, and her sides bored to pieces. The admiral soon after discovered the enemy standing toward him with a strong gale of wind. The Windsor, Pendennis, and Greenwich, a-head of the enemy, came to the leeward of the disabled ship, fired their broadsides, passed her, and stood to the southward: then came the Defiance, fired part of her broadside, when the disabled ship returning about twenty guns, the Defiance put her helm a-weather, and ran away right before the wind, lowered both her top-sails, and ran to the leeward of the Falmouth, without any regard to the signal of battle.\*

The enemy seeing the other two ships stand to the southward, expected they would have tacked and stood towards them, and therefore they brought their heads to the northward. But when they saw those ships did not tack, they immediately bore down upon the admiral, and ran between their disabled ship and him, and poured in all their shot, by which they brought down his main-top-sail-yard, and shattered his rigging very much; none of the other ships being near him, or taking the least notice

\* It was upon full evidence of this fact, that Captain Kirby, whom the Gazette calls Kirkby, was condemned for cowardice, though on other occasions he had behaved well. It was generally supposed, that he was the author of this scheme; at least, he was charged with being so, by Wade and Constable.

of his signals, though Captain Fog ordered two guns to be fired at the ships a-head, in order to put them in mind of their duty. The French, seeing things in this confusion, brought to, and lay by their own disabled ship, re-manned and took her into tow. The Breda's rigging being much shattered, she was forced to lye by till ten o'clock; and, being by that time refitted, the admiral ordered his captain to pursue the enemy, then about three miles to the leeward, his line-of-battle signal out all the while; and Captain Fog, by the admiral's orders, sent to the other captains, to order them to keep the line, and behave like men. Upon this Captain Kirby came on board the admiral, and told him, "That he had better desist; that the French were very strong; and that from what was past, he might guess he could make nothing of it." \*

The brave Admiral Benbow, more surprized at this language, than he would have been at the sight of another French squadron, sent for the rest of the captains on board, in order to ask their opinion. They obeyed him indeed, but were most of them in Captain Kirby's way of thinking; which satisfied the admiral, that they were not inclined to fight; and that, as Kirby phrased it, *there was nothing to be done*, though there was the fairest opportunity that had yet offered. Our strength was, at this time, one ship of seventy guns, one of sixty-four, one of sixty, and three of fifty; their masts, yards, and all things else in as good condition as could be expected, and not above eight men killed, except in the vice-admiral's own ship, nor was there any want of ammunition; whereas the enemy had now no more than four ships, from sixty to seventy guns, and one of them disabled and in tow. The vice-

\* This was deposed at the trial, and was not denied by Kirby. After this, the officers of his own ship pressed the admiral to retire to Jamaica, from an apprehension, that these captains, being become desperate, might go over to the enemy, to which the afflicted admiral most unwillingly consented.

admiral thought proper upon this, to return to Jamaica, where he arrived with his squadron, very weak with a fever induced by his wounds; and was soon after joined by Rear-admiral Whetstone, with the ships under his command. \*

As soon as he conveniently could, Vice-admiral Benbow issued a commission to Rear-admiral Whetstone, and to several captains, to hold a court-martial for the trial of several offenders.† On the 6th of October, 1702, the court sat at Port Royal, when Captain Kirby, of the *Defiance*, was brought upon his trial. He was accused of cowardice, breach of orders, and neglect of duty; which crimes were proved upon oath, by the admiral himself, ten commission, and eleven warrant officers; by whose evidence it appeared that the admiral boarded *Ducasse* in person three times, and received a large wound in his face, and another in his arm, before his leg was shot off; that Kirby, after two or three broadsides, kept always out of gun-shot, and by his behaviour created such a fear of his desertion, as greatly discouraged the English in the engagement; that he kept two or three miles a-stern all the second day, though commanded again and again to keep his station; that the third day he did not fire a gun, though he saw the admiral in the deepest distress, having two or three French men-of-war upon him at a time; and that he threatened to kill his boatswain for repeating the ad-

\* The reason of his retiring is given in the former note, and the truth of this account is verified in the *Histoire de St. Domingue*, vol. iv. p. 203.

† An account of the arraignments and trials of Colonel Richard Kirby, Captain John Constable, Captain Cooper Wade, Captain Samuel Vincent, and Captain Christopher Fog, on a complaint exhibited by the judge-advocate, on behalf of her majesty, at a court-martial held on board the *Breda*, in Port Royal harbour, in Jamaica, &c. for cowardice, and other crimes committed by them, in a fight at sea, on the 19th of August, 1702, for which Colonel Kirby, and Captain Wade, were sentenced to be shot to death. London, 1703, folio.

“ found his captains so very remiss in their duty, I think  
 “ he ought, in point of discretion, to have summoned  
 “ them; and even that at first, on board his own ship, and  
 “ there confined them; and placed their first lieutenants  
 “ in their rooms, who would have fought well, were it  
 “ for no other reason than the hopes of being continued  
 “ in those commands, had they survived.” \*

This, I must confess, does not by any means satisfy me, Admiral Benbow was no prophet: he could not foretel that these captains would behave ill, nor could he be sure that they did behave ill, till they had frequently disobeyed his signals. Part of the time he was warmly engaged. and that could be no season for consultation; and part of the time the weather was foul, and then he could not call them on board. Besides, he was surrounded by bad men, and thought himself in so little capacity of punishing these people at sea, that he retired to Jamaica, purely to be safe. But it would, methinks, have suited Mr. Burchet's purpose better, to have gone to the bottom of this affair; which, for any thing I can learn, the world is unacquainted with yet, and therefore I think myself obliged to publish it.

The admiral was an honest, rough seaman, and fancied that his command was bestowed upon him for no other reason, than that he should serve his country: this induced him to treat Captain Kirby, and the rest of the gen-

\* Naval History, p. 598. The captains who suffered, had some very great relations; and, in all probability, a desire of being well with them, prevented the inserting the names of these offenders in this celebrated performance. But to be so tender of them; and, in the very same breath, to attack obliquely the character of so worthy a man as Admiral Benbow, does no great honour to his history. Bishop Burnet, likewise, who is so ready on every occasion to attack the character of Sir George Rooke, Vice-admiral Graydon, and many others of our naval commanders, is wholly silent in respect of this business; there being not the least trace of it in any part of his works, influenced no doubt by the same motive, that wrought so powerfully upon Secretary Burchet.

tlements, a little briskly at Jamaica, when he found them not quite so ready to obey his orders as he thought was their duty; and this it was that engaged them in the base and wicked design, of putting it out of his power to engage the French; presuming that, as so many were concerned in it, they might be able to justify themselves, and throw the blame upon the admiral, and so they hoped to be rid of him. But his rugged honesty baffled them: and we may guess at the spirit of the man, by the answer he gave to one of his lieutenants, who expressed his sorrow for the loss of his leg. "I am sorry for it too," says the gallant Benbow; "but I had rather have lost them both, than have seen this dishonour brought upon the English nation. But, do you hear, if another shot should take me off, behave like brave men, and fight it out."\*

The turn given by the French to this affair, is very extraordinary. They tell us, that Admiral Benbow, at the distance of twelve leagues from Santa Martha, with seven men-of-war, attacked M. Ducasse, who, though he had but four, did not refuse to fight. The engagement lasted five days; and, on the sixth, Benbow made all the sail he could for Jamaica. He had a leg shattered, and died a little while afterwards: his ships were most of them in no condition to keep the sea, more than half their crews being killed. Only one ship of M. Ducasse's squadron suffered, and he had but twenty men killed and wounded in the whole. However, he did not care to pursue Benbow, who he did not believe to be in so bad a condition as he really was; and therefore he made the best of his way to Carthagena, where he arrived in a few days, and where his presence gave now as much joy as it had formerly, that is, when he plundered it in conjunction with Monsieur Pointis, given terror. This is a very

\* The reader will meet with some other particulars in the memoirs of Admiral Benbow, contained in a subsequent volume, and communicated by his descendants.

florid, and, at the same time, a very false account of the affair, and hence we may learn the value of inquiries; since the court-martial at Jamaica, by their proceedings, set this whole business in its true light; and left us undeniable evidence, that it was not their own bravery, but the treachery of Benbow's captains, that saved the French squadron.\*

The reflections he made on this unlucky business, threw the brave admiral into a deep melancholy, which soon brought him to his end; for he died on the 4th of November, 1702, as much regretted as he deserved.† The command of the squadron then devolved on Captain Whetstone, who, in this expedition acted as rear-admiral; and of whose proceedings in the West Indies we shall give an account in its proper place. In the mean time, it is requisite that we should follow the condemned captains home, in order to put an end to this disagreeable narration. They were sent from Jamaica, on board her majesty's ship the Bristol, and arrived at Plymouth on the 16th of April, 1703, where, as in all the western ports, there lay a dead warrant for their immediate execution, in order to prevent any applications in their favour; and they were accordingly shot on board the ship that brought them home, and shewed at their death a courage and constancy of mind, which made it evident, that their behaviour in the late engagement did not flow from any infirmity of nature, but from the corruption of their minds; and I hope their example will always have a proper effect on such as are entrusted with the like commands.‡

\* This French account is taken from the *Histoire de St. Domingue*, vol. iv. p. 202, 203, 204. But M. Bucasse was too brave a man to gloss things in such a manner; as the reader will be convinced by reading his letter to Admiral Benbow, which will be found in his memoirs.

† *London Gazette*, No. 3386. *Mercurius Historicus et Politicus*, tom. xxxiv. p. 335. *Boyer's Life of Queen Anne*, p. 50. *Pointer's Chronological Historian*, vol. ii. p. 497.

‡ See the *London Gazette*, No. 3907. *Oldmixon's History of the*



I should now, according to the order I have hitherto pursued in this work, take notice of what was transacted at home, in relation to the navy, and particularly of what passed in parliament upon this subject: but as the queen's proclamation for a thanksgiving, in which honourable mention is made of the success at Vigo, and the thanks bestowed by the house of commons on Sir George Rooke for his conduct in that affair, will appear with greater propriety, when I come to the memoirs of his life; to avoid repetitions I shall not insist further upon them here. I must however observe, that as, in the case of Kirby and Wade, her majesty shewed a strict regard to justice, so; with respect to Admiral Hopson, she gave as lively a testimony of her just sense of merit; for she not only conferred on him the honour of knighthood, but was graciously pleased to settle upon him a pension of five-hundred pounds a-year for life, with the reversion of three-hundred pounds a-year to his lady, in case she survived him, on account of the prodigious service he did in breaking the boom at Vigo.\*

But this extraordinary mark of royal favour did not, as indeed it ought not, screen him from a strict examination in the house of lords, in conjunction with Sir George Rooke, as to the miscarriage of the design upon Cadiz; but, upon the strictest review that could be made of that whole affair, there appeared so little colour for censuring the actions of either of the admirals, that how much soever their enemies might desire it, they were at last glad to let this matter fall. Indeed the fleet, though it had not performed all that was expected, had done as much as

Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 303. The complete History of Europe, for 1703, p. 183.

\* This was published in the Gazette of November 30, 1702, with this addition, that he was introduced to the queen, when he received the honour of knighthood, by the hand of his royal highness, prince George of Denmark, lord high-admiral of England. See the complete History of Europe, for the year 1702, p. 452.

was possible for the service of the nation ; and had thereby afforded an opportunity to our worthy minister at Lisbon, Mr. Methuen, to draw over from his alliance with the two crowns, the king of Portugal, to the interest of the allies, and to conclude a treaty of commerce there ; which, to say no more, has been of much greater benefit to the nation, than many, I might add most, of the treaties that have been concluded since. \*

There had hitherto appeared very little of party-opposition to the management of the war ; and therefore the

\* Bishop Burnet gives this account. " A committee of the house of peers sat long upon the matter : they examined all the admirals and land-officers, as well as Rooke himself, upon the whole progress of that affair. Rooke was so well supported by the court, and by his party in the house of commons, that he seemed to despise all that the lords could do, some who understood sea-matters, said, that it appeared from every motion during the expedition, that he intended to do nothing but amuse and make a shew ; they also concluded, from the protection that the ministry gave him, that they intended no other. He took much pains to shew, how improper a thing a descent on Cadiz was, and how fatal the attempt must have proved : and in doing this, he arraigned his instructions, and the design he was sent on, with great boldness ; and showed little regard to the ministers, who took more pains to bring him off, than to justify themselves. The lords of the committee prepared a report, which was hard upon Rooke, and laid it before the house ; but so strong a party was made to oppose every thing that reflected on him, that though every particular in the report was well proved, yet it was rejected, and a vote was carried, in his favour, justifying his conduct." The truth of this matter is, that as Sir George Rooke knew nothing of his orders, until he came to execute them ; so he was absolutely free from dependence upon any minister, and spoke what he thought with the greatest intrepidity. The main of his defence was this, that his orders were contradictory ; that the chief of them required his bringing over the Spaniards, if possible, to the interest of the house of Austria, and the rest enjoined him to sink their ships and burn the town, which he found scarcely practicable ; and if it had been more so, not at all eligible, since at first the inhabitants did not discover any great enmity : and if more had been done, it could only have served to have made the Spaniards implacable, and after all, perhaps the town might not have been taken.

supplies for the service of the year 1703, were very cheerfully granted, and very easily raised; which was the reason that the fleet was much earlier at sea, had all things provided in a better manner, at less expense to the nation, and yet sooner than they had ever seen before, which was one great reason why the French never had any of those advantages they boasted of so much in the former war. In the month of March, the queen made a naval promotion.\* The marquis of Caermarthen was advanced from being vice-admiral of the white, to be vice-admiral of the red; John Graydon, Esq. was made vice-admiral of the white; John Leake, Esq. vice-admiral of the blue; George Byng, Esq. rear-admiral of the red; Thomas Dilkes, Esq. rear-admiral of the white; and Basil Beaumont, Esq. rear-admiral of the blue.†

The first scheme that was formed for performing any thing remarkable at sea, was upon a foreign plan. It was intended, that the Arch-duke Charles, who was to take upon him the title of king of Spain, should also marry an infanta of Portugal: and, in consequence of that marriage, was to undertake something of importance immediately, with the assistance however of the English and Dutch; and so hearty were the latter, that they sent a squadron of men-of-war, with nearly three thousand land-troops on board, upon our coast; and after tossing and tumbling there for some weeks, the project in the council of the

\* Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. Annals of Queen Anne, vol. ii. p. 2. London Gazette, No. 3896.

† The supplies granted this year, amounted to 3,517,937l. 7s. 2d. which in those days was thought an immense sum, though we have since seen much larger granted, without being well able to tell whether for peace or war. As to the promotion, it was declared in the Gazette of March 15, 1702, No. 3896, and was at that time highly applauded, because it was generally conceived, that those gentlemen were promoted purely in regard to their merit. It was also said at that time, that Mr. Graydon was advanced on another *officer's* refusing to serve in the West Indies.

imperial court was changed; the design dropt; and the Dutch went home again.\*

Sir George Rooke had proposed a scheme for distressing the enemy, by sailing very early into the Bay of Biscay; where he thought, if they had any men of war without Port Louis and Rochfort, they might be surprized and taken, or at least the commerce might be interrupted; and for the performance of this scheme, he took it upon himself.† About the middle of the month of April, he arrived at St. Helen's, with eighteen ships of the line,‡ with which he was very desirous of sailing on the intended expedition, without waiting for the Dutch; but this proposition was not at first accepted; so that he remained

\* This was among the number of those things which gave great offence to the state of Holland. They actually equipped a squadron; embarked on board it 3000 land troops; and sent them so early as the month of January on the coast of England, where they were to be joined by twenty sail of English men of war, with 3000 land troops: but the Portuguese match being lost, and the councils of the imperial court taking a sudden turn, this expedition was dropt, and then it was given out, that it was intended for the West Indies; which, whatever effect it might have abroad, created abundance of groundless reflections at home; as if we had neglected making war in that part of the world, where we were most able to have carried it on with success, and to have drawn advantages from it. But the truth is, our allies would never consent to our making any conquests in the Spanish West Indies; and this rumour of the fleets going thither, was only spread to alarm the Spaniards, and produce some good effects in Europe.

† There could not well be a greater sign of his being in earnest; and, as to the nature of the proposal, it was certainly well calculated for preventing the French from reaping any benefit from their trade with Spain, or the Spaniards from feeling any effects of French protection. Thus agreed exactly with the maxim upon which Sir George Rooke always went, of treating the French as enemies, and the Spaniards as allies. For it was his opinion, and he was not shy of declaring it, that it might be very practicable to retrieve Spain, though impossible to conquer it. Let it be considered, how far this was justified by the event.

‡ Burchet's Naval History, book v. chap. xiii. Boyer's Life of Queen Anne. London Gazette, No. 3906.

there till the beginning of the month of May, when he was so ill that he kept his bed, though Bishop Burnet is so charitable as to suggest, that he was only sick of the expedition; which, had it been true, was no reflection upon him, since the execution of what he proposed depended entirely on its being done in time; and the putting off his departure was chargeable upon those who were vested with that authority which commanded him. \*

The truth, however, was, that the admiral found himself so ill, that he applied for leave to go to Bath, which was granted him: and George Churchill, Esq. admiral of the blue, was sent to take upon him the command. But he not arriving in time, and Sir George finding himself better, put to sea, and continued at sea for something more than a month; and then finding what he suspected to be true, that the enemy had notice of his design at the Isle of Wight, and that most of their squadrons had sailed; and therefore, perceiving that he could do the nation no service by remaining longer on the French coast; he returned home about the middle of June, that he might be ready to undertake any more necessary service. †

\* That I may not seem to charge this prelate rashly, I will produce his own words: "This year things at sea, (says he) were ill designed, and worse executed: the making Prince George our lord high-admiral, proved in many instances very unhappy to the nation: men of bad designs imposed on him; he understood those matters very little, and they sheltered themselves under his name, to which a great submission was paid; but the complaints rose the higher for that; our main fleet was ready to go out in May, but the Dutch fleet was not yet come over; so Rooke was sent out to alarm the coast of France: he lingered long in port, pretending ill health; upon that Churchill was sent to command the fleet; but Rooke's health returned happily for him, or he thought fit to lay aside that pretence, and went to sea, where he continued a month; but in such a station, as if his design had been to keep far from meeting the French fleet, which sailed out at that time; and to do the enemy no harm, not so much as to disturb their quiet, by coming near their coasts; at last he returned without having attempted any thing."

† Sir George sailed, as appears by the Gazette, on the 9th of May.

This expedition has the misfortune to displease Secretary Burchet, who says, that in his poor opinion, \* a squadron of small ships might have had better success; and, in my poor opinion, Sir George Rooke was as good a judge of the probability of this as he was. The question in such cases is not the success, but the contrivance and execution of the scheme; and if these be right, the conduct of the commander cannot be wrong, and therefore ought not to be blamed. When Sir George Rooke returned, he was still so weak and infirm, that he asked and had leave to go to Bath, † his superiours seeing no reason to censure his behaviour; and therefore as soon as he was able to undertake it, we shall find him again in command, and employed in a service of much greater importance.

A.D.  
1703.

The grand fleet was commanded this year by Sir Cloudesley Shovel. ‡ It consisted at first of twenty-seven ships of the line, and the admiral had under him rear-admiral Byng, and Sir Stafford Fairborne; and being afterwards reinforced with eight ships more, these were commanded by Vice-admiral Leake. § His instructions were very large; but all of them might be reduced to these three heads, viz. annoying the enemy; assisting our allies; and protecting our trade. He waited till the middle of June for the Dutch, and then was joined only by twelve ships of the line, carrying three flags; and it is

On the 23d, he sent in the *Lenox* to Portsmouth, with a French East India ship worth 100,000l.; on the 15th of June, he sent in Lord Dursley, who commanded the *Litchfield*, with a French man of war of 36 guns, and a West India merchantman, worth 40,000l.; and on the 22d of June, Sir George returned with many prizes from the West Indies. This is the plain English of the prelate's *without attempting any thing*.

\* Naval History, p. 645.

† See our Memoirs of Sir George Rooke.

‡ Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 358. Burchet's Naval History, book v. chap. xiv. Annals of Queen Anne, vol. ii. p. 96. London Gazette, No. 3928.

§ London Gazette, No. 3931, 3933.

certain, that if the force he had with him, had been better adjusted than it was to the things he had orders to perform; yet, the time allowed him, which was only till the end of September, was much too short; so that it was really impossible for him to execute the services that seemed to be expected.\* He represented this, and is commended for it by Bishop Burnet,† who had notwithstanding censured another admiral for the same thing before; however, Sir Cloudesley Shovel was ordered to obey, and he did so; but was not able to get clear of the land till near the middle of July, having also a fleet of upwards of two hundred and thirty merchant-men under his convoy.

On the twenty-fourth, he arrived off the rock of Lisbon, where he held a council of war, in which the rendezvous was appointed to be held in Altea-bay.‡ He pursued his instructions as far as he was able; and having secured the Turkey fleet, he intended to have staid some time upon the coast of Italy. But the Dutch admiral informed him, that both his orders and his victuals required his thinking of a speedy return; and it was with much difficulty that Sir Cloudesley Shovel prevailed on him to go to Leghorn.§ In the mean time, the instructions he had to succour the Cevennois, who were then in arms against the French king, were found impracticable with a fleet; and

\* This, as I observe in the text, is ingeniously confessed by Bishop Burnet, who carries his reflections on this subject very far; he says, it was not easy to imagine what the design of so great an expedition could be. Much was said to the same purpose in the house of lords; but nobody reflected upon the admiral, as indeed there was no reason for it. But then, I confess I do not see why the same justice should not be done to other admirals, when their conduct appears to have been as innocent, or as laudable.

† History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 358.

‡ Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 312. Annals of Queen Anne, vol. ii. p. 98. London Gazette, No. 3941.

§ Burchet's Naval History, p. 653. The complete History of Europe, for 1703, p. 415. London Gazette, No. 3955, 3958.

therefore the admiral contented himself with doing all that could be done, which was to send the Tartar and the Pembroke upon that coast, where they also found it impossible to do any thing.\* The admiral then detached Captain Swanton to Tunis and Tripoli; and sent Rear-admiral Byng to Algier, to renew the peace with those states; and, on the twenty-second of September, arrived off Altea, whence he soon after sailed for England.†

On the twenty-seventh, in the Streights-mouth, he met with an Algerine man of war becalmed, upon which he immediately took her under his protection, till all the Dutch ships were passed. In this he certainly performed the part of an English admiral; preserved the reputation of our flag; did great service to our trade; and put it out of the power of the French to practise upon those piratical states to our disadvantage, as they had done formerly.‡ Having intelligence that a fleet of merchant ships waited for a convoy at Lisbon, he sent Sir Andrew Leake thither with a small squadron,§ who escorted them safe into the Downs. ||

\* It is clear, that the Dutch were victualled for a still shorter time than our fleet; and, if I durst, I would suggest that our ministry were obliged to comply with the schemes of our allies, in such joint expeditions. Mr. Oldmixon has given a large account of the attempt made in favour of the Cevennois, and has fully vindicated the admiral's conduct.

† London Gazette, No. 3961, 3966. Annals of Queen Anne, vol. ii. p. 107.

‡ Burchet's Naval History, p. 655.

§ London Gazette, No. 3969.

|| It is certain that Sir Cloudesley gained as much reputation in this expedition, as it was possible for an admiral to do who had no opportunity of fighting; and therefore, those people seem to carry things too far, who say that this fleet did neither hurt our enemies, nor protect our friends; whereas, in truth, all circumstances considered, it did both; and our allies the Dutch were very well contented with what was done; imagining, that the protection of their own trade was



A.D.  
1703.

On the sixteenth of November, the fleet being off the Isle of Wight, the Dutch crowded away for their own ports, and left the admiral to steer for the Downs, which he did; but before he made land, Captain, afterwards Sir John, Norris in the *Orford*, a ship of the third rate, together with the *Warspight* of seventy guns, and the *Litchfield* of fifty, being a-head of the fleet, gave chase to a French ship of war; and, beginning to engage about eight at night, the dispute continued till two in the morning, when, having lost her fore-top-mast, and all her sails, and her standing and running-rigging being much shattered, she struck. This ship came from Newfoundland; was commanded by Monsieur de la Rue; was named the *Hazardous*; and had fifty guns mounted, with three hundred and seventy men; but had more ports, and was larger than any of our sixty gun ships, so that she was registered in the list of our royal navy.\*

This expedition did not reflect much honour upon the nation, and therefore it created some murmurs; but these fell where they ought; not upon the admiral, who certainly did all that was in his power; but upon those who framed the project, and gave the admiral his instructions, and who were thought to have rather more power than parts.

But while the grand fleet was at sea, rear-admiral Dilkes performed a very acceptable service to his country on the French coast. For the lord high-admiral's council having intelligence, that a considerable fleet of French merchant-ships, with their convoy, were in *Cancalle-bay*; orders were sent to the rear-admiral, who was then at

a matter of as great importance, at least to them, as the support of King Charles's title to the crown of Spain, which the court of Vienna left, at that time, entirely to the confederates.

\* Burchet's *Naval History*, p. 656. Oldmixon's *History of the Stuarts*, vol. ii. p. 313. Boyer's *Life of Queen Anne*, p. 85, 86. *London Gazette*, No. 3968.

Spithead with a small squadron, to sail immediately in pursuit of them, which he did on the twenty-second of July.\* On the twenty-fourth, he ordered the captain of the *Nonsuch* to stretch a-head of the squadron, stand as near Alderney as he could, and send his boat ashore to gain intelligence. On the twenty-fifth he stood towards the Casquets for the same purpose; and at six in the evening, anchored off the south-west part of Jersey; whence he sent Captain Chamberlain, commander of the *Spy* brigantine, to the governor, that he might obtain from him the best intelligence he could give.

The governor sent to him Captain James Lampriere, and Captain Thomas Pipon, who well understood that coast; by whom being informed of a fleet about forty sail, plying to the windward on the 15th, to get to Granville, the rear-admiral, upon a consultation at a council of war with the pilots, resolved to sail immediately, though the tide fell cross in the night, that getting clear of the westernmost rocks of the Minques, he might attack the enemy by break of day; which succeeded perfectly well; for the next morning, the 26th, by day-light, perceiving the enemy at an anchor about a league to the westward of Granville; they, upon his approach, got under sail, and stood in for the shore.

The rear-admiral followed them as far as the pilot would venture, and found them to consist of forty-three merchant-ships, and three men-of-war. Being come within four feet water more than the ship drew, he manned all his boats, and the rest of the ships did the same. By noon he took fifteen sail, burnt six, and sunk three; the rest stood so far into a bay, between Avranches and the Mount of St. Michael, that in the judgment of the pilots, our ships could not attack them; whereupon, on the 27th in the morning, it was resolved at a council of war, to go

\* Burchet's Naval History. Annals of Queen Anne, vol. ii. p. 12. London Gazette, No. 3934.

into the bay with the Hector, Mermaid, a fire-ship, the Spy brigantine, a ship of six guns, taken the day before from the enemy, a ketch fitted out as a fire-ship, and all the boats of the squadron; which was performed between ten and eleven in the morning, the rear-admiral being present, accompanied by Captain Fairfax, Captain Legg, and Captain Mighells; as also by the Captains Lampriere and Pipon.\*

There were three ships equipped for war; one of eighteen guns, which the enemy burnt; the second of fourteen guns, which Mr. Paul, first lieutenant of the Kent, set on fire, who in this service was shot through the lower jaw, and four men killed; and a third of eight guns, which was brought off. Seventeen more of the merchant-ships were burnt and destroyed, by this second attack; so that of the whole fleet only four escaped, by getting under the command of Granville Fort. The enemy, during this attack, sent several large shallops from Granville, but with no success; the rear-admiral having manned a brigantine with eighty men, and another vessel of six guns, with forty, who covered all the boats. This last vessel unfortunately run a-ground, which obliged the rear-admiral to burn her. There were, during the time of this action, about five thousand of the enemy seen on shore; but they did not advance near enough to do their own people any service, or our people any hurt. The queen, to testify her kind acceptance of so cheerful and so effectual a service; ordered gold medals to be struck on this occasion; and delivered to the rear-admiral and all his officers, who certainly had very well deserved them.†

We are now to speak of the greatest disaster that had happened within the memory of man, at least, by the fury of the winds; I mean the storm which began on the 26th

A.D.  
1703.

\* Boyer's Life of Queen Anne. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xxxv. p. 230, 231.

† See the London Gazette, No. 3937, 3938.

wrecked seamen, and to the distressed widows of such as were drowned, as might have endeared her to her subjects; if she had not already so fully possessed their hearts, as to render any increase of affection impossible. \*

Charles, arch-duke of Austria being declared king of Spain by his father, and owned as such by the allies; Sir George Rooke was sent in the month of October to Holland, in order to convoy his Catholic majesty to Lisbon. † There the Dutch not being ready, the admiral was forced to continue for some time, and then the great storm occasioned a new delay; at last he embarked, and with a joint squadron of English and Dutch ships, and a considerable number of transports, with land-forces on board; he arrived at Spithead on the 26th of December; ‡ he was there complimented by the dukes of Somerset and Marlborough; on the road to Windsor, he was met by his

\* On the 12th of December, the queen published a proclamation for a general fast, on Wednesday the 19th of January following, which was kept with wonderful strictness; in the Gazette of December 16th, the lord high-admiral, by an advertisement dated the 13th, gives notice, that the companies of her majesty's ships which were cast away, should be paid that day month, which was done accordingly; and in the Gazette, No. 3978, appeared the following order:

"Her majesty taking into consideration, the great loss sustained by the families of such, as being in her majesty's service at sea, perished by the late storm; her majesty, with the advice of her privy council, is pleased to order, as it is hereby ordered accordingly, that the widows and families of such commission and other officers and seamen as have perished by reason of the late storm, in her majesty's service at sea, be entitled to her majesty's bounty in the same manner, as if they had been actually killed in fight, in her majesty's service at sea, according to the establishment in that behalf. And his royal highness Prince George of Denmark, lord high-admiral, is desired to give the necessary directions herein accordingly."

The house of commons, which was then sitting, addressed her majesty upon this melancholy occasion, desiring her to give immediate directions for repairing this loss; and to build such capital ships as she should think fit, and promised to make good the expense at their next meeting.

† London Gazette, No. 3959.

‡ Ibid. No. 5979.

royal highness the prince of Denmark; and, on his arrival, was received with all imaginable marks of respect by the queen, for whom he shewed greater deference than was even expected by the English court. \* Here we will end the naval transactions in Europe for this year, and proceed to take a view of what passed in America, after the death of Admiral Benbow in Jamaica. †

\* Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 354. "About the end of December, (says the bishop,) the king of Spain landed at Portsmouth. The duke of Somerset was sent by the queen to receive him, and to bring him to an interview, which was to be at Windsor; Prince George went and met him on the way, and he was treated with great magnificence; the court was very splendid, and much thronged, the queen's behaviour toward him was very noble and obliging: the young king charmed all that were there, he had a gravity beyond his age, tempered with much modesty, his behaviour was in all points so exact, that there was not a circumstance in his whole deportment that was liable to censure: he paid an extraordinary respect to the queen, and yet maintained a due greatness in it; he had an art of seeming well pleased with every thing, without so much as smiling once all the while he was at court, which was only three days: he spoke but little, and all he said was judicious and obliging." *Annals of Queen Anne*, vol. ii. p. 225. *London Gazette*, No. 3980.

† Most of our historians have placed Sir George Rooke's voyage to Lisbon in 1703, which is what I do not understand, since he did not leave England till the month of January, 1704, and therefore I have contented myself with placing that part of his expedition within this year, which fell out in it, and left the rest to be related in its proper place. I shall take this opportunity of observing, that the Arch-duke Charles was proclaimed king of Spain at Vienna, on the 12th of September, N. S. his journey to Portugal being then resolved on. The choice made of Sir George Rooke to bring him over hither, and convoy him to Lisbon, was a clear proof that his conduct was equally approved at home and abroad. Indeed, it could not be otherwise, for every body at this time, was satisfied that our ministry designed to place King Charles III. on the throne of Spain, partly by assisting the Spaniards, who should declare for him, but chiefly by compelling the French to abandon the cause of his rival. Now this was exactly agreeable to Sir George Rooke's way of thinking, who was for treating the Spaniards kindly, and fighting only with the French. This being considered, we may easily account for the making choice of Sir George Rooke to command this fleet; though

The command devolving upon Captain Whetstone, whom Mr. Benbow had appointed rear-admiral of his squadron, he immediately put it into the best condition possible for going to sea, and then cruized on the coast of Hispaniola. On his return to Jamaica, an opportunity offered of shewing his great concern for the interests of the colony. A fire breaking out at Port-Royal on the 9th of February, 1703, about noon, burnt it down to the ground before night, leaving nothing standing but the two fortifications. In this sad distress of the inhabitants, which still would have been much greater, if the seamen, with great courage and industry, had not assisted in preserving their goods and stores; the rear-admiral published a proclamation, in which he promised to entertain and relieve all such as should desire it, on board her majesty's ships, until they could be otherwise provided for; which he with great care and tenderness performed.\*

Soon after this he sailed again on a cruize, in hopes of meeting a considerable fleet of merchant-ships, which were expected from France. He spent five weeks in search of them to no purpose; and after looking into Port Lewis, not finding any thing there, he stood away for Petit Guavas and Leogane. When he arrived near this port, he divided his squadron, because when Admiral Benbow attacked the enemy here, their ships escaped on one side, as he entered on the other. He therefore sailed westward with part of his ships, and sent the rest to the south. When these came in sight, three privateers, which were in every respect ready for service, stood away

it will not be easy to divine, why those writers bear hardest on Sir George's character, who are fondest of Lord Godolphin's measures, which we have shewn to be a thing absolutely absurd; since they thought alike, and adopted the single plan that could so much as promise success.

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 593. Annals of Queen Anne. London Gazette, No. 3886. 3897. British Empire in America, vol. ii.

northward; but the rear-admiral forcing two of them ashore, burnt them, and the other he took. Captain Vincent, who commanded to the southward, rowed in the night into a place called the Cul de Sac; where he found four ships, one of which he burnt, another he sunk, the third, which was a consort of the privateers aforementioned, he towed out, and boarding the fourth, she was blown up by the accidental firing of a grenado-shell. From this place the rear-admiral sailed to Port de Paix, but found no shipping there; for the before-mentioned privateers were all that the enemy had in those parts, with which, and five hundred men, they thought to have made an attempt on the north side of Jamaica; and in these ships were taken one hundred and twenty prisoners.\*

While Rear-admiral Whetstone was thus employed, they were far from forgetting the safety of the plantations at home. Sir George Rooke, in the month of September, 1702, detached from the Mediterranean Captain Hovenden Walker in the Burford, five more third rates, ten transports, and four regiments on board, for the Leeward-islands. He arrived in Barbadoes in the beginning of the month of January; and upon the coming thither soon after of six of our East India ships richly laden, he sent them home; by the advice of a council of war, under the convoy of the Expedition, a third rate, Captain Knapp commander, who brought them safely to England. From Barbadoes, Commodore Walker sailed to Antigua, where

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 602. *Annals of Queen Anne*, vol. ii. p. 6. *London Gazette*, No. 2926. It is very remarkable, that *Pere le Pers*, in his accurate history of St. Domingo, has nothing of this expedition, which could not possibly have escaped his notice any more than that which was intended by the French against Jamaica. But as no honour could arise to his countrymen from the relation of what passed in this part of the world at this time, he thought proper to be silent, rather than record the advantages gained by the English.

he joined Colonel Codrington, who was about undertaking an expedition to Guadaloupe, in which Captain Walker was to assist him. They sailed from Antigua the latter end of February; on the 12th of March, General Codrington landed with great part of the forces; but was so warmly received by the French, that they would have been able to have done little or nothing, if Commodore Walker had not sent in the *Chichester*, which drove the enemy from their batteries, and which our men quickly entered.\* The next day, the rest of the soldiers, and four hundred seamen were landed, who attacked the north part of the town with great fury; forced the enemy to abandon it; and to retreat into the castle and fort; which they defended to the 3d of April, and then blowing them both up, retired to the mountains. After this, our troops ravaged all the country, burnt the town to the ground, razed the fortifications, carried the best of the artillery on board, burst the rest, and with a very great booty embarked, without the loss of a man.†

The French writers give a different account of this affair, and because the English thought fit to retreat, they will needs have it the proof of a victory on their

\* Burchet's *Naval History*, book v. chap. 6. *Columna Rostrata*, p. 292. *The Complete History of Europe*, for 1703, p. 131. *London Gazette*, No. 3912.

† There were some unlucky circumstances attended this expedition. In the first place, when Captain Walker arrived, the land-forces had no powder, with which, however, they were furnished from the fleet. When they came next to examine their stores closely, it was found, that in a thousand flints, there were not fifty fit for muskets, nor had they mortars, bombs, pick-axes, spades, or indeed any thing proper and convenient for a siege. But we must take care not to attribute this mismanagement either to Commodore Walker, who commanded here, or to Sir George Rooke, who sent him, since they both acted in obedience to orders; the commodore to those of the admiral, and the admiral receiving his from the ministry, who ought to have considered better what they were doing.



side. \* Now as to this retreat, there were many reasons for it, and some indeed that rendered it indispensibly necessary. General Codrington fell sick, and was forced to return to Nevis; then Colonel Whetham, upon whom the command devolved, fell also dangerously ill, and was carried to Antigua. The command of the land-forces fell next to Colonel Willis; who, upon certain information that the French had landed nine hundred men on the back of the island, called a council of war, in which it was resolved to embark the forces; and this was accordingly done, as I have before observed, on the 7th of May. † It must be acknowledged, that this service suffered not a little from some disputes that happened between the land and sea-officers; which is, generally speaking, the ruin of our West India expeditions. ‡

\* Quincy *Histoire Militaire de Louis XIV.* tom. iv. P. Daniel *Journal Historique de Louis XIV.* p. 211. Limicres de Larey, the last mentioned French historian, says, that Monsieur Gabaret, arriving at Fort St. Mary, with two frigates, a flute, nine armed barks, and seven hundred men, to the assistance of the inhabitants, the English did not think themselves a force sufficient to withstand them, and therefore re-embarked.

† Burchet's *Naval History*, p. 604.

‡ The governors of our colonies have scarcely ever been able to agree with the commanders of our squadrons; and with respect of this very expedition, there were as warm complaints made against the commodore, as ever came from the West Indies: but he represented that the road of Guadalupe was excessively bad; that he found it impossible to procure pilots; that several of the ships lost their anchors, the ground being foul, and the water deep, so that some or other were daily forced out to sea; and added to this, that the troops were under excessive difficulties, having no guides to conduct them, and being under the utmost want of necessaries to support them. Besides, the island was not abandoned, till the expedition had cost us pretty dear, as appears by the following account of our loss. There were killed in the first action, one major, two captains, and six lieutenants; and wounded, two colonels, seven captains, and nine lieutenants; and three ensigns died. One hundred and fifty soldiers were killed; two hundred and eleven wounded; seventy-two died; fifty-nine deserted; and twelve were taken prisoners.

As soon as the news of Vice-admiral Benbow's misfortune and death arrived in England, it was resolved to send another flag-officer thither with a considerable squadron. This command, it is said, was offered to Sir Stafford Fairborne, who refused it; \* and then it was proposed to Mr. Graydon, who, though a certain prelate † styles him a brutal man, made this answer: "That it was his duty to go where the queen thought proper to command him, and that he knew no difference of climates, when he was to obey her orders." His instructions may be found at large in Burchet, ‡ and the strength he was to take with him, consisting only of a third, a fourth, and a fifth rate; which last proved unfit for the voyage, and therefore the Montague of sixty, and the Nonsuch of fifty guns, were ordered to see him a hundred and fifty leagues into the sea. They sailed about the middle of March, and on the 18th of that month they saw four French ships to leeward, viz. two of sixty, one of fifty, and another of forty guns. § This last being both the smallest and sternmost, the Montague, commanded by Captain William Cleveland, bore down to, and soon after engaged her. Hereupon the vice-admiral made the signal for a line of battle, and consequently for the Montague's coming off; but her fore-top-sail being shot in pieces, the second broadside she received from the enemy, she could not tack so soon as otherwise might have been expected; insomuch, that the other three French ships wore, and bearing down to the ship that had been engaged, each of them fired her broadside at the Montague; but she being to windward, and the sea running high, as the French

\* *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xxxiv. p. 338.

† Burnet's *History of his own Time*, vol. ii. p. 359.

‡ *Naval History*, p. 600.

§ *Annals of Queen Anne*, vol. ii. p. 2. *Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts*, vol. ii. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xxxiv. p. 338.

generally fire in hopes of wounding masts, yards, or rigging, all their shot flew over her, so that she received not any considerable damage. The French ships, which now made the best of their way from ours, were foul, for they were part of the squadron under command of Monsieur Ducaise, with which Vice-admiral Benbow engaged in the West Indies, and, as it was reported, were very rich.\*

This affair drew very heavy reproaches on the admiral, who, notwithstanding, seems to have acted according to the best of his abilities; and in saying this, I am warranted by the judgment of the admiralty-board, who were best acquainted with Admiral Graydon's instructions.† He proceeded with all imaginary diligence in his voyage, and arrived at the island of Madeira on the 10th of April, 1703; and from thence he sailed to Barbadoes, where he arrived the 12th of May. The day before came a brigan-

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 601, 602. Columna Rostrata, p. 291, 292. London Gazette, No. 3910.

† Bishop Burnet blames the admiralty, for inserting a paragraph in the Gazette, to justify the admiral's conduct. It is necessary the reader should see that paragraph, which runs thus: "Plymouth, April 26.—The Montague, Captain Cleveland, commander, is come in here: the Nonsuch and she went from thence the 13th of March, with Vice-admiral Graydon, in the Resolution, Captain Day, in the Blackwall, the transports with Brigadier Columbine's regiment, store-ships, and merchants, bound to the West Indies, and parted from them on the 26th of the same, in the latitude of 43 degrees. The captain says, that on the 18th of that month, in the latitude of 47 degrees, 30 minutes, they met four French men-of-war, and that he engaged the sternmost for some time; but upon his first engaging, the vice-admiral made a signal to call him off, being under orders not to lose any time in his passage, by chasing or speaking with any ships whatsoever; the contrary winds having kept him here much longer than was intended, and the service upon which he was bound very much requiring his presence, and the regiment that was with him." The single question that arose on this subject was, whether Admiral Graydon obeyed his orders? And this is plainly decided by the foregoing paragraph in the affirmative.

tine from Guadaloupe, with advice, that Commodore Walker was there, and that both seamen and soldiers were in danger of being starved for want of provisions. The vice-admiral thereupon applied himself to the agent-victualler, and having furnished himself with all the beef, pork, bread, and pease that could be got, he sailed on the 17th. On the 20th, he ran in with the fort and town of Guadaloupe; and seeing it in ruins, he sailed instantly for Antigua, and thence to Nevis, where he met with the army and squadron in the greatest distress; and having relieved them, he proceeded thence with all the ships of war to Jamaica, where they arrived the 5th of June.\* The first thing he did there, was to direct a survey of the ships under his command; which proved to be very defective, not only in their hulls, but in their masts, stores and rigging; and at the same time very ill manned. This, together with some differences that arose between the admiral and some of the principal persons in Jamaica, determined him to sail home as soon as possible: and accordingly, having left the *Norwich*, the *Experiment*, and the *Sea-horse*, with the *Harman* and *Earl-galley* fire-ships, together with two sloops, to attend the island; and the *Colchester* and *Sunderland* to convoy home the latter trade, he sailed for Blewfields, and proceeding thence, he fell in with Newfoundland on the 2d of August.†

In the evening of that day there arose such a fog as had scarcely ever been seen; for it lasted thirty days complete, and the weather was so very dark, that it was difficult to discover one ship from another: this occasioned the dispersion of the fleet, which could not be brought

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 605. London Gazette, No. 3942. This was certainly a very signal service done to the nation; since, if the admiral had acted less vigorously in procuring a supply; our troops must necessarily have perished for want.

† Burchet's Naval History, p. 605. Boyer's Life of Queen Anne. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 359.

together again till the 3d of September, when the vice-admiral thought it proper to consult his officers, as to the principal design of his voyage, which was the attacking the French at Placentia, and thereby forcing them to quit Newfoundland. At this council of war, there were present, besides the vice-admiral, Rear-admiral Whetstone, and thirteen sea-captains; of the land-officers, the commander in chief, Colonel Rivers, six captains, and an engineer. They took into consideration the queen's instructions to Brigadier Columbine, then deceased, and those to Admiral Graydon; and finding all their ships in a very weak condition; that they were thinly manned; and most of them sick, already at short allowance; and the soldiers, through their being forced to drink water in so cold a climate, having their limbs benumbed, so that they were scarcely fit for service; five regiments reduced to one thousand and thirty-five men; of five hundred they were to receive from New England, there came but seventy, now reduced to twenty-five, and those in a manner disabled; and, from the best accounts, the enemy at Placentia judged to be not only superiour in number, and consequently able to make a good resistance, but the avenues to the place extremely difficult, the grounds marshy, and no planks, or other materials, for mounting the guns on the batteries; these difficulties and obstructions being maturely considered, together with the good circumstances the enemy were in, and the assistance they might have from their privateers, and other shipping then at Placentia; the council of war were unanimously of opinion, that to make an attempt on that place with the ships and forces, in such a condition and at such a season of the year, was altogether impracticable; and, instead of any probability of success, might tend to the dishonour of her majesty's arms. \*

\* I transcribe this from a MS. account of Admiral Graydon's defence, in which are particular certificates as to the truth of each of

This was the end of Vice-admiral Graydon's unfortunate expedition; in which, though it be certain, on the one hand, that he did not do the nation any remarkable service; yet, it is no less certain, on the other, that in respect of protecting the trade, and the rest of the things in his power, he did all the service he was able. But it was his misfortune, first, to feel the effects of other men's mistakes, and next, to be made answerable for them. On his return, the house of lords entered into an enquiry into his conduct; and, besides their former warm vote, which was more than enough to have undone him, came to a resolution of addressing her majesty, to remove him from all employments, for impressing servants in the West Indies; desiring her, at the same time, to direct the attorney-general to prosecute him for that offence.\* This had the desired effect: Vice-admiral Graydon, as to service, was laid aside, and his memory has been loaded with the foulest imputations; though there is great reason to believe, that he was rather unlucky than unjust; and that he suffered for miscarriages which it was not in his power to avoid. In order to have a clearer idea of this, we must consider that he justified himself as to his not fighting the French, under his orders, which were very precise upon that head; and, if he had not obeyed them, he must have been answerable for all the consequences before a court-martial; while, on the other hand, the lords, as the supreme judicature, decided in this case on the reason of the thing; and because, as they thought, the necessity

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these facts, and which, I suppose, satisfied the house of lords as to this part of the charge; which the admiral looked upon as that which would affect him most, since here he had not executed his orders, but avoided attacking the French.

\* It appears by the Gazette, No. 3960, that the vice-admiral arrived in the Downs, on the 22d of October. See the Journal of the House of Lords. I do not find that the admiral was ever prosecuted, and I guess from a reflection of Mr. Oldmixon's, that he was not. History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 349.

of fighting ought, in his judgment, to have superseded his orders; yet, when he pleaded necessity in excuse of impressing servants, this would not serve his turn; but he was punished in that case as severely for making use of his own judgment, as for the supposed neglect of it in the other.

In all probability the resentment of the house of lords against this gentleman, was sharpened by their inspecting closely into other affairs relating to the navy; in which, it must be confessed, they found things very indifferently managed. As, for instance, complaints had been made to the lord high-admiral, of bad provisions, by which the seamen were poisoned, as well as the nation cheated; yet a survey of the provisions objected to was delayed for three months, which gave an opportunity for making such removes and changes, as rendered the proof of this charge altogether impracticable. The merchants complained that they were ill served with convoys, and that so little care was taken of the Newcastle fleet, as occasioned an excessive rise of coals: the neglect of providing for such seamen as were prisoners in France, was likewise rendered very evident; as was the danger of the island of Jamaica, and the betraying our naval councils to the French. These were all digested into an address, which was presented by the house of lords to the queen; to which her majesty was pleased to answer, that the address consisted of so many parts, that she could not then take notice of them.\* In the general, however, she promised she would consider of them, and give such directions as should be proper for the safety and welfare of the nation.

I think it necessary to observe here, that at this time

\* Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 359, 365. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 329. Boyer's Life of Queen Anne.

there were very warm disputes in the house of lords, \* as to the conduct of the admiralty in the late reign, which had been censured by the house of commons, and, in a great measure, justified here; so that at this season all the strength of party was exerted on both sides, and the merit of a man was less considered, than the faction to which he attached himself. † But it is time to leave so troublesome and unentertaining a subject, in order to return to the conduct of the war, and the great things performed in the year 1704; for the service of which the commons granted upwards of four millions; and of this the sum of two millions eighty thousand pounds was for the service of the navy; ‡ which shews, how desirous the nation was of supporting the war to the utmost; and of giving whatever was necessary for the service of the common cause, in hopes that it would be honestly and effectually laid out, for those great and salutary purposes for which it was so cheerfully given.

The king of Spain was very desirous of prosecuting his voyage to Lisbon, and therefore came to Portsmouth, and would have embarked on the third of February, § if the wind had been at all favourable. Sir George Rooke, who was to command the fleet that escorted him, and the land forces intended for his service, did every thing that could be expected to facilitate the expedition: for when he found the transports were ready, and that it was im-

\* Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 365.

† The queen, by soft answers, endeavoured to pacify both houses, which indeed was the only measure left for her to pursue; since, if she had complied with the demands of either, it must have enflamed both. Her prudence, therefore, in this respect, was very conspicuous; though perhaps the rightest step she could have taken, would have been to have dismissed his royal highness's council as lord-high-admiral, and either restored the earl of Pembroke or appointed commissioners.

‡ See Whitworth's Collections of Supplies, &c.

§ London Gazette, No. 3990.



possible to have the intended number of great ships so early at sea, he proposed sailing with a small squadron to Lisbon, and waiting there for a reinforcement. This was a very wise, as well as vigorous step; for, according to the informations our court had received of the designs of France, they intended to have a great naval strength in the Mediterranean; which, if it had come there earlier than our reinforcement, would have been able to shut up our small fleet, then in those parts, in the river of Lisbon, and have intercepted all our trade homeward-bound; whereas if, according to Sir George's scheme, the supply arrived early enough at Lisbon, our fleet would be so strong as to prevent the junction of the Brest with the Toulon squadron, and to perform other requisite services on the coast of Spain. \*

In the first part of his design, Sir George was as fortunate as he could wish; for sailing on the twelfth of February, he arrived, after a fine passage, with the squadron, and all the transports in the river of Lisbon, on the 25th; and after two days had been spent in adjusting the ceremonial, his Catholic majesty was conducted to shore by the king of Portugal, and most of the royal family. †

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\* This was certainly a very wise and well judged scheme, and is a clear and direct proof that Sir George Rooke was very desirous of doing as much service as possible, and to lose no opportunity of being early in action; his going on this expedition, with the small squadron under his command, was liable to many exceptions, if considered in a prudential light, and with a view to the credit of the admiral; but Sir George disregarded these, when they came into competition with the public service; and chose rather to risk his own character, than the nation's honour, and the prospect the king of Spain then had of success, of which his Catholic majesty was extremely sensible; and gave upon all occasions the most ample testimonies of his particular respect for Sir George Rooke, and just acknowledgment of his services.

† Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 354. The Complete History of Europe for 1704, p. 108. London Gazette, No. 4090 Burchet's Naval History, p. 665, 666.

Among other debates in relation to this ceremony, there was one which deserves particular notice, and that was in relation to our flag. The king of Portugal desired, that, upon his coming on board the admiral's ship in his barge of state, and striking his standard, the English flag might be struck at the same time; and that when his Catholic majesty, with himself, should go off from the ship, his standard might be hoisted, and the admiral's flag continue struck until they were on shore. This proposition was made from the king of Portugal, by the king of Spain; to which the admiral replied, that his majesty, so long as he should be on board, might command the flag to be struck when he pleased; but that whenever he left the ship, he was himself admiral, and obliged to execute his commission by immediately hoisting his flag. This, and some other reasons, satisfied the king of Spain, as well as his Portuguese majesty; so that the flag of England was no longer struck, than the standard of Portugal. \*

\* We take this passage from the account published by authority; and I think I may venture to assert, that Sir George Rooke's concern for the honour of the flag became him very well, as an English admiral, whatever might be thought of it at home by some English statesmen. Bishop Burnet, speaking of our treaty with the king of Portugal, mentions a very extraordinary incident relating to this affair, which I find it necessary to transcribe. "In this treaty, an accident happened, that had almost spoiled all: the king of Portugal insisted on demanding the flag, and other respects to be paid by our admiral, when he was in his ports. The earl of Nottingham insisted it was a dishonour to England to strike, even in another king's ports. This was not demanded of the fleet that was sent to bring over Queen Katharine; so, though Methuen, our ambassador, had agreed to this article, he pressed the queen not to ratify it." The Lord Godolphin looked on this as too inconsiderable to be insisted on; the whole affairs of Europe seemed to turn upon this treaty, and so important a matter ought not to be retarded a day, for such punctilios, as a salute, or striking the flag; and it seemed reasonable, that every sovereign prince should claim these acknowledgements, unless where it was otherwise stipulated by express treaties. The laying so much weight on such matters, very much heightened jealousies; and it was said, that the earl of Nottingham, and the

Two days after this, the admiral, in compliance with the resolution of a council of war, sent a squadron of seventeen sail, to cruize off Cape Spartell; which squadron was afterwards increased to twenty-two sail. On the ninth of March, the admiral himself put to sea, and continued cruizing for a month. Rear-admiral Dilkes, who commanded the squadron before-mentioned, on the twelfth of March in the morning, discovered four sail of ships standing to the N. E. He had with him, three third rates, and two fourth, *viz.* the Kent, Bedford, Suffolk, Antelope, and Panther. By eleven he came up with them, and the Panther, which was the headmost of ours, engaged them; the Suffolk getting the wind of them, did the same, as also the Antelope, and the Dutch privateer; insomuch, that the ship of sixty guns struck, after exchanging several broadsides. The rear-admiral could not get his own ship in reach of them until noon, and then engaging the commodore, which was a ship of sixty guns, she struck to him in a little time, having lost half her complement of men, as the third did soon after, which was a ship of twenty-four guns; and in this action the Panther had her fore-top-mast shot by the board, the Suffolk her main-mast, and the Antelope's masts and yards were wounded. The two ships before-mentioned of sixty guns, were galleon men of war, one of them called the *Porta-Cœli*, and the other the *St. Theresa*, and came from *St. Sebastian*, with bombs, guns, iron bars, &c. being bound for *Cadiz*; where, as it was reported, they were to be fitted out for the *West Indies*, the commodore *Don Diego Bicuna* having a commission to command all the

“ Tories seemed to lay hold of every thing that could obstruct the progress of the war; while the round proceeding of the Lord Godolphin reconciled many to him.” The friends of the earl of Godolphin need be under no concern about this story, since it is most evident from the foregoing account of Sir George Rooke's conduct, that the fact is false, and that the honour of the English flag was never given up.

fleet designed thither; and in these ships were taken nearly seven hundred prisoners. \*

The rear-admiral, on account of bad weather, did not arrive at Lisbon till the twenty-fifth of March; and then in going in he lost the *St. Theresa*, but most of the men were saved. Sir George Rooke having also returned, and meeting with orders to sail up the Straits, prepared to execute them, though at the same time, the admiral was extremely pressed by his Catholic majesty to undertake somewhat in his favour. The difficulties with which Sir George was at this time encompassed, were many and great. In the first place, the reinforcement he depended on was not arrived; in the next, the queen's orders were positive for the relief of Nice and Villa Franca; and he knew how great a risk he ran, in case either of those places were taken for want of timely succour. The design formed in favour of King Charles III. to invade Catalonia, and make an attempt on Barcelona, was almost ripe for execution; and that monarch insisted very strenuously that the fleet should escort this embarkation. In this thorny conjuncture, the admiral resolved to do as much as in him lay to satisfy all parties; and we shall hereafter see with how great judgment he executed this resolution; in the mean time, it is necessary that we should explain the conduct of the administration in regard to the expedition of Sir Cloudesley Shovel. †

After Sir George Rooke had sailed, the court received intelligence, that the French were very busy in fitting out a great squadron at Brest. ‡ This alarmed us very much,

\* See the London Gazette, No. 4008. Burchet's Naval History, p. 467. Annals of Queen Anne.

† Burchet's Naval History, book v. chap. xvi. Annals of Queen Anne. London Gazette, No. 4017.

‡ Lamberti, tom. iii. p. 324. Quincy Histoire Militaire de Louis XIV. tom. iv. p. 426. P. Daniel Journal Historique de Louis XIV. anno 1704.

because it was not easy to foresee how this force would be employed. At all events, it was thought proper to equip, with the utmost expedition, a good fleet, which was put under the command of Sir Cloudesley Shovel, admiral of the white, who had under him Sir Stafford Fairborne, vice-admiral of the red, and George Byng, Esq. then rear-admiral of the same squadron.\* The admiral was instructed, if he found the Brest squadron still in port, to send away the trade, store-ships, and victuallers, under a proper convoy, to Lisbon, and to remain before that port himself to endeavour to keep in the enemy; or, if that were found impracticable, to burn and destroy them in case they came out. But if he found the Brest squadron already sailed, then he was to call a council of war, in order to judge what strength might be necessary to be sent to Sir George Rooke; and if it amounted to twenty-two ships, then he was to sail with them himself, that our fleet might, at all events, be stronger than that of the enemy. Sir Cloudesley executed his instructions punctually; and finding that a great strength was necessary in the Mediterranean to oppose the French, he sailed thither about the latter end of the month of May.†

We have now seen how and why the succours intended for Sir George Rooke's fleet, were so long delayed, and what care was taken for their coming, after all, in good time; we will next, therefore, return to that admiral, and give a short account of the manner in which he extricated

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 672. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 388. London Gazette, No. 4018.

† It was certainly well judged in Sir Cloudesley Shovel, to sail as he did with his fleet into the Mediterranean; for the French, perceiving how much their reputation suffered by the declension of their power at sea, resolved this year to make the utmost effort possible to recover it; grounding their hopes chiefly on our fleets being divided, and the possibility there was of attacking Sir George Rooke, before any reinforcement could join him; which, but for this prudent method of Sir Cloudesley Shovel, might have been effected.

himself out of the difficulties in which we left him. In the first place, he signified to the prince of Hesse, who had the chief direction of his Catholic majesty's affairs, that if the troops which were to make the attempt on Barcelona, could be speedily embarked, he was content to escort them, and to give all imaginable countenance to his majesty's affairs in Catalonia. In compliance with this offer, he sailed accordingly with the transports under his convoy; and, on the 18th of May, he arrived before the city of Barcelona.\* A priest and some others surrendered themselves; and informed the prince of Hesse, that if some few forces were landed, and a shew made of a bombardment, they would declare for King Charles III. and receive him into the place. Upon this there landed, on the 19th of May, about twelve hundred marines, four hundred Dutch foot, a company of Catalans, and as many volunteers as made up, in the whole, two thousand men. They remained ashore all night; and the prince finding nothing done, notwithstanding the Dutch had bombarded the place with some effect, his highness himself proposed the re-embarking the men, from an apprehension of their being attacked by a superiour force. The truth is, that he had great reason to abandon this design as he did, since, in the first place, the governor had discovered it, and had secured the chiefs of the Austrian party; and, in the next, the force he had with him was not at all proportioned to such an undertaking.†

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 675. Annals of Queen Anne, vol. iii. p. 102. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xxxvii. p. 109. London Gazette, No. 4018, 4035.

† There was certainly a very strong party in Barcelona for King Charles; and if they had had courage enough to have declared on the first arrival of the fleet, and had marched out, and joined the land forces as soon as they had disembarked, something might have been done; but they continued consulting and intriguing, till the governor seized their chiefs, and then they themselves advised the prince of Hesse not to remain any longer before the place, on account of its being equally inconvenient for him and them.

In this whole transaction one would imagine the admiral must have been blameless, since he had done all that could be expected from him, and did not retire till his highness himself thought it requisite. Yet Bishop Burnet has given such an account of it, as I must take the liberty of transcribing, that the public may see how necessary it is for an historian to be free from party. "Sir George Rooke came before Barcelona, where the prince of Hesse D'Armstadt assured him there was a strong party ready to declare for King Charles, as it was certain there was a great disposition in many to it. But Rooke would not stay above three days before it; so that the motions within the town, and the discoveries that many made of their inclinations, had almost proved fatal to them. He answered, his orders were positive; he must make towards Nice, which it was believed the French intended to besiege." \* At this rate of writing, no man's fame or memory can be safe. Yet, to heighten the malice of this reflection, and to mislead the reader, if possible, still more egregiously; the bishop tells us a long story, previous to this account, of the admiral's reprimanding one of his captains very severely, for departing from his orders, † though the intelli-

\* History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 388.

† In a grand debate in the house of lords, in 1740, this fact happening to be touched upon by a noble peer, who was speaking in that august assembly, the late illustrious John duke of Argyle, rose up and said, "As for what has been mentioned in relation to Admiral Rooke, we know, my lords, the history from which it was taken. It is a story of Bishop Burnet's, in his History of his own Time, and those who have sat in this house with that prelate must know he was a very credulous weak man. I remember him, my lords, in this house; and I likewise remember, that my Lord Halifax, my Lord Somers, and his other friends in the house, were always in a terror when he rose up to speak, lest he should injure their cause by some blunder. With regard to what he says against Admiral Rooke, I know I have heard it from those that were present, that the greatest part of it is a downright lie. The bishop, it is well known, was no friend to that admiral, and therefore he easily gave credit, as he

gence he brought, is supposed to have saved the fleet of England, and of his avoiding the French fleet, and joining Sir Cloudesley Shovel. All of which, to speak in the softest terms, seems to have been without any foundation.

The admiral landed his troops before Barcelona, on the 19th of May; it was the 27th before they had any intelligence of the Brest squadron; and then, instead of shunning, they chased them; and on the 16th of June, the fleet was joined by Sir Cloudesley Shovel, with the ships under his command; upon which it was immediately resolved, to proceed up the Mediterranean, in search of the French fleet. The whole of this affair was so perfectly well conducted, that our allies and our enemies join in commending Sir George Rooke; and yet his memory is in danger of suffering with posterity, merely because he was esteemed a Tory. This it was that drew upon him so many and such severe reflections; obscured all the great actions he did; and forced men, who valued themselves on their skill in writing, not only to misrepresent, but to falsify facts, that they might be able to cast such imputations upon him as he never deserved.\*

On the 31st of May, the admiral steered for the isles of Hieres, but in the passage met with a storm, which separated his fleet. On the 27th, they joined again, and had sight of a large French squadron, which they rightly judged to be sailing for Toulon; and therefore, it was resolved, in a council of war, to chase them thither, and if

"generally did in like cases, to every malicious story he heard against him." *The History and Proceedings of the House of Lords*, vol. vii. p. 575.

\* See Burchet, book v. chap. xvi. *The Complete History of Europe for 1704*, and all the foreign journals of that year. In the Dutch edition of Bishop Burnet's History, there is a large note to set right, that the editor takes to be the effects of haste or confusion; and in that note he states the facts and dates fairly from our Gazettes, and other public authorities, as I do. Burnet's History, vol. v. p. 770.



it were not possible to prevent them getting into that port, then to sail for Lisbon, in order to wait for a reinforcement; which was accordingly done.\* On the 14th of June, our fleet passed through the Straits-mouth, and were joined two days afterwards by Sir Cloudesley Shovel, with his squadron, off Lagos: † a council of war was then called, in order to consider what service should be proceeded on. Several schemes were proposed, particularly a second attack on Cadiz, which was soon found to be impracticable for want of a sufficient number of land-forces. At this council of war the admiral also was pleased to declare, that he was limited by his instructions from attempting any thing, without the consent of the kings of Spain and Portugal; which was another discouragement to the service, because those princes could very seldom agree on any measure; so that, except sending some ships to the Terceiras, in order to protect the homeward-bound Brazil fleet, there was little done, that I can find, which ought to be considered as the unavoidable consequence of this order.

Sir George Rooke being very sensible of the reflections

\* This is a fact, in which Burchet, Oldmixon, the Complete History of Europe, and all our writers agree, as taking it from the Journals deposited with the secretary of the Admiralty; and therefore we may easily know what to think of the following passage in Burnet's History, which follows immediately the account he had given of the admiral's leaving Barcelona, to sail for the coast of Italy, in order to prevent the siege of Nice, or to relieve it if it was besieged. "Having advice, (says the bishop,) that the French made no advances in that design, he turned his course westward, and came in sight of the French fleet, sailing from Brest to Toulon, the advantages he had were so visible, that it was expected he would have made towards them; he did it not: what orders he had was not known, for the matter never came under examination; they got to Toulon, and he steered another way. The whole French fleet was then together in that harbour; for though the Toulon squadron had been out before, it was then in port."

† Burchet's Naval History, p. 676. Annals of Queen Anne, vol. ii. p. 105. London Gazette, No. 4035.

that would fall upon him, if, having so considerable a fleet under his command, he spent the Summer in doing nothing of importance; called a council of war on the 17th of July, in the road of Tetuan, where having declared he thought it requisite they should resolve upon some service or other; after a long debate it was carried to make a sudden and vigorous attack upon Gibraltar, for three reasons: First, because in the condition the place then was, there was some probability of taking it; which, in case it had been properly provided, and there had been in it a numerous garrison, would have been impossible. Secondly, because the possession of that place was of infinite importance during the present war. Thirdly, because the taking of this place would give a lustre to the queen's arms, and possibly dispose the Spaniards to favour the cause of King Charles.

A.D.  
1704.

The fleet, in pursuance of this resolution, arrived in the Bay of Gibraltar on the 21st of July; and the marines, English, and Dutch, to the number of eighteen hundred, were landed under the command of the prince of Hesse, on the Isthmus, to cut off all communication between the town and the Continent. His highness having taken post there, summoned the governor; who answered, that he would defend it to the last.\* On the 22d, the admiral at break of day, gave the signal for cannonading the town; which was performed with such vigour, that fifteen thousand shot was spent in five hours; when the admiral perceiving that the enemy were driven from their fortifications at the south molehead; and that if we were once possessed of these, the town must be taken of course; he ordered Captain Whitaker to arm all the boats, and to attempt to make himself master of them.

This order was no sooner issued, than Captain Hicks,

\* Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 339. Boyer's Life of Queen Anne, p. 155. Mercure Historique et Politique, tom. xxxvii. p. 339. London Gazette, No. 4044.

and Captain Jumper, who were nearest the mole, pushed on shore with their pinnaces, and actually seized the fortifications before the rest could come up. The Spaniards seeing this, sprung a mine, by which two lieutenants and forty men were killed, and about sixty more wounded: however, they kept possession of the great platform, till they were sustained by Captain Whitaker, and the seamen under his command, who very soon made himself master of a redoubt, between the mole and the town; on which the admiral sent in a letter to the governor, who on the 24th capitulated,\* and the prince of Hesse took possession of the place. I must, upon this occasion, observe, that as this design was contrived by the admirals, so it was executed entirely by the seamen, and therefore the whole honour of it is due to them. I must likewise put the reader in mind, that nothing could have enabled the seamen to take the place, but the cannonading of it in such a manner, as obliged the Spaniards to quit their posts; for the general officers, who viewed the fortifications after the place was in our hands, declared, that they might have been defended by fifty men against as many thousands. The French indeed say, in order to diminish, as much as possible, the glory of this action, that the Spaniards had neither garrison nor guns there; but this is far from being true, since there were above one hundred brass pieces mounted. After putting as many men as could be spared into the place, under the command of the prince of Hesse, the fleet sailed to Tetuan, in order to take in wood and water.†

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 678. Annals of Queen Anne, vol. iii. p. 106. Columna Rostrata, p. 277, 278. London Gazette, No. 4045.

† The Marquis de Quincy tells us, that the court of London being informed of the weakness of the garrison of Gibraltar, gave Sir George Rooke orders to attack it; which he did, and was so lucky as to make himself master of it, through the negligence of the Spaniards. Though this is the most accurate book published in relation to this

While they lay here, the Dutch admiral sent a flag-officer and six ships to Lisbon, under orders to return home, and a promise that he would quickly follow them. On the 9th of August, they sailed again from Gibraltar, and had sight of the French fleet, which they resolved to engage. The latter declined coming to action, and endeavoured to get away; but Sir George pursued them with all the sail he could make.\* On the 13th of the same month, which was Sunday, he came within three leagues of them, when they brought to with their heads to the southward, the wind being easterly; and forming a line, lay in a proper posture to receive him. They were fifty-two ships, and twenty-four gallies, very strong in the centre, but weaker in the van and rear; to supply which, most of their gallies were placed in those squadrons. In the centre was Count Thoulouse, high-admiral of France, with the white squadron; in the van the white and blue flag, and in the rear the blue, each admiral having his vice and rear-admiral. Our fleet consisted of fifty-three ships; but the admiral ordered the Swallow and Panther, two fourth-rates, with a fifth and a sixth, and two fire-ships, to lye to windward of him, that if the enemy's van should push

war; yet, in this point, the author is certainly mistaken. We have Sir George Rooke's instructions in Burchet, his journals and orders are yet in being, and have been consulted in this work; but nothing of this sort has been discovered; and indeed, if any minister had been wise enough to contrive this scheme, he would undoubtedly have done himself justice, by claiming the merit of it. The French historian proceeds to say, that though Gibraltar was taken for King Charles III. yet it was never put into his possession; but has been ever since kept by the English, who, to say the truth, says he, have dearly purchased it, since it has cost them more pounds sterling, than there are stones in the fortifications. *Histoire Militaire*, tom. iv. p. 121.

\* This plainly proves, that no man was more inclined to fight, than Sir George Rooke, when fighting was a prudent measure; and in the night of the 11th, he had the good luck to force one of the enemy's ships a-shore, to which they were forced to set fire, in order to prevent its falling into our hands.

through our line with their gallies and fire-ships, they might give them some diversion. \*

A little after ten in the morning, our fleet bore down in order of battle, and when they came within half gun-shot of the enemy, the French set all their sails at once, as if they intended to stretch a-head and weather us; so that our admiral, after firing a chace-gun at the French admiral to stay for him, of which he took no notice, threw broad the signal, and began the battle, which fell very heavy on the Royal Catherine, the St. George, and the Albemarle. About two in the afternoon the enemy's van gave way to ours, and the battle ended with the day, when the enemy went away by the help of their gallies, to the seaward. In the night the wind shifted to the northward, and in the morning to the westward, which gave the enemy the wind of us. We lay by all day within three leagues of each other, repairing our defects, and at night they filed and stood to the northward. Our fleet endeavoured the two next days to renew the fight, but the French avoided it, and at last bore away. †

This plainly discovers that he had a victory, notwithstanding the great advantages of the French: which I think those who understand maritime affairs, will allow to be as great as ever any fleet had. For first, their ships were bigger; they had seventeen three-deck ships, and we had but seven. Secondly, they had a great advantage in their weight of metal; for they had six hundred guns more than we had. Thirdly, they were clean ships just come out of port; whereas ours had been long at sea, and

\* See Sir George Rooke's Account of this Battle, published by authority. This disposition plainly proved the admiral's great capacity, and how dextrously he could supply, by good management, any accidental deficiencies he might labour under.

† Burchet's Naval History, p. 677, 678. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 339. Columna Rostrata, p. 278. See Sir George Rooke's Account of this Battle, as also Sir Cloudesley Shovel's Letter, describing the same, in the Complete History of Europe for 1704. n. 456—459.

had done hard service. Fourthly, they had the assistance of their gallies; and how great an advantage this was, will appear from hence, that about the middle of the fight, the French admiral ordered a seventy-gun ship to board the Monk, a sixty-gun ship of ours, commanded by Captain Mighells; which she did, and was beaten off three times, and after every repulse she had her wounded men taken off, and her complement restored by the gallies. Fifthly, the French fleet was thoroughly provided with ammunition; which was so much wanted in ours, that several ships were towed out of the line, because they had not either powder or ball sufficient for a single broadside. But the skill of the admiral, and the bravery of the officers and seamen under his command, supplied all defects; and enabled them to give the French so clear a proof of their superiority over them in all respects at sea, that they not only declined renewing the fight at present, but avoided us ever after, and durst not venture a battle on that element during the remainder of the war. It may be therefore justly said, that the battle of Malaga decided the empire of the sea, and left to us and the Dutch an undisputed claim to the title of MARITIME POWERS. \*

\* I cannot conceive why Bishop Burnet, and other writers, should say so much to the prejudice of their country, purely to lessen the reputation of the admiral; but I can least of all account for the falsehoods that prelate has thrust into his relation. He says, that most of the ships had twenty-five rounds of powder when they began to fight; and that it seldom happened that so much had been spent in an engagement at sea. The Dutch Admiral Callenberg, in his letter to the States, says, that ten rounds would not serve above an hour, and that many of the English ships had no more when the engagement was over; so that if the bishop intended to insinuate, that the want of powder was only an excuse, he is effectually refuted by this authority; and we see at the same time, how able he was to make calculations. He commends Shovel's bravery justly, but then adds, that Rooke fought at a greater distance. Now I think I have some authority to prove, that he is in the wrong in both; by which I mean, that though Sir Cloudesley Shovel was a very brave man, yet here he had no great opportunity of shewing it, whereas Sir George Rooke had and did.

It is true, that the French, according to their old custom, claimed the victory. Lewis XIV. wrote a letter, affirming this to the arch-bishop of Paris, directing *Te Deum* to be sung on that occasion; and afterwards published an account, which I shall give the reader as nearly as may be from the Gazette; and I shall then demonstrate, that the whole was no more than an artifice of state,\* in order to lessen the ill consequences that were

For, observe reader, what Sir Cloudesley says in his letter, printed in the complete History of Europe, for the year 1704. His words are these: "The ships that suffered most in my division, were the *Lenox*, " *Warspight*, *Tilbury*, and *Swiftsure*; the rest escaped pretty well, " and I the best of all, I never took greater pains in all my life to " have been soundly beaten, for I set all my sails, and rowed with " three boats a-head, to get along-side with the admiral of the white " and blue. But he, out-sailing me, shunned fighting, and lay along-side of the little ships. Notwithstanding, the engagement was " very sharp, and I think the like between two fleets never has been " in any time. There is hardly a ship that must not shift one mast, " and some must shift all; a great many have suffered much, but " none more than Sir George Rooke, and Captain Jennings, in the " *St. George*."

\* I think it necessary to give the reader a transcript of this letter, from the French king to Cardinal Noailles, because two great politicians have differed much about it. Bishop Burnet says, that from the coldness of this letter, it was concluded in England, that the French were beaten; so that, in his judgment, this letter was the best evidence of our victory. Mr. Oldmixon thinks just the contrary; the reader, by perusing the letter, will be able to judge for himself:

" *COUSIN,*

" The fleet which I have assembled in the Mediterranean, under " the command of my son the Count de Thoulouse, admiral of " France, has not only disappointed the designs which the joint fleets " of England and Holland had upon the coasts of Catalonia, but has " also put a glorious end to the campaign, by a general engagement, " which issued wholly to my advantage, though the enemies were " considerably more in number, and had a favourable wind. Their " first efforts were sustained, and repulsed with so much valour by all " the officers and equipage of my ships, animated by the example of " their general, that the enemies could think of nothing during the " fight, which lasted ten hours, but how to defend themselves, how

apprehended from the defeat; and therefore, it is no less injurious to the glory of this nation, than to the honour of Sir George Rooke's memory, to make use of the distorted tales in this relation, to prejudice the indubitable facts contained in ours. The substance of this French account was:

“ That, before the fight, the admiral ordered all the ships to make ready; but the sea being calm, he gave directions for the gallies to prepare to tow the men of war off to sea. But at day-break the whole fleet weighed by favour of a bræze that blew gently from the land, and made toward the enemy, whom the currents had carried out to sea. The 24th, their fleet, in a line of battle, came up with the enemy; the Marquis de Vilette, lieutenant-general, commanded the van-guard, having behind him in a second line the duke of Tursis, with his own squadron of seven gallies, and five of Spain. The Count de Thoulouse commanded the centre, having behind him the Marquis de Royes, with four gallies, and the Marquis de Langeron had the command of the rear-guard with eight French gallies, under command of the Count de Tourville. The enemy's van-guard was commanded by Sir Cloudesley Shovel; the centre by Sir George Rooke; and the rear-guard were the Dutch ships, commanded by Vice-admiral Callemberg. They had sixty ships of the line, many frigates almost as large, and bomb-vessels that did them good service. Sir Cloudesley Shovel advanced before the wind, separating himself from the centre; but observing that the Marquis de Vilette endeavoured to surround him, he kept to the wind, and Sir George

“ to avoid being boarded several times by my ships, and to secure themselves by a retreat; and though the Count de Thoulouse did all he could the two following days to come up with them, he could not bring them to a second engagement. This happy success obliges me to return thanks to God, by public prayers.”



“ Rooke seeing the danger he was in, bore upon the king’s  
“ fleet. The fight began about ten o’clock, north and  
“ south off Malaga, ten or eleven leagues from shore, and  
“ lasted till night. The fire was extraordinary on both  
“ sides, and notwithstanding the enemy had the advantage  
“ of the wind, which blew the smoke upon the French  
“ fleet, they always kept as near the wind as they could,  
“ while the Count de Thoulouse made all possible efforts  
“ to approach them. The Marquis de Vilette had so  
“ roughly used the van of the enemy, having obliged five  
“ of their ships to quit their line, that he would have  
“ entirely put the same into disorder, had not a bomb  
“ fallen upon his stern, and set it on fire; which obliged  
“ him to quit the line, and extinguish the fire. Another  
“ bomb fell on the ship of the Sieur de Belleisle, who  
“ quitted the line to refit, as did likewise the Sieur de  
“ Grancy, Osmont, Rouvroy, Pontac, and Roche Allard.  
“ The latter fought the ship of Sir Cloudesley Shovel, of  
“ 90 guns, though he had but sixty. The Sieur Cham-  
“ meslin boarded three times a ship of the enemy, but  
“ quitted the same, seeing she was on fire in several  
“ places, but because of the smoke, could not see whether  
“ sunk. The bailiff of Lorrain was killed with a cannon-  
“ shot, and the Sieur de Relingue had a leg shot off.  
“ They were the Count de Thoulouse’s two seconds,  
“ and distinguished themselves very much, following the  
“ example of their general. The enemy continuing to  
“ sheer off, the fight with the van ended about five, with  
“ the centre about seven, and with the rear toward night.  
“ The French fleet pursued with all their lights out;  
“ whereas the enemy, their flag-ships excepted, had none.  
“ The 25th the wind blowing again from the west, the  
“ enemy sailed toward the coast of Barbary, so that  
“ they lost sight of them at night. The 26th, in the  
“ morning, they were seen again about four leagues dis-  
“ tance, the wind having again shifted to the east, which

“ gave them a fair opportunity to renew the fight, but  
 “ they did not think fit to approach. They were not  
 “ heard of afterwards; whereupon it was judged they  
 “ had passed the Straits, and this obliged the Count de  
 “ Thoulouse to return the 27th to Malaga, with the gal-  
 “ lies. We had about one thousand five hundred men  
 “ killed or wounded. But we do not know the loss of the  
 “ enemy, which must be very great; and several persons  
 “ said, that two of their ships sunk.” \*

I shall mention but one objection to this account, be-  
 cause I think I need not mention any more, and it is this;  
 that whenever the French endeavour to account for their  
 not pushing the affair farther, they insist on the mis-  
 chief done them by the English bomb; whereas nothing  
 can be more certain, than that there was not a single  
 bomb-vessel in the English fleet. As to the force on both  
 sides, and the loss of each, I shall give a particular ac-  
 count at the bottom of the page; † and having done this,

\* See the complete History of Europe, for 1704, p. 787. *Histoire Militaire*, tom. iv. p. 426. *Lamberti*, tom. iii. p. 324. *Memoires Historiques et Chronologiques*, P. Daniel, *Journal Historique de Louis XIV.* p. 208, 209.

† The English fleet, at the time of this battle, consisted of five divisions, besides the Dutch, of which there were but eleven ships. The strength of the fleet will particularly appear from the following list transmitted from the admiral to the queen.

	Ships Names.	Men.	Guns.	Men slain.	Wounded.		Ships Names.	Men.	Guns.	Men slain.	Wounded.
Admiral's division.	Royal Cath.	730	90	27	94	Rear-admiral Byng's.	Ranelagh.	535	83	24	45
	St. George	680	96	45	93		Somerset.	500	80	31	62
	Namur . . .	680	96	18	44		Perme . . .	440	70	25	48
	Shrewsbury	500	80	31	73		Triton . . .	230	50	5	21
	Nassau . . .	440	70	15	26		Dorsetshire	500	82	12	20
	Grafton . . .	440	70	31	66		Torbay . . .	500	80	21	50
	Monmouth	440	70	27	62		Essex . . . .	440	70	13	36
	Montague..	565	60	15	34		Kingston..	365	60	14	46
	Panther . . .	280	50	10	16		Centurion..	280	56	10	33
		4755	682	219	508			3790	631	155	361

I believe I need add nothing to shew the folly of the French academy's causing a medal to be struck upon this

Ships Names.					Ships Names.				
Men.	Guns.	Men slain.	Wounded.		Men.	Guns.	Men slain.	Wounded.	
Sir Cloudes. Shovel's.					Rea-adm. Dukes				
Barfleur...	710	96	6	24	Kent.....	400	70	15	26
Eagle ....	440	70	7	57	Royal Oak	500	76	20	33
Orford ....	440	70	6	9	Swallow...	280	50	1	3
Assurance.	440	66	6	14	Cambridge.	500	80	11	27
Warspight.	440	70	17	44	Bedford ..	440	70	12	51
Swiftsure..	440	70	13	33	Monk ....	365	60	36	52
Nottingham	365	60	7	19	Suffolk ...	440	70	13	38
Tilbury....	280	40	20	25	Burford ...	440	70	11	19
Lenox.....	440	70	23	78					
	3995	612	105	303		3865	540	119	249
Sir J. Leake's.					Total ...				
Pr. George	700	90	15	57		18,985	2925	687	1632
Boyne ....	500	80	14	52					
Newark ..	500	80	15	32					
Norfolk ..	500	80	15	20					
Yarmouth..	440	70	7	26					
Berwick ..	440	70	23	24					
	3080	470	89	211					

Commission officers slain; Captains, Sir Andrew Leake, and Captain Cow; lieutenants four, and warrant officers two. Commission officers wounded; Captains, Myuge, Baker, Jumper, Mighells, Kirkson; lieutenants thirteen; warrant-officers, thirteen.

As to the French fleet, it consisted of three squadrons; the first, sixteen ships of the line, carrying in all, 1120 guns, and 7700 men; the white squadron in the centre, consisting of 17 ships, carrying 1271 guns, 8500 men; the blue division in the rear, consisting of 17 ships, which carried 1152 guns, 7625 men. In all, 3533 guns, 24,155 men. Besides this, they had nine frigates, as many fire-ships, 12 French and 11 Spanish galleys, with two flutes; in all, 92 sail. On their side was slain, a rear-admiral, five captains, six lieutenants, and five sea ensigns. The Count de Thoulouse himself wounded in the forehead, shoulder, and thigh; the Count de Religues had his leg shot off. The Marquis de Herbault, intendant of the fleet; Monsieur Ducasse, commodore of the squadron; M. de Chateau Regnault; the Count de Phelipeaux; the Count de Cominges; M. de Valincourt; the Count de Thoulouse's secretary; seven captains, eight lieutenants, and about one hundred and fifty other officers were wounded; as to the loss of private men, it amounted, in the whole, to 3048.

occasion; as if, instead of being defeated, the French had gained a victory worthy the notice of posterity.\*

After the English had in vain endeavoured to renew the fight, they repaired to Gibraltar, where they continued eight days in order to refit; and having supplied that place to the utmost of their power with ammunition and provision, it was thought convenient to return to England; care being first taken to provide such a squadron for the Mediterranean service as might secure our trade, and render any designs of the enemy abortive. On the 24th of August, the admiral sailed from Gibraltar; on the 26th, he gave orders to Sir John Leake, to take upon him the command of the squadron that was to remain in the Mediterranean during the winter; and then sailed home with the rest, where he arrived safely on the 24th of September;† and was received with all exterior marks of esteem by the ministry, at the same time that the populace shewed for him an unfeigned affection.‡

But though Sir George Rooke had been happy enough to beat the French under great disadvantages; yet, he was not able to baffle that spirit of envy by which he had

\* In this extraordinary medal, Spain is represented sitting, and her arm leaning on a pillar, with victory over her head; the legend thus: *ORÆ HISPANICÆ SECURITAS*, i. e. The security of the Spanish coasts. To shew how this was attained, we read in the exergue, *ANGLORUM ET BATAVORUM CLASSE FUGATA AD MALAGAM, XXIV AUGUSTI, M,DCC,IV.* i. e. The English and Dutch fleet beaten at Malaga, 24th of August, 1704: Gerard Vanloon, *Histoire Metallique des Pays Bays*, tom. iv. p. 457.

† Burchet's Naval History, p. 680. Annals of Queen Anne, vol. iii. p. 112. London Gazette, No. 4058.

‡ Sir John Leake had under his command, two ships of the 3d, nine of the 4th, four of the 5th, one of the 6th rate, and a fire-ship. His orders were to repair to Lisbon, from whence he was to send home the trade, under a convoy of four men-of-war. He was likewise to take under his command such ships of the States-general, as remained in those seas; and it was particularly recommended to him to take care of Gibraltar. Sir George Rooke carried home five 2d, twenty-five 3d, and four 4th rates, with six fire-ships, two hospital-ships, and a yacht.

been so long persecuted. There was a party that not only questioned his conduct and the late victory, but were willing to sacrifice the glory of their country; and, as far as in them lay, to propagate the idle stories invented by the French, as undoubted truths, purely to gratify their own spleen; and this too in direct contradiction to the voice of the nation, as appeared by the many addresses presented to the queen, in which the courage, conduct, and fortune of Sir George Rooke are highly extolled. To put this matter, however, out of doubt, and to shew the true sense of the queen and the ministry on this subject; it was thought proper that his royal highness Prince George, should introduce such officers of the fleet, as had deserved best, to her majesty: and, accordingly, on the 9th of October, he presented, first, Sir Cloudesley Shovel, who had the honour to kiss her majesty's hand; then Captain John Jennings, commander of the *St. George*, upon whom her majesty was pleased to confer the honour of knighthood: \* and on the 22d or 24th of the same month, George Byng, Esq. and Thomas Dikles, Esq. the former rear-admiral of the red, and the latter of the white squadron, were likewise knighted. †

When the parliament came to sit, which was on the 23d of October, new disputes arose, and great pains were taken to prevent Sir George Rooke's conduct from meeting with public approbation: this, however, was without success; for the house of commons, in their address, made use of these words: " We beg leave to congratulate  
 " your majesty upon the great and glorious successes with  
 " which it has pleased God to bless your majesty in the  
 " entire defeat of the united forces of France and Bavaria,  
 " by the arms of your majesty and your allies, under the

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\* Complete History of Europe, Oldmixon. London Gazette, No. 4061, which Gazette is filled with addresses on the successes of the duke of Marlborough, and Sir George Rooke.

† London Gazette, No. 4064, 4065.

“ command, and by the courage and conduct of the duke  
 “ of Marlborough, and in the victory obtained by your  
 “ majesty’s fleet, under the command, and by the courage  
 “ and conduct of Sir George Rooke.” \* As it was known  
 that these expressions gave offence to many of the warmest  
 friends of the ministry, who thought there was no comparison  
 between the victories gained at Blenheim and Malaga, the house  
 thought fit to express its sentiments more clearly; and having,  
 on the 2d of November, taken into their serious consideration  
 the services both of the fleet and the army, they unanimously  
 voted, “ That her majesty be desired to bestow her bounty upon  
 the seamen and land forces, who had behaved themselves so  
 gallantly in the late actions both by sea and land.” To which  
 her majesty very graciously answered, “ That she would give her  
 directions accordingly.† One would have imagined, that acts of  
 so solemn a nature must have silenced such as pretended to  
 doubt the services performed by the admiral and the fleet; and yet  
 it hath since appeared, that some of our historians,‡ and many  
 of our memoir-writers,§ have attempted to persuade us, that,  
 notwithstanding these decisions of the queen and parliament,  
 the fleet did little or nothing, and that the fight at Malaga  
 was a drawn battle; in which, however, they differ from the  
 Dutch, who confess that it was the best fought action recorded  
 in history; and that the skill of Sir George Rooke convinced  
 the French, that it was in vain any longer to contest with the  
 maritime powers the empire of the sea.

Before we conclude the naval transactions of this year,  
 it is necessary that we should again pass into the Medi-

\* Chandler’s Debates, vol. iii. p. 393.

† Annals of Queen Anne, vol. iii. p. 153.

‡ Burnet’s History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 391. Oldmixon,  
 vol. ii. p. 340, and such writers.

§ Conduct of Sarah Duchess Dowager of Marlborough, p. 146.

terranean, in order to take a view of the services performed there by Sir John Leake. The Spaniards, who were the best judges, found our possession of Gibraltar so great a thorn in their sides, that as they very lately prevailed on the French to hazard an engagement at sea, to facilitate their taking of it; so they afterwards demanded and obtained a squadron of French ships, under the command of Monsieur de Pointis, to assist them in carrying on the siege. The prince of Hesse having sent early advice of this to Lisbon, Sir John Leake, in the beginning of the month of October, proceeded with his squadron to the relief of the place; and actually landed several gunners, carpenters, and engineers, with a body of four hundred marines; but receiving intelligence, that the French were approaching with a force much superiour to his, he found it necessary to return again to Lisbon.

He did this with a view only to refit, and to be in a better condition to supply and assist the garrison in a second expedition, for which he had very prudently directed preparations to be made in his absence. This enabled him to put to sea again on the 25th of October, and on the 29th he entered the bay of Gibraltar at a very critical juncture; for that very night the enemy intended to storm the town on all sides, and had procured two hundred boats from Cadiz, in order to have landed three thousand men near the new mole. But Sir John Leake entered so suddenly, that he surprised in the bay two frigates, one of forty-two, and the other of twenty-four guns, a brigantine of fourteen, a fire-ship of sixteen, a store-ship full of bombs and granadoes, two English prizes; and a Tartane and another frigate of thirty guns, which had just gotten out of the bay, were taken by an English ship that followed her.\*

\* Burchet's Naval History, book v. chap. 17. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 391. Oldmixon, vol. ii. London Gazette,

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1704. The enemy, notwithstanding these discouragements, continued the siege, in expectation of a strong naval succour from France, and therefore Sir John Leake resolved to land as many men as he could spare, to reinforce the garrison; which he performed on the 2d, 3d, and 4th of November, and continued still on the coast in order to alarm and distress the enemy. On the 19th and 20th, he ordered his smallest frigates to go as near the shore as possible, and then manned all his boats, as if he intended a descent; but this was done so slowly, and the troops feigned such a reluctance to land, as gave the Spanish general time to draw down a great body of cavalry, which enabled the admiral to put his design in execution, and to salute them in such a manner with his great and small arms, as made them scamper back to their camp with great precipitation. The *Centurion* arrived on the 22d of November, and brought in with her a French prize from Martinico, very richly laden; and, at the same time, gave the admiral intelligence, that he had sailed as far as was convenient into the bay of Cadiz, and had discovered a very strong squadron there, which he apprehended would soon be in a condition to sail. Upon this and some other intimations, Sir John Leake resolved to put to sea, and to stand with his fleet to the eastward of Gibraltar, that he might be the better able to take such measures as should be found necessary, as well for the preservation of the place, as for securing the succours that were expected from Lisbon.\*

No. 4066, 4075. Not only our own writers, but even the Marquis de Quincy acknowledges the truth of this fact: he likewise tells us of an attempt made by five hundred men, who crawled up the mountain, and appeared on the back of the town; which they had certainly taken, if they had been properly supported; but he says nothing of the English forcing them over the precipice, and leaving their mangled carcasses a melancholy mark of their own rashness, and their countrymen's cowardice.

\* Burchet's *Naval History*, p. 682.\* The *Complete History of Europe for 1704*, p. 527—529. Quincy *Histoire Militaire*, tom. iv.



On the 7th of December, the Antelope arrived, with nine transports under her convoy; and two days afterwards, the Newcastle with seven more, having on board nearly two thousand land troops. They escaped the French fleet very luckily; for when they were off cape Spartel they had sight of Monsieur Pointis's squadron, consisting of twenty-four sail of men-of-war, under English and Dutch colours. As they expected to meet the confederate fleet under Sir John Leake and Rear-admiral Vanderdussen thereabouts, they did their utmost to join them; but, by good fortune, were becalmed. They put their boats to sea on both sides to tow the ships; but the English observing that the men of war stretched themselves, and endeavoured to make a half-moon to surround them, they made a private signal, which Sir John Leake would have understood. This spoiled the measures of the French, who were thereby discovered, and put up their colours, and endeavoured to fall upon the transports; but they escaped by means of their oars; and the night coming on, they got away by favour of a small breeze from the south-west. By the arrival of these succours, the garrison was increased to upwards of three thousand men; and having already obtained many advantages over the enemy, it was no longer thought requisite to keep the fleet, which by long service was now but in an indifferent condition, either in the bay, or on the coast; especially when it was considered that M. Pointis was so near with a force equal, if not superiour to that of Sir John Leake. The prince of Hesse having acknowledged this to be reasonable, the admiral called a council of war on the 21st of December, and having laid before them the true state of the case; it was unanimously resolved to sail with all convenient speed to Lisbon in order to refit, and to provide further supplies for the

garrison, in case, as the Spaniards gave out, they should receive such reinforcements from King L ouis and King Philip, as would enable them to renew the siege both by land and sea. This resolution was as speedily executed as wisely taken, and the fleet arrived at Lisbon in the latter end of 1704; where we shall leave them in order to return to what was doing at home, and the preparations made for carrying on the war by sea with greater vigour, in the next year, than they had been, at any time, since the beginning of this dispute. \*

It was a common complaint at this juncture, that we did not prosecute the war at sea with so much vigour as might be expected from a nation so powerful on that element: that the enemy's taking our ships was a reproach on the nation, which ought to fall under the notice of parliament. In answer to this, I mean in the house of commons, it was said, that though the facts could not be denied, yet on the other hand it must be allowed, that the board of admiralty could not do more than the supplies granted by parliament would enable them; and that therefore, if more was expected from, more ought to be done for them. This was chiefly said by the admirals and their friends, who were very numerous. The house having considered the whole affair with great attention, came at length, on the 7th of November, 1704, to the following resolutions, *viz.* That forty thousand seamen should be allowed for the year 1705, including eight thousand marines. On the 9th, they resolved that one hundred thousand pounds should be allowed for the ordinary of the navy for the same year; and that forty thousand pounds should be given to the office of ordnance for the sea service, over and above the usual provision; and that ten thousand pounds should be given for making a wharf and store-house at Portsmouth. These were

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 682. Annals of Queen Anne, vol. iii. London Gazette, No. 4084, 4087, 4093.

great and glorious provisions, such as shewed that the people were desirous not to spare their treasure, where the credit of the crown and their own interest were at stake.\*

Yet in the latter end of this, and in the beginning of the succeeding year, certain inquiries were made in the house of lords, which did as great honour to that assembly, as they gave pain to some in the administration. A great clamour had been raised against the prince's council, for not giving sufficient attention to merchants; and for having very little regard to the resentment shewn by that house against certain persons, and certain proceedings. The warm speeches of Lord Haversham, and some other lords, raised a great heat; but before any address was made to the queen, two committees of inquiry were appointed; one to inspect the books at the admiralty-office, in order to see exactly what conduct the board had pursued, and the other to consider what was done at sea. This was certainly a very clear and methodical way of acting, and contributed to the laying open all the wrong steps that had been winked at, either on account of private friendships, or through the prejudices of party.

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In the first place, the house observed, that twenty-two ships had been employed to cruize the whole summer; and they shewed, from their accounts returned to the admiralty-office, that they had performed their duty so negligently, as not to have done more than might have been justly expected from three ships, commanded by active captains. They likewise complained, that there were ten

\* It must be observed, that the supplics were carried in the house of commons before the least notice was given by the ministry, that Sir George Rooke had lost their favour. In this, there was a great deal of policy, because the majority of that house of commons were Tories; and if they had been at all aware of Sir George Rooke's being forced to resign, or, as Mr. Oldmixon phrases it, being laid aside, they might have been less inclined to receive from the ministry implicitly the terms of the supply.

flags in pay, three of which were not at sea ; that Mr. Churchill had not been at sea in any one year this war ; that Mr. Graydon had been ashore all the last year, and that he had been employed, notwithstanding a former address for his discharge ; that Sir James Wishart, though a rear-admiral, had the last year been Sir George Rooke's captain ; that Sir John Munden, though he had not done his duty, had a pension of three hundred and nineteen pounds a-year, &c. Though the queen could not be very well pleased with an address which reflected on the supineness of her royal consort ; yet, she concealed her dislike ; and answered, Feb. 5, " Your address contains  
" many observations, which I will consider particularly,  
" and give such directions upon them, as may be most  
" for the advantage of the public service." \*

Thus, between the two houses, the business of the nation, with respect of naval affairs, was very fully done. The lords took care to correct, or at least to point out, what was amiss in past transactions ; and the commons made ample provision for the thorough supply of whatever was necessary in times to come. Yet in doing all this, some sharp expressions escaped, especially in the

\* This address of the lords was presented to the queen on the 5th of February, 1704-5. It is, without question, one of the most valuable state papers extant, as it is a noble instance of the true spirit of an English parliament. It shews, how enquiries may, and ought to be conducted ; and how agreeable it is to the nature of our constitution to lay before the crown, and exhibit to the people true representations of the state of public affairs, that men may see how the money goes, which is said to be raised for their service ; and not look upon the public as a bad steward, that receives and pays without account. This, I will be bold to say, was the reason that this war was carried on so much cheaper than our naval armaments have been ever since : for, when enquiries are frequent, frauds seldom happen ; but when these are either discouraged, made only for form, or so turned as to serve the little purposes of parties, who, under colour of discovering the faults of a ministry, mean no more than to become ministers themselves ; things must go from bad to worse, and a spirit of plundering insinuate itself through all public offices.

house of peers, which certainly flowed from a zeal to party, than any love to justice; which gave such disgust to Sir George Rooke, that, after all honours had been paid him, he declined any further command, as desiring that the queen might be easy, and the nation well served, rather than that any opportunities might be given him of adding either to his reputation or estate. This is the true state of the case, as far as I have been able to learn; nor can I believe, what some warm people have ventured to assert, that the lord-treasurer, Godolphin, procured Sir George to be laid aside, in order to gratify the duke of Marlborough; a suggestion better becoming the narrow spirit of a party-writer, than the wisdom of that great lord, or the known calmness and equanimity of the noble duke. \*

\* Mr. Hornby, the reputed author of the famous caveat against the Whigs, which is now become extremely scarce, gives the following reflections on the disgrace of this great admiral. "In 1704," says he, "Sir George Rooke, with a crew of cabin-boys, took the almost impregnable fortress of Gibraltar; so that, at the same time, British trophies were erected eastward as far as the banks of the Danube, and her flags were seen waving on the towers of the most western part of Europe, where Hercules fixed his *ne plus ultra*. After this, under great disadvantages, both in the number, rates, and condition of his ships, and, above all, in the want of ammunition, he so far convinced the French how unequal a match they were for us on the watery element, that they never after ventured to equip another royal navy; yet, how were his services undervalued by the faction here! Gibraltar, which was able to defy the power of Spain, and to baffle and waste their army in a fruitless siege, and which is like to continue to future ages, an honour to our arms, and a safeguard to our commerce, was a place of no strength or value, and the engagement at sea was celebrated with lampoons, instead of congratulations. Neither his actions in this war, nor in the last, his conduct in saving our Turkey fleet, or his courage in destroying the French ships at La Hogue, could prevail with them to allow him any share of skill or bravery; so that he is to wait for justice from impartial posterity, not only in these qualities, but one much more rare in this age, which he shewed in refusing to ask a privy seal for a sum of money remaining in his hands of what had been remitted to him;

In consequence of this measure, however brought about, a sort of thorough change ensued in the admiralty. Sir Cloudey Shovel was appointed rear-admiral of England, and a second and commander-in-chief of the fleet; Sir John Leake was appointed vice-admiral of the white squadron, as Sir George Byng was of the blue; Sir Thomas Dilkes, rear-admiral of the red; William Whetstone, Esq. rear-admiral of the white; and Sir John Jennings, rear-admiral of the blue. I have thrown these debates and promotions into the most regular order I could, for the reader's ease and my own, that I might the sooner return to action, and to the exploits of our sea force, under these new commanders; and though I have not observed the strict rules of chronology, yet, as the promotions were the effect of the inquiries, I hope the reader will be satisfied with my manner of stating it. These formalities thus settled, let us now proceed to the transactions of the fleet, under the command of Sir John Leake in the Mediterranean, who shewed no less prudence and fortitude in preserving Gibraltar, than Sir George Rooke had done courage and conduct in acquiring it.\*

The French and Spaniards, as their own writers confess, were obstinate in their resolution of retaking Gibraltar, cost what it would. The eagerness shewn by King Philip on this occasion, had nearly been fatal to him; and the method he took to regain Gibraltar, had well nigh lost

"as he had not wasted it in monstrous bowls of punch, so he scorned to enrich himself by converting the public treasure to his own use, but justly accounted for it. These monuments, in spite of envy and detraction, will remain to his honour in the records of time, and his memory will live without the assistance or expense of a lumpish pile of stones, clamped up against the walls of Westminster-abbey, as was bestowed to commemorate the loss of some of her majesty's ships, and the more valuable lives of many of her subjects, for want of common care and discretion."

\* London Gazette, No. 4086, 4090, 4091. Burnet, vol. ii. Oldmixon, vol. ii. Chaudier's Debates, vol. iii.

him Spain, by disgusting most of the nobility. Hitherto, the Marquis Villadarias had commanded before the town, and had done all that a man could do, in a very bad season, with very indifferent troops. King Philip, however, removed him, and sent Marshal de Tesse, a Frenchman, with the title of captain-general, to command in his place; and, at the same time, baron de Pointis was ordered to sail with his squadron from Cadiz to block up the place by sea. This being performed, the Spaniards made no doubt of their being quickly masters of the city; and indeed the prince of Hesse found the French general so much better acquainted with the art of war, and so much better supplied with all things necessary, than the Spaniard had been, that he thought it requisite to send an express directly to Lisbon, to desire Sir John Leake to come with all imaginable speed to his assistance.\* Sir Thomas Dilkes had, in the mean time, arrived from England, with five third rates, and a body of troops; and these being embarked, Sir John sailed from Lisbon, on the 6th of March, to prevent the loss of this important fortress. †

Upon the 9th of the same month, he had sight of cape Spartell, but not having light enough to reach the bay of Gibraltar, he thought proper to lye by, to prevent his being discovered from the Spanish shore, intending to surprize the enemy early in the morning; but, by bad weather, was prevented from making sail so soon as he intended. About half an hour past five, he was within two miles of

\* It was the great misfortune of King Philip, that few of the Spanish officers were able to serve him effectually; and yet none of them could bear the thoughts of serving under Frenchmen. His making Marshal de Tesse captain-general, gave excessive offence, inasmuch, that many of the principal nobility, and some who had considerable offices about his person, immediately entered into intrigues for driving him out again. Quincy *Histoire Militaire*, p. 441. *Memoires de La Torres*, Lambert, &c.

† London Gazette, No. 4104, 4106.

cape Cabretta, when he discovered only five sail making out of the bay, and a gun fired at them from Europa point; whereupon, concluding the garrison was safe, he gave chase to the ships, which proved to be the Magnanimous of seventy-four guns, the Lilly of eighty-six, the Ardent of sixty-six, the Arrogant of sixty, and the Marquis of fifty-six.

At first, they made for the Barbary shore; but seeing our fleet gained upon them, they stood for the Spanish coast: at nine o'clock, Sir Thomas Dilkes, on board her majesty's ship *Revenge*, together with the *Newcastle*, *Antelope*, *Expedition*, and a Dutch man-of-war, got within half gunshot of the *Arrogant*, and after a very little resistance she struck, the *Newcastle's* boat getting first on board her. Before one o'clock, the *Ardent* and the *Marquis*, with two Dutch men of war, and the *Magnanimous*, with the *Lilly*, ran ashore a little to the westward of *Marbella*. The former, on board which was the *Baron de Pointis*, ran ashore with so much force, that all her masts came by the board as soon as she struck upon the ground, and only her hull from the traffril to the midships, remained above water, which the enemy set fire to in the night, as they did to the *Lilly* next morning. After the engagement was over, our squadron got farther from the shore, and on the 12th looked into *Malaga* road, where her majesty's ships, the *Swallow* and *Leopard*, chased a French merchant-man ashore, of the 'burden of about three hundred tons, which the enemy burnt. The rest of the enemy's ships, having been blown from their anchors some days before Sir John's arrival, took shelter in *Malaga* bay; and, soon after, hearing the report of our guns, cut their cables, and made the best of their way to *Toulon*. \*

Upon this, Marshal de Tesse, finding it now absolutely

\* Burchet, Burnet, Oldmixon: but all these are taken from the account published in the *Gazette*, No. 4116.



in vain to continue the siege, formed a blockade, and withdrew the rest of his troops. M. Pointis was well received at the court of France, notwithstanding his misfortune; neither did the Marshal de Tesse meet with any check on account of his behaviour; and indeed it would have been hard if he had, since he had done all that man could do, there having been thrown into Gibraltar, by the 15th of March, new stile, more than eight thousand bombs, and upwards of seventy thousand cannot-shot fired, though to very little purpose. \*

While these great things were doing in the Mediterranean, Sir George Byng was sent with a small squadron of cruizers into the Soundings. He sailed in the latter end of January, with a large and rich fleet of outward-bound merchant-ships. As soon as he had seen these safe into the sea, he disposed of his squadron in such a manner, as he thought most proper for securing our own trade, and for meeting with the French privateers. Among other new regulations which had been the consequence of the complaints of their merchants, one was the sending a flag-officer to have the constant direction of the cruizers; which, in this case, appeared a very wise provision, since Sir George Byng, by this disposition of his ships, was so fortunate as to take from the enemy a man-of-war of forty-four guns, twelve privateers, and seven merchant-ships, most of which were richly laden from the West Indies. The number of men taken on board all these prizes was upwards of two thousand, and of guns three hundred and thirty-four. This remarkable success made a great noise

\* The obstinacy of the two courts, in obliging their generals to continue this siege, when they were thoroughly sensible that it was to no purpose, proved the ruin of their affairs in Spain, at least for that campaign; and if it had not been for the accident of the earl of Galway's losing his arm by a cannot-shot, which occasioned the raising the siege of Badajoz, King Philip in all probability had been driven out of Spain. *Memoires de La Torres*, tom. iv. p. 204. *Quincy Histoire Militaire*, tom. iv. p. 442, 451. *Lamberti*, tom. iii. p. 514.

at that time ; it was published by particular directions from the court, and has been since thought worthy of being inserted in a general history ; and yet there is not a word said of the whole affair by Mr. Secretary Burchet, who must have known all the particulars of it as well, or better than any man, which renders his omission the more extraordinary. This gave such a blow to the French privateers, that they scarcely ventured into the channel all the year after, but chose rather to sail northward, in hopes of meeting with some of our ships homeward-bound from the Baltic. \*

A.D. 1703. We are now to give an account of the exploits that were performed by the grand fleet, which was commanded by the famous earl of Peterborough, and Sir Cloudesley Shovel, as joint-admirals ; and the first orders they received, were, to proceed for the Mediterranean, with the force then ready, which amounted to twenty-nine sail of line-of-battle ships, besides frigates, fire-ships, bombs, and other small craft. † On the 11th of June, they ar-

\* See the London Gazette, No. 4107, Sir George took at this time the following prizes :

Privateers.	Guns.	Men.	Privateers.	Guns.	Men.
Thetis, a man of war of . . .	44	250	Sanspareil . . . . .	20	135
Desmaria . . . . .	36	240	Mimve . . . . .	16	92
Philipp . . . . .	22	220	Marveilleux . . . . .	14	85
Constable . . . . .	30	210	Postboy . . . . .	10	70
Voler . . . . .	28	210	Bonaventure . . . . .	10	70
Royal . . . . .	26	200	Admirable . . . . .	12	75
Bernghen . . . . .	24	160			

As also seven French merchant-ships, most of them richly laden, from the West Indies.

† Burchet's Naval History, book v. chap. 18. Annals of Queen Anne, vol. iv. p. 137. London Gazette, No. 4126. Sir Cloudesley Shovel was the seaman picked out by the opposite party, to rival Sir George Rooke, and mighty expectations were raised on account of his being at the head of the grand fleet. There was likewise a good deal of pains taken to equip the ships he was to command in such a manner, as that he might want nothing abroad ; but by his activity this year, justify their censure of what was done the last.

rived in the river of Lisbon, where they found Sir John Leake, with his squadron, in great want of provisions; upon which the admiral ordered them to be supplied out of the stores brought from England, and that for four months whole allowance. On the 15th of June, a council of war was held, at which were present the joint admirals, Sir Stafford Fairborne, Sir John Leake, Sir Thomas Dilkes, and John Norris, Esq. then captain to Cloudesley Shovel; of the Dutch, Admiral Allemand, Vice-admiral Wassenaer, Rear-admiral Vanderdussen, and Rear-admiral de Jonge; in which it was determined to put to sea with forty-eight ships of the line, English and Dutch, and to dispose them in such a station between cape Spartell and the bay of Cadiz, as might best prevent the junction of the French squadron from Toulon and Brest.\*

On the 22d of June, Sir Cloudesley Shovel, with the fleet, sailed for Lisbon; from thence he sailed to Altea-bay, and there took in his Catholic majesty, who pressed the earl of Peterborough to make an immediate attempt on the city of Barcelona, and the province of Catalonia; where he was assured the people were well affected to him.† This being agreed to, the fleet sailed accordingly to Barcelona, and arrived on the 12th of August. After the troops were disembarked, there were many disputes, whether the siege should, or should not, be undertaken; but at last the affirmative carried it; and then a proposal was made, that the fleet should land two thousand five hundred men, exclusive of the marines, and that the Dutch should land six hundred of their men; which was agreed to; on condition, however, that on the first certain intelligence of the French fleet being at sea, both seamen and marines should embark again immediately. It was next deliberated in a council of war, whether the admiral's

\* Buchet's Naval History, p. 685.

† Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 419. *Annals of Queen Anne*, vol. iv. p. 137. *London Gazette*, No. 4136, 4146.

instructions, in regard to the duke of Savoy, should be complied with or not; and it was resolved, that as the winter season was advancing, it was too late for the fleet to proceed to the coast of Italy: and, at the same council of war, it was determined to return to England the first fair wind after the 20th of September. \*

On the 3d of September, the prince of Hesse having formed a scheme for attacking Fort Mountjoy, it was put in execution; and though it cost his highness his life, yet, through the extraordinary bravery of the earl of Peterborough, who renewed the attack, it was taken. This giving a happy prospect of the reduction of the place, the gunners and carpenters demanded by my Lord Peterborough, were ordered by Sir Cloudesley Shovel to be in constant readiness to land. After this success, the siege was pushed with great vigour; the trenches were opened the 9th, and batteries raised for fifty guns and twenty mortars. His Catholic majesty having at length consented to it, our bomb-vessels threw four hundred and twelve shells into the town; and eight English and Dutch ships, under the command of Sir Stafford Fairborne, being appointed to cannonade it from the sea, while the cannon from the batteries and fort continued to do the like on shore; the viceroy desired to capitulate the 23d, and the capitulation being signed the 28th, the gate and bastion of

\* It is very clear from the original papers, which have been printed in relation to this affair, that the admiral, from the time of his coming before Barcelona, to the reducing of that city, did all that was in his power for the service of King Charles; and it likewise appears from the letters of the prince of Hesse to him, that he was the person principally depended upon by his Catholic majesty, and to whom he constantly applied when distressed by his wants, or vexed by the earl of Peterborough's humours. It is no less clear from the same letters, that the earl of Peterborough applied to him in like manner in all his difficulties, and was constantly assisted and relieved; so that one may safely assert, that Sir Cloudesley Shovel was the soul of this expedition, and that without him nothing was, nor indeed could be done.

St. Angelo was delivered up the same day, and the whole city in a few days after. The surrender of this capital of Catalonia so strengthened King Charles's party, that the whole principality, Rosa's only excepted, submitted soon after. \*

All the world knows, that the reduction of Barcelona has been considered as one of the most extraordinary events that fell out in this, or, perhaps, in any modern war; and though we have already many accounts of it, which seem to attribute it, some to one thing, some to another; yet I will be bold to say, that nothing but the assistance given by our fleet could possibly have reduced it. When there wanted men to carry on the works, these were spared from the fleet; so were carpenters and engineers. While our army was before the place, Captain Loads was sent to reduce Denia, and Captain Cavendish to take Terragona, both which they effected. When artillery was wanted, it was landed from the fleet, and when ammunition was wanted for this artillery, all the twenty-four and eighteen pound shot were landed for the supply of the batteries, except as much as would supply thirty rounds; and when the city was taken, and a garrison established there by King Charles the third, the fleet landed eighteen hundred barrels of gun-powder, eight brass cannon, and all the three pound shot they had. †

A.D.  
1705.

On the 1st of October, it was resolved in a council of war, that Sir Cloudesley Shovel should proceed for England with the best part of the fleet; that Sir John Leake, with a strong squadron, should be left in the Mediterranean; that six ships should be left to attend the earl of Peterborough; two more remain at Gibraltar; and a

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 686, 687. The Complete History of Europe for 1705, p. 323. London Gazette, No. 4164, 4177, 4178.

† Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 362. Burchet, Annals of Queen Anne, vol. iv. p. 141. Mercure Historique et Politique, tom. xxxix. p. 366.

third and fourth rate be employed at the request of his Portuguese majesty in cruising for the homeward-bound Brazil fleet. \*

\* In order to convince the reader of the truth of what has been asserted, it may not be amiss to lay before him part of a letter written by Sir Cloudesley to his royal highness the lord high-admiral, dated October 12, 1705, containing an account of what passed in the last days of this siege.

" The 17th, our battery of thirty guns was opened, and fourteen  
 " of them began to play, with very great execution, upon that part  
 " of the wall where the breach was designed; the earl of Peter-  
 " borough came aboard, and represented to us the great necessity he  
 " laboured under for want of money for subsisting the army, and  
 " carrying on the siege of Barcelona, and the services in Catalonia,  
 " and, in very pressing circumstances, desired the assistance of the  
 " fleet; upon which our flag-officers came to the inclosed resolution:  
 " To lend the earl of Peterborough forty thousand dollars, out of the  
 " contingent and short allowance money of the fleet. The 19th, we  
 " came to these resolutions, *viz.* To remain longer before Barcelona  
 " than was agreed on at first; to give all the assistance in our power,  
 " and to lay a fire-ship ashore with two hundred barrels of powder;  
 " and a further demand being made for guns for the batteries, we  
 " landed fourteen more, which made up in all 72 guns, whereof 30  
 " were twenty-four pounders that we landed here, with their utensils  
 " and ammunition. We continue to bombard the town from the sea,  
 " as our small store of shells and the weather will permit. The 20th,  
 " a demand was made for more shot, and we called together the  
 " English flag-officers, and came to a resolution to supply all the bat-  
 " teries with all the twenty-four and twenty-eight pound shot, except  
 " a very small quantity, which was accordingly done.

" The 22d, the prince of Lichtenstein, and the earl of Peterbo-  
 " rough having desired, at the request of his Catholic majesty, that  
 " the town of Lerida might, for its security, be furnished with about  
 " fifty barrels of powder; and a further supply of shot being demanded  
 " for the batteries a-shore, it was considered at a council of war, and  
 " we came to the inclosed resolutions, *viz.* To furnish fifty barrels of  
 " powder for Lerida, and to send so many more twenty-four and  
 " eighteen pound shot a-shore, as would reduce the English to thirty  
 " rounds, as likewise to be farther assistant upon timely notice.

" The 23d, at night, our breach being made, and all things pre-  
 " pared for an attack, the town was again summoned, and they de-  
 " sired to capitulate, and hostages were exchanged; on our side,  
 " Brigadier Stanhope, and on the enemy's, the marquis de Rivera;  
 " and all hostilities ceased."

In pursuance of these resolutions, Sir Cloudesley, with nineteen ships of the line, and part of the Dutch fleet, passed the Straits on the 16th of October; and arrived happily at Spithead on the 26th of November following, after as glorious a sea-campaign, as either ourselves or our allies could expect. \*

It is but just, in such a history as this, to mention our losses as well as our successes: among these I was in some doubt, whether I ought to reckon the taking a great part of our homeward-bound Baltic fleet, with their convoy, consisting of three men-of-war, by the Dunkirk squadron, of which we have a large account in the French historians; I say, I was in some doubt about this, as finding no notice taken of it, either by Mr. Burchet or our Gazettes; but as I am satisfied that the Dutch writers would not be partial to our enemies in such a case, I find myself obliged to relate the fact as it is stated by them.

The count de St. Paul, after the death of the famous John du Bart, was looked upon as the best seaman in France, and therefore was promoted to the command of the Dunkirk squadron, in the room of M. de Pointis. We had a squadron under the command of Sir Thomas Dilkes, to watch that port, and another in the Soundings; yet Mr. de St. Paul found means to get out with his squadron, consisting of five men-of-war and five privateers, and were joined at sea by several other privateers; on the 20th of October, O. S. they fell in with our Baltic fleet, and having directed Mr. du Bart, with one of the men-of-war and the privateers, to secure as many of the English ships as possible, Mr. de St. Paul, with the other three men-of-war, attacked the convoy, which made a very gallant defence, but was at last forced to yield; and the Count d'Illiers, who commanded after the death of Mr. de St. Paul, who was shot in the midst of the action

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 687, 688. Annals of Queen Anne, vol. iv. p. 154. London Gazette, No. 4179.

with a musquet ball, carried our three men-of-war, and twelve merchant-ships, into Dunkirk. I am extremely surprized not to find the least notice of this in any of the memoir-writers; but before I part with the fact, I must remark a very extraordinary saying of Lewis XIV. when the news was brought him at Versailles.

The person who told it, thought the king received him very coldly, and repeated it therefore pretty loud, that there were three English men-of-war, and twelve merchant-men, carried into Dunkirk. "Very well," returned the king, with a sigh; "I wish they were all safe in any "English port, if that would restore Mr. de St. Paul." This was certainly a very noble and generous speech, and it was by such testimonies of respect as these, that, in the midst of his misfortunes, the French king always maintained a succession of brave officers, ever ready to expose their lives in his service. \*

A.D.  
1707.

At home we had this year a signal instance of naval discipline, which therefore deserves a place in this work. One Captain Cross, who commanded the Elizabeth, gave her up to the French in the channel, after a very slight defence. He was tried by a court-martial' on board the Triumph, on the 25th of August; Sir George Byng being president, and having twelve captains to assist him. It appeared there, that he shewed the utmost signs of fear, which intimidated the men; and that if he had behaved as he ought to have done, the enemy might have been repulsed, and the ship saved. He offered several things in

\* This I take from a private letter from Paris, published in the *Mercure Historique*, 1705, and it is confirmed likewise by Father Daniel, and other historians. Her majesty Queen Anne shewed no less regard to merit, on a recommendation from his Catholic majesty. Captain John Norris, whom I take to have been the late worthy Sir John Norris, having distinguished himself in an extraordinary manner in the attack of Fort Montjoy, King Charles III. was pleased to write a letter in his favour to the queen, who knighted him, and made him a present of a thousand guineas.



his defence, such as that his surgeon was sick, and many of the men were drunk, and would not do their duty ; but, upon a full hearing, he was declared guilty of neglect of duty, and the sentence pronounced upon him was, that he should be cashiered, rendered incapable to serve her majesty in any capacity, forfeit all the arrears due to him, and remain a prisoner for life. \*

Our trade escaped, generally speaking, better this year, than it had done formerly ; for in the month of November, there arrived ten East India ships, that had for some time put into Ireland : a few days after, there came thirty West Indiamen into the Downs, and the very same day nineteen vessels from Barbadoes, which were given over for lost. Yet all this could not quiet the merchants ; they still exclaimed grievously against the lord-high-admiral's council ; and things rose to such a height, that I find in some of the Dutch papers of that time, it was expected the queen would have restored the earl of Pembroke, and that his royal highness should have been created lord-high-constable of England ; but, by degrees, this affair blew over, for the prince's council were extremely wise in one particular ; they constantly printed large vindications of their conduct, and accounted so plausibly for every thing that was charged upon them ; that it was a very few only, and those too well versed in maritime affairs, who were able to distinguish where they were right, or where they were wrong ; so that they never wanted a strong party for them among the people ; and even at this day it is very difficult, if not altogether impracticable, to distinguish between the complaints that were excited by a spirit

\* The evidence against this man was very full and clear, and a resolution having been taken to preserve for the future very strict discipline in the navy, it was resolved to make such an example of him as he deserved ; and this it was that induced the queen to suffer this sentence to be put in execution without any mitigation, except as to his imprisonment. *Annals of Queen Anne*, vol. iv. p. 177.

of party, and those that were really grounded on their miscarriages or neglects. \*

In this year our successes had been so great both by sea and land, and there appeared so fair a prospect of humbling the house of Bourbon in Flanders, and of driving them out of Spain; that when her majesty thought fit to recommend the Spanish war in a particular manner to parliament, the house of commons immediately voted two hundred and fifty thousand pounds, for the prosecution of those successes; and for the whole service of Spain, during the succeeding year, they gave no less than seven hundred twenty-six thousand seven hundred and forty pounds; afterwards they voted for the supply of the sea-service, for the year 1706, forty thousand men, including the marines; they then voted one hundred and twenty thousand pounds, for the ordinary of the navy; ten thousand pounds to the office of ordnance, for the works at Portsmouth; and eighteen thousand two hundred ninety-eight pounds seventeen shillings one farthing, for ordnance stores and carriages, for the eight new ships built to supply the loss of such as perished in the great storm. †

A.D.  
1706.

After so generous a supply, the ministry had nothing to consider, but how to employ it in such a manner, as that

\* Bishop Burnet, vol. ii. p. 423, gives a very different account of our affairs at sea in this year, from those that I have already cited from him, and therefore it is but just that I should present the reader with this: "Our affairs at sea were more prosperous this year, than they had been formerly. In the beginning of this season, our cruizers took so many of the French privateers, that we had some thousands of their seamen in our hands. We kept such a squadron before Brest, that the French fleet did not think fit to venture out, and their Toulon squadron had suffered so much in the actions of the former years, that they either could not, or would not, venture out: by this means, our navigation was safe, and our trade was prosperous."

† See the votes of the house of commons, for the year 1705. *Annals of Queen Anne*, vol. iv. p. 197. *Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts*, vol. ii. p. 367.

those, upon whom it was raised, might be satisfied that it was laid out for their service; and this produced a resolution of equipping a numerous fleet, as early as it was possible: but it being found by experience, that it was simply impracticable to man the navy, as the laws then stood, both houses, to shew their earnest desire to put maritime affairs into the best condition possible, came to certain resolutions, upon which a bill was brought in, that perfectly answered its purpose for that time; and enabled Sir Cloudesley Shovel to man very fully, and in good time, the large fleet that was intended for the Mediterranean service.\*

This, with the settling the terms of the union, were the

\* The house came to those resolutions on Thursday the 14th of March, 1705-6, and it is necessary that the reader should be made acquainted with them. In few words, then, they were, 1. That in order to man the navy for this year, the justices of peace, and other civil magistrates, be empowered and directed to make search after seamen that lay concealed. 2. That the said justices and civil magistrates, cause such seamen, when found, to be delivered to such persons as should be appointed to receive them. 3. That a penalty should be laid upon such persons as should presume to conceal seamen. 4. That a reward be given to such persons as shall discover, and take up such hidden seamen. 5. That conduct-money be allowed. 6. That seamen being turned over from one ship to another, should receive the wages due on the former ships. 7. That able-bodied landmen be raised for the sea service. To bring these resolutions to effect, they ordered, that the committee to whom the bill for the encouragement and increase of seamen, &c. was committed, should have power to receive a clause or clauses pursuant thereunto, and to receive a clause for discharging such seamen, and other insolvent prisoners, as were in prison for debt, and delivering them into her majesty's service, on board the fleet. Which being passed into an act, received the royal assent on the 19th. The same day the lords addressed her majesty on the same subject, praying her to take into her royal care, and employ proper persons to consider of effectual means, to restore the discipline of the navy, in order to be laid before the parliament the beginning of the next session. Pursuant to which her majesty, a few days after, caused a long proclamation to be published, for the better putting in execution the act of parliament above-mentioned.

matters which principally took up the attention of this session of parliament. While the house was still sitting, Sir Edward Whitaker had orders to assemble a squadron to convoy the duke of Marlborough to Holland, which he did in the beginning of the month of April, and having seen the yachts safe into the Maese, returned by the middle of the month.

Before we mention the proceedings of the grand fleet, it will be necessary to give an account of the exploits performed by Sir John Leake, whom we lately left steering his course for the river of Lisbon. In that passage he had the misfortune to meet with worse weather, and more contrary winds, than was usual in those seas, or in that season. This unforeseen accident reduced the English squadron to some straits for provisions; and the Dutch, who are much heavier sailers, to far greater. However, when they were off Cape St. Vincent, they met the Pembroke, Roebuck, and Falcon, which escorted a small fleet of victuallers, that could not have arrived more opportunely, or have been consequently more welcome. †

On his coming to Lisbon, Sir John Leake had some proposals made him by the Portuguese ministry, which were thought altogether impracticable in the then situation of things, and therefore Sir John waved complying with them. In the beginning of the month of February, came letters from the admiralty, with advice of the mighty preparations that were making in the French ports, and the resolution that had been taken by the Spaniards to send away their galleons directly from Cadiz, under a French convoy, for the West Indies; which Sir John was directed to consider, and, if possible to prevent; of which mighty hopes were conceived in England, when these

\* *Annals of Queen Anne*, vol. v. p. 4. *London Gazette*, No. 4219.

† *Burchet's Naval History*, book v. chap. 19. *The complete History of Europe for 1706*, p. 6. *London Gazette*, No. 4194, 4198.

news were made public; Sir John being held as able, and reputed withal as fortunate an admiral as any in the service, and indeed deserved to be so reputed. \*

Upon this intelligence, he called a council of war on the 16th of February, in which it was resolved, to proceed directly with the ships then ready, which were nine third rates, one fourth, two frigates, two fire-ships, and one bomb-vessel, English; six ships of the line, one frigate, two fire-ships, and a bomb-vessel, Dutch; and with these, in case the galleons were in the harbour of Cadiz, to enter it directly, if wind and weather would permit, and either take or destroy them. On the 19th, another council of war was held, before which was laid a memorial of the Portuguese ministry, directed to Mr. Methuen, in relation to the homeward-bound Brazil fleet; and strict instructions from the lord high-admiral for succouring his Catholic majesty without delay. † Upon mature deliberation, they remained fixed to their former resolves, with these additions only, that as soon as they had executed their intended design on the galleons, they would make such a detachment as the Portuguese desired; and that whenever they should be joined with the ships and transports from England at Gibraltar, whither they intended to repair, they would instantly steer their course for the coast of Catalonia.

A. D.  
1706.

\* This scheme of sending so great a fleet into the West Indies, was of the last importance to the house of Bourbon; since, without a supply of money, the war could not be carried on in Europe; as, on the other hand, there were little hopes of preserving the West Indies in a due dependence upon Spain, without furnishing them from time to time with proper supplies. If, therefore, we could have taken the galleons at this time, it is most evident, that we must have disappointed both their designs, which, as affairs then stood, would in all probability have obliged King Philip to retire into France, at least for the present, and perhaps have put it for ever out of his power to return to Spain.

† Burchet's Naval History, p. 689. Annals of Queen Anne, vol. v. p. 131. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xl. p. 462.

When these resolutions were formed, and the day fixed for the departure of our fleet, Sir John Leake acquainted Mr. Methuen, then our ambassador at the court of Portugal, that it would be necessary to lay an embargo on all ships and vessels, that the enemy might have no intelligence of our design; and, upon Mr. Methuen's application, such an order was granted. But as there is nothing weaker, or at least nothing more subject to disappointment, than human policy, so this point that was thought so necessary to our security, proved, by an accident, if indeed it ought to be so called, altogether unaccountable, the ruin of our design. Sir John Leake sailed with the fleet under his command, on the 24th of February; but, when he arrived before fort St. Julian, the Duke de Cadaval, who commanded there, discharged first several single guns, and then fired the cannon of a whole bastion upon him.\* This surprized the admiral very much, who sending to know the reason of it, the duke pretended that it was done in pursuance of the order of embargo; as if the court of Portugal could possibly intend to detain the fleet of the allies in their harbour. This dispute hindered Sir John's sailing, somewhat more than twenty-four hours; and, in the mean time, the Portuguese, who doubted whether the embargo did not extend to the fleet of the allies, suffered five merchant-ships, two of which were Danes, and were supposed to have given notice of the design, to go out of the port the next day after the embargo was laid.†

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 690. The complete History of Europe for 1706, p. 62. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xl. London Gazette, No. 4210.

† It was very justly suspected, that there was more of treachery than of mistake, in this odd affair; and, indeed, whoever consults the history of the war in Spain, as written under the direction of Lord Galway, will find sufficient reason to believe, that the French had always a strong party in the court of Portugal, who made it their business to thwart vigorous measures, and to give all the checks pos-

On the 27th, Sir John Leake reached Cape St. Vincent, where he met with an easterly wind, which decayed so much about noon, that it became perfectly calm. Next morning, however, he lay fair for the galleons, if they had come out before the wind would suffer him to reach Cadiz. But that night he received advice, that the galleons had sailed with a very hard gale at east, on the 10th of March, N. S. the 27th of February according to ours; so that it is plain that if he had sailed on the 24th he must have met them. He was likewise informed, that they consisted of thirty-six sail, that is to say, twenty-four galleons, and ten or twelve French privateers, from forty to fifty-six guns, which were ordered to see them safe into the sea. Sir John steered after them, though with little hopes of coming up, unless the east wind had left them when they were at the height of Cape St. Vincent. Next morning he saw two sail a head, to which the fleet gave chase. \* About six, the Dutch Vice-admiral Wassenaer took one of them, and soon after, the other was taken by the Northumberland; they proved to be Spanish ships bound for the Canaries; and as they sailed from Cadiz the day after the galleons, it was thought needless to continue the chase any longer. †

We are now to turn our eyes towards the conduct of King Charles III. He had been left in the city of Bar- A.D.  
1706.

sible to the schemes formed by the allies, for pushing on the war with vigour, from the side of Portugal, and this was sometimes so barefaced, that Mr. Methuen was constrained to threaten them into better behaviour.

\* Burchet's Naval History. Annals of Queen Anne, vol. v. p. 131, 132. London Gazette, No. 4215.

† The masters of these two prizes owned to Sir John Leake, that they had intelligence at Cadiz of his design, and that this induced the galleons to sail as they did. Now, to understand this perfectly, it is necessary to observe, that the order for the embargo was obtained on the 22d. The two Danish ships were permitted to sail on the 23d. Sir John Leake, with his fleet was retarded, as we have related in the text, on the evening of the 24th, and did not sail till late on the 25th.

celona with a very small garrison, while the earl of Peterborough went to conquer the kingdom of Valentia, which he very happily accomplished, though with a very inconsiderable force. \* The French and Spaniards, in the mean time, were projecting the destruction of King Charles's affairs at a single blow; and it must be acknowledged, that their scheme was so well laid, that nothing but a few untoward accidents could possibly have disappointed it. This design of theirs was to shut him up in Barcelona, which city they intended to attack both by land and sea, in the beginning of the month of March, when they looked upon it as a thing impossible for our fleet to have succoured him, as indeed it would have proved. The command of the land army was committed to Marshal Tesse; but whether he really wanted activity in his own nature, or was so crossed in all his undertakings by the grandees of Spain, that he could do nothing; I say whichever was the case, so it was, that when the Count de Thoulouse was ready to sail with the French fleet from Toulon, the Spanish army was in no condition to form the siege; so that the whole month of March was spun out in preparations, and the place was not invested till the beginning of April. †

This design was very early discovered here at home, and advice was sent of it to Sir John Leake before he sailed from Lisbon; but it does not appear, that either the earl of Peterborough, or King Charles, apprehended this mischief, at least in due time, otherwise the king would have been provided with a better garrison, and the place have been certainly put in a condition of making a greater

\* See Dr. Friend's History of the campaign of Valentia, at the end of his account of the earl of Peterborough's conduct in Spain, p. 197. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 448, 444. Boyer's Life of Queen Anne, p. 207, 208; and other historians. See likewise the London Gazette, No 4216.

† This account I have taken from the French historians, Quincy *Histoire Militaire*, tom. v. p. 204. Lamberti, tom. iv. p. 146.



resistance. After missing his design on the galleons, the fleet under the command of Sir John Leake, repaired to Gibraltar, where he received a letter from his Catholic majesty intreating his immediate assistance, in terms which sufficiently discovered the deep distress he was in, and the concern and terror he was under. \*

The king's fears were far from being ill founded. M. Tesse came before the place with a numerous army, and the Count de Thoulouse landed ammunition and provision sufficient for the service of an army of thirty thousand men for two months; so that it is very evident, the French

\* The style and contents of King Charles's letter to Sir John Leake, are so singular that they certainly deserve the reader's notice.

#### " I THE KING.

" Admiral Leake,

" I am disposed to take upon me this occasion to advise you of the high risk this principality and my royal person are found in; for I make no doubt before to-morrow the enemy will molest us. They have already blockaded me with a squadron, and their army is now almost in sight of this city, and by their quick marches, have obtained some posts, which, if they might have been prevented, would very much have hindered their designs.

" I am resolved, although I find myself with such a small garrison (as a thousand men of regular troops, and four hundred horse) not to leave this place; for, in the present conjuncture, I have considered that my going hence will be the loss of the city, and consequently of all the other places which the happy success of the last campaign hath reduced to my obedience; for which reason, it is my opinion to risk all, and venture the casualties that a siege is incident to, putting just trust and confidence in your known zeal towards the great forwarding the common cause, making no doubt how much you have contributed towards the succours forwardness. I hope in a few days you will appear before this place, where your known valour and activity may meet with a glorious success, for which I shall again constitute you the credit of my royal gratitude.

" Given at Barcelona, the 31st of March, 1706.

" I the KING.

" By command of the king my master,

" HENRY DE GUNTER."

did all that could be expected from them by sea ; and if their endeavours had been as well seconded on shore, the place had undoubtedly been lost. But it so fell out, that the *Sieur de Lepara*, their principal engineer, was far enough from being a perfect master of his trade. He made a mistake at the beginning, which lost him eight or ten days time, and before he could correct this, they lost him by a shot from the place. This proved an irreparable misfortune ; for though he was but an indifferent engineer, yet after his death it appeared they had not his equal ; so that when they came to make an assault on the place, they were repulsed with considerable loss. These circumstances I thought it necessary to relate, previous to our account of *Sir John Leake's* proceedings ; and having now shewn the errors, mistakes, and misfortunes of the French and the Spaniards before Barcelona, we will return to our fleet, and the measures taken for relieving *King Charles* by raising the siege. \*

A.D.  
1706.

On the 3d of April, *Commodore Price*, with six English, and as many more Dutch men-of-war, joined *Sir John Leake*, who, in a council of war held on the 6th, resolved, in obedience to *King Charles's* letter, to sail immediately to Barcelona. In pursuance of this resolution, he arrived on the 18th in *Altea-bay*, and the next day had intelligence, that *Sir George Byng*, with a squadron from England, was coming up ; three days after they were joined by *Commodore Walker*, with his squadron, as they had been the day before by *Sir George Byng*, and then it was determined to sail north of *Majorca*, and that each ship should make the best of her way without staying for the

\* All the French historians agree, that their design on Barcelona miscarried through their own fault, and, generally speaking, relate the whole affair as I have done in the text. But if any reader of a more curious and critical disposition than ordinary, would see a long and exact detail of this affair, he may be satisfied in the admirable memoirs of *M. de l'euquieres*, tom. iv. p. 151.

rest.\* Upon the 26th the earl of Peterborough came off from Tarragona, with a squadron of barks, having fourteen hundred land forces on board; and when he came to the fleet, hoisted the union-flag on board the Prince George, as admiral and commander-in-chief.† His excellency found that the councils of war had rejected his proposals, and indeed their rejecting them saved the place; since before his arrival, Sir George Byng, Sir John Jennings, and Admiral Wassenauer, had anchored in the road of Barcelona; and by the contrivance of Sir George Byng, a considerable body of troops had been thrown into the town.‡

On the 27th, in the afternoon, the whole fleet arrived in the harbour of Barcelona, without meeting with the least opposition; for the Count de Thoulouse having received an exact account of the naval force of the allies, thought fit to sail away with the French fleet to Toulon; which obliged the land-army, as we shall hereafter see, to raise the siege with great precipitation. This relief appeared the more surprising, and must have been, consequently, the more grateful to King Charles, and all his faithful subjects; since it prevented their destruction but by a few hours, the enemy having made all the necessary dispositions for storming the place that very night, when considering the extreme weakness of the garrison, their success could scarcely have been doubted.§

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 692. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 444. London Gazette, No. 4222.

† Dr. Friend's Account of the earl of Peterborough's conduct in Spain, p. 55. Annals of Queen Anne, vol. v. p. 135. London Gazette, No. 4232.

‡ All these brisk and extraordinary measures, which appeared by the event so indispensably necessary, were concerted as well as executed, by our admirals only: the earl of Peterborough, though he had been constantly before of a sentiment directly different, when he saw them put in practice, and foresaw (as he easily might) their good effects, very judiciously approved them. Impartial inquiry into the management of the war in Spain, p. 101.

§ Burchet's Naval History, p. 693. Burnet, vol. ii. p. 447. Old-

Two days after the arrival of the fleet, M. de Tesse thought fit to raise the siege in a very extraordinary manner, for which our own, and the French historians, profess themselves equally at a loss to account. His army consisted still of fourteen thousand men, the succours thrown into the place did not exceed six thousand; so that it was very strange he should leave behind him a train of one hundred and six pieces of brass cannon, forty-seven mortars, two thousand bombs, ten thousand grenades, forty thousand cannon-shot, two hundred barrels of musquet-shot, five thousand barrels of powder, eight thousand swords, eighteen thousand sacks of corn, besides flour, rye, and oats, in proportion, not only undestroyed, but untouched; as if they intended it as a present to the besieged, by way of compensation for the trouble they had given them.

Yet to me the cause of this is pretty evident; \* the marshal saw himself under the necessity of regaining the kingdom of Castile, by a strange sort of a march; first into Rousillon, then round by the Pyrenees, and so through Navarre, which constrained him to leave his sick and wounded in his camp, with a letter recommending them to the earl of Peterborough's clemency: and, I make no manner of question, that he chose to let things remain as he did, that these helpless people might obtain the more favour; which, though needless, when he had to do with an English general, was nevertheless humane in him. † The admiral took to himself and his officers the honour of

mixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 370. Boyer's Life of Queen Anne, p. 240. Quincy Histoire Militaire, tom. v. Feuquieres, de Larrey, &c.

\* The accounts that I have given of the raising of this siege, are taken from French historians, who are certainly likely to be best informed; and with respect of the stores left behind, most impartial: and this, I suppose, is sufficient to satisfy the most critical reader, as to the difference between my computations and those he may meet with in some other histories.

† See the London Gazette, No. 4232, already cited.

this great exploit, which was one of the most important, and withal one of the most honourable, that happened throughout the war. \* His most Catholic majesty, on the other hand, was no less ready in paying a just tribute of praise and respect to his merit ; so that, if ever there was a fact so well established as to be out of all dispute, it is this, that Barcelona was relieved by Sir John Leake. †

\* This appears by Sir John Leake's letter to the prince's secretary, dated at Barcelona, May 1st, 1706, in which, among other things, he says, " The 27th of last month I got to this place, and in a lucky time " to rescue it from falling into the enemy's hands, for they expected " to have been stormed the next night. Count Thoulouse, with the " fleet under his command, which consisted of about twenty-eight of " the line, retired the night before ; but if it had pleased God, that " the wind had continued that brought Sir George Byng to me, I " believe I should have been able to have given you a much better " account of his strength. This comes by Captain George Delaval, " who is sent by my Lord Peterborough, with the king of Spain's, and " his lordship's own letters to her majesty, in the *Faulcon*, which ship " his excellency has appointed Mr. Robert Delaval, brother to Cap- " tain Delaval, to command."

† A more pregnant proof of this cannot be had, than from the following letter of his Catholic majesty, to Sir John Leake, before the relief of Barcelona ; but which evidently shews, that the king placed all his hopes in our naval force, and expected from Sir John Leake alone, that it should be exerted for his preservation. This letter, to say the truth, is so honourable to the British arms, as well as to the very worthy man to whom it is addressed, that I thought fit to transcribe the whole, otherwise the last paragraph might very well have served my purpose.

" SIR,

" It is with no small satisfaction, that I have been informed, from " the earl of Peterborough's letters, of your happy arrival upon the " coast of Valentia. I doubt not, but you have heard of the loss of " *Montjoy*, and of the condition my town of Barcelona is in, where I " was willing to suffer myself to be besieged, and to endure all the " hardships and accidents of war, to encourage both the garrison and " my subjects, by my presence, to make a long and vigorous defence.

" It seems, by the enemy's motions, they have already received " notice of your approach ; but instead of thinking to retreat, they " have redoubled their efforts, and fire upon the breach, which will " be in a condition to be stormed after to-morrow at farthest ; and in

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1706.

The next great service that was attempted, was the reducing Alicant; and in sailing thither, putting into Altea-bay, the admiral received notice, that Carthagena was disposed to submit: upon which Sir John Jennings was sent to that city, who returned on the 24th of June, after leaving a garrison in the place. But with respect to Alicant, the governor refused to surrender, and therefore it was resolved to besiege it by land, while it was attacked by the fleet at sea.\* To facilitate this, seamen were landed from the fleet, and Sir George Byng, with five ships, anchored in a line so near the town, that he quickly dismounted all the enemy's artillery, though the guns pointing toward the sea were no fewer than one hundred and sixty.

On the 28th, in the morning, it was resolved to attack the place on all sides; and with this view Sir John Jennings landed the marines he brought from Carthagena. About nine in the morning, the ships had made a breach

" all appearance, they will make a desperate attempt to render themselves masters of this town, before the fleet can arrive with the succours.

" Hence you will judge of the indispensable necessity there is, that you should do your utmost endeavours to relieve us without loss of time, and bring the fleet directly hither, together with the troops, to my town of Barcelona, without stopping or disembarking the forces elsewhere, as some other persons may pretend to direct you, for they can be no where so necessary as in this town, which is at the very point of being lost for want of relief. Wherefore I pray God to have you in his holy protection, and expecting the pleasure of seeing you as soon as possible, I assure you of my perfect esteem and acknowledgment.

" Barcelona, May 4, N. S. 1706.

CHARLES.

" P. S. Sir, you will discern the condition we are in by our letters, and I hope you will come as soon as possible to save us, of which you alone shall have the glory. For the rest, I refer you to Mr. Stanhope's letter."

\* Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 450. Burchet's Naval History, p. 694. Annals of Queen Anne, vol. v. p. 304, 305. London Gazette, No. 4218.

in the round tower, at the west end of the town, and another in the middle of the curtain, between the mole and the easternmost bastion, when the land-forces marching up toward the walls of the city, fifteen grenadiers, with an officer and serjeant, advancing, without order so to do, to the breach of the round tower, all the boats under the command of Sir John Jennings, went directly to sustain them, but before the men landed, the grenadiers were beaten back. However, the boats proceeded, and all the men getting ashore, Captain Evans of the Royal Oak mounted the breach first, got into the town with two or three of the boats crews; Captain Passenger of the Royal Anne followed; and next to him Captain Watkins of the St. George, with some seamen. Sir John Jennings, with the rest of the seamen and forces, who were in possession of the suburbs, moved on to support them; who coming into the town secured the posts, and made proper dispositions until the rest got in; when Mahoni retiring into the castle, left them in possession, with the loss of but very few men; \* Colonel Petit, however, was killed in the suburbs, standing arm and arm with Sir John Jennings, by a small shot out of a window, as they were viewing the ground for raising a battery against the wall of the town; besides whom there were not above thirty killed either of the sea or land forces; and not more than eighty wounded, notwithstanding the Spaniards had a continued communication from one house to another, and fired on our men from the windows and holes made for that purpose. †

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 695. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. Boyer's Life of Queen Anne, p. 240. Mercure Historique et Politique, tom. xli. p. 461. London Gazette, No. 4257.

† All that I have said, with respect to the service performed by the fleet, is fully confirmed by the author of the inquiry into the management of the war in Spain, who gives us the following account of this transaction, p. 135. "Brigadier Gorge's troops, which were so

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1706.

Next day, Brigadier Gorge, who commanded the troops before the place, summoned Count Mahoni to surrender, which he absolutely refused to do; but the ships continuing to cannonade very briskly, and a great number of bombs being thrown into their works, the garrison, which consisted mostly of Neapolitans, compelled the governor to give up the place, notwithstanding all his declarations to the contrary. Brigadier Gorge took possession of it, and was appointed governor.\*

It was even then much disputed, whether this place was of any use, and whether the time and men lost before it were not absolutely thrown away. But, be that as it will, the conduct of Sir John Leake, and the courage of his officers and seamen are no way impeached thereby; nor does it at all lessen the glory of this action, which was one of the boldest that ever was performed by men, that it was undertaken to little or no purpose.† Thus much is certain, that soon after the taking of Alicant, King Philip's forces were entirely driven out of Arragon,

“ much wanted in Castile, really contributed very little towards the reduction of Alicant; for as the fleet, without any assistance from the army, had made themselves masters of Carthagena, not long before, by the exemplary courage and conduct of Sir George Byng, and Sir John Jennings; so now the squadron, which Sir John Leake had ordered Sir George Byng to command for that purpose, bombarded and cannonaded the town of Alicant with so much success, that in a few days they made two practicable breaches in the wall, between the east and west gates, which the sailors bravely stormed; and Sir George Byng, being in possession of the place, forced open the gates to let the land forces in, who, having lost their engineer Petit, were not even masters of the suburbs.”

\* Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 540. Columna Rostrata, p. 283. Annals of Queen Anne, vol. v. p. 306. London Gazette, No. 4266.

† The truth of this fully appears in a letter from Brigadier Gorge to Sir John Leake, in which he complains of being left in the midst of enemies, in so distressed a condition, that unless Sir John was able to relieve him, he should find himself obliged to abandon it.



and that whole kingdom reduced to the obedience of his competitor.

After the reduction of Alicant, Sir John Leake, in the beginning of the month of September, sailed to Altea-bay, whence he sent Sir John Jennings with his squadron, intended for the West India service, to refit at Lisbon. He next made the necessary disposition for a winter squadron, which was to be commanded by Sir George Byng, and then proceeded to put in execution his last orders, which were to reduce the islands of Ivica and Majorca. These islands not only belonged to the crown of Spain, but their situation rendered them very necessary at this time to the allies, affording them an opportunity of supplying the places they had lately reduced with provisions, and securing a proper retreat for their smaller vessels, whenever it should be found necessary to keep a squadron in those seas during the winter. It does not appear, that the Spanish court had taken any precautions for their defence, being entirely occupied with the thoughts of preserving Minorca, which was looked upon as the island of greatest importance, and therefore most of their regular troops were there. \*

On the 6th of September, Sir John sailed from Altea-bay, and on the 9th anchored before Ivica. This island, which is about fourscore miles in circuit, abounds with corn, wine, fruit, salt, &c., and the inhabitants being a trading people, were rather inclined to submit to the allies, than to remain under their old government; and therefore, on the first summons, they sent deputies to make their submission, which was readily accepted, and King Charles III. immediately proclaimed. † On the 13th, the fleet sailed for Majorca, and arrived on the 14th

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 696. Annals of Queen Anne, vol. v. p. 306. London Gazette, No. 4267.

† *Columna Rostrata*, p. 283. *The Complete History of Europe for 1706*, p. 390. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xii. p. 555.

before Palma. This island, which is one of the finest in the world, abounding with all the necessaries of life, well planted and well peopled, and so large as to be once accounted a kingdom, was at this time governed by the Conde de Alcudia, who was a native of the place. He was warmly in the interest of King Philip, and when the admiral summoned him, sent him a Spanish answer, "That he would defend the island as long as there was a man in it." But, upon throwing three or four bombs into the place, which did no great mischief, the inhabitants rose and forced the viceroy to surrender. He shewed his wisdom, however, where he could not shew his courage, by making a very prudent capitulation.

Sir John Leake left a garrison in Porto-Pin, and two men of war to carry off the Conde, and such other of the inhabitants as were disaffected to King Charles III; and, on the 23d of the same month, he prosecuted his voyage for England. Before his departure, he received a letter from his Catholic majesty, who very gratefully acknowledged the services he had done him, and expressed the highest satisfaction with his conduct upon all occasions. On the 2d of October, Sir John passed the Straits, and, on the 4th, when he was off the south cape, he detached Sir George Byng, with the winter-squadron, for Lisbon. On the 17th, he arrived safely at St. Helen's, having been separated in a storm from the rest of the fleet, which came soon after into Portsmouth. And thus ended as successful a sea-campaign as is recorded in our own, or, perhaps, in any other history. \*

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1706.

Sir Stafford Fairborne, then vice-admiral of the red, was appointed, with a small squadron, to look into the

\* See the London Gazette, No. 4272, in which there is a large account of the capitulation with the viceroy of Majorca, which shews that Sir John Leake was a very able man in the closet, as well as in the field, and knew how to treat, as well as how to act in a rougher manner.

mouth of the river Charente, with orders also to destroy such ships as the enemy might have at Rochfort. He sailed for this purpose in the latter end of the month of April; and, after continuing at sea about three weeks, he returned to Plymouth with a few prizes. \* Soon after he received orders to sail for the Downs, whence he was quickly ordered over to Flanders, to assist in taking Ostend. Arriving before that place, he stood in so near the town, that they fired upon him, which he returned; but was soon after ordered to Newport, whence, after the blockade of that place was formed, he came back to Ostend. A scheme had been contrived by some of the land-officers for destroying the little vessels belonging to that port; but, when it came to be executed, it was found wholly impracticable. The entrance of the harbour being long, narrow, and crooked, whatever vessel or ship attempted to go in, must inevitably be much exposed to the platform of guns; so that there seemed but little hopes of attempting any thing against the ships by sea, which lay all in a cluster close to the quay, on the back side of the town; but there were letters in the camp which insinuated, that, as soon as the trenches were opened, the batteries raised, and some bombs thrown into the place, the Spaniards in garrison, assisted by the seamen and burghers, would oblige the French garrison to yield.

On the 19th of June, the trenches were opened before the place; Sir Stafford Fairborne, with his squadron, cannonaded it by sea, and, at the same time, two bomb-vessels were sent as near as might be, and, when they came to play, did great execution. Sir Stafford likewise caused all the small frigates to run in as near the town as possible, and to discharge their broadsides; which they did with so little damage to themselves, and such great

\* Burchet's Naval History, book v. chap. 26. Annals of Queen Anne, vol. v. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xi. p. 637. London Gazette, No. 4228, 4241.

injury to the place, that the people began to mutiny, and the governor found himself, as he pretended, under a necessity of capitulating, which he did on the 25th.

Thus the city of Ostend, which had formerly held out so many months, was taken in a week, though, besides the Spanish garrison, Count de la Mothe, was there with a considerable body of French troops, which he undertook should not serve again in six months; and, as one of their own writers pleasantly says, it had been very happy for France, if he had for himself undertaken never to serve again. After the surrender of Ostend, Sir Stafford Fairborne returned to Spithead, to assist in convoying a body of troops that were intended for a descent. \*

A.D.  
1706.

Before we speak of the proceedings of the grand fleet under Sir Cloudesley Shovel, it will be requisite to say something of the intended descent which we have just mentioned: this was a design framed upon the representation of some French Huguenots; particularly the famous Marquis Guiscard, who was afterwards engaged in a design to assassinate the queen. The land-forces designed for this service consisted of very nearly ten thousand men. They were to be commanded in chief by the Earl Rivers; under him by the Lieutenant-generals Earle and De Guiscard: the earl of Essex, and Lord Mordaunt, eldest son to the earl of Peterborough, were to serve in this expedition as major-generals. On the 10th of August, the fleet under the command of Sir Cloudesley Shovel,

\* In the siege of Ostend, the duke of Marlborough gave signal proofs of his personal courage; for, coming to make a visit to M. d'Auverquerque, he went into the trenches, where he staid a considerable time, and examined every thing very attentively, though the enemy, who had slackened their fire before, renewed it with excessive violence, as soon as they knew by the salute of the fleet, that his grace was come to the camp. In doing this, contrary to his usual custom, he shewed, that when he was more careful of his person, it was out of respect for the service, and not from any want of that temper of mind which commonly passes for heroism.

sailed from St. Helen's; but, not being joined time enough by the Dutch, this project proved abortive; and it was resolved, that the fleet should proceed to Lisbon with these forces on board, and that they should be employed in the service of his Catholic majesty. \*

It does not appear, that, after their disappointment in this scheme of making a descent on France, the ministry came to any resolution as to the employment of the grand fleet, or of the land-forces on board it; it looks as if all things had been trusted to the wisdom of the admiral, Sir Cloudesley Shovel, and of the general. The fleet was extremely late before it sailed for the Mediterranean, viz. the 1st of October, and being in the Soundings on the 10th of the same month, the *Barfleur*, a second rate, sprung a dangerous leak, which obliged the admiral to send her home, and to take the *Earl Rivers*, and his principal officers, into his own ship, the *Association*. Proceeding in their voyage, they met with exceedingly bad weather, insomuch, that when the admiral arrived in the river of Lisbon, he had with him but four men-of-war, and fifty transports; but he had the good luck to find the rest of the fleet arrived before him, so that he began immediately to prepare for action, and sent two ships of Sir George Byng's squadron to Alicant, with money and necessaries for the army, then under the command of the earl of Galway, which was in very great want of them. †

While he was thus employed, he heard, with great regret, of the disorders that had fallen out in the Spanish court and in our army. It is very hard to say, who was, or who was not, in the right; but this is certain, that in

\* Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 453. Annals of Queen Anne, vol. v. p. 310, 311. *Mercurie Historique et Politique*, tom. xli. p. 207, 303. London Gazette, No. 4252.

† Burchet's Naval History, book v. chap. xxiv. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. Boyer's Life of Queen Anne, p. 245. *Mercurie Historique et Politique*, tom. xli. p. 579. London Gazette, No. 4268.

consequence of these disputes, King Charles III. lost his interest among the Spaniards; and though he was once master of Madrid, he was forced to quit it again, and his affairs began to fall into such confusion, that the admiral at Lisbon could scarcely tell what he had to do, or how he was to act for his Catholic majesty's service; and therefore, thought it requisite to send Colonel Worsley to Valencia, in order to receive from the king himself, and the general, a certain account of their affairs, and a true state of the services they expected from him. While this gentleman was gone, and before the admiral had it in his power to take any settled resolution, the king of Portugal died, which threw the affairs of that kingdom into some confusion; and that could not happen without affecting us. We before observed, that the Portuguese ministry acted in a manner no way suitable to the strict alliance which then subsisted between our court and theirs. But now things grew worse and worse; and whatever sentiments the new king might be of, his ministers ventured to take some such steps, as were not to be borne with patience by an admiral of Sir Cloudesley Shovel's temper.\*

Upon the return of Colonel Worsley, the admiral was apprized, by letters from the King and the earl of Galway, that, unless he could bring Earl Rivers, and the forces under his command, and land them so as that they might come to their assistance, things were likely to fall into as great confusion as they were in the winter before, whereby all the advantages would be lost which had been afterwards procured at so vast an expense, both of blood

\* In order to be better informed of the particulars here mentioned, the reader may consult our larger historians, the collections of Lamberti, and the memoirs of the count de la Toirre. The narrow bounds prescribed to my work, will not allow me to enter deeply into political disquisitions, for that would draw me beside my purpose, so that whenever I touch upon them, it is only to preserve the connection that is necessary to render the accounts I give of naval affairs easy, and fully understood.

and treasure, by the maritime powers. These advices gave the admiral so much the more concern, as he knew that the ships were so much damaged by the rough weather they had met with in their passage, that it was impossible to fit them speedily for sea; and that, on the other hand, the land-forces were so much reduced by sickness, death, and other accidents, that, instead of ten, there were scarcely six thousand effective men. He resolved, however, to do the best he could to comply with the desire of the king and the general; the rather because he saw that nothing but spirit and diligence could possibly recover those advantages, which had been lost through divisions and neglect of duty. He gave orders, therefore, for repairing, with the utmost diligence, the mischief that had been done to his ships; directed the transports to be victualled, and made the other necessary dispositions for proceeding with both the fleet and army for the Spanish coast; and, in the mean time, despatched five men-of-war with a considerable sum of money and clothes for the troops,\* and was on the very point of embarking the forces, when he was restrained by an order from England, of which we shall say more when we come to treat of the transactions of the ensuing year, to which it properly belongs.†

In the mean time, Captain William Coney, who commanded the *Romney*, a ship of fifty guns, having been despatched, as we before observed, by Sir Cloudesley Shovel, to cruize in those seas; and being then with the *Milford* and *Fowey*, two fifth rates, they received intelligence, on the 12th of December, that a French ship of

\* London Gazette, No. 4239.

† I cannot pretend to say where the blame lay, as to the miscarriages that happened in Spain; the reader will perhaps be best able to judge by comparing Dr. Friend's account of the earl of Peterborough's conduct in Spain, the earl of Galway's narrative, and the impartial inquiry into the wars there, which I have so often quoted.

sixty guns, with thirty pieces of fine brass cannon on board, that had been taken out of the ship commanded by M. De Pointis, and which he had run ashore when he fled from Sir John Leake, lay at anchor under the cannon of Malaga. Upon this information, he resolved to go and attempt her; which design he put in execution, though one of the fifth rates was accidentally disabled, and the other separated from him; and sailing directly under the cannon of the place, he cut her from her anchors, notwithstanding all the fire they could make, and carried her safely into the harbour of Gibraltar. \*

On the 26th of the same month he chased, and came up with another French ship, called the *Content*, that carried sixty-four guns. Her captain, instead of attempting to fight the English ships, got as soon as he could under the cannon of a little castle, about eight leagues west of America, where he crept as closely as it was possible to the shore. Captain Coney anchored before him, and ordered the *Milford* and *Fowey* to do the same, the one a-head, the other a-stern. They plied their guns for about three hours very briskly, and then the French ship took fire, blew up, and was entirely destroyed, with most of her men. This ship had been detached by M. Villars, to bring the before-mentioned ship from Malaga.\* Some time after, Captain Coney took another French ship, called the *Mercury*, of forty-two guns, which the French king had lent the merchants, and which, at their expense, was fitted out as a privateer. †

\* Burchet, p. 729. Lediard, vol. ii. p. 812. But both their accounts are taken from the *London Gazette*, No. 4298.

† Mr. Secretary Burchet says, this happened on the 8th of July; but Mr. Lediard conjectured very rightly, that, instead of July, it should have been January; and so it appears by the account we have of this transaction in the *Gazette*, No. 4304, where the article is dated from Lisbon, February 9, N. S. which is one proof out of many of the wretched incorrectness of this naval history, as to dates, in which one would have expected, from its author's station, remarkable regularity and exactness.



I should now proceed to resume the history of affairs in the West Indies, but that there remains a remarkable action or two in Europe, which I think deserve notice, and therefore I have set them down here, in the close of the year, by themselves, not finding it so easy to reduce them to any particular service. On the 19th of April, the *Resolution*, a seventy-gun-ship, commanded by Captain Mordaunt, youngest son of the earl of Peterborough, having his father on board, and his Catholic Majesty's envoy to the duke of Savoy, fell in with six large ships of the enemy, in his passage to Genoa; the earl of Peterborough perceiving the danger, desired that himself, and the Spanish envoy, might be put on board a small frigate, called the *Enterprize*; for as he took his business then to be negotiating, not fighting, he was willing to escape to Oneglia, if it was possible, which, according to his usual good fortune, he was lucky enough to effect.

The *Milford*, a fifth rate, which we have lately mentioned, was likewise with Captain Mordaunt, but seeing the danger, ran from it, and escaped. On the 20th, the weather proved very bad, so that the *Resolution* was in part disabled, which gave the enemy an opportunity of coming up with her; upon which Captain Mordaunt, by advice of his officers, resolved to run her ashore, having received a great deal of damage in the engagement. About three in the afternoon he effected this, and ran her a-ground in a sandy bay, within a third of a cable's length of the land, and directly under the cannon of the castle of Ventimiglia, belonging to the Genoese, who, notwithstanding, gave them not the least assistance. About half an hour after four, Captain Mordaunt, being disabled by a shot in his thigh, was carried on shore, but would not retire far from his ship; and about five the French commodore manned out all the boats of his squadron, in order to board the *Resolution*, under the fire of one of their seventy-gun ships, which plied ours warmly all the while;

but the *Resolution*, even in the condition she was in, gave them such a reception, as obliged them to return to their respective ships. On the 21st, about half an hour past six in the morning; one of the enemy's ships of eighty guns weighing her anchor, brought to under the *Resolution's* stern, and about nine o'clock, a spring being put under the cable, she lay with her broadside towards her, while she, at the same time, looked with her head right into the shore, so that it was not possible to bring any more guns to bear upon the French ship, than those of her stern-chace; and the others being within less than gun-shot, and the water coming into the *Resolution* as high as her gun-deck, Captain Mordaunt sent to his officers for their opinion what was fitting to be done; and, pursuant to their advice, he gave them directions to set her immediately on fire, which they did about eleven o'clock, after the men were all put on shore; and, by three in the afternoon, she was burnt to the water's edge.\*

In the month of November, a singular adventure happened to the Lisbon packet-boat, which was taken by a Dunkirk privateer of considerable force. The mate, who had the care of the packet, hid it when the privateer appeared first in sight, and being soon after killed, the captain threw over a chest of papers, with a weight of lead, just as the enemy boarded him, which they took for the mail, and therefore did not make so strict a search as otherwise they would have done. At sea they were separated from the privateer, which gave eleven English sailors an opportunity of rising upon fifteen Frenchmen, making themselves masters of the vessel, and carrying her into the Texel, where the government letters were happily found, sewed up in an oil-skin case, and thrown into a water-cask.

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 691.

We ended our last account of affairs in the West Indies with the return of Admiral Graydon's squadron from thence: it is now requisite that we should enter into a detail of what passed in those parts, from that time to the close of the year 1706.\*

The complaints which had been made in almost every session of parliament, of miscarriages and misdemeanors in the West Indies, engaged the ministry to make choice of Sir William Whetstone to go thither with a squadron of seven men-of-war, in order to settle affairs, after the ravages which, they had an account, had been committed in those parts. He sailed accordingly with the trade in the spring of the year 1705, and arrived, on the 17th of May, safely at Jamaica.† There he soon received intelligence, that a stout squadron of the enemy's ships was on the coast of Hispaniola, and that several rich ships were speedily expected from the coast of New Spain. Upon this, he ordered the squadron to be put in a posture of sailing as soon as possible, and having left a sufficient convoy for the protection of the homeward-bound fleet, he proceeded, on the 6th of June, for the Spanish coast.‡

On the 17th of the same month, being then within sight of Carthagena, he chaced a ship, which in the night ran in among the Sambay keys, where there are very uncertain soundings and shoal-water, insomuch, that the Bristol, a ship of fifty guns, came on ground, but was got off again with little or no damage; however, he came up with the French ship, and, after two hours dispute with those that were nearest to her, she submitted. She had forty-six guns mounted, and carried out with her three hundred and seventy men; but buried all but one hundred and fifty, unless it were a few they had put into prizes. She

London Gazette, No. 4278.

† Ibid. No. 4105. 1151.

‡ Burchet's Naval History, book v. chap. 20.

had brought six hundred and forty negroes from Guinea, of which two hundred and forty died, and most of the rest were put on shore at Martinico, the island of St. Thomas and Santa Martha, for they had heard that a squadron of English ships was in the West Indies. The rear-admiral plying then to the eastward, discovered off the river Grande two sail, close in with the land, one of which being forced on shore, was burnt by her own men, being a privateer fitted out at Martinico, to disturb our trade.

The coast being thus alarmed, and no prospect of any immediate service, the rear-admiral returned back to Jamaica; but appointed three of the best sailers to cruize twenty days off Anigada, in the windward passage, for the French in their return home, it being the usual season for them to go from Petit Guavas, Port de Paix, and other places; but those ships joined him again without meeting with any success. \*

On his return to Jamaica, he had intelligence of a rich ship bound from Carthagen to Port Lewis, and in order to take her, he detached the Montague and the Hector, who, though they missed their intended prize, brought in a French ship of twenty-four guns, laden with sugar, indigo, and hides. Toward the latter end of the same month, the rear-admiral put to sea, to cruize off Hispaniola, where he met with such a storm, as forced him back to Jamaica in a very distressed condition. While the ships, particularly his own, were refitting, the Montague, a sixty-gun ship, was sent to cruize on the coast of Hispaniola, where he met with two French ships, one of forty-eight, the other of thirty-six guns, and the captain bravely engaged them both till he lost them in the night. The next morning, he had sight of them again, and would willingly have renewed the engagement, but his officers and seamen were not in the humour to fight, and so the French-

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 698. London Gazette, No. 4154.

men escaped. The captain, whose name Mr. Burchet has not thought fit to transmit to posterity, though for what reason I cannot imagine, on his return to Jamaica complained to the admiral, and brought the whole affair under the examination of a court-martial; where it fully appeared, that he had done his duty to the utmost of his power, and he was thereupon honourably acquitted; but as for his officers, they were broken, as they well deserved, and many of his seamen punished. \*

The admiral, in the mean time, to repair this mistake as far as he was able, sent two fourth rates, the Bristol and the Folkstone, in quest of those ships; they fell in with them and the vessels under their convoy; they behaved very briskly in seizing the defenceless merchant-men; but though they had it absolutely in their power to have fought at least, if not to have taken the men-of-war, they let them slip through their hands, with half the fleet under their care; for which scandalous neglect, the senior officer, whose name is again missing in Mr. Burchet's History, but I have reason to believe it was Anderson, was tried, broken, and rendered incapable to serve at sea. †

I am very sorry that a more particular detail of these affairs cannot be had, because the merit of history is the bestowing just praises on worthy men, and setting such a mark of disgrace on men of another character as they de-

\* Burchet's *Naval History*, p 699. *London Gazette*, No. 4176.

† Mr. Oldmixon, who was the author of the *British Empire in America*, vol. ii. p. 814, gives us the following account. The Bristol and Folkstone met with ten sail of merchant-men, bound from Petit Guavas to France, under convoy of two French men-of-war, one of four and twenty, and another of thirty guns, out of which Captain Anderson, commodore of the English, took six merchant-men, laden with sugar, cocoa, cochineal, and indigo, and brought them to Jamaica. When he arrived, Admiral Whetstone held a court-martial, and Captain Anderson, with the other officers, were condemned to lose their commissions, for not engaging the French men-of-war.

serve. A little after these unlucky incidents, while the admiral was detained for want of stores at Jamaica, the Suffolk, where his flag was flying, by some unfortunate accident, which I think was never accounted for, blew up in the gun-room, where most of the men were killed, and seventy more in their hammocks were so burnt, that the greatest part of them died. When things were once more put in tolerable order, he sailed for the coast of Hispaniola, and had thoughts of stretching over again to the main, with a view to have sent the orders of his Catholic majesty, King Charles III. to the governor of Carthage; but finding this impracticable, and himself much too weak to undertake any thing against the French in those seas, he returned back to Jamaica. \*

I do not find in any of the accounts which I have met with, that Sir William Whetstone was so much as suspected of being in any degree wanting in his duty; but so it was, that through neglects of our admiralty, and a mercenary spirit in some of our governors of colonies, and captains of men-of-war, things were fallen into such distraction in the West Indies, that we were not either in a condition to hurt the enemy's settlements, or so much as able to defend our own. The truth seems to be, that the great fleets we fitted out every year for the Mediterranean, and the cruizers that were necessary upon our own coasts, took up so many ships, that it was scarcely possible to supply even the reasonable demands of the West Indies.

The enemy, on the other hand, had some very signal advantages; for after Sir George Rooke had taught them, that sea-fights were not for their advantage, they had recourse to their old trade of carrying on a piratical war;

\* Bouchet's Naval History, p. 699. During the time that the admiral was in the West Indies, he had, as some write, the good fortune to make a prize of two rich Spanish ships, on board of which were two hundred thousand pieces of eight, and a great quantity of valuable goods. *Mercurius Historicus et Politicus*, tom. xli. p. 309.

and as they had little trade to protect, and many good ships, they were able to furnish out stout squadrons for this purpose. Add to all that has been said, the great concerns they had in the West Indies, where now not only the French, but the Spanish settlements were immediately under their care; and where, as France had the free use of the ports, so she had the direction also of the naval force of both nations, without which she could never have carried on the war.

The driving the English out of the Leeward-islands, was the point the French had most in view, and having a very exact account of our condition there, the governor of St. Domingo, M. Iberville, had orders to assist in an attempt that was to be made on St. Christopher. It is in truth a very difficult thing to give a fair account of this matter, since the French magnify it, and such of our writers as have taken any notice of it, have done all they could to lessen and disparage it. The most probable relation that I have met with among many, sets the affair in this light. The Count de Chavagnac, with a small squadron of French men-of-war, attacked the island of St. Christopher in the month of March, where they burnt and plundered several plantations; but when they came to attack the castle, they were repulsed with loss. † They would, however, in all probability, have carried their point at last, if the governor of Barbadoes, on receiving information of what had happened, had not sent down thither a sloop, with intelligence to the governor, that a squadron

\* I do not pretend to give the reader these reflections as my own, because I am very sensible that they have been made before by other writers. All the merit that I would assume is, that of introducing them properly, and so as to prove what it certainly imports us much to know, that the French are as vigilant in making the most of every advantage, as we are generally backward in using such opportunities as our situation and naval force afford.

† Burchet's Naval History, p. 699. London Gazette, No. 4230. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xI. p. 613.

from England was coming to his relief. This reaching the ears of the French, as it was intended it should, they embarked in much haste, after having done a great deal of mischief; but, however, nothing comparable to what the French writers say. \*

But, unluckily for us, before Count de Chavagnac sailed, Count Iberville joined him with his squadron; so that they had now five stout men-of-war, some frigates, and twenty sloops, with which they resolved to attack Nevis. They landed in Green-bay, in the evening of the 22d of the same month, which was Good-Friday; and they pushed their operations so briskly, that by the 21th, which was Easter-Sunday, the inhabitants made a capitulation, by which they promised to deliver up all their negroes, and to procure a number of prisoners, equal to that of themselves, to be set at liberty in Europe, in consideration of their not being taken off the island. Our Gazette says, that the French broke these articles, by treating them barbarously, burning their houses and sugar works, and other actions of the like nature.. But other accounts say, that the inhabitants could not comply with their capitulation, because the negroes retiring into the mountains, stood on their defence, and, when attacked, killed a great number of the French. Upon this, the inhabitants came to a new agreement, on the 6th of April, in which they undertook to deliver to the French, in less than six months, one thousand four hundred negroes, or one hundred and forty thousand pieces of eight; upon which the French retired, carrying off with them most of the effects, and a great number of negroes, but fewer certainly than seven thousand, as a French his-

\* Father Daniel, in his journal of the reign of Lewis XIV. p. 236, computes the plunder of St. Christopher at three millions of French money, or one hundred and fifty thousand pounds of ours; which is, I think incredible; especially, if the French retired in some kind of consternation; and that they did so is pretty certain, since the Count de Chavagnac was questioned about it when he returned to France.



torian computes them. \* A little after this unfortunate accident, Commodore Ker arrived with a considerable force in the Leeward-islands, and having stationed several ships according to his instructions, he bore away with the rest for Jamaica, which was then thought to be in danger, from the junction of Iberville's squadron, with that of Ducasse. †

In the mean time, Rear-admiral Whetstone sailed with a few ships from Jamaica, in hopes of attacking Ducasse, before he was joined by the succours he expected. But this design being defeated by bad weather, he returned to Jamaica about the middle of July; and, toward the latter end of the same month, was joined by Commodore Ker, with the squadron under his command. There being now so considerable a force, the admiral was very desirous that something should be attempted capable of effacing the memory of past mistakes, and worthy the naval force of the British nation. After mature deliberation, it was resolved to proceed to Carthagena, where they knew the galleons were, to try what effects King Charles's letters would produce, and whether the governor might not be wrought upon, by our successes in Europe, to own him for his rightful sovereign in America. With this view, Sir William Whetstone and Captain Ker sailed from Jamaica, on the 8th of August, and, on the 18th, arrived before Carthagena, and sent in a packet to the governor. At first he trifled a little, and gave evasive answers, but when more closely pressed, he declared roundly, that he knew no sovereign but Philip V. and that no other he would obey. There were at that time in the port fourteen large

\* Most of these particulars I have drawn from a private letter, written by a planter, but ten days after the last capitulation. The inquisitive reader may consult the Gazette, No. 4241, and Oldmixon's History of the British Empire in America, vol. ii. p. 254. *Mercure Historique et Politique*, tom. xli. p. 198.

† Burchet's Naval History, p. 700. London Gazette, No. 4265. *Histoire de St. Domingue*, vol. iv. p. 212.

galleons, lying close in with the city, and unrigged. The admiral was for attempting to burn them, but the pilots unanimously declared, that any such design would be found impracticable, unless we were first in possession of Bocca Chica Castle, and the other forts; and, even in that case, it was very doubtful whether ships of so great a size as theirs could get in. \*

Then it was taken into consideration, what further service might be done, and the result of this was, a resolution to return to Jamaica: from whence, as soon as the trade was ready, the rear-admiral was to convoy them home, and Commodore Ker to remain behind, in order to take upon him the command of the force left in the West Indies. This scheme was immediately put in execution, and, upon their return, Sir William made all possible despatch, in order to get home in time; and, accordingly, leaving the island the latter end of October, he arrived at Plymouth on the 23d of December, 1706, with the Suffolk, Bristol, Reserve, and Vulcan fire-ship, and a fleet of merchant-men under his convoy, having been long abroad, and performed little, though no man in the service had shewn a greater spirit of activity, before his being sent on this West India expedition. †

The squadron which Commodore Ker brought into the West Indies, consisted of six ships of the line, three frigates, and a fire-ship. With this force he stretched over from Jamaica to the coast of Hispaniola, and thence to the main, where he cruized till the 4th of September; when, the winds proving northerly, he returned to Hispaniola, on the coast of which island he held a council of war, in order to determine whether it might not be practicable to surprize Port Lewis. But the pilots not being well acquainted with the entrance into that port, it was

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 700. London Gazette, No. 4275.

† London Gazette, No. 4292. *Mercure Historique et Politique*. tom. xlii. p. 98.

resolved to proceed directly to Petit Guavas, and to go to the northward of the island of Guanaua, in order the better to prevent their design from being discovered. On the 13th of September he detached Captain Boyce, in the *Dunkirk-prize*, with all the boats in the squadron manned and armed, with orders to range along the bays of Leogane and Petit Guavas, in the night, with all imaginable care and caution, and so to dispose themselves as that they might destroy the enemy's ships in either of those roads, and be able to return to the squadron next morning on a signal given. But how well soever this scheme might be laid, it miscarried through the ill conduct of some of the officers, who running in too near the shore, alarmed the inhabitants to such a degree, that any farther attempt was rendered impracticable. \*

Upon this disappointment, Comodore Ker returned to Jamaica, in order to refit his vessels, and to repair the damage he had sustained in this fruitless expedition. But while he was thus employed, he was attacked by a new and greater evil, occasioned by a mortality which prevailed among the seamen, and that to such a degree, as in a manner utterly disabled him from any further service. The merchants, however, who suffered for want of ships to protect them, losing abundance of sloops, laden with silver, upon the Spanish coasts, began to complain loudly of the commodore's conduct; and even went so far as to send home an agent, who had instructions to lay the matter before the house of commons, where, after a full and fair examination, this officer's behaviour received a censure, in consequence of which he was laid aside. In the mean time, the command in the West Indies fell into the hands of Sir John Jennings, who had been, as we before observed, detached for that purpose, with a considerable

\* Burchet's Naval History, p. 700. Lediard's Naval History, vol. ii. p. 815

squadron from the Straits. But, as his proceedings belong to the succeeding year, we must refer the reader to that part of our history, for an account of them. \*

We must, before we leave America, take notice of a disappointment the enemy met with in attacking Carolina. The French had long had their eyes on our northern colonies, which were then in a very flourishing condition; among other projects that M. Iberville had been furnished with, one was the attacking, and, as far as it should be in his power, destroying the province of Carolina. When therefore he had finished his designs in the Leeward-islands, he sailed with a squadron of six men-of-war, and several transports for South Carolina. He made a descent in the neighbourhood of Charles-town, with about eight hundred and fifty soldiers and seamen, and sent an officer to summon the governor to surrender the city and colony to the French king, telling him at the same time, that he would allow him but an hour to consider of it. Sir Henry Johnson told him, that was much too long a space, for that he did not want half a minute to resolve on doing his duty; and that therefore he was at liberty to return, and tell those that sent him, that the English were not to be frightened with words, for they should soon find that they were able to return blows.

Upon this spirited answer followed an attack, in which the French met with so vigorous a resistance, that they were glad to retreat with the loss of three hundred killed, drowned or taken; and among the latter ten officers, *viz.* their chief commander at land, his lieutenant, three captains of ships, four lieutenants, and a master, who toge-

\* I thought it more expedient to take notice of this matter here, than postpone it absolutely, till we come to speak of the proceedings of parliament, in the year 1707, where we shall however be obliged to resume it, and where the reader will have a more particular account of what the offences were, with which this gentleman was charged.

ther offered ten thousand pieces of eight for their ransoms. One of the French ships having ventured to make a descent at the distance of six miles from Charles-town, the governor sent a detachment of militia to the assistance of the planters, who were so lucky as to make themselves masters of the ship, with all its crew, which consisted of about one hundred and forty men. \*

The French had also some designs upon New York, of which we had such early intelligence in England, that Lord Cornbury, eldest son to the earl of Clarendon, was sent over to take upon him the government; and he, finding all things in great confusion, and the few fortresses in that country running to ruin, first obtained from the assembly a considerable supply for that service, and then ordered a general embargo to be laid, which enabled him to employ fifteen hundred men, in working on their fortifications; so that they were, in a very short time, put into a good posture of defence, and all the views of the enemy disappointed on that side. We had not, however, as great success in bringing home the Virginia fleet; part of which fell into the hands of the French privateers, and the rest were separated by a storm, which occasioned great apprehensions and uneasinesses about them; but most of them, notwithstanding, arrived at last safely in the western ports. The merchants, however, raised loud complaints against the admiralty, who had now, in a great measure, lost their interest in the house of commons; so that whatever charges were brought against them, had all the encouragement that could be expected, and the merchants were left at full liberty to produce their witnesses, and to make out all that they could; which, though it afforded no remedy to these mischiefs, yet it took the weight off the

\* See the complete History of Europe, for the year 1706, p. 548, and the *Mercure Historique*, 1707, vol. i. p. 99. Father Daniel takes not the least notice of the matter, and indeed few or none of the French historians have courage enough to report fairly their defeats.

ministry, and gave the nation general satisfaction, as all inquiries, strictly and impartially prosecuted, ever must. \*

We are now, according to the method hitherto pursued in this work, to give the reader an account of the measures taken for the supplying the service of the succeeding year; and this the success attending the war, both by sea and land, enables us to do in a very short space. The queen opened the sessions on the 3d of December, 1706, with a most gracious speech, wherein she took notice of what had been already done, and of the reasons which obliged her to desire, that as great despatch as possible might be given to the supplies; and how much weight her majesty's recommendation had, will appear from this, that though they amounted to no less than five millions eight hundred ninety-three thousand three hundred eighty-one pounds fifteen shillings and three-pence three farthings, yet they were voted in less than a week; so that the queen came on the 21st to the house of peers, and having sent for the commons, the speaker presented the bills, and in his speech on that occasion, took notice, "That as the glorious victory obtained by the duke of Marlborough, at Ramillies, was so surprizing, that the battle was fought before it could be thought the armies were in the field, so it was no less surprizing, that the commons had granted supplies to her majesty before the enemy could well know that her parliament was sitting." †

The care of the public being thus shewn, the house went into the consideration of the several expeditions executed within the compass of the preceding year; and after a long debate, on the 27th of January, in relation to the method of carrying on the war in Spain, it was carried on the question, by a majority of two hundred and fifty,

\* Burnet, Oldmixon, *British Empire in America*, vol. ii. p. 245.

† See *Chandler's Debates*, vol. iv. p. 47.

against one hundred and fifty, that the several sums of money for the extraordinary services for the year 1706, which had been agreed to by this house, had been advanced and expended for the preservation of our firm ally the duke of Savoy, for promoting the interest of King Charles III. in Spain, against the common enemy, and for the safety and honour of the nation. \* Not long after, the house proceeded to take into consideration the report from the committee, to whom the petition of several proprietors of plantations in the islands of Nevis and St. Christopher, in America, and other merchants trading to the same, on behalf of themselves and the other inhabitants and traders to the said islands, was referred, and the same being read, it was resolved, "That an humble address be presented to her majesty, that she will be pleased to appoint such persons, as her majesty shall think fit, to inquire into the true state of the losses of the people of the islands of Nevis and St. Christopher, in order to lay the same before this house the next session of parliament, to apply what may be convenient for the better securing those islands, and supplying them with necessaries, in order to re-settlement." The said address being presented accordingly, her majesty was pleased to answer, "That she was very well pleased to find the house of commons had so compassionate a sense of the losses of her subjects in Nevis and St. Christopher; as also with the concern they shewed upon this occasion for the plantations, which were so justly entitled to their care, by the large returns they made to the public; and her majesty would give the necessary orders for what the house had desired in that matter." Accordingly, her majesty was afterwards pleased to appoint two gentlemen, of known ability and

\* Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 469. Annals of Queen Anne, vol. v. p. 435.

integrity, to go to the said islands, to procure an exact state of the losses of her subjects there in order to their being put on such a footing, as might be best for the particular benefit of the inhabitants, and the general good of these kingdoms. \*

The house having had notice of the great declension of our interest in, and of our lucrative trade to Newfoundland; the marquis of Caermarthen having likewise acquainted them, that certain pirates had made a great and dangerous settlement at Madagascar, where they threatened to erect a kind of thievish republic, little inferiour to those on the coast of Barbary; and having offered to go himself with a small squadron, to put an end to this mischief while there was a probability of doing it, the house appointed a committee to take these matters into their consideration; who, after having thoroughly examined them, came to the following resolutions: †

“ I. That a great number of pirates have settled themselves in the island of Madagascar, from whence they have committed many great piracies, robberies, and depredations, very ruinous to trade, and whereby the lives of many of her majesty’s good subjects have been destroyed.

“ II. That an humble address be presented to her majesty, that she would be graciously pleased to take into her royal consideration, how the said pirates may be suppressed, and their further piracies, robberies, and depredations, may be effectually prevented.” Which resolutions were on the 8th of April agreed to by the house. The same day it was resolved, “ That an humble address be presented to her majesty, that she will be graciously pleased to use her royal endeavours to re-

\* The Complete History of Europe for 1707, p. 118. Chandler’s Debates, vol. iv. p. 65.

† Oldmixon’s History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 387. Annals of Queen Anne, vol. v. p. 482.



“ cover and preserve the ancient possessions, trade, and  
“ fishery in Newfoundland.”

Her majesty received these addresses very graciously, and promised that proper care should be taken with respect to the matters contained in them : and thus ended the proceedings of this session of parliament, with which I shall conclude the events of this winter.

We have now run through the naval transactions of about eighteen years, in which short period there happened so many things worthy of remark, and our maritime power increased to such a degree, that it is with no small difficulty I have been able to bring them into this compass. But a bare relation of events will very little benefit ordinary readers, if they are not attended with some few reflections, in order to point out the advantages and disadvantages which befel society in consequence of these transactions. The two wars in which we were engaged, in conjunction with the Dutch, as they demonstrated on the one hand our mighty power at sea, so, on the other, they put us to a prodigious expense. The house of commons, in the year 1702, in a representation to the queen, say expressly, that from November, 1695 to March the 8th, 1701, there had been raised for the service of the war, forty-five millions five hundred sixty-eight thousand seven hundred twenty-five pounds nineteen shillings and two-pence half-penny; an immense sum indeed! As to the expenses of Queen Anne's war, we shall take notice of them when we come to the conclusion of it : at present, let us observe, that one national end, with respect of England, was, in this last war particularly, in a great measure answered, I mean the destruction of the French power at sea ; for after the battle of Malaga, we hear no more of their great fleets ; and though by this the number of their privateers was very much increased, yet the losses of our merchants were far less in the latter than in the former reign, which, I think, was chiefly owing to a

series of inquiries, constantly carried on, either in one house of parliament or the other.

The success of our arms at sea, and the necessity of protecting our trade, joined to the popularity of every step taken toward increasing our maritime power, occasioned such measures to be pursued in order thereto, as annually added to its force. The great storm in 1703; the misfortunes that so many squadrons met with in the West Indies; our ill luck in regard to the Dunkirk privateers; and, in short, every other untoward accident which fell out within this period of time; though it bore hard upon private persons, and was injurious to our trade in general, yet it was in the main beneficial to our marine, inasmuch as it gave a handle for augmenting it, as every thing tending thereto was well received. Hence arose that mighty difference which, at the close of the year 1706, appeared in the royal navy; which not only in the number, but in the quality of the ships of which it was composed, was greatly superiour to what it had been from the time of the revolution, or even before it.

The economy and discipline of our marine were also much mended; and those jealousies in a great measure worn out, which had been very prejudicial to men of the greatest merit, during the preceding reign, as they certainly were in the latter part of this, when they were most unfortunately revived. The great encouragement given to the sailors, by taking the utmost care of the sick and wounded, exact and speedy paying of prize-money, and the many extraordinary orders that, from time to time, were issued in their favour, and are still to be met with in our Gazettes, from which some of them have been cited in this work, gave a mighty spirit to our sailors, and in a manner extinguished that prejudice, which has since revived, against going to sea in a man-of-war. Thus, in this respect, whatever we might do in others, the nation certainly thrived by the war, that is to say, we grew con-

stantly stronger, our fleets more numerous and better manned; so that at the time I conclude this chapter, we were much more capable of asserting our claim to the dominion of the sea, than at the time the war began.

If any of my readers should entertain a doubt, either as to the truth of the facts here laid down, or the validity of the judgment I have delivered upon them, I think I need not turn him over, for satisfaction, to foreign authors; for certainly, if they concur in sentiment with me on this head, there ought to be no dispute about it. But if we dip into any of the French political writers, we shall not fail to find them deploring the visible decay of their maritime power, from the time of the battle of Malaga, and constantly blaming the administration for not bending their thoughts to the recovery of it so much as they ought to have done; which they, generally speaking, ascribe to the vast expense of the war by land, which would not, by any means, admit the diverting such supplies as were necessary for the service of the sea. From these complaints, which were certainly well founded, it is manifest that, on the one hand, their maritime power declined, while ours increased; and, on the other, that this declension grew so fast upon them, that their ablest ministers thought it in vain to struggle, and therefore gave up all further concern for their reputation in this respect, in a fit of despair, out of which nothing but our inactivity or negligence would recover them.

To this I may add, that as the Spanish naval power had been long decaying, so by this war it was totally destroyed; they had indeed a few gallies in the battle of Malaga, and, perhaps, half a dozen men-of-war in the West Indies; but, upon the whole, they had such occasion for ships of force, and had so few of them, that the assistance given them by the French, contributed not a little to the declension of their marine, as appears by the destruction of their men-of-war at Vigo, which was a loss they

were never able to repair; and though it be very true, that while Spain was governed by a prince of the house of Austria, and lived in amity with us, we were rather bound to encourage and protect, than any way to lessen or depress, the Spanish power at sea; yet, by the passing of this crown into the house of Bourbon, our interest, in this respect, was entirely changed, and the lessening their maritime strength was a comparative augmentation of our own; and this I take to be the principal reason, that, through the course of the war, France complained so much of the burden of Spain. For though by the returns of her Plate-fleets, and letting the French for a time share in the trade of the South-seas, she might repair that loss of treasure, which the maintaining so many armies for her service might occasion; yet, the loss of that maritime power, which was now to protect both states, was a loss that never could be repaired, as reason informed all wise people then, and as we have been taught by experience since.

It may, perhaps, be said, that as the Dutch were concerned in this war as well as ourselves; as they shared jointly in the dangers and expenses of it, so they must have been equally gainers in respect of their trade and maritime power. But as to this, it is most evident, that the French, according to the information they received from the most intelligent Dutchmen, take the thing to be quite otherwise; and argue on it to the Dutch themselves, as if it were a fact out of dispute; whence they take occasion to alledge, that while the English made a pretence of ruining the maritime power of France, they in reality aimed at doing as much for the Dutch, in order to secure universal trade, and the supreme power of the sea, to themselves. How far the fortune of war might have put this in our power, I will not say, but this I will venture to assert, and hope it will be readily credited, that such a thing was never in our intention. The supplanting allies

is a strain of policy common to the French, but, without partiality I may say, unknown to Britons. We have fought for our allies, and conquered for our allies; nay, we have sometimes paid our allies for fighting in their own cause, and for their own profit; but to outwit our allies, especially our favourite allies the Dutch, was, I dare say, never in our will, nor in our power.

This, indeed, I must own, that in the conduct of this last war, especially to the year 1706, we had as much the lead in councils as ever the Dutch had in the former war; for this we paid largely, and, I think, we had a right to it, if we got any thing by it. I must also ingenuously confess, that the economy of the Dutch greatly hurt their reputation and their trade. Their men-of-war in the Mediterranean were always victualled short, and their convoys were so weak and ill-provided, that for one ship we lost, they lost five, which begat a general notion, that we were the safer carriers, which certainly had a good effect; so that, taking all things together, I doubt whether the credit of the English nation abroad, or the spirits of the people at home, were ever higher than at this period of time.

Hence it was that our trade rather increased, than diminished, in this last war, and that we gained so signally by our strict intercourse with Portugal; concerning which, I will take the liberty of running over a few facts that are not commonly attended to. When the war first broke out, Portugal was allied to the two crowns; and with great difficulty it was that we detached that monarch from their interest: but the means by which we detached him, ought not to remain a secret. In the treaty he concluded with Lewis XIV. and his grandson, he had stipulated that he should be protected by an annual fleet from France; but when he found that this could not be complied with, and that if he performed his part of the agreement, his coast would be left open to the insults of the

maritime powers, he saw the necessity of changing his party, which induced him to make a treaty with us in 1733; and when the French minister, M. de Chateauneuf, reproached him for thus changing sides, Don Pedro replied, with great spirit, "If your master had sent thirty ships of the line to cruize between Lisbon and Setubal, I had never quitted his alliance; and therefore I would have you let him know, that he ought to blame himself, not me, for the consequences."

By the treaty of commerce concluded with the same crown, by Mr. Methuen, we were prodigious gainers; and I will even venture to say, that this single alliance was worth more to us than all the negociations in the former reign. The Portuguese began to feel the comfortable effects of the mines they had discovered in Brazil; and the prodigious commerce that followed thereupon with us, made their good fortune in this respect, in a great measure, ours also; and so it has been ever since, otherwise I know not how the expenses of the war could have been borne: for, as Dr. Davenant justly computed, the running cash of this kingdom, at the time the revolution happened, could not have been above eighteen millions; at the accession of the queen we had not so much; but, at the time of concluding the union, it was increased again very considerably, which must be attributed, in a great measure, to our Portugal trade: and this, as I have made it manifest, we owed entirely to our superiour power at sea.

As to our trade with the Spanish West Indies, by the channel of Cadiz, it was certainly very much interrupted by the war at the beginning; but afterwards it was in a good measure restored, as well by our direct correspondence with Spain, after the reduction of several provinces under the power of King Charles III. as through Portugal, by which a very great, though contraband trade, was carried on. We were, at the same time, very great

gainers by our commerce with the Spaniards in the West Indies, as I am satisfied from several French authors, who complain that their colonies suffered much less from our naval force than they did from the loss of this trade; which is strongly confirmed by the complaints of the Jamaica merchants against Commodore Ker, who was very negligent in protecting their sloop trade, by which they were great sufferers. The reason they assign also for his negligence, is yet a stronger proof; for they alledge, that he would not grant them convoys, without sharing in their profits; and if these had not been very considerable, they could never have tempted an officer of his rank to run such a risk. The same thing may be said of the complaints of the other colonies, which, however just in themselves, yet if they, as it is evident they did, grew richer, more populous, and carried their trade farther than in former times, then it is surely as evident, that the nation in general gained considerably in this branch; to which I may add, that the act for giving a bounty upon hemp imported from our plantations, and other laws, were sufficient instances of the inclination of the ministry to promote commerce and navigation as far as lay in their power.

There is another remark that naturally arises upon this subject, and that is, the mighty spirit which appeared among our merchants, and enabled them to carry on all their schemes with such vigour, as kept a constant circulation of money through the kingdom, and afforded such mighty encouragement to all manufactures, as have rendered the remembrance of those times grateful in worse. Our successes abroad, our victories by land and sea, the respect paid to us by all the states of Europe, served to heighten and sustain this spirit, which is at once the source and soul of prosperity; and a nation grows low and lifeless, as soon as it is taken away.

There were indeed some accidental advantages which

attended the latter part especially of this period, that have not been always visible in preceding or succeeding times. Among these I reckon, in the first place, an unfeigned loyalty; for it was the felicity of this princess, that her person was dear to all her subjects, nay, even to those who questioned her title; and this produced another advantage, which was a kind of coalition of parties, of which I rather chuse to say something at the end of this chapter, because, after the union, parties broke loose again, and threw us, as they will always do, into the utmost confusion. At the beginning of the war, the Tories were as heartily for it as the Whigs; and if they grew weary of it by degrees, it must be acknowledged, that they might be tempted thereto in some respects by the ill usage they met with.

While the duke of Marlborough was esteemed a Tory, his services were often extenuated; and though the parliament gave him thanks, there was a party that denied him merit. When he and the treasurer went over to the Whigs, the scale turned so strongly in their favour, that none could be employed who were not of this denomination; and thus Sir George Rooke was laid aside, immediately after he had gained a victory, honourable in every respect, but most honourable in this, that it was wholly owing to the prudence and conduct of the admiral. Before the Whigs gained this ascendancy, and both parties were embarked in the cause of their country, their unanimity produced those supplies, which enabled our armies and fleets to act as they did; and taught the most haughty and faithless of all powers, that bounds might be set to its force, though not to its ambition. The last advantage of which I shall speak, was the public spirit of parliaments in the queen's reign. If they gave in one sessions, they inquired in the next; and it is impossible to mention any remarkable expedition within the first six years, which was not examined and cleared up by such inquiries;



so that the people saw and knew what they were doing, which encouraged them to pay cheerfully, at the same time that it put them upon endeavouring to acquire by their industry what might maintain them happily, notwithstanding these large, but necessary expenses.

It is certainly matter of great satisfaction to me, and must be so to every man who wishes well to his country, that after running through a series of such events, settling out at first with the sight of so great a naval power as the French king had assembled, while we struggled under many difficulties; and when we got out of that troublesome war, found ourselves loaded with a debt too heavy to be shaken off in a short interim of peace; it must, I say, be a great satisfaction to be able, at the close of this chapter, to assert, that we had overcome all these difficulties; and, instead of seeing the navy of France riding on our coasts, we sent every year a powerful fleet to insult theirs, superiour to them, not only in the ocean, but in the Mediterranean, forcing them, as it were, entirely out of the sea: and this, not by the thunder of our cannon, but by the distant prospect of our flag; as, at the raising the siege of Barcelona, when the son of the French king, the famous Count Thoulouse, high-admiral of France, fled from Sir John Leake, and took shelter in the harbour of Toulon.

By this, we not only secured our trade in the Levant, and strengthened our interest with all the Italian princes, but struck the States of Barbary with terror, and even awed the Grand Signior himself so far, as to prevent his listening to any propositions from France. Such were the fruits of the increase of our naval power, and of the manner in which it was employed: and though some, through misconception of the advantages flowing from this disposition in those princes and states: and others, from a perverse humour, perhaps, of objecting against whatever carried us into a great expense, inveighed

against sending such mighty fleets into those seas; yet nothing can be plainer, than that while we continued this war, such fleets were necessary; that they at once protected our allies, and attached them to our interest; and, which is of greater importance than all the rest, that they established our reputation for maritime force so effectually, that we feel even at this day the happy effects of that fame which we then acquired. Of what consequence, therefore, could the expenses of these fleets, however large, be to a nation like this? especially if we consider, that the greatest part of them only shifted hands; since it is the peculiar property of naval expenses, that though they rise ever so high, they can hardly ever impoverish, because they are raised on the one part of the society, and laid out with the other; and, by a natural circulation, must certainly very soon return into the first hands.

It is a further satisfaction, that we can safely say our trade flourished through the course of the war, and our merchants were so loyal to the queen, and so well affected to her government, that upon every occasion they were ready to credit the administration with the best part of that immense wealth that had been raised under their protection. These were glorious times indeed, if riches, victory, and honour, can render a nation glorious; and for all these mighty advantages, we stood indebted to the maternal affection of the queen; the wisdom and probity of her ministers; the heroic courage and generous public spirit of the officers she employed by land and sea; and, above all, to the sincere union of parties among us, the contempt of private advantages, and a steady concern for the safety, reputation, and future prosperity of this nation.

## CHAP. V.

The Naval History of Great Britain, from the Union of the two Kingdoms, to the end of the Reign of her Majesty Queen Anne.

As I propose to make the UNION of the two kingdoms the great event from which, in this chapter, I shall deduce our naval history to the present times; and as this event in itself has had a great influence on the naval power and commerce of this nation, I think I cannot act with greater propriety, than to open the chapter with an impartial account of that important transaction.\* This I take to be the more necessary, because almost all historians, and writers of memoirs, have given too much way to their passions and prejudices, in what they say about it; and this to so great a degree, that they not only contradict and abuse each other, but also darken things in such a manner, that even the most intelligent reader can hardly discern the truth.† As I am not conscious of feeling in myself so much as a spark of party heat; as I have some relation to, and at the same time an equal affection for both countries, without the least bias in

\* There were several curious and valuable treatises published on this important subject, among others, "The Rights and Interests of the two British Monarchies enquired into and cleared." "War between the two British Monarchies considered." "Essay upon the Union:" all these in quarto. "The Interests of the two Kingdoms, and the Consequences of their Union stated." "The Union of Great Britain in Civil and Religious Concerns," by Simon Mackenzie, of Allangrange, in 8vo. and many others, besides single papers, &c.

† Bishop Burnet's History of his own Time. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts. Memoirs of the Affairs of Scotland, by George Lockhart, Esq. of Caruwath.

favour of either, I shall endeavour to give a clear, succinct, and fair account of this whole business; in order to which, I shall begin with the motives which induced the queen's ministry to push this matter so earnestly at that time: I shall next consider, the advantages proposed to each nation from this UNION, which will consequently oblige me to say somewhat of the persons who opposed, and the grounds of their opposition to it; after which, I shall give a very short detail of the rise, progress, conclusion, and consequences of it.

It had been very apparent almost to every English ministry, from the time the two kingdoms had been united under one monarch, that something was wanting to complete that strength and harmony, which every reasonable man looked for from this conjunction; neither was it long, before some able statesman perceived what it was that must produce this effect; and a national union accordingly was proposed in the reign of King James I. \*

It was defeated then, as great and good designs are generally defeated, through want of public spirit. The king was partial to his countrymen, and the English were partial to their country. The former thought it his duty to make all his old dependents rich, in a manner not over justifiable; and the latter despised the poverty of that nation to such a degree, that they forgot how far their own power and riches might suffer from such treatment.

Under King Charles I. his old hereditary subjects departed from their duty to him, and, a potent faction in England inclining the same way, the great weight of

\* See Sir Francis Bacon's weighty speech upon this subject. See also what is thrown out by Francis Osborne, in different parts of his works, upon this topic, more especially in his traditional memoirs of King James I.

these northern neighbours was soon made but too evident, by the murder of the king, and the destruction of the constitutions of both kingdoms. After the restoration, the politics of Charles II. took such a turn, as necessarily occasioned all thoughts of a closer union between the two crowns to be laid aside, it having been a maxim, during his reign, to make use of one nation to awe the other. The unfortunate King James II. sat too short a time on the throne, and felt too many cares, from the time he ascended it, to form any projects of this nature, though otherwise much might have been expected from him; for he was certainly a better judge himself, of the interest of both kingdoms, than any prince of his line. Some thoughts there were of an union in the beginning of King William's time; but the design was dropped from the belief, or rather the apprehension, of its being impracticable.\*

The lord high-treasurer Godolphin, one of the ablest and most prudent ministers we ever had, saw very soon the expediency of such a thorough national union, for the public service, and the necessity of it, for his own safety. He saw that, without this, the Hanoverian succession could never take place, the war with France could not be effectually carried on, or the new system that he was then introducing, ever be established on a firm basis. As he was far from affecting the exercise of a boundless arbitrary power, so, to establish his influence

\* In the text I have given a succinct account of the several designs formed for uniting the two kingdoms. I am not ignorant, that there were other attempts of that nature; such as in the reign of King Charles II; in the beginning of that of King William; as also in the beginning of the queen's reign: but these were mere acts of state policy, and not founded upon any settled design of really bringing it about; and therefore, as the nature of this work would not allow me to enter into a strict chronological deduction of this affair, I thought the best thing I could do, was to give the reader, as far as in my power lay, a true state of the matter, in the shortest compass possible.

in Scotland, he had, through the advice of some of the statesmen of that country, given way to the passing some acts of parliament there, which enabled the people to stand upon even ground with the English, and put it in their power, when they were at any time crossed, to carry things very high, and consequently to talk much higher.\*

In order to rid himself of these difficulties, the treasurer, in conjunction with Lord Somers, formed the scheme of the union, which they resolved should not be a temporary expedient, but such an act as might remove all their doubts and fears effectually, and for ever. When they had settled this project to their own satisfaction, they took the advice of some great men of the other kingdom, particularly the earl of Stair, a man of vast abilities, and, in all the senses of the word, a perfect politician. He it was who gave them the lights they wanted; he shewed them how, and by what means, his countrymen might be managed; he pointed out such

\* Whatever other writers may assert, this was undoubtedly the fact. The English parliament had recommended the succession, I mean the procuring the Hanover succession to be settled in Scotland, very earnestly. The parliament of Scotland, inclined to make use of this opportunity, to get some favourable conditions stipulated for their trade; and as quiet was at this time very necessary, and in the nature of the thing, perhaps, the desires of the parliament of Scotland not altogether unreasonable, they were allowed to pass an act, by which the prerogative of the crown was limited, and peace and war were left, not only to the approbation, but to the consent of parliament. This, with another act empowering the Scots to arm themselves, alarmed the English house of commons to such a degree, as to address the queen, to order the militia of the four northern counties to be disciplined, and to take some other steps, which had a direct tendency to plunge the two nations in a war. The treasurer, therefore, saw himself under the necessity of bringing about an union, to avoid these mighty inconveniences, and to enable him to carry on his great scheme, of ruining the power of France; which must certainly have miscarried, if these domestic quarrels had come to extremities.

as would oppose it heartily, and such as would oppose it only till they found their account in desisting from that opposition. In short, he gave both the first plan of, and the last form to this great work, and dictated the means which made it both plausible and practicable. \*

In regard to the advantages resulting from this measure to both kingdoms, they were, in the judgment of the ministry, very great; on the side of England especially, and of Scotland apparently. With regard to the former, the benefits derived from it were real and substantial, but some of them were such as it was not thought proper to avow. For example, the government in England could never be safe, while Scotland remained an independent kingdom, at liberty to make laws, set up trading companies, or raise forces whenever she thought fit; nor was the succession safe, while the parliament of Scotland had an indubitable right to depart from that measure, and a strong party was actually formed in that country for departing from it.

An entire, absolute, and uniform dominion over Scotland, was necessary to the safety, power, and commerce of England; and this dominion could be attained no other way. The danger of having princes drawn to pursue different measures in the different kingdoms, or to govern in

\* The notion of the earl of Stair, that if a considerable number of the Jacobites could be brought to approve this measure as commissioners, they would be forced to second it in parliament, was extremely well founded, as the event proved. For, whatever ways and means were made use of, to engage the high Tories in this commission, to sign the articles of the treaty, which, except Mr. Lockhart of Carnwath, they all did; yet this is certain, that they adhered to their sentiments in parliament, and pushed the affair with effect; so that, if we consider that it brought about a total change of the constitution, instead of being amazed at the difficulties it met with, we shall be surprized, that they were so easily got over; especially if we reflect on the temper of the nation in general, and the great repugnance it must have had to some particular points in this treaty.

England upon the maxims of northern ministers, the mischiefs of which had been severely felt, and thoroughly understood, from the power of the duke of Lauderdale with King Charles II. which lasted during life; and which, without disputing how far it was right or wrong, enabled the king to maintain his power in both countries, and that too in a higher degree than was very acceptable to a great part of his subjects, in either, was yet recent.

The other motives that were commonly insisted upon, were these, *viz.* The uniting the interests of both kingdoms, which had often thwarted each other, and thereby giving the united kingdoms, or, which was the same thing, England, much greater force, and consequently much greater weight abroad; the conveniency of bringing both nations under one form of government, the seat of which must always remain fixed in England, and consequently all advantages accruing to Scotland for the future, must be drawn to, and centre there; the extirpating the French and Jacobite interest, where it was evidently strongest, introducing the Hanover succession, securing the Protestant interest, giving one turn of mind to all the people in the island; putting them under the same rulers, the same taxes, and the same prohibitions, so as to have but one political head, with a due subordination of members; these were considerations so high in themselves, and of such certainty in their consequences, that the bulk of the English nobility and gentry were no sooner acquainted with them, than they were convinced of their utility, and that it was not very easy to set the purchase at too high a rate; especially, when they considered the mischiefs to which they had been exposed in former times from the want of such an union. The ministry had a just foresight of this, and gave themselves, therefore, very little trouble about preparing their friends in England for the reception and execution of their scheme, because they knew, that whenever it was proposed and explained, it would make



its own way ; and their good sense, and right judgment in this management, were fully justified by the event.

The advantages proposed to Scotland, were the freeing that kingdom from all the grievances of which they had so long, and so justly complained ; such as, that their interest always gave way to that of England ; that their concerns abroad were sacrificed, instead of being protected ; that, with equal prejudice to them, they were considered sometimes as subjects, but mostly as foreigners ; that they were discouraged in carrying on their trade and manufactures ; and, in fine, continually upbraided with their poverty, while it was made an invariable maxim of English policy, to keep them poor. By this union, it was proposed to make them one nation with the English, and to admit them to a full participation of their liberties, privileges, and commerce ; as also to a share in the government and legislature, and a perpetual conjunction of interests at home and abroad : so that henceforward the government of the united kingdom would be equally in the hands of persons of both countries, which would prevent partiality on the one side, and take away many hardships that had hitherto been felt on the other.

In short, it was insinuated, that, for the sake of peace and general security, the English were content to grant their neighbours, not only as good conditions as they could well expect, but even better than they could reasonably desire ; and that to obtain the friendship and assistance of Scotland, the people of England were desirous to bury in oblivion all their former prejudices, and to contribute, as far as lay in their power, to support and enrich the inhabitants of the northern part of the island, and to treat them so favourably in point of taxes, as that they should have many and strong reasons to be very well pleased with the exchange of nominal prerogatives, for real and weighty advantages.

Such as opposed the union in Scotland, were either the

friends of the Stuart family, or such as were, from neglect or disappointment, discontented under that administration. The former were in earnest concerned for the dignity and independence of the crown of Scotland, the honour of the nobility, and the welfare of the people, considered by them as a nation having interests separate from, and in some cases opposite to, those of the English. These men, upon their principles, heartily disliked the union, and had reason to dislike it.\* But as for the malcontents, they set up pretences of an odd, and extraordinary nature, and

\* Bishop Burnet's reflections upon this subject, which he understood as well as any man, deserve the reader's notice and attention. "The treaty," says he, "being laid before the parliament in Scotland, met with great opposition there. It was visible, that the nobility of that kingdom suffered a great diminution by it; for, though it was agreed, that they should enjoy all the other privileges of the peers of England, yet the greatest of them all, which was the voting of the house of lords, was restrained to sixteen, to be elected by the rest, at every new parliament; yet there was a greater majority of the nobility that concurred in voting for the union, than in the other states of that kingdom. The commissioners for the shires and boroughs were almost equally divided, though it was evident, they were to be the chief gainers by it; among these, the union was agreed to, by a very small majority: it was the nobility that in every vote turned the scale for the union. They were severely reflected on by those who opposed it; it was said, many of them were bought off to sell their country, and their birthright. All those who adhered inflexibly to the Jacobite interest, opposed every step that was made, with great vehemence; for they saw, that the union struck at the root of all their views and designs for a new revolution; yet these could not have raised or maintained so great an opposition as was now made, if the Presbyterians had not been possessed with a jealousy, that the consequence of this union would be the change of church-government among them, and that they would be swallowed up by the church of England. This took such root in many, that no assurances that were offered could remove their fears. It was infused into them, chiefly by the old duchess of Hamilton, who had great credit with them. And it was suggested, that she and her son had particular views, as hoping, that if Scotland should continue a separate kingdom, the crown might come into their family, they being the next in blood after King James's posterity."

while they pretended zeal for the government, alledged, that Scotland would be prejudiced by the union; which, according to their principles it was impossible to prove.

There was a third party in Scotland, which must be allowed by men of all principles, to have acted with great candour and uprightness. These were styled the Squadron, and, if I might be allowed to translate the word into political English, I should call them Old Whigs. They had been very instrumental in the revolution, and were cordial friends to the government; but, from motives of state which I shall not take upon me to explain, had been turned out of their places, and ill enough treated during this reign. These men, however, remained firm to their principles, which led them to approve and promote the union; and they did it with great zeal. Their arguments were strong and conclusive, and made the greater impression, because they were disinterested. There was, as is usual in cases of the like nature, a good deal of corruption practised; but all this would never have carried the point, if it had not been abetted by the industry and zeal of these worthy men. The earl of Stair, who was not of their number, knew this, and therefore advised taking them, and the country party, into the commission for settling that important treaty; but his advice was followed by the ministers only in the latter part, which, though it amazed the world at that time, had however the effect he expected from it, and was one great cause that the affair succeeded so well as it did.

All things being thus settled, the queen, by her commission dated at Kensington, the 27th of February, 1706, in virtue of powers granted to her by an act of parliament, passed in Scotland, appointed thirty commissioners on the part of Scotland, and on the 10th of April following, her majesty appointed as many English commissioners.\*

\* Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 446. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 375. See the Journal of the Proceedings of the Noble and Honourable Persons who acted for both Nations

This commission was opened at the Cockpit, on the 16th of April, 1706, William Cowper, Esq. then lord-keeper, delivering the sense of the English commissioners, and the earl of Seafield, lord high-chancellor of Scotland, acted in like manner on the part of their commissioners. On the 1st of May, the queen paid them a visit, and inquired into the progress they had made. \*

About a month after, she did the same; and these instances of royal care had such an effect, that on the 22d of July, the commissioners signed and sealed the articles, which were presented to the queen the next day. † By these articles, which were in number twenty-five, the two kingdoms of England and Scotland, were united under the title of GREAT BRITAIN; the Protestant succession settled; one parliament established; the common enjoyment of privileges and commerce stipulated; ships built in Scotland, admitted under the act of navigation; an equal distribution of customs and excises fixed; the duties upon salt regulated; the land-tax adjusted in the following proportion, *viz.* that when England paid one million nine hundred ninety-seven thousand seven hundred thirty-six pounds eight shillings and four pence half-penny, Scotland should pay forty-eight thousand pounds, and so in proportion; and, as an equivalent for Scotland's being charged with the debts of England, there was granted to the former by the latter, the sum of three hundred ninety eight thousand eighty-five pounds ten shillings, to be

in the Treaty of Union, which began on the 16th of April, 1706, and was concluded on the 22d of July following, with the Articles then agreed on in London, 1706. The Queen's Commissions to the Lords Commissioners of both Kingdoms are prefixed thereto. Boyer's Life of Queen Anne, p. 232.

\* Journal of the Proceedings, &c. p. 22. The Complete History of Europe for 1705, p. 131.

† Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 457. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 376. Journal of the Proceedings, &c. p. 54, 55. The complete History of Europe, for 1706, p. 246. London Gazette, No. 4247.\*

applied to the discharge of the public debts of the kingdom of Scotland, the capital stock of the African and India company, with interest at five *per cent.* and for the improvement of manufactures and trade in that part of the island. It was also provided, that the monies and weights of Scotland should be the same with those of England; the Scotch courts of justice were preserved, together with all hereditary offices, and the rights and privileges of the royal boroughs; the representation of Scotland was fixed at sixteen peers, and forty-five commoners, which though small in proportion to the English peers and commoners, yet was high in comparison of the share borne by Scotland in the taxes; the rights and privileges of the rest of the peers were fully secured; so that, except sitting in the house, they were to enjoy all the privileges of the peerage; and all the laws of either kingdom, inconsistent with the union, were declared null and void. \*

\* The advantages on the side of Scotland were such, as enabled those who supported the union, to say many strong things in its favour; for whereas, when England paid two millions by way of land-tax, Scotland was to pay but forty-eight thousand pounds, yet, in return for bearing a fortieth part of the expense, they had the eleventh part of the legislature given them; and the event has shewn, that the power of their members in a British parliament, is not so inconsiderable as the enemies of that treaty represented it to the parliament. There were, besides, some other strong motives which induced the better sort of the inhabitants of Scotland to wish well to the union. A great part of the gentry of that kingdom, who had been often in England, and observed the protection that all men had from the house of commons, and the security that it procured against partial judges and a violent ministry, entered into the design with great zeal. The opening a free trade, not only with England, but with the plantations, and the protection of the fleet of England, drew in those who understood those matters, and saw there was no other way to make the nation rich and considerable. Those also who had engaged deeply in the design of Darien, and were great losers by it, saw now an honourable way to be re-imbursed; which made them wish well to the union, and promote it.

In the next session of parliament in Scotland, the union was carried, though not without great debates, and some protests. In England it went easier. In the house of commons, there was little or no opposition; there would have been a very warm one in the house of lords, but it was prevented by the wisdom of Sir Simon Harcourt, afterwards Viscount Harcourt, the lord-chancellor, who drew the act so, that it would admit of no debate, but upon the general question, whether it should, or should not pass. \*

It was carried in the house of commons by a majority of two hundred and seventy-four, against one hundred and sixty, and was carried up to the house of lords on the 1st of March, by the late earl of Wilmington, then Spencer Compton, Esq. passed in that house by a majority of fifty-

\* We have this fact from Bishop Burnet, who lays it down in a very clear and satisfactory manner. "When all was agreed to, (says he,) in both houses, a bill was ordered to be brought in, to enact it, which was prepared by Harcourt; with so particular a contrivance, that it cut off all debates. The preamble was a recital of the articles, as they were passed in Scotland, together with the acts made in both parliaments, for the security of their several churches; and, in conclusion, there came one enacting clause, ratifying all. This put those upon great difficulties, who had resolved to object to several articles, and to insist on demanding some alterations in them; for they could not come to any debate about them; they could not object to the recital, it being but bare matter of fact; and they had not strength enough to oppose the general enacting clause, nor was it easy to come at particulars, and to offer provisos relating to them. The matter was carried on with such zeal, that it passed through the house of commons, before those, who intended to oppose it, had recovered themselves out of the surprize under which the form it was drawn in had put them. It did not stick long in the house of lords, for all the articles had been copiously debated there for several days before the bill was sent up to them; and thus this great design, so long wished and laboured for in vain, was begun, and happily ended, within the compass of nine months. The union was to commence on the 1st of May, and till that time the two kingdoms were still distinct, and their two parliaments continued still to sit."

five, to twenty-nine, and on the 6th of March the queen came, and gave her royal assent; upon which occasion her majesty delivered herself thus : “ I consider this union as  
“ a matter of the greatest importance, to the wealth,  
“ strength, and safety of the whole island; and at the  
“ same time as a work of so much difficulty and nicety in  
“ its own nature, that, till now, all attempts which have  
“ been made towards it, in the course of above one hundred years, have proved ineffectual; and therefore, I  
“ make no doubt, but it will be remembered and spoke of  
“ hereafter, to the honour of those who have been instrumental in bringing it to such a happy conclusion. I  
“ desire, and expect from all my subjects, of both nations,  
“ that from henceforth they act with all possible respect  
“ and kindness to one another, that so it may appear to  
“ all the world, they have hearts disposed to become one  
“ people; this will be a great pleasure to me, and will  
“ make us all quickly sensible of the good effects of this  
“ union. And I cannot but look upon it as a particular  
“ happiness, that in my reign, so full a provision is made  
“ for the peace and quiet of my people, and for the security of our religion, by so firm an establishment of the  
“ Protestant succession throughout Great Britain. Gentlemen of the house of commons; I take this occasion,  
“ to remind you of making effectual provision for the  
“ payment of the equivalent to Scotland, within the time  
“ appointed by this act, and I am persuaded you will  
“ shew as much readiness in this particular, as you have  
“ done in all parts of this great work.”

It is certain, that the passing the union was a mortal blow to the French; and it is no less certain, that the French did not exert themselves, as they might have done, to prevent it. Yet I am far from thinking with Bishop Burnet,\* though I esteem his account of the union very

\* History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 462.

much, that this proceeded from an absolute inability, and that they did not, according to their common practice, try the influence of their gold, because they had it not ; I say, I do not think this, because I apprehend I shall be able to shew the contrary. The true reason, then, in my judgment, why the French were so cool in this affair, was this ; they thought that, though the union would destroy their interest in Scotland entirely, if it could be established, yet, that the suffering that law to pass, was the likeliest for them to defeat it : for they depended upon a back game ; and, looking upon it as a thing certain, that this would throw Scotland into the utmost confusion, they projected an invasion, not with any sincere intention of fixing the son of King James upon the throne of Scotland, but of making use of him to excite a civil war in that kingdom ; which, they apprehended, would at least force England to consent to the dissolution of the union, in order to make the people of Scotland easy.

If this had not been their scheme, why did they afterwards attempt the invasion ? If want of money had been the only reason for their not exerting their influence, how came they by the mighty sums of ready money, which that fruitless and foolish invasion cost them ? I have now done with this affair of the union, and shall only add my opinion of it freely, which is, that both nations have been great gainers by it, and that neither has the least cause to complain of it. If, on the one hand, the inhabitants of North Britain have not profited as much by it as they expected, it is their own fault ; for, without industry and application to TRADE, it is impossible any nation should be great gainers by it ; and, on the other, if the English repine at seeing so many of that nation in civil, military, and naval employments, they are blind to their own interests ; for it is plain, that by acting in this manner, these men waste all their days in the service of England ; whereas, if they applied themselves to commerce and ma-



nufactures, they might live happily in their own, and enjoy there the greatest freedom and independence.

The war had now continued long enough to make both sides very weary of it, and yet the French were not sufficiently humbled, to think of peace on the terms prescribed to them. On the contrary, they found means in this campaign, to bring more troops into the field, than since the war began; which obliged the allies to make as formidable augmentations to oppose them. In short, as the maritime powers bore the largest share in the expense, and reaped the least immediate benefit from the continuance of the war, it was resolved to make the utmost efforts this year to put an end to it. With this view, the duke of Marlborough, and the English ministry, concerted several schemes for distressing the enemy on all sides, particularly in Spain, in Italy, and even in their own country; and this, especially, by the help of the great maritime power we then had in the Mediterranean.\* It would lead us into frequent and unnecessary repetitions, if we should enter here into a copious detail of these projects, and therefore, to avoid such inconveniences, we will speak of each in its turn, and, as nearly as may be, in the order of time in which they were undertaken.

A.D.  
1707.

In respect of the war with Spain, an opinion began about this time to prevail in England, that it was neglected, chiefly because the ministry found it impractica-

\* It is very surprising, that France, after such a series of misfortunes, should be able to make the figure that she did this year. The truth, however, seems to be, that the absolute power of her government, gave her great advantages over the allies. The emperor's consenting to the evacuation of Italy, without so much as consulting either Great Britain or Holland, was the great source of King Philip's success in Spain; and whoever considers attentively the French schemes for carrying on this campaign, will easily discern, that they must have met with the like success every where else, if it had not been for our expedition against Toulon. Quincy, *Histoire Militaire*, tom. v. p. 271. *Memoires de la Tournes*, tom. v. p. 69. *Limiers*, tom. iii. p. 230.

ble to push this, and the war with Flanders, at the same time. The duke of Marlborough knowing how injurious this report was to his reputation, pressed the prosecution of the war in Spain this year with the utmost spirit; the rather, because a great reinforcement of English and Dutch troops had been lately sent thither: and it was very well known, that Sir Cloudesley Shovel would neglect nothing that might contribute to the advancement of the service. The army under the command of the earl of Galway, was very early in the field, and promised great things; but whether his abilities were unequal to such a command, as some have suggested; or, as others alledge, King Charles ruined his own affairs, by marching back with a great body of troops into Catalonia; so it was, that about the middle of the month of April, that nobleman found himself under the dreadful necessity, at least as he imagined, of either starving, or fighting a superiour army. \*

Accordingly, on the 14th of April, his lordship, with about sixteen thousand men, ventured to give battle to the duke of Berwick, who had twenty-four thousand, and of these nearly eight thousand horse and dragoons, that were very fine troops. The English and Dutch were at first victorious, and broke through the enemy twice; but the Portuguese, it is said, behaved very ill, or rather, did not behave at all, which gave the enemy an opportunity of flanking the English and Dutch, of whom about ten thousand were killed or taken prisoners. The earl of Galway retired with the broken remains of his army, which, however, nothing could have saved, but the timely appearance of our fleet. † Sir Cloudesley Shovel knowing the distress

\* This is a matter much too long for us to discuss, and therefore we mention in it terms not leaning to one side or the other.

† See the Complete History of Europe, for 1707. Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 475. Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 390. Boyer's Life of Queen Anne, p. 292. London Gazette, No. 4337.

our army was in, through the want of almost every thing necessary, sent Sir George Byng, with a strong squadron, to the coast of Spain for their relief. Sir George sailed on the 30th of March, and coming off Cape St. Vincent, on the 15th of April, he received there the news of our defeat. \*

He soon after received a message from Lord Galway, acquainting him with the distress he was in, and desiring, that whatever he brought for the use of the army, might be carried to Tortosa, in Catalonia, to which place his lordship designed to retreat; and that, if possible, he would save the sick and wounded men at Denia, Gandia, and Valencia, where it was intended the bridges of boats, baggage, and all things that could be got together, should be put on board. Accordingly, he took care of the sick and wounded men, and sent them to Tortosa, where the Lord Galway proposed to make a stand with the poor remains of the army. This service employed Sir George Byng almost the whole month of April, and then he was in daily expectation of being joined by Sir Cloudesley Shovel, from Lisbon, either on that part of the coast of Spain, or at Barcelona, whither he was designed. † Thus all the great things that were hoped for, from the augmentation of our forces in Spain, were absolutely disappointed; and this, chiefly, through the unaccountable mismanagement of that prince, for whose service all these expensive and hazardous expeditions were undertaken. Let us now turn our eyes to Italy, where we shall find a scene much of the same nature.

The first design that was formed upon Toulon, by the duke of Savoy, is very positively said to have been concerted with the famous earl of Peterborough; but his

\* *Reflections Militaires et Politiques du Marquis de St. Cruz*, tom. xi. p. 163, 164.

† *Burchet's Naval History*, b. v. chap. xxiv. *Complete History of Europe*, for 1707. *London Gazette*, No. 4334.

royal highness, finding that nobleman had no longer any credit at court, he changed the scheme entirely, and concerted by his ministers at London a new one, with the duke of Marlborough.\* This, to say the truth, was the best design laid during the war, if we except the march into Germany, which had this advantage over it, that it was not only laid, but executed by the duke of Marlborough. The taking Toulon, if it could have been effected, would have destroyed for ever the maritime power of France; rendered her utterly incapable of carrying on any commerce with Spanish America, and have distressed her to such a degree at home, as must have produced an immediate peace, even upon worse terms than had been hitherto prescribed to her. All things were soon settled between us and the duke of Savoy; he could not undertake such an expedition without large supplies of money, and these we both promised and paid him: yet, even this would not have engaged him in so dangerous an attempt, if we had not given him the strongest assurances, that our fleet should constantly attend him; which we likewise very punctually fulfilled.†

The first ill omen that appeared, was, the resolution

\* This is a very dark and perplexed affair; and, for any thing I can perceive, most of our historians are at a loss about it. The truth of the matter, to me, seems to be this. The duke of Savoy, and Prince Eugene, first proposed attacking Toulon, to the earl of Peterborough, who thereupon wrote to his court about it. In the mean time, the duke of Marlborough had proposed the same thing to Count Massey abroad, and afterwards concerted the whole scheme with that minister, and Count Briançon at London. The duke of Savoy, however, did not think fit to acquaint the earl of Peterborough, that his project was laid aside; and this it was, if I conjecture right, that created all this confusion.

† Complete History of Europe, for 1707, p. 125. It is from this period we are to date some part of the queen's ministry growing cold in the prosecution of the war, in which they suspected our allies had each their private interests in view, while they all concurred in loading us with expenses.

taken by the emperor, at this juncture, when his forces in Italy should have been employed in promoting our design, to make with them the conquest of the kingdom of Naples. In vain our ministers represented to his imperial majesty the mighty things we had done for him and his family; the great importance of the present undertaking to the common cause, and the certainty of his acquiring Naples without resistance after this expedition was over. In vain were the like applications from the Dutch; and in vain the earl of Manchester's journey, and the queen's letter to dissuade him from that ill-timed attempt, though written in the strongest terms, and all with her own hand. He alledged, that such assurances had been given to his friends in Naples, that something should be immediately done for their service, that it was impossible for him to desist, and therefore, notwithstanding all these applications, Count Daun had orders to march with twelve thousand men, part of the troops that should have been employed in the expedition against Toulon, to invade that kingdom; which he accordingly performed.

The duke of Savoy, notwithstanding this disappointment, continued, at least in all appearance, firm in his resolution, and it was resolved to prosecute this great design, with the assistance of the English fleet. Accordingly, Sir Cloudesley Shovel having joined Sir George Byng, near Alicant, sailed for the coast of Italy, and on the 5th of June, came to an anchor before Final, with a fleet of forty-three men of war, and fifty-seven transports. †

\* Bishop Burnet, vol. ii. p. 476, 478, reflects upon this step taken by the emperor, very severely; and, I think, with great justice. But the emperor went yet further; for he sent such orders to Prince Eugene, to avoid, on all occasions, exposing his troops that were to be employed in the Toulon expedition, as proved one great cause of the miscarriage of the allies when they came before that city.

† London Gazette, No. 4343. Columna Rostrata, p. 284. *Mercurius Historique et Politique*, tom. xliii. p. 22.

Prince Eugene went thither to confer with the admiral: and soon after the fleet sailed for Nice, where, on the 29th of the same month, the admiral had the honour to entertain the duke of Savoy, Prince Eugene, most of the general officers, together with the English and Dutch ministers, on board his own ship, the *Association*. \*

After dinner, they held a council of war, and therein it was resolved to force a passage over the Var, in which hazardous enterprize the English admiral promised to assist. On the last of June, this daring attempt was undertaken, to the great astonishment of the French, who believed their works upon that river to be impregnable; and so indeed they had proved, to any forces in the world, except English seamen. The gallant Sir John, then only captain, Norris, with some British, and one Dutch man-of-war, sailed to the mouth of the river, and embarking six hundred seamen, and marines, in open boats, entered it, and advanced within musket-shot of the enemy's works, making such a terrible fire upon them, that their cavalry, and many of their foot, astonished at an attack they never suspected, began to quit their entrenchments, and could not be prevailed upon by their officers to return. †

Sir Cloudesley Shovel, who followed Sir John Norris to the place of action, no sooner saw this confusion, than he ordered Sir John to land with the seamen and marines, in

\* Sir Cloudesley Shovel, though he was not one of the politest officers we ever had, shewed a great deal of prudence and address, in the magnificent entertainment he made upon this occasion. The duke, when he came on board the *Association*, found a guard of halberdiers, in new liveries, at the great cabin-door. At the upper end of the table was set an armed chair, with a crimson velvet canopy. The table consisted of sixty covers, and every thing was so well managed, that his royal highness could not forbear saying to the admiral at dinner, "If your excellency had paid me a visit at Turin, I could scarcely have treated you so well."

† London Gazette, No. 4352. Complete History of Europe, for 1707, p. 123, 124. *Memoires Historiques et Chronologiques*.

order to flank the enemy. This was performed with so much spirit, and Sir John and his seamen scampered over the works which the French thought inaccessible, so suddenly, that the enemy, struck with a panic, threw down their arms, and fled with the utmost precipitation. The duke of Savoy immediately pursued this advantage, and in a single half hour passed that river, which, in the judgment of the best officers in his army, had, without this assistance, proved the *ne plus ultra* of his expedition.\*

On the 2d of July, his royal highness, and Prince Eugene, with the British envoy, and Sir John Norris, dined again on board the admiral; and, after dinner, they entered into a conference, wherein, upon mature deliberation, his royal highness was pleased to declare, that since the queen of Great Britain had earnestly recommended to him the marching directly to Toulon, without losing time in the siege of any place, of less importance, he was resolved to comply with her majesty's proposal, and hoped for a good conclusion of the affair, through the continuance of her majesty's friendship and assistance, which had encouraged him to undertake it. The army of the allies con-

\* It may not be amiss to cite, on this occasion, the words of the despatch, received from the confederate camp, July 14, N. S. as they are printed in the London Gazette, No. 4352. "The admiral himself followed Sir John Norris to the place of action, and observing the disorder of the enemy, commanded him to put to land, and flank them in their entrenchments. His men advanced in so undaunted a manner, that the enemy, fearing to be surrounded, marched out of their works, and retired with great precipitation. His royal highness having received from the admiral an account, that we were in possession of the enemy's works, ordered his troops to pass the river, which they did with so great eagerness, that above a hundred men were driven down by the violence of the stream, and ten of them drowned; which was all the loss we sustained, in forcing a pass, where we expected the most vigorous opposition." Thus we see this whole affair was effected by English sailors.

sisted of about thirty-five thousand men, all enured to hardships, commanded by officers of the greatest experience, and of the highest reputation, supported by a numerous fleet, commanded by an admiral of known courage and conduct, who, upon all occasions, shewed the utmost zeal for their service, and particularly in this last conference, where the duke of Savoy having observed, that even after Toulon was taken, himself and his army might find it impracticable to retreat; the admiral replied, “ I hope better things from your royal highness’s fortune; but, if there should be any appearance of such an event’s happening, your highness may rely upon me, I will take care to supply a sufficient number of transports to embark all your troops.” The duke thanked him for his generous offer; told him, he depended chiefly on the assistance he expected from him, and that, if he would repair to the island of Hieres, he should not long remain there, before he had advice of the army’s being in the neighbourhood of Toulon, and that then he should expect to see the fleet in the road. \*

It is impossible to describe the confusion into which this march of the duke of Savoy threw the French. Toulon was not in any state of defence; they had no troops in that part of the country; they scarcely knew whence to bring them. They had then in the port a better fleet than they have been masters of since; besides twenty-five frigates, fire-ships, and other vessels of the same size, all of which, they were sensible, were in the utmost danger

\* Thus far all things went well, because all parties were agreed; but from this very moment the business began to be clouded. The duke of Savoy, whatever the reason was, did not make the expedition he might have done; for though he began his march from the Var, on the 3d of July, yet he did not arrive before Toulon till the 15th. But when he found it necessary to make his retreat, he did it with much greater expedition, for though he began it on the 12th of August, he reached the Var by the 19th of the same month.



of being destroyed.\* In this distress, Lewis XIV. shewed less presence of mind than on any other occasion in his whole reign; for he condescended to recal the best officer in France, whom he had disgraced, I mean the Marshal Catinat, in order to consult him; and, after taking his advice, was prevailed upon, by female intrigues, to trust the execution of an affair of such importance to the Marshal de Tesse, who had so notoriously blemished the honour of the French arms, by raising the siege of Gibraltar.†

To say the truth, the zeal of his subjects contributed more to the preservation of the place, than either the

\* I take this from the London Gazette, No. 4357, in which there is the following list of the large men-of-war then in that port:

Guns.		Guns,	
Le Terrible .....	110	L'Eclatant .....	66
Le Foudroyant .....	104	L'Henry .....	66
Le Soleil Royal .....	102	L'Ecueil .....	64
L'Admirable .....	100	Le Thoulouse .....	62
Le Triomphant .....	96	L'Eole .....	62
L'Orgueilleux .....	92	Le Serieux .....	60
Le Triomphant .....	92	Le Content .....	60
Le St. Phillippe.....	90	Le St. Louis.....	60
Le Magnifique .....	90	Le Fendant .....	60
Le Tonnant .....	90	Le Vermandois.....	60
Le Sceptre .....	90	Le Temeraire .....	60
La Couronne .....	86	Le Laurier .....	60
Le Vainqueur .....	86	Le Furieux .....	60
Le Monarque .....	84	La Zelande .....	60
Le Pompeux .....	80	L'Entreprenant .....	58
L'Intrepide.....	80	Le Fleuron .....	56
Le Neptune .....	76	Le Trident .....	56
Le Parfait .....	76	Le Diamant .....	56
Le St. Esprit .....	70	Le Sage .....	54
Le Bizarre .....	70	Le Ruby .....	54
L'Invincible .....	70	Le Mercure.....	52
L'Heureux .....	68	La Poile .....	50
Le Constant .....	68	La Meduse.....	50

† Hist. Militaire de Louis XIV. tom. v. p. 357. Reflexions Militaires et Politiques, du M. St. Cruz. tom. viii. p. 91. Memoires du M. de Feuquieres, tom. ii. p. 124.

monarch's care, or the skill of his generals; for the nobility and gentry of the adjacent provinces, did not content themselves with arming and marching thither their tenants and servants, but even coined their plate, and pawned their jewels, to raise money to pay the workmen employed in the fortifications, which were carried on with such amazing alacrity, that in three weeks time, the town, as well as the port, was in a pretty good state of defence; and they had, besides, in the neighbourhood three entrenched camps, which, however, was all owing to the dilatoriness of the allies.\*

A.D.  
1707.

Sir Cloudesley Shovel, with the fleet under his command, sailed for the Hieres, after having made all the necessary dispositions for securing a safe and constant intercourse between the army, and the dominions of the duke of Savoy, upon which the success of the whole was then thought to depend. It was the 15th of July before the siege of Toulon was formed, and on the 17th Admiral Shovel landed, and assisted at a council of war, in which many demands were made on the fleet for the service of

\* One need not wonder at the surprize the French court was in, when the design of the duke of Savoy was no longer to be doubted; Toulon was then in such a situation, that, if the duke of Savoy had marched expeditiously, it is not easy to conceive how his enterprize could have miscarried. They did not begin to fortify the city, till he passed the Var, and it was the 7th of August, N. S. before M. Tesse arrived there. Four days sooner would have given his royal highness possession of Toulon, without a blow, unless the French had been mad enough to have stood a storm; and in that case, the dispute must have been over in a few hours. As it was, the duke of Savoy found the enemy as strong as himself, they had six thousand men in the town, and twenty-four thousand in the neighbourhood of it. The very moment the allies arrived, the generals differed, his royal highness sent orders to Prince Eugene, to possess himself of Mount St. Ann, which he refused to do, because, as I have observed, the emperor had ordered him not to expose his troops. Foul weather, too, prevented the fleet from landing artillery, and ammunition; in all this time the enemy's forces were increasing, since the allies never had it in their power to invest Toulon.

the army; and the admiral cheerfully promised all that was in his power, which he accordingly performed. One hundred cannon were landed from the fleet for the batteries, with two hundred rounds of powder and shot, and a considerable number of seamen to serve as gunners; and cordage, nails and spikes, with all other things wanting for the camp, for indeed they were but poorly furnished, were supplied from the ships; so that affairs had a very good face till the 4th of August, when early in the morning the enemy, making a vigorous sally, forced most, if not all the confederate troops out of their works, and took possession to the right, where they continued all day, and upon their going off destroyed them, drawing away eight or ten guns into the town; in which action there were killed and wounded on the side of the duke of Savoy above eight hundred men, among whom were the prince of Saxe Gotha and some officers of distinction.\*

This attempt being made with such superiority of numbers, it put the troops under great apprehensions, and the generals were of opinion, it would not be proper to carry on the siege; since, while the duke of Savoy's army decreased, the enemy continually gathered strength, insomuch that, on the 6th of August, his royal highness desired the admiral would immediately embark the sick and wounded, and withdraw the cannon, in order to his raising the siege, which from this time was turned only to a cannonading and bombardment. His royal highness also informed him, that he proposed to decamp the 10th in the morning, and desired that the fleet might accompany the army as far as the Var; which being done, it was proposed to carry the duke, Prince Eugene, and the troops which could be spared for service in that country, on board the fleet to Spain; but since there was not any thing determined in this affair, the admiral soon after

\* *Histoire Militaire de Louis XIV.* tom. v. p. 366. *Memoires de la Torres*, tom. v. p. 67. *Memoires Historiques et Chronologiques*.

shaped his course down the Straits, as we shall see hereafter. \*

The very day the army began to march, the fleet drew as near the place as possible, and five bomb-vessels, supported by the lightest frigates, and all the boats of the men-of-war, under the command of Rear-admiral Dilkes, advanced into the creek of Fort St. Lewis; and, notwithstanding a prodigious fire from the place, bombarded the town and harbour, from noon till five the next morning, and this with all the success that could be expected. By this means the land-army had time to quit their camp at La Villette, which they did in five columns in great safety, the enemy having something else to do than to pursue them: and as to any attempts afterwards, his royal highness put them pretty much out of their power, by marching, in two days, as far as in his approach to the place he had marched in six. This disastrous end had the famous siege of Toulon, from whence the confederates hoped, and the French feared so much. †

\* Many reasons were assigned for the raising this siege; I shall mention only a few. It was said, that Sir Cloudesley Shovel disgusted the duke of Savoy, by detaining the payment of his subsidies, which were due on his passing the Var. I apprehend, however, this fact could not be true, since the admiral sailed the next day; and therefore, he must either have paid the money, or his royal highness would not have stirred a foot further. Bishop Burnet says, that the duke was afraid of getting to Toulon before the fleet, and in that case, he would have wanted provisions; all our Gazettes contradict this, and say, that if he had arrived there sooner, he must have taken the place, and all the French magazines. I think there are three substantial reasons which cannot be disputed, and which sufficiently account for the failure of this design. First, the want of twelve thousand imperialists, which, as I have said, were sent to Naples. Secondly, the disagreement between his royal highness, and Prince Eugene. Thirdly, the treacherous correspondence held by the countess of Soissons, sister-in-law to the prince, and the duke's near relation, of which we have an account in the London Gazette, No. 4368.

† In all the party disputes from this time, the miscarriage of this siege was continually mentioned as a proof of the insincerity of our allies.

To speak impartially, one may safely set the faults of both generals against each other. If the duke of Savoy had arrived a week sooner, he had carried his point; and if, on the other hand, Marshal Tesse had understood, as well as Marshal Catinat, his business, his royal highness had returned without an army. \* After all, this business, though it miscarried in the main, proved of great service to the allies, and had many happy consequences, which, perhaps, ought to balance its expense, for besides the great damage the French sustained in their shipping; the burning and destroying of eight of their capital ships; the blowing up several magazines; the burning of above one hundred and sixty houses in Toulon, and the devastations committed in Provence by both armies, to the value of thirty millions of French livres; this enterprize, which struck a greater terror throughout all France, than had been known there during the whole reign of Lewis XIV. brought these further advantages to the common cause; that it caused a great diversion of the enemies' forces, whereby their army in Germany was weakened, the duke of Orleans's progress, after the battle of Almanza, retarded in Spain; the succouring of Naples prevented; and the conquests of the allies in Italy secured. †

I must observe further, that as no prince in the world knew better than the duke of Savoy how to repair faults, and recover past miscarriages; so he gave on this occasion a noble proof of his high spirit, and great presence of

\* This is the opinion of all the French writers, and seems to be founded in truth; for it is certain, that except the loss his royal highness sustained by so quick a march, and the desertion that attended it, he was very little incommoded by the pursuit of the enemy: and yet the siege and the retreat are said to have cost him thirteen thousand men. *Histoire Militaire*, par M. Quincy, tom. v. p. 369. *Memoires de la Torres*, tom. v. p. 67. *Histoire de Louis XIV.* tom. v. p. 441.

† These were certain advantages, but such advantages as were in no degree due to the skill, courage, or diligence of our allies.

mind, by investing the important fortress of Suza, which surrendered at discretion, on the 24th of September, and thereby gave him an open passage into Dauphiné, at the same time that it enabled him to shut the French effectually out of his dominions.

A.D. 1707. Our admiral, not a little chagrined at the miscarriage of an expedition upon which he had set his heart, after having assigned Sir Thomas Dilkes a squadron of thirteen sail, for the Mediterranean service, sailed with the rest of the fleet from Gibraltar. † On the 23d of October, he had ninety fathom water in the Soundings, in the afternoon he brought the fleet to and lay by. At six in the evening he made sail again, and stood away under his courses, whence it is presumed, he believed he saw the light of Scilly; soon after which he made signals of danger, as several other ships did. ‡ Sir George Byng, who was then within less than half a mile to the windward of him, saw the breaches of the sea, and soon after the rocks, called the Bishop and his Clerks, upon which the admiral struck; though, according to some, Sir Cloudesley struck upon the Gilston rock, and not upon the Bishop and his Clerks, and in two minutes there was nothing more of him, or his ship seen.

Besides the Association, the Eagle, Captain Robert Hancock, of seventy guns, and the Romney, Captain William Coney, of fifty guns, perished: the Firebrand fire-ship was lost likewise; but Captain Piercy, who commanded her, and most of the company were saved: the Phoenix fire-ship, commanded by Captain Sansom, ran ashore, but was happily got off again. § The Royal Anne,

\* The Complete History of Europe, for 1707, p. 313. London Gazette, No. 4376. Annals of Queen Anne.

† Burchet's Naval History, p. 734.

‡ Oldmixon's History of the Stuarts, vol. ii. p. 394. Complete History of Europe, for 1707, p. 343.

§ Burnet's History of his own Time, vol. ii. p. 485. Columna Rostrata, p. 285. London Gazette, No. 4580.

in which Sir George Byng bore his flag, was saved by the presence of mind of the officers and men, who in a minute's time set her top-sails, when she was within a ship's length of the rocks. Lord Dursley, in the *St. George*, ran as great hazard, and was saved by mere accident; he struck on the same rocks with Sir Cloudesley, and that wave which beat out the admiral's lights, set his ship afloat. The day after this unhappy accident, some country fellows took up Sir Cloudesley Shovel's body, stripped him, and buried him in the sand; but the boats crew of the *Salisbury*, and the *Antelope*, having discovered it, dug him up again, put his corpse on board the *Salisbury*, by whom it was brought home to Plymouth, on the 28th of October, thence conveyed to London, and buried with great solemnity in Westminster Abbey, where a magnificent tomb was soon after erected to his memory. \*

' Rear-admiral Dilkes, with the squadron appointed for the Mediterranean service, sailed from Gibraltar on the 5th of October, in order to have escorted a convoy of troops, and provisions from Italy to Catalonia. But when he was some leagues westward of Barcelona, he received several expresses, desiring that he would enter that port, his Catholic majesty having some matters of great consequence to communicate to him. The admiral accordingly repaired thither, and found that the principal point in view with his Catholic majesty was, the reduction of the island of Sardinia, and the defence of the Catalonian coasts. The proposition made by his majesty, not being consistent with the orders Sir Thomas Dilkes had already received, he found himself under a necessity of waving, in the best manner he could, a compliance with what his

\* We shall have occasion to speak hereafter, more at large of this unfortunate event, when we come to the memoirs of this admiral. There were nearly nine hundred persons on board the *Association* when she was lost, and not a soul escaped. The chaplain happened to go on board another ship that morning, in order to administer the sacrament to some dying people, and by this means his life was saved.

Catholic majesty desired; and since the care of the embarkation in Italy, was particularly recommended to him, by his instructions, he sailed from Barcelona on the 2d of November; but meeting with hard gales of wind, his squadron was separated, and could not join again before the 14th, when, being off Cape Corsica, he received a letter from the king of Spain, which contained an account of the loss of Lerida, and of the great danger of Tortosa and Terragona. \*

He arrived at Leghorn the 19th of November, but met in the road with so terrible a storm, that almost every ship in his squadron suffered by it. At his arrival he demanded a salute of seventeen guns, which was refused him: upon this, he wrote to her majesty's minister at the court of the grand duke, who complained of the disrespect. The secretary of state sent him soon after an answer, importing, that the castle of Leghorn never saluted any flag under the degree of a vice-admiral first; and therefore Sir Thomas Dilkes, being a rear-admiral only, had no right to expect it; and as to the number of guns, Sir Cloudesley Shovel was content with eleven, and returned the same number. † On the 1st of December, this dispute being adjusted, he was invited on shore, and died a few days afterwards of a fever, caused, as most people imagined, by an Italian dinner.

\* *Mercuré Historique et Politique pour l'Année, 1708, vol. i. p. 120.*

† The court of Tuscany was all along manifestly partial to the French, and this demand of Sir Thomas Dilkes was founded upon some extraordinary civilities that had been paid to French flags. The seamen always looked upon the admiral as a martyr for the honour of his country, and I wonder that nobody has touched on this matter. See Burchet's *Naval History*, p. 736.